Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-006
Tuesday
9 January 1990

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-006 *9 January 1990*

CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

CSSR Spokesman Calls for Soviet Withdrawal *[Prague Radio]* 1
Col Gen Krivosheyev Reviews Armed Forces Cuts *[TASS]* 1
Troop Reduction Talks in Vienna Analyzed *[Chernyshev on TASS]* 1
NATO Seen Stalling at CFE Talks *[KRASHNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Jan]* 2

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

Ryzhkov Departs for CEMA 45th Session in Sofia *[Moscow International]* 4
Delegation Members Listed *[PRAVDA 9 Jan]* 4
Arrives 8 Jan *[TASS]* 4
Other CEMA Delegations Arrive *[TASS]* 4
Ryzhkov Meets BCP Politburo Members *[Sofia BTA]* 4
Meets Mladenov *[Sofia BTA]* 5
TASS Reports on Talks 5
CEMA Session Opens in Sofia 9 Jan *[Sofia BTA]* 6
Ryzhkov Addresses Session *[TASS]* 6
Atanasov Speaks at Opening *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Development on Agenda *[TASS]* 7
Soviet Economist Endorses CEMA Reform *[Budapest Radio]* 7
CSSR Remark on CEMA 'Disbandment' Qualified *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 6 Jan]* 7
CSSR's Proposal Detailed *[Moscow Radio]* 8
CEMA Chairman Remarks on Future Prospects *[PRAVDA 4 Jan]* 8

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Gerasimov Holds 8 Jan News Briefing in Moscow 11
Medvedev to Lithuania *[TASS]* 11
New Bulgarian Ethnic Policy *[TASS]* 11
Ryzhkov to CEMA Meeting *[TASS]* 11
Further on CEMA Meeting *[Moscow Radio]* 11
Calls for Helsinki-2 Welcomed *[TASS]* 12
Gorbachev To Meet Japan's Abe *[TASS]* 12
Rogachev to PRC *[TASS]* 12
Rogachev To Discuss Cambodia *[Tokyo KYODO]* 13
Zholkver on Dangers to 'Common European Home' *[Moscow Radio]* 13

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Analyst on U.S. 'Interference' in Central America *[Petrov on TASS]* 14
Burlatskiy Rejects U.S. Congress Statement *[IZVESTIYA 7 Jan]* 14
Admiral Crowe Suggests Talks on Naval Arms Cuts *[TASS]* 15
Crowe's Proposals Analyzed *[Bogachev on TASS]* 15
Baker, Shevardnadze To Discuss Arms Treaty *[Moscow International]* 16
'Imperial' Thinking Behind U.S. Panama Act *[PRAVDA 8 Jan]* 16
U.S. Political, Economic Scene Viewed *[PRAVDA 4 Jan]* 17
Riga Official Interviewed on U.S. Trip *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 3 Jan]* 18

China

Rogachev Arrives in PRC on 3-Day Visit *[TASS]* 21
Beijing Martial Law To Be Lifted *[Tokyo TV]* 21

Spokesman Cites Topics for Talks *[AFP]* 21

Northeast Asia

Japan's Prime Minister Leaves on Europe Tour *[Potapov on Moscow International]* 22
Japanese Political Figures Support Perestroyka *[TASS]* 22
JSP Demands Revised Stance on Soviet Threat *[Moscow International]* 22
Journalist Delegation's Visit to DPRK Described *[IZVESTIYA 6 Jan]* 23

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Plan for Cambodia *[IZVESTIYA 6 Jan]* 26
Progress of Initiatives on Cambodia Reviewed *[TASS]* 27
Benefits to Cambodia Through Cooperation Noted *[Moscow International]* 27
Leadership Bodies Send Greetings to Cambodia *[PRAVDA 7 Jan]* 28
SRV Writer Deplores 'Gloomy' Depictions of Socialism *[PRAVDA 3 Jan]* 29

Near East & South Asia

Military Successes Boost Kabul's Prestige *[PRAVDA 5 Jan]* 29
Activities of Iranian Foreign Ministry Delegation 30
Bessmertnykh Meets Va'ezi *[TASS]* 30
Tehran Radio Report 30
Iranian Tourism Delegation Visits Baku *[Tehran IRNA]* 30
Iranian Deputies Attend Friday Prayers in Moscow *[Tehran International]* 30
Official Views Arab-USSR, Arab-U.S. Relations *[Polyakov in Kuwait AL-WATAN 7 Jan]* 31
Increased Jewish Immigration to Israel Examined *[Moscow International]* 33
Sudanese Efforts To Solve Economic Crisis Noted *[Mikhaylov on Moscow International]* 34
Bahrain, USSR Exchange Telegrams *[IZVESTIYA 23 Dec]* 35

East Europe

Bulgarian Newsman's Impressions of Albania Cited *[PRAVDA 7 Jan]* 35
Bulgarian Consulate General Opens in Minsk *[Moscow Radio]* 35
Minister Bessmertnykh Receives Bulgarian Envoy *[IZVESTIYA 4 Jan]* 36
Bulgarian Public Council Discusses Minorities *[TASS]* 36
Radio Assesses Bulgaria's Ethnic Unrest *[Moscow Radio]* 36
Bulgarian Demonstrations, Developments Reported *[IZVESTIYA 4 Jan]* 37
CSSR's Havel To Visit USSR Early February *[TASS]* 37
Katushev, CSSR's Calfa Discuss Cooperation *[Moscow Radio]* 37
CSSR Political Developments Detailed *[PRAVDA 5 Jan]* 38
Economic Reforms Planned *[IZVESTIYA 7 Jan]* 38
PRAVDA Cites Adamec CPCZ Plenum Remarks *[8 Jan]* 39
CSSR Row Over 'Apology' to Germans Reported *[PRAVDA 6 Jan]* 39
GDR, FRG Leaders Berlin Meeting Described *[LITERNATURNAYA GAZETA No 52]* 40
Conflicting Reports on Soviet Role in GDR Noted *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 7 Jan]* 41
Abuses by Former SED Leaders Brought to Light *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Jan]* 41
SED-PSD Leadership Makes Changes, Cutbacks *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Jan]* 42
Aboimov, Hungary's Gyorke Discuss Relations *[Budapest MTI]* 42
'Considerable Increase' in Hungarian Food Prices *[PRAVDA 5 Jan]* 42
Polish Economic Program Gets Stormy Sejm Reception *[IZVESTIYA 4 Jan]* 43
PZPR Head Says Socialism Fails Test of History *[PRAVDA 6 Jan]* 43
Romanian Moves on Parties, Organizations Reported *[PRAVDA 5 Jan]* 43
Romanian Army's Current Role Examined *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Jan]* 44
Ceausescu Ouster Marks End of Stalinist Methods *[IZVESTIYA 6 Jan]* 45
PRAVDA Views SFRY Reform Process Problems *[6 Jan]* 45
E. European Communist Congresses Evaluate Crisis *[PRAVDA 4 Jan]* 46
East European Political Changes Examined 47
PRAVDA Observer's Viewpoint *[Agayants, Krushinskiy on Moscow Radio]* 47
Grammatikov Commentary *[Moscow International]* 49
PRAVDA's Korionov Reflects *[5 Jan]* 50

West Europe

USSR Interior Minister Arrives in Austria *[TASS]* 52
Austrians Arrive for Mir Space Training *[TASS]* 52
EC Parliament Chairman Urges E. Bloc Contacts *[IZVESTIYA 5 Jan]* 52
FRG Parties Seen as Interfering in GDR *[PRAVDA 6 Jan]* 53
W. Berlin Donor Sends Medical Aid to USSR *[PRAVDA 5 Jan]* 54
Mitterrand Answers IZVESTIYA Questions *[7 Jan]* 54
French Intelligence Reorganization Reported *[IZVESTIYA 4 Jan]* 55
Deputy Minister Vorontsov Receives Italian Envoy *[TASS]* 55
CPSU Delegation Leaves for Spain 8 Jan *[TASS]* 55

Latin America & Caribbean

'Clumsy' U.S. Argument on Panama Acts Refuted *[Levchenko on Moscow International]* 55
Panama Seen as 'Monroe Doctrine' Manifestation
[Gerasimov in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 26 Dec] 56
Nuns' Murder in Nicaragua Viewed *[Moscow Radio]* 57
Diplomatic Ties Established With Antigua, Barbuda *[TASS]* 57
PRAVDA Notes Cuba's Food, Housing Problems *[31 Dec]* 57

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Congress of People's Deputies

Treatment of Servicemen in Baltics Deplored *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Dec]* 59
Stance of Baltic, Georgian Deputies Criticized *[PRAVDA 3 Jan]* 61
23 Dec Debate on Yakovlev Report on 1939 Pact *[IZVESTIYA 25 Dec]* 61
Findings of Congress Panel on Tbilisi Events *[IZVESTIYA 30 Dec]* 71

Political & Social

Shevardnadze Denies Gorbachev Meetings Cancelled *[KYODO]* 76
Gorbachev to Arrive Lithuania 11 Jan *[Vilnius International]* 76
Sajudis Organizes Rally for Gorbachev Visit *[Vilnius International]* 77
Medvedev Leads CPSU Delegation to Lithuania 77
Meets Vilnius Workers *[Moscow TV]* 77
Further Details *[PRAVDA 9 Jan]* 78
Maslyukov Visits Power Station *[Moscow Radio]* 79
Pro-CPSU Lithuanian Hits Sajudis' Tactics *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 5 Jan]* 79
Pro-Independence Lithuanian CP Member Interviewed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 5 Jan]* 81
'Split' in Lithuanian Communist Party Viewed *[Gurov on Moscow International]* 83
Lithuanian Party Elections Discussed *[SOVETSKAYA LITVA 29 Nov]* 83
Rayon Chief Dropped Due to Pro-CPSU Faction Links *[Klaipeda Maritime Press Service]* 85
Greater Economic Autonomy for Latvian Press *[IZVESTIYA 7 Jan]* 85
Estonian Komsomol Resolution on Transition *[MOLODEZH ESTONII 28 Nov]* 85
Estonian Poll on Supreme Soviet Sessions *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 14 Dec]* 86
Estonian Price Hikes to Support Social Fund *[Moscow Radio]* 87
Estonian Government Adopts Decisions on Banking *[Tallinn Radio]* 87
Baltic Self-Determination Poll in Moscow *[ATMODA 4 Dec]* 88
Belorussian Party's Sokolov on Perestroyka *[PRAVDA 2 Jan]* 92
New Belorussian Weekly Published *[Moscow Radio]* 96
Ukraine Patriarch on Catholic 'Extremist Actions' *[Kiev International]* 96
Moldavians Demand Parts of Romania *[Belgrade TANJUG]* 97
Renewed Tension in Georgia Reported; 1 Killed *[AFP]* 97
Armenian Supreme Soviet Resumes Session *[Yerevan Radio]* 97
Azerbaijan Party Aktiv Meets 8 Jan 98
Girenko Address *[Moscow Radio]* 98
'Contemporary Questions' Examined *[Baku Radio]* 98
Aktiv on Border Situation *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 9 Jan]* 99
Nishanov, Nikiforov on Azeri Border Situation *[Moscow TV]* 100
KGB Briefing on Azerbaijan Border Situation *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 1]* 102

Girenko, Nishanov Visit Baku Refinery *[Baku Radio]* 102
Azerbaijanis' Meet With Iranian Relatives *[Baku Radio]* 102
Azerbaijan's Mutalibov Ends Visit to Istanbul *[Baku Radio]* 103
Violent Incidents, Sabotage Reported in NKAO *[TASS]* 103
Kazakhstan's New Soviets Hold First Sessions *[Moscow Radio]* 103
Uzbek Minister for Tashkent Construction Appointed *[PRAVDA VOSTOKA 10 Dec]* 104
Ligachev Signs Agriculture Leader's Obituary *[IZVESTIYA 5 Jan]* 104
Dissident P.M. Yegides Interviewed *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 1]* 104
Maslyukov Discusses Government Program *[Moscow TV]* 106
Rumors of TV Program's Demise 'Exaggerated' *[IZVESTIYA 6 Jan]* 110
Soviet Germans Hold Protests in 20 Towns *[Hamburg DPA]* 110
Sverdlovsk Food Supply Appeal Reported *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 7 Jan]* 111
New TV Program To Air 8 Jan, Maslyukov To Speak *[Moscow TV]* 111
IZVESTIYA Readers Assail Perestroyka *[6 Jan]* 111
Data Released on Moscow 1989 Industrial Output *[Moscow Radio]* 113
All-Union Association To Combat Natural Disasters *[Moscow Radio]* 113
Election Campaign Problems Discussed *[PRAVDA 4 Jan]* 113
More on Dismissal of Chernovtsy Obkom Secretary *[PRAVDA 6 Jan]* 114
Human Rights Body Protests Journalist's Conviction
[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 3 Jan] 114
RSFSR Independent Trade Union Council Formed *[TASS]* 115
Fergana Oblast Ethnic Murder Trial Ends *[IZVESTIYA 4 Jan]* 115

Economic

Maslyukov Comments on Government Program *[IZVESTIYA 3 Jan]* 115
Academician Views Government's Economic Program *[Moscow International]* 116
Concern Over Grain Imports, Currency Drain *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 13 Dec]* 117
Problems in Railcar Unloading Reported *[Moscow TV]* 119

Scientific

Mir Cosmonauts Conduct Space Walk 8 Jan 119
Crew Checks Equipment *[TASS]* 119
3-Hour Space Walk *[TASS]* 120
Austrian Cosmonauts To Train for Mir Flight *[Smelov on TASS]* 120

Military

Central Asian, Ural Military Districts Abolished *[Moscow TV]* 121
Difficulty Freeing Afghan War POW's Discussed *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 52]* 121
Officer Decries Turkestan 'Nationalist' Attacks *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Jan]* 123
Extra Effort Urged During New Training Year *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Jan]* 123
Poor State of New Floating Dock Criticized *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Jan]* 124
Leaders Sign General Kurochkin's Obituary *[PRAVDA 3 Jan]* 124

CSSR Spokesman Calls for Soviet Withdrawal

LD0901112890 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1100 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] At a press briefing in Prague today, Lubos Dobrovsky, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, declared that Soviet troops should leave Czechoslovakia by the end of 1990. He added that for our part we regard the treaty on the stationing of Soviet troops on our territory as null from the very outset.

Col Gen Krivosheyev Reviews Armed Forces Cuts

LD0801105790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0907 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 8 Jan (TASS)—In 1990 the USSR Armed Forces' numerical strength will be reduced by 185,400 men, Colonel General Grigoriy Krivosheyev, deputy head of the USSR General Staff, said.

Interviewed by TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy, he recalled that, within the framework of the obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union and aimed at unilaterally reducing its Armed Forces, in 1989 their numerical strength was cut by 265,000. Four tank divisions, the directorate for an aviation division, two anti-aircraft missile brigades and a number of assault-landing and training units and sub-units have been withdrawn to Soviet territory from the groups of forces and Mongolia.

Grigoriy Krivosheyev stressed that, on USSR territory, two military districts—the Central Asian and the Urals—have been abolished, and the directorates of two combined-arms armies and four army corps, seven combined-arms divisions (including three tank divisions withdrawn from groups of forces), and three aviation and four helicopter regiments have been disbanded.

The general noted, "Apart from that, organizational measures aimed at reducing the numerical strength of a number of combined units and institutes of the USSR Armed Services and Army branches have been taken."

According to him, the number of tanks in Europe has been reduced by 9,321, artillery systems by 5,052, and combat aircraft by 835. Forty fighting ships, including 12 submarines, have been written off for destruction. In addition, 38,700 items of automotive and special equipment have been handed over to the national economy.

The deputy head of the General Staff said that the withdrawal of units and sub-units from groups of forces will be continued in 1990. Thus, 1 aviation regiment and 1 motorized rifle regiment, 2 separate tank battalions, and other units numbering a total of 6,000 servicemen, over 40 aircraft, 120 tanks, about 180 armored personnel carriers, and more than 400 motor vehicles will be withdrawn from Hungarian territory. The general added that a large portion of the troops to be withdrawn from the groups is subject to disbanding.

"This way the Soviet Union is rigorously and precisely fulfilling its obligations to unilaterally reduce its Armed Forces by 500,000 men by 1991," Col Gen Grigoriy Krivosheyev said in conclusion.

Troop Reduction Talks in Vienna Analyzed

LD0901110290 Moscow TASS in English 1041 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 4 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The polemic about possible scopes of the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe now held in the United States merits serious attention.

As is known, President George Bush suggested negotiated reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces that are stationed, respectively, in Western and Eastern Europe to the level of 275,000 men.

This suggestion apparently lags behind events, as it was made before substantial changes in the political situation in Europe, which clearly require the revision of the entire military strategy.

Therefore it is quite understandable why a number of legislators, among them Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn and member of the committee Carl Levin, raised the question of larger cuts of the U.S. military contingent in Europe.

As a result of the first stage of the Vienna talks this contingent may be decreased by a third, that is to 200,000 men.

This step would help save more funds from the military budget whose large scale is sharply criticized by most legislators in the U.S. Congress. Sixty per cent of the United States' 300-billion dollar budget is now spent on the preparation for a possible war in Europe.

It should be noted that the idea of deeper cuts in the numerical strength of the U.S. and the USSR Armed Forces is quite in keeping with the stand of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty member countries.

In the first half of 1989 the USSR suggested that an arrangement be reached at the Vienna talks to establish in Europe equal ceilings for the numerical strength of the personnel of the land forces and tactical aviation, 1,350,000 men for each side. If this proposal were accepted, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO would reduce its forces in Europe by over one million men each.

This proposal reflects the fundamental essence of the Soviet approach to the problems of ensuring stability and security with the minimal levels of armed forces.

The implementation of this proposal, alongside the proposals for cuts in the basic kinds of offensive arms would enable the sides to have the structure and personnel of

the armed forces suiting the principles of defence sufficiency, and would lead to the confidence that the sides are guided by non-offensive military doctrines.

When the reduction of the Soviet and the U.S. forces in Eastern and Western Europe is discussed, one cannot but note the double standard in the stand of the North Atlantic alliance with regard to the numerical strength of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO armed forces personnel in Europe.

At the Vienna talks the West continues to insist that only Soviet and American forces stationed outside their national territories should be reduced.

Socialist countries are not against this. Simultaneously, they proposed the reduction of British, French, Belgian, Dutch and Canadian forces in West German territory, numbering 160,000 men. This proposal remains unanswered.

During the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, the Soviet Union proposed that United Nations member countries supply to the U.N. secretary general the information about presence of their forces abroad and about foreign military presence in their territories.

The Soviet Union is confident that the supply of such information would be a contribution to asserting high standards of openness in the military area at the United Nations, confidence-building and the widening of objective information about military potentials of the world community.

It also is hoped in the USSR that this step would be in keeping with a constructive discussion of questions of the gradual lowering of foreign military presence so that it should ultimately be ended.

NATO Seen Stalling at CFE Talks

PM0801100790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Colonel V. Nazarenko dispatch: "Vienna: On the Road to Agreement"]

[Text] Vienna-Moscow—It is 10 months since the Vienna talks between the representatives of 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on conventional forces in Europe [CFE] began. Four rounds of plenary sessions and debates in working groups are behind us. What has been done in this period? What prospects are there for working out a treaty on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms on the continent?

First, let me briefly describe what has been achieved. The opening round consisted of stating, analyzing, and elucidating in detail both sides' initial positions. The second round consisted of defining the overall shape of an initial agreement. The third round consisted of defining the framework of a future agreement on the basis of accords relating to reductions in those categories of arms which constitute the potential for a surprise attack and the implementation of offensive operations. The fourth round consisted of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries submitting drafts, similar in structure and format, of a treaty on conventional forces in Europe. As a result an opportunity emerged for a clause-by-clause discussion of the drafts. Practical success has thus been obvious. Each round ended by bringing something new to the talks.

What lies ahead? By June 1990, when the official meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevic Gorbachev and George Bush will be held, we must prepare proposals for examining the problems that are still unresolved. We must do this in order to define positions on these problems and arrive at a treaty signing ceremony a few months later. Both sides are setting this goal for themselves. This is attested, in particular, by the following entry in the final communique of the NATO Council's December session: "The progress achieved at the Vienna talks on conventional forces in Europe strengthens our conviction of the possibility of signing a treaty in 1990."

And yet the results of the forum of the 23 could have been weightier. After all, a number of major differences in the ways the various sides approach key issues still have not been overcome. Thus the problem of aircraft reductions continues to be a stumbling block. The West is proposing limiting the level of warplanes to 5,700 for each alliance. The Warsaw Pact countries are insisting on cutting front-line (tactical) aviation to a limit of 4,700 aircraft. And they advocate that a definite ceiling be set for fighter-interceptors—provided, of course, that there is no increase in the airborne attack systems which air-defense aircraft are tasked with combating. There has not yet been any official response to these proposals, which were presented back in September.

What route should be taken to solve our task with regard to aircraft? I put that question to Ambassador R. Hartmann, head of the FRG delegation. "I think," he said, "that the only acceptable option is to continue the discussions. When points of contact and divergence are defined, the question should be taken out of the sphere of talks into the politicians' sphere of influence in order to let them decide." In this connection the ambassador made a positive assessment of the Soviet Union's initiative in staging a meeting between the foreign ministers of the countries participating in the talks. But he stressed that the time for such a meeting is not yet ripe.

Of course, it is hard to object to discussions. Talks are discussions. However, they should be meaningful. In order to avoid wasting time, proposals should be put forward in response. But where are they?

The working groups, for instance, still have not worked out definitions for tanks, armored combat vehicles, and helicopters. Yet these are key components in the talks. Without these definitions it is impossible to indicate the level of arms to be cut, the measures to eliminate them, and the verification system.

For almost 5 months the NATO countries delayed the elaboration of these definitions before presenting their formulations at the end of the fourth round. And what happened? NATO continues to exclude light tanks from the category of tanks. On what basis, one wonders? After all, light tanks are still tanks. Why are they classed as armored vehicles in the same sublevel as infantry fighting vehicles? It is not as if specialists are unaware that tanks, even light tanks, and armored vehicles, specifically armored personnel carriers, are not comparable in terms of their qualitative parameters and combat potential. From the military-technical standpoint it is unnatural to link them.

But NATO is looking for loopholes—and not just to keep its 2,000 light tanks (the Warsaw Pact has relatively few)—but to leave the way open to engage in a tank arms race and sidestep any future accords. The point is that in conditions of the intensive development of modern technology it is not difficult to imagine the possibility that a tank with armor based on light alloys could appear. It would have the firepower and all the other features of a main battle tank in a lightweight unit.

Where is the way out of the tank impasse? Here is the opinion of Major General V. Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation: Cuts must apply to all types of tanks, and they should be viewed as a single category. To this end the optimum parameters for tank weights and gun calibers must be agreed in a bid to stop light tanks "spilling over" into the armored vehicles category. This approach seems highly justifiable.

Now to discuss troop cuts. Here, too, there are more questions than answers at the moment. It seems obvious that we need to cut not just arms but personnel too. In the present-day situation this would be an important factor in strengthening stability. However, the United States and a number of other NATO countries are opposed. Why? The West has not provided any meaningful explanation.

Take the situation in terms of reductions in the forces sited in Europe outside their national territories. NATO proposes restrictions solely on Soviet and U.S. troops. The Warsaw Pact countries are not opposed to this, if the British, French, Canadian, Belgian, and Dutch troops located in the FRG are cut at the same time. Why should they have privileged status? Behind all this, in my opinion, we can discern the West's desire to cast a cloak of invisibility over the 160,000 servicemen (10 divisions by NATO norms) located beyond their national borders on FRG territory.

The core of present-day European politics is not just the radical reduction of the huge mass of troops and armaments, but also the creation of a system of political relations guaranteeing security and confidence. That is why new elements—such as extensive exchanges of information on the size, structure, and disposition of troops in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals, all-pervasive verification, and stabilizing measures—have been introduced into the negotiating process. As for exchanges of information and verification, the sides have definite conceptual similarities in their positions. But there are still some substantive differences on a number of points. We are wary of the West's tendency to artificially narrow the approach toward stabilizing measures designed to remove the danger of a surprise attack and increase the openness and predictability of military activity in Europe. This is a whole system of measures limiting the scale of military exercises, the draft of reservists, and the concentration of troops and armaments predetermining the restructuring of the sides' armed forces with a view to making them defensive in nature. Unfortunately, the NATO proposals mention a willingness to extend these measures to just three of the six conventional force categories—tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles.

You get the impression that NATO seems stuck in the position it adopted some time in the middle of last year. There has been no movement from the other side and the dynamism of the talks has clearly decreased. All this prompts concern, if not—to put it more forcefully—alarm. Here is the opinion of Ambassador K.D. Ernst, head of the GDR delegation, on this issue: "Certain circles in NATO are obviously trying to speculate on the fact that wide-ranging transformations are taking place in the Warsaw Pact and therefore, they think, its member countries will unquestioningly support everything NATO proposes." It seems to me that the ambassador has accurately assessed the West's current position, at least in the light of the statements made by NATO on the achievement of the first agreement in 1990.

So is it realistic to expect the work to be completed in the new year? O. Grinevskiy, the leader of the Soviet delegation, answered this question as follows: "We are prepared for this. We are pursuing our negotiating line on the basis of this aim. However, we should state bluntly that great efforts will be needed to implement this task—above all, movement by both sides to meet each other halfway. I think that after Malta the talks process in Vienna will be more dynamic."

The essence of what has been said needs no commentary.

Ryzhkov Departs for CEMA 45th Session in Sofia

LD0801153490 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] The Soviet Prime Minister, Nikolay Ryzhkov, has left for Sofia to attend the 45th session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, opening in the Bulgarian capital on Tuesday.

In an interview before his departure from Moscow, Nikolay Ryzhkov voiced hope that the meeting would lay new foundations for cooperation. I think, he said, we'll be able to adopt cardinal decisions and will meet in a few months again.

The Soviet prime minister expressed the view that the Sofia meeting would be an unusual one. He stessed that dismissing the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance would be disadvantageous for each of its members. On the contrary, he remarked, it's necessary to integrate on a new basis and take into account the reforms taking place in some countries.

Delegation Members Listed

PM0901094790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "For CEMA Session Meeting"]

[Text] A Soviet delegation headed by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, left Moscow for Sofia 8 January to take part in the 45th meeting of the CEMA Session. The delegation comprises N.P. Laverov and S.A. Sitaryan, deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers, K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations, V.S. Pavlov, USSR finance minister, I.P. Aboimov, USSR deputy foreign minister, Yu.P. Khomenko, deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, and V.V. Sharapov, USSR ambassador to Bulgaria.

The delegation was seen off at the airport by A.N. Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, A.P. Biryukova, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and other officials.

On the same day N.I. Ryzhkov and the members of the Soviet delegation arrived at Plovdiv Airport. They were greeted by G. Atanasov, member of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, P. Pachov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of Plovdiv BCP Okrug Committee, and other officials.

Arrives 8 Jan

LD0801173190 Moscow TASS in English 1724 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Sofia January 8 TASS—A Soviet delegation led by Nikolay Ryzhkov arrived in Bulgaria today for the 45th meeting of the session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The plane landed at the Plovdiv Airport due to bad weather conditions in Sofia.

At the airport the delegation was welcomed by Bulgarian Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov, Pantelei Pachov, first secretary of the Plovdiv Regional Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and other officials.

Other CEMA Delegations Arrive

LD0801220490 Moscow TASS in English 2149 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Sofia January 9 TASS—Delegations from Hungary, Vietnam, East Germany, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia arrived in the Bulgarian capital on Monday for the 45th session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

The delegations are led, respectively, by Prime Ministers Miklos Nemeth, Vo Van Kiet (deputy), Hans Modrow, Dumagyin Sodnom, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Petre Roman, Nikolay Ryzhkov and Marian Calfa.

The delegation of Bulgaria, hosting the meeting, is led by Prime Minister Georgy Atanasov.

Cuba's delegation is expected to arrive in a few hours. It will be led by Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.

Ryzhkov Meets BCP Politburo Members

AU0901075690 Sofia BTA in English 2207 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Sofia, January 8 (BTA)—This evening members and alternate members of the Politburo and secretaries of the CC [Central Committee] of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] held a meeting with Mr Nikolay Ryzhkov, Politburo member of the CC of the CPSU and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The sides briefed each other on the state of affairs in the two fraternal countries.

Mr Petur Mladenov discussed in detail the situation in Bulgaria and the tasks which the BCP and the party and the state leadership are solving. He stressed that the country resolutely embarked on the road of restructuring on November 10, 1989 and that political life had become exceedingly dynamized in the very short period of time since then.

Analyzing the situation which has arisen from the many years of supremacy of the command-and-administer system, the secretary general of the CC of the BCP evaluated the complicated processes and the ways which

the BCP along with the entire people is seeking to solve the problems. He noted the novelties in political life: the emergence of new political forces, the beginning of roundtable discussions, the wide-ranging national dialogue seeking solutions and the appearance of a political opposition. He emphasized that the BCP will not give up the road its has taken: a road of building a democratic society committed to the rule of law.

Having briefed his guest on the resolutions of the December 29, 1989 Plenum of the CC of the BCP and more specifically on the restoration of rights to the Turkish-speaking and the Muslim population and on the peculiar political situation which has emerged in the country since then, Mr Petur Mladenov stressed that by surmounting resolutely the difficulties along the road of renewal, the BCP adheres to a policy of wide-ranging dialogue and search for national concord.

Mr Nikolay Ryzhkov conveyed cordial greetings from Mr Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership to the Bulgarian leadership. He said that the Soviet Union follows closely the processes in Bulgaria and is well aware of their roots and nature because similar processes unfold in the USSR and other socialist countries.

The Soviet head of government briefed his hosts on the state of political and economic affairs in the USSR and emphasized that 1989 was a period of serious tests for Soviet society. Still, despite the enormous difficulties the Soviet people emerged from the old year with more experience in democratization which requires much greater political awareness and more strenuous efforts from the party and from society as a whole.

He considered the main political and economic problems which the Soviet Union is solving now: ownership, the new economic mechanism, the annual socioeconomic program and the provision of adequate market supplies. He made a special point of interethnic relations which are exceedingly complicated and which the CPSU tries to address with utmost consideration and tactfulness, taking into account both the interests of the individual nationalities and the interests of all Soviet people.

Mr Ryzhkov stressed that the key political event of the year in the USSR will be the 28th CPSU Congress. He pointed out that Soviet Communists realize that without a reform consistent with the present-day conditions the party will not retain its leading role. New approaches are needed and the CPSU is preparing a new platform which will be submitted for nationwide debate.

The participants in the meeting expressed the shared conviction that there is no alternative to restructuring, that the two fraternal parties pursue a similar strategic policy line of renewal and enrichment of socialism. It is precisely on this basis that the BCP and the CPSU and Bulgaria and the Soviet Union will be seeking the best ways to further their friendly ties and traditional relations.

Meets Mladenov

AU0901080090 Sofia BTA in English 2201 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Sofia, January 8 (BTA)—Mr Petur Mladenov, secretary general of the CC [Central Committee] of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] and president of the State Council of Bulgaria, today received Mr Nikolay Ryzhkov, member of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who arrived here for the session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance which opens tomorrow.

The sides commended highly the promotion of relations between the two fraternal countries and reaffirmed the ascertainment made at last year's meeting between Mr Petur Mladenov and Mr Mikhail Gorbachev that parallel with the progress of restructuring, bilateral relations receive a fresh impetus for extension in all fields: politics, economics, scientific and technical advances and inter-party ties.

Economic cooperation was the centerpiece of the nearly one-hour session. The two leaders discussed some fundamental aspects of economic interaction in which there is room for improvement. They shared the understanding that long-term ways have to be sought now to meet the requirements and the interests of the two countries.

The sides agreed that Bulgaro-Soviet economic cooperation should be reformed on the basis of a socialist market mechanism which will boost the promotion of relations and will open up fresh opportunities for still more profitable interaction.

The shared conviction was expressed that the existence and the activity of the CMEA is useful and that it should be resolutely overhauled. The sides noted the importance of the CMEA session which begins tomorrow at a time of vigorous changes in the socialist countries.

TASS Reports on Talks

LD0801224790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2215 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Sofia, 9 Jan (TASS)—Petur Mladenov, secretary general of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, has received here N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who arrived here in Bulgaria at the head of a Soviet delegation to take part in the 45th meeting of the CEMA session.

In the course of the conversation, a high assessment was made of the development of relations between the two fraternal countries. Great attention was devoted to matters relating to economic cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The sides agreed that it is now necessary to search for new and promising paths for resolving topical problems

of both countries' development. The common view expressed a need for the restructuring of economic cooperation between the USSR and Bulgaria on the basis of a socialist market mechanism. This will give a boost to Soviet-Bulgarian cooperation and will allow new reserves to be put into action.

P. Mladenov and N.I. Ryzhkov stressed the importance of CEMA's activity, pointing out, at the same time, the need for it to be resolutely revitalized. In this connection, they noted the significance of the opening session of the council.

Georgiy Atanasov, chairman of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Council of Ministers, and Andrey Lukanov, secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, both members of the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, took part in the meeting.

CEMA Session Opens in Sofia 9 Jan

AU0901085890 Sofia BTA in English 0825 GMT 9 Jan 90

["45th CMEA Session: Beginning of Economic Destalinization"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—After two postponements during the eight most stormy months in its history, the 45th Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance started here today.

This will be not only the mostly delayed but also the most expected session of the CMEA as the pressure of the European CMEA member states for destalinization cannot be held back anymore. On the eve of the opening the leaders of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary made most radical demands for reforms. For years now the USSR and Bulgaria have been searching for new in principle methods of economic cooperation and after the changes in Romania it is hardly possible that its representatives will remain on its former positions.

Because of these and other reasons the agenda of the session was not announced clearly on the two preliminary press-conferences but there is no doubt that the attention will focus on the basic principles of cooperation.

The delegations of the member-states are headed by: Mr Mikios Nemeth, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Hungary, Mr Vo Van Kiet, first vice chairman of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam, Mr Hans Modrow, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, vice president of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of Cuba, Mr Dumaagiyn Sodnom, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, Mr Tadeusz Mazowiecki, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Poland, Mr Petre Roman, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Romania, Mr Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr Marian Calfa, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Czechoslovakia, Mr Georgi Atanasov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria.

The session is attended also by a delegation of Yugoslavia and by representatives of Angola, Afghanistan, PDR Yemen, Laos, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Nicaragua.

The session was opened by Mr Georgi Atanasov.

Ryzhkov Addresses Session

LD0901070590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0650 GMT 9 Jan 90

[From roundup of international events]

[Text] Sofia (dateline as received)—The 45th CEMA session has started. N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has delivered a speech at it.

Atanasov Speaks at Opening

AU0901121390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] About 3 hours ago in Sofia at the People's Palace of Culture the 45th CEMA session opened. The delegations of the participating countries are led by heads and deputy heads of the governments. A special crew of the Khorizont Program is following the session. Petko Georgiev is among them. He just returned and reports from the studio:

[Begin Petko Georgiev recording] In accordance with an old tradition, the session's meetings are closed. All journalists were allowed into the hall only for the official opening. I recorded the opening speech of Georgi Atanasov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, for our listeners. This is a part of it. [end Georgiev recording]

[Begin Georgi Atanasov recording] The present session coincides with CEMA's 40th anniversary. The anniversaries always have been a reason not only for assessing the past, but also for analyzing the urgent problems and outlining the prospects and tasks of future development. This particularly applies to the present session. It is taking place under conditions of profound processes of renewal in the CEMA member countries. I am deeply convinced that the session will be an important turning point in the work of our economic organization.

The objective analysis of the unfavorable phenomena that are taking place in the system of mutual cooperation shows that they reflect negative processes in socioeconomic development of the CEMA member countries. Therefore we deeply believe that further developing cooperation and economic integration are directly related to the radical reforms that are developing in CEMA member countries.

I would like to express hope that the present session will contribute to turning CEMA into an efficiently acting organization. Allow me to wish fruitful work to all

delegations that are taking part in the 45th CEMA session. I hereby open the 45th CEMA session. [end Atanasov recording]

[Begin Georgiev recording] I think that all of the past 44 CEMA sessions have been opened with the last sentence, which is a matter of protocol. However, today hardly anybody doubts the fact that the 45th CEMA session will be different. For many of the CEMA governmental leaders, the Sofia meeting is the first opportunity of establishing personal contact. Perhaps that is why the observers are exceptionally careful with their preliminary forecasts. However, there is a unanimous conviction, which also was pointed out in the introductory speech of our premier, that without profound and radical reforms, the future of CEMA in unthinkable.

On the eve of the session many commentators pondered over the possibility of the discontinuation of CEMA's activity, or over the possibility that certain CEMA members could leave the organization. They relied on the statement of Vaclav Klaus, the CSSR's minister of finance. Therefore, during the brief moments before the beginning of the session, the CSSR delegation was closely surrounded by journalists with microphones and TV cameras.

The CSSR representative stated that the statement on his country leaving CEMA is greatly exaggerated. Many of the correspondents express the conviction that the present exceptionally difficult stage of economic development, in which all CEMA members find themselves, can be overcome only by creating a new efficient and active mechanism of cooperation based on the real interests of all participants. The statements of the leaders of the delegations, that will take place today will probably follow that direction.

After the end of the meetings we shall have a press conference with the leaders of all delegations, when we shall perhaps learn more about the session. We shall report immediately afterward. [end Georgiev recording]

Development on Agenda

LD0901092890 Moscow TASS in English 0830 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Sofia January 9 TASS—The 45th meeting of the session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) opened in the Bulgarian capital on Tuesday. It is being attended by delegations from Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet delegation is led by Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

During the two-day meeting its participants plan to analyse a wide range of issues connected with the further development of cooperation within the CMEA framework. They will focus their attention on the radical restructuring of the mechanism for multilateral cooperation, legal and organisation problems connected with this restructuring, currency and financial relations and price- setting problems.

They also plan to discuss the implementation of a comprehensive programme for the scientific and technological progress of CMEA countries until 2000, the coordination of national economic plans for the coming period and planned measures for intensifying the social orientation of cooperation.

Georgiy Atanasov, head of the Bulgarian Government, opened the meeting and warmly greeted its participants.

Soviet Economist Endorses CEMA Reform

LD0501194790 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] A noted Soviet economist has told our Moscow correspondent that CEMA must be reformed but that he does not advise drastic changes. Jozsef Barath reports.

[Barath] For us, too, it is quite obvious that the present system of the CEMA is truly unable to function, that we must go over to dollar accounting on the basis of world market prices, and that we must make our economic relations completely free of politics, also with the central European states. This is how Professor (Aleksandr Nikitalov) replied to my question in connection to the Czechoslovak declaration. He is Academician Bogomolov's deputy at the head of the institute studying the economies of the socialist countries.

Moscow cannot object either to those countries which are capable of going over more quickly to the world economy than others, searching for outside contacts. A rapid change, however, is seldom successful, said Nikitalov. He added that we should honestly admit, however much we complain that the decisive majority of Soviet exports are energy carriers and raw materials, that this still has an advantage, for we can sell these on the world market, which is not necessarily true for all products of the Czechoslovak or Hungarian industries. A wise businessman does not slam doors behind him, added the deputy director of the institute studying the socialist world system, which is also, by the way, going to change its name.

CSSR Remark on CEMA 'Disbandment' Qualified

PM0501204590 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 3

[Dispatch by TASS correspondent V. Rzhevskiy: "Changing Course"]

[Text] Prague—The CSSR's gravitation toward Western Europe is becoming increasingly obvious. This was the conclusion reached by participants in a television debate in which representatives of CSSR political groups took part.

The facts show that the country's current leadership intends to steer a course geared precisely to these guidelines. At the CEMA session which is to open in Sofia soon, Czechoslovakia will propose that CEMA be disbanded, according to V. Klaus, Czechoslovak minister of finance, speaking in an interview with the Polish newspaper RZECZPOSPOLITA. He stressed that if the CSSR's proposal is not accepted, it will withdraw from the organization. At the same time, RUDE PRAVO reports, V. Klaus stated at a news conference at the CSSR Government Presidium that he "was not talking about the immediate disbandment of CEMA, but it is obvious that this organization cannot continue to exist in its present form." A report on a recent session of the government indicates that it has drawn up a plan of action for the Czechoslovak delegation at the CEMA session and for the CSSR representative in CEMA.

Every day now brings events which reflect new phenomena in the reinterpretation of the country's entire postwar history. This is borne out by the disputes which have flared up around the renaming of cities, streets, and squares.

A special scientific commission has been set up by presidential decree to study the history of Czechoslovak statehood, and an institute named for the republic's first president, T. Masaryk, is to be established.

The CSSR Government has appealed to Czechoslovak emigres to forget any grievances and injustices committed against them.

Yesterday's news included an item about A. Kapek, former member of the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] Central Committee Presidium and first secretary of the Prague CPCZ City Committee, who has reportedly been found near his dacha with a serious bullet wound in the head. The investigation assumes that this was an attempted suicide.

V. Komarek, first deputy premier of the CSSR Government, has voluntarily resigned from the CPCZ, of which he had been a member since 1946. According to official data, some 60,000 people have resigned from the Communist Party of late.

CSSR's Proposal Detailed

LD0601112790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Report by correspondent Aleksandr Samylin in Czechoslovakia]

[Text] Recent events in the political life of the socialist countries have, for a while, diverted attention from the problems of economic cooperation within the framework of the CEMA. Yet it is precisely thanks to the political transformations that crisis phenomena both in the economic mechanism of individual countries and in the interaction between them are being openly discussed today at the highest level. This will be considered at the sitting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance that will open on 9 January in Sofia. Let's listen to a dispatch from Aleksandr Samylin in Czechoslovakia.

[Samylin] At the 45th session of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance in Sofia, the CSSR will propose that CEMA should be disbanded and that countries should switch over to bilateral economic ties. This was announced by Vaclav Klaus, Czechoslovak minister of finance, in an interview with the Polish government newspaper RZECZPOSPOLITA. He added that Poland agrees with most of his initiatives relating to the matter. The minister of finance noted the need to review many earlier agreements. If its partners refuse to do so, the CSSR will do it unilaterally, Vaclav Klaus warned.

What are Czechoslovakia's arguments? The structure of CEMA does not allow radical economic reforms leading to a market mechanism to be carried out. Nor does it provide an objective assessment in mutual monetary calculations. In this connection, Vaclav Klaus stressed that talks with Polish partners had upheld the possibility of already transferring to bilateral ties, revising the exchange rate of the zloty in direct relation to the koruna and abandoning the conversion of the two currencies via the ruble. I will point out that this tendency emerged under the previous CSSR Government.

In the minister of finance's interview there are several points that may determine the future development of the political, as well as the economic, life of the country. He was critical of the opening of Austria's borders, regarding it as premature. That situation led to a sharp increase in the flow of tourists and created currency problems and difficulties in supplying goods. Vaclav Klaus is also against the idea of decentralization. In his view, it is sufficient to abolish the monopoly of individual enterprises, while preserving necessary state control from the center. Otherwise inflation and instability in production are inevitable. The situation in the Polish economy provides an example of this, said Vaclav Klaus.

CEMA Chairman Remarks on Future Prospects

PM0801132190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[Report on interview with A. Lukanov, member of the Bulgarian Communist Party, BCP, Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the BCP Central Committee, and chairman of the CEMA Executive Committee, by PRAVDA correspondent in Bulgaria L. Zhmyrev under the "Cooperation" rubric: "Does CEMA Have a Future?"; first paragraph is editorial introduction; date of interview not given]

[Text] Sofia—Some 18 months ago, at the 44th CEMA session in Prague, it was decided to hold the next session, the 45th, in Sofia. The dates, however, were changed several times. What has forced the leaders of the allied states to prepare so carefully for a routine meeting?

Andrey Lukanov, member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the BCP Central Committee, and chairman of the CEMA Executive Committee, shared his thoughts on this score during a conversation with PRAVDA's own correspondent in Bulgaria, L. Zhmyrev.

"During the preparations for the 45th CEMA session, the member countries have attached particular importance to the elaboration of collective decisions on such questions of cooperation as the gradual creation of a united market, the improvement of the mechanism for socialist economic integration, the preparation of important drafts within the framework of the Comprehensive Program for CEMA Countries' Scientific and Technical Progress Through the Year 2000, and the coordination of economic plans for 1991-1995," A. Lukanov said. "It is clear that under new conditions the session's work must also be conducted in a new way. However, perestroyka within CEMA, despite a political summit accord, is not proceeding at the pace we would like.

"What are the reasons for this? Obviously, if we had tackled this about 10 years ago, we would have had a document reflecting the sides' 'complete unanimity,' which, however, would have been forgotten later like many others. Our aim now is not verbal unity.

"This is the first time that we have really begun to realize that there are very diverse conditions within the CEMA framework and that different countries are at different levels of economic development. That in itself predetermines differences in practical interests. Economic and political reforms are progressing differently, which also prompts different approaches.

"We are encountering totally new problems. Moreover, from the theoretical viewpoint we have insufficiently elaborated problems to do with market-type integration and we cannot simply adopt models used by other integration groupings: We do not have the same conditions.

"The world is not standing still. Integration processes in the world economy have begun to develop exceptionally rapidly and we cannot fail to take this into account. I see the main task of the coming CEMA session in Sofia as being to speed up this work. But not by means of achieving purely formal unity."

Touching on problems of creating a united market among socialist countries, A. Lukanov noted: "This task cannot be resolved in a year or two. A single market in the true sense of the word is a united market area with developed commodity-money relations where national borders do not create barriers to free movement of goods, services, work force, and other production factors, including financial resources. Several more phases have to be covered. The task of creating a single market must be regarded within the timeframe of 10-15 years. True national markets must exist for it to be created. They do not exist now either in Bulgaria or in the USSR.

"It must be considered that a number of highly complex issues will have to be resolved on the way to a single market. I think that the most complex of these are the problems of a financial-currency mechanism," A. Lukanov stressed. "In order for there to be a market, there must be real money. My personal opinion is that the use of national currencies would be the most feasible approach in accordance with the interests of integration. But not like today, and not under present conditions.

"Now that the new political thinking is making increasingly resolute headway in international affairs, the CEMA countries have a different view of cooperation with Western countries and these countries' economic groupings," my interlocutor continued. "We are all proceeding on the premise that socialist countries' full and wholehearted participation in world economic ties is absolutely necessary both for us and for the rest of the world. But, on the one hand, I would like to stress the following idea: In the present real world small countries cannot count on successful involvement in the world division of labor and world economic ties unless they rely on economic integration. We are all interested in ensuring that CEMA is established and strengthened as a leading economic and technological center in the world economy. Within the framework of this kind of community our voice in world economic affairs will be more audible."

The discussion moved onto problems of CEMA-EEC cooperation.

"I believe that these issues cannot be addressed at the 45th CEMA session," A. Lukanov said. "We are following the processes in Western Europe with great interest and some concern.

"I would like (this is also the opinion of a number of Western representatives) to ensure that integration processes do not aggravate the economic division of Europe but, on the contrary, result in the unification of conditions of economic activity, despite different socioeconomic systems. That is, I would like to ensure that these processes help build a common European home, rather than the reverse.

"That is how we will regard the course of our talks with the EEC. I must be frank and say that we do not yet have grounds for feeling satisfied with the results achieved following the signing of the well-known declaration establishing relations between CEMA and the Common Market. We believe that we can and must make more rapid progress in those areas which are of common interest, for instance, in ecology, transport, standardization, and so on."

Then, touching on gloomy forecasts in some quarters of the press to the effect that CEMA supposedly "will disintegrate spontaneously by the year 2000," my interlocutor pointed out:

"Those people who voice such opinions are forgetting about the truly impressive positive results achieved by

CEMA. Over the years of its existence it has set up an original system for direct production cooperation, specialization, and production sharing, and wide-ranging economic ties have been developed on this basis between CEMA countries. Cooperation within CEMA for these countries—take, for instance, Bulgaria—was for decades a crucial factor in their accelerated economic growth.

"The fact that the model of integration which we have set up does not fully correspond with present-day requirements is another matter. I believe, however, that structural ties and mutual interests formed during the process of socialist integration in the last few decades are so firm and profound that there can be no question of 'eliminating' CEMA.

"Socialism as a system is now undergoing a rigorous test," A. Lukanov said in conclusion. "The turbulent processes in the countries of Eastern Europe attest to this. These also took hold of Bulgaria after 10 November last year. Life inevitably brings us back to basics and to theory. We realized the need to create a new model of socialism. We are getting close to understanding the main characteristics of this model, although of course we can by no means imagine in detail what the new socialism will look like, particularly at later stages. But one thing is clear for us today: Socialism does not differ from capitalism in that one has a market and the other does not. It is incorrect in principle to counterpose socialism to the market. It is well known that toward the end of his life V.I. Lenin elaborated a detailed concept for socialist development in market conditions. This was not a tactical maneuver but a long-term strategy. We are now once again coming back to this Marxist-Leninist formulation of the question; that is, we must develop socialism in market conditions rather than in opposition to the market. Our historical practice has shown that it is, first, utopian and, second, harmful from the practical viewpoint—from the viewpoint of the people's interests—to combat objective reality on the basis of any ideological postulates. We are not making any concessions here to capitalism. We are simply returning to the sources of our teaching and to common sense.

"In this connection I also would like to stress the special role of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, which has smashed many stereotypes, unfettered political and economic thinking, and covered a great political and intellectual ground. It is the Soviet Union that is objectively the natural center, the core of integration processes in our community. On this basis all of us in CEMA not only follow the processes in the USSR with great interests but also wholeheartedly wish Soviet perestroyka success."

Gerasimov Holds 8 Jan News Briefing in Moscow

Medvedev to Lithuania

LD0801134990 Moscow TASS in English 1338 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS—A delegation of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee today left for Vilnius, Lithuania, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a briefing.

The delegation includes Vadim Medvedev, a politburo member and Central Committee secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Ulyanov, member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU, a renowned actor and public figure, Gennadiy Yagodin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Education, Islam Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, and Valentin Kuptsov, first secretary of the Vologda Regional Committee of the CPSU.

Answering the question on the date of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's trip to Lithuania, Gerasimov expressed the supposition that the Soviet leader will leave for Lithuania on Wednesday.

New Bulgarian Ethnic Policy

LD0801153390 Moscow TASS in English 1519 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS—Respecting the right of every people to a free choice, the Soviet Union regards the new Bulgarian leaders' decision to correct the deformations in the ethnic policy as a step towards democratisation, building a rule-of-law state and honoring the relevant agreements within the framework of the all-European process, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing today.

He said the decision of Bulgaria's State Council and Government to set right the aberrations committed by the former leaders vis-a-vis the Turkish-speaking and Moslem Bulgarians will, doubtless, improve Bulgaria's international standing.

Gerasimov said the State Council and the Government have condemned any actions in breach of the right to freely choose a surname, a religion and to use in everyday communication languages other than Bulgarian, which is the official state language.

In the words of the spokesman, a "constructive approach of all the parties concerned to such a complex issue and renunciation of pressure or any violent actions will help an early normalisation of the situation in the country, based on national concord and national unity."

Ryzhkov to CEMA Meeting

LD0801152990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1350 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, 8 Jan (TASS)—Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, is to head the Soviet delegation at the 45th session of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance [CEMA], which opens in Sofia on 9 January, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported at a briefing here today.

In the delegation, he said, are Stepan Sitaryan, chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the USSR's permanent representative to the CEMA; Nikolay Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology; Valentin Pavlov, USSR minister of finances; Konstantin Katushev, USSR minister for foreign economic relations; and Ivan Aboimov, deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs.

The meeting will examine matters connected to renewing the mechanism of multilateral cooperation and economic integration of the CEMA member countries and the activities of the council.

After expressing the Soviet side's conviction that the choice of strategic directions for restructuring the mechanism for multilateral cooperation between the CEMA member countries, as recorded in the decisions of the 43d and 44th sittings of the session of the council, is correct, the representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted the need to speed up this process.

Further on CEMA Meeting

LD0801212990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] A briefing on current issues of international policy for Soviet and foreign journalists took place in the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs today. Comrade Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in particular: The 45th session of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance opens in Sofia on 9 January. The head of the Soviet delegation is the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov.

On the agenda of the session is the report of the Executive Committee on the activity of the council between sessions; further scientific and technical progress of the member countries of the council until the year 2000, in particular concerning the pace of cooperation in implementation of comprehensive program of scientific and technical progress until the year 2000; the pace of implementation of the tasks of the 3d priority aspect of the comprehensive program—namely, an accelerated development of atomic power engineering; and further about the progress of implementation of the tasks of the

5th priority aspect of the comprehensive program, accelerated development of biotechnology. In addition, the speed of work on the coordination of the national economy plans of the member countries of CEMA for the years 1991-1995 will be considered, as well as possible suggestions on further work in this area.

The present session is already the 3d perestroyka meeting—if one can describe it like that—at the level of heads of government. Issues connected with the renovation of the mechanism of multilateral cooperation will be examined at the meeting. We consider to be correct the choice of strategic means of reconstructing the mechanism of multilateral cooperation of the member countries of CEMA, which were registered in the decisions of the 43d and 44th CEMA sessions. The implementation of these decisions, however, is unsatisfactory. At present, it is necessary first and foremost to accelerate the reconstruction of the mechanism of multilateral cooperation for the successful solution of the tasks facing the member countries of CEMA.

Calls for Helsinki-2 Welcomed

LD0801144890 Moscow TASS in English 1438 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS—It was noted with satisfaction in Moscow that West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez favoured the proposal that an all-European conference, Helsinki-2, be held this year, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists here today.

Gerasimov commented on Genscher's West German radio speech on Sunday. Genscher said that the planned conference was a remarkable opportunity for headway in the consolidation of security, disarmament and the development of cooperation in Europe.

The idea of an all-European summit meeting, put forward by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Rome, is enlisting growing support, the Soviet spokesman said.

Gorbachev To Meet Japan's Abe

LD0801140490 Moscow TASS in English 1347 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS—As earlier agreed, Shintaro Abe, a leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and former foreign minister, will arrive in Moscow in January at the invitation of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a briefing here today.

Under the program of the visit, Shintaro Abe will meet Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Rogachev to PRC

LD0801164190 Moscow TASS in English 1622 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow Janary 8 TASS—A delegation of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee today left for Vilnius, Lithuania, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a news briefing.

The delegation includes Vadim Medvedev, a Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, Mikhail Ulyanov, member of the Central Auditing Commission and a renowned actor and public figure, Gennadiy Yagodin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Education, Islam Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, and Valentin Kuptsov, first secretary of the Vologda regional party committee.

Asked about the date of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's trip to Lithuania, Gerasimov said the Soviet leader may leave for Lithuania on Wednesday [10 January].

The spokesman said Shintaro Abe, a leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and former foreign minister, will arrive in Moscow in January at the invitation of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

Under the programme of the visit, Abe will meet Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gerasimov said Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov will head the Soviet delegation at the 45th session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), opening on Tuesday in Sofia, Bulgaria.

The session will discuss the renewal of the mechanism of multilateral cooperation and economic integration of CMEA members, and the council's work.

The spokesman said Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev leaves for Beijing today for consultations with Chinese officials on issues of bilateral relations and the Cambodian settlement. The consultations wil be held from January 9-12.

On January 13, representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church will resume consultations in Moscow on the Uniate Church in the Soviet Union, the spokesman went on. The consultations, postponed last November, will continue until January 17.

Commenting on the decision by the Bulgarian leadership to remove distortions in the ethnic policy, Gerasimov said the Soviet Union considers this decision as a "step towards democratisation, the construction of a socialist rule-of-law state and the observance of agreements within the all-European process."

He said a visiting delegation of Iran's Foreign Ministry, led by Deputy Minister Mahmud Vaezi, is holding consultations at the Soviet Foreign Ministry on bilateral and international issues of mutual interest.

Rogachev To Discuss Cambodia

OW0901083990 Tokyo KYODO in English 0819 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Beijing, Jan. 9 KYODO - Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister for Asia and Pacific Affairs Igor Rogachev visited here Tuesday to exchange views with China in a bid to revitalize deadlocked negotiations on a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem, reliable Eastern diplomatic sources in Beijing said.

The sources said Rogachev's visit to China was aimed at coordinating views between the two nations prior to a Paris meeting on the 11-year-old conflict planned by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council expected to be held next week.

According to Western diplomatic sources, the meeting will be attended by deputy ministers of foreign affairs from the five countries—the United States, Soviet Union, China, France and Britain.

The talks will focus on an Australian proposal to replace the Vietnamese-backed Phnom Penh government with a U.N. interim administration until a new government is formed to implement free elections, the sources said.

The Soviet Union has been at odds with China over support for the warring Kampuchea factions. Moscow has been taking sides with the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime while Beijing supports the three Kampuchea resistance factions, including the Pol Pot or Khmer Rouge faction, the largest of the three.

Zholkver on Dangers to 'Common European Home'

LD0801223290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 8 Jan 90

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Sergey Pravdin, with political observer Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] [Pravdin] Many news agencies are noting that from the very first days of the New Year there has been a clear increase in the discussion of problems linked to the building of a common European home. French President Mitterrand, FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, and Gysi, chairman of the SED-PDS [Socialist Unity Party of Germany—Party of Democratic Socialism], and many other eminent European politicians already have commented on this matter. I have asked our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver to analyze these comments, and now I will hand it over to him:

[Zholkver] I will start by recalling that the idea of building a common European home was first expressed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and it has to be said that as time passes, the number of supporters of this idea increases. The president of France, for example, has stated that the proposal put forward by the Soviet leader is a fine, important concept for defining the future of the continent. Developing this idea, Mitterrand proposed the establishment of a European confederation that might include countries of both Western and Eastern Europe. FRG Foreign Minister Genscher, in turn, noted that if walls of concrete are now falling in Europe, then other walls of missiles, tanks, and artillery also should be dismantled.

Georg Gysi, the new chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, which is now also called the Party of Democratic Socialism, made this thought more specific by proposing that both German states should halve their armed forces and should completely remove nuclear and chemical weapons from their territories by next year.

I think that all these and other proposals will be discussed at the most varied of the all-European forums in the very near future. The prime minister of Ireland, whose turn it is from the start of this year to head the leading bodies of the European Economic Community, has proposed the convening of an extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers of West European countries to consider the matter of developing contacts with the states of East Europe. The Soviet leadership's idea on holding an all-European summit meeting this year is also supported.

Even so, I would like to caution against excessive euphoria. Attempts by certain circles to seek to review the current political realities on the European continent under the slogan of constructing a single Europe are manifestly apparent. First and foremost, this concerns the thesis of the reunification of Germany. Under this slogan, demands are now being advanced more and more loudly in Bonn for the absorption of the GDR and the restoration of the German Reich almost within the borders of 1937. Things have gone so far that the leaders of some West German parties, especially the CDU-CSU [Christian Democratic Union—Christian Social Union] are interfering more and more openly in the internal affairs of the GDR, setting its parties against each other, and calling on them to unite on a nonsocialist footing.

I think that not only is this not a constructive policy, but moreover, it is provocative and fraught with risk. Also, it is remarkable that it has already provoked serious concern among Germany's neighbors—from France to Poland.

At the present time, a time of radical renewal of society in many European states, not a little froth is boiling on the high wave of political activity—from nationalistic passions and demands for the review of borders, to the revival of old and new fascists. Such a time requires especially balanced and responsible decisions. I think that only in this way is it possible to build a common European home where all the peoples of our continent can live in peace and cooperation.

United States & Canada

Analyst on U.S. 'Interference' in Central America

LD0801164990 Moscow TASS in English 1626 GMT 8 Jan 90

[By TASS political news analyst Gennadiy Petrov]

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS— Will the new large-scale action by Washington to combat narcotics trafficking become a cover-up for a new act of U.S. aggression in Central America? This question is prompted by the Pentagon's decision to send the aircraft carrier *John F. Kennedy* and the nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser *Virginia* to the Caribbean Sea, to the shores of Colombia.

Pentagon officials allude to the need to conduct naval exercises and monitor Colombia's sea and air space to stop narcotics export from its territory. In fact they are referring to a blockade of Colombia's shores.

Colombian president Virgilio Barco said that his country will not take part in any U.S. military manoeuvres in the international waters of the Caribbean Sea and refused to help Americans conduct operations in Colombia's territorial waters.

In December 1981, the American press alleged that a similar operation was being prepared jointly by the United States and Colombia. The Colombian Government was compelled to state that representatives of the United States had not consulted with it about a sea or air blockade of the Colombian coast.

It appears that the action was planned by Washington in advance and its true purposes are hidden behind the reassuring promise by the U.S. President to preserve goodneighbourly, effective and respectful relations with Latin American countries.

The U.S. President alleges that the invasion of Panama was a special case that will not influence further U.S. policy in the region. Recognising, nevertheless, that the invasion of Panama damaged Washington's relations with its southern neighbours, George Bush decided to send Vice President Dan Quayle on a tour of several Latin American countries in order to justify the act of armed aggression against Panama.

This is a no easy task. The use of force, the recurrence of the gunboat diplomacy have sparked anxiety among many governments in the region. The question of the legality of the military action in Panama remains open, the ABC television network points out. Only 17 countries have recognised Panama's new government. The international community is in no hurry to establish relations with those who came to power with the aid of American bayonets.

Whatever the end of Washington's Diplomatic manoeuvres, U.S. efforts to build up its military might in the Caribbean give rise to justified concern and not only in Latin America. Only naive people can believe that the United States needs the giant aircraft carrier to combat drug trafficking.

Why, then, will not Washington commit similar military forces against Pakistan or other Asian countries that export large amounts of narcotics to the eastern coast of the United States? Is this not a plan to interfere in the election process in Nicaragua, where the forces opposing the Sandinista Government are threatened with defeat?

The speech by U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney on the CNN television network gives food for serious thought. He said, in part, that the armed invasion of Panama did not signal the implementation of the Bush doctrine—the use of military force to ensure the outcome of the election process, suitable to the United States.

Answering a question on possible U.S. interference in the election campaign in Nicaragua, Cheney admitted that, generally, the United States preserved for itself the freedom of choice depended on the situation.

Burlatskiy Rejects U.S. Congress Statement

PM0801130990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Statement by Members of U.S. Congress"]

[Text] Senator D. Deconcini and Congressman S. Hoyer issued a statement 2 January 1990 in Washington on behalf of the U.S. Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe regarding the development of political events in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], based on a distorted interpretation of the Soviet leadership's approach to the resolution of ethnic problems in our country.

In this connection F.M. Burlatskiy, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Humanitarian, Scientific, and Cultural Ties, said the following:

I consider it my duty to voice my attitude to the statement by members of the U.S. Congress Senator D. DeConcini and Congressman S. Hoyer, with whom we had extremely fruitful and important meetings recently in Washington, where an accord was secured on developing businesslike cooperation in the human rights sphere. Their statement on events in the Lithuanian SSR arouses particularly great regret. I got the impression that this statement is based on an incorrect and unsubstantiated report, in which talk of possible "bloodshed" in Lithuania is attributed to the Soviet leader.

Nothing of the kind has been said. On the contrary, our country's leadership and supreme bodies of state power are making vigorous efforts to seek a solution to ethnic problems by political means and eliminate the threat of civil conflicts. I am convinced that the Soviet leadership's line of seeking just solutions to internal conflicts

based on dialogue and reasonable compromises fully accords with the spirit of the Helsinki process and the Vienna accords.

I would also like to stress that our subcommittee holds a consistent stance, supporting the aspiration of the peoples of the Baltic and the country's other peoples for economic autonomy, sovereignty, and defense of human rights; we have proclaimed this on several occasions at the congresses of USSR people's deputies and USSR Supreme Soviet sessions.

All this provides me with moral grounds to point out that the statement by Senator D. DeConcini and Congressman S. Hoyer not only does not help but, on the contrary, impedes the settlement of the problems in the Baltic and at the same time goes against today's trend of strengthening trust and mutual understanding between the USSR and the United States and between our two countries' parliamentarians.

Admiral Crowe Suggests Talks on Naval Arms Cuts

LD0801141990 Moscow TASS in English 1404 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Washington January 8 TASS—The United States should consider negotiations with Moscow on scrapping nuclear weapons at sea, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff William Crowe said in an interview published by the newspaper WASHINGTON POST today.

"If some naval reductions can get us more than they are worth, we ought to be willing to consider talking with the Soviet Union," the admiral said.

According to WASHINGTON POST, Crowe's statement was at odds with the position of the Bush administration that is against discussing naval arms cuts.

During the Reagan administration Crowe lobbied vigorously for increased military spending. But, now "the evidence is just overwhelming that there is something different going on in the Soviet Union, which will eventually allow the United States to act accordingly by reducing its own military expenditures," Crowe said.

Crowe spoke for reducing the purchase of B-2 bomber incorporating the Stealth technology to hide them from Soviet radar, and called for cutting expenditures on SDI.

The admiral also said that "the United States should move from a redundant 'triad' of strategic forces, consisting of air, sea and land-based weapons to a 'dyad', by dropping either bombers or land-based missiles.

Crowe's Proposals Analyzed

LD0801182490 Moscow TASS in English 1800 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS—By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev:

Admiral William Crowe, who until recently held a high post in the U.S. armed forces, said he favours holding Soviet-American talks to liquidate sea-based nuclear weapons and achieve a general reduction in the naval forces of the two sides.

In an interview with THE WASHINGTON POST, the former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff effectively called into question the U.S. Administration's uncompromising refusal even to discuss with the Soviet Union a reduction in its naval arms.

He said there should not be "anything sacrosanct" before the potential possibility to agree on reductions. The admiral admitted the feasibility of an agreement and performing inspections on U.S. subs, thus contradicting the present Pentagon leaders who peremptorily declare that they would never allow Soviet inspectors aboard any U.S. naval vessel.

Crowe actually denounced the administration's dual position, which insists on reductions in the Soviet land forces, since the USSR is allegedly a land power, and applies a reversed logic to the U.S. armed forces—refusing to reduce them because the United States is a naval power.

The naval forces are a most destabilizing component with a strong offensive potential, even in terms of a first nuclear strike capability. The current composition of the U.S. Navy is clearly in excess of the need to protect naval communications and ensure coastal defence.

The Navy can strike blows at land-based targets. Crowe said that liquidating this "bloody mess" with the naval forces will also benefit the U.S. Indeed, many U.S. analysts stress that a huge part of the poppulation lives in the coastal area. The bulk of the U.S. economic potential is deployed there.

So a naval forces reduction via negotiations will mean more security for these vital regions of the United States. As the saying goes, people who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones.

The admiral said it is time to reduce the nuclear potential, since this will increase "predictability of Soviet actions" and diminish the nuclear war threat.

The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called on Washington to adopt a more pragmatic approach with respect to military purchases and to cut the share of the U.S. gross national income allocated for defence spending, given the present situation in the world.

Crowe bases his position on the assumption that major changes are occurring in the structure of U.S. military spending, of which there is "convincing proof".

The admiral reminded the interviewers that originally some people in the U.S. intelligence community called into question reports on cuts in Soviet defence spending because they were only interested in talking about the growth of military spending in the Soviet Union.

The statement of Admiral Crowe, one of the most seasoned U.S. military experts, is doubtless a sign of the times and a sign of encouraging changes underway in the world after April 1985.

Baker, Shevardnadze To Discuss Arms Treaty

LD0901092390 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] The United States Secretary of State, James Baker, will visit Moscow early next month to hold talks with his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze. It's been announced in Washington that the talks will be devoted to a search for ways to overcome the remaining difficulties hampering a treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on a 50-percent reduction of their strategic offensive weapons. The two presidents, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, agreed during their Malta meeting to prepare this treaty for signing already this year.

'Imperial' Thinking Behind U.S. Panama Act

PM0801115690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Jan 90 Second Edition pp 1, 5

[Gennadiy Zafesov article under the rubric "Observer's Opinion": "Recurrence of Imperial Thinking"]

[Text] The United States is awash with victory fanfares. And how! The mightiest power in the world has brought about the "surrender" of little Panama, which is smaller in size than any American state. As for the correlation of armed forces, it is hard to find any kind of comparison here.

In reality, Panama is absolutely defenseless, in military terms, against the Pentagon war machine. The resistance offered by the national defense forces to the thousands of crack American interventionists was based largely on the Panamanians' patriotism and inextinguishable sense of freedom. But, as the Russian proverb says, strength breaks a straw. Today Panama, crucified and laid low, has once again fallen beneath the iron heel of its northern neighbor.

Having worked in Latin America for many years, I never cease to be surprised at the unthinking shamelessness with which the United States treats the Latin American countries if something there is not to the liking of the White House. The "package" of measures is always the standard one: behind-the-scenes machinations by the CIA, diplomatic pressure, economic diktat, and, in extremis, military intervention. Whatever doctrine may be employed, the "Monroe doctrine," the "big stick," or the "gunboat policy," the same thing has always been behind it: "Latin America is our backyard. And so we deal with it as we think fit."

The world, however, does not stand still. Today, perhaps more than ever before in history, there is a deepening and widening awareness that our planet is one, and that the interdependence of countries and peoples is far stronger than was usually believed quite recently. In recent years so much has been done by both East and West toward rapprochement that perhaps only the historians of the future will be able properly to assess the scale of what has been achieved. It seemed that the custom of strong-arm tactics, and especially military invasions, was also becoming a thing of the past. This view was boosted both by the "Vietnam syndrome" in the United States and, let us admit it, by the painful reassessment of our own action in Afghanistan. In short, the hope that the strained relations between the United States and Panama would find some kind of political resolution was not without foundation.

However, as events in Central America have shown, the new approaches that are springing up in Washington are still weaker than the traditions of imperial thinking among U.S. leaders. I think it is difficult as yet to conceive fully of the disappointment and doubts evoked in the world community by the American aggression against Panama. It is no exaggeration to say that it buried the hopes of millions of Latin Americans that the very nature of relations between the United States and its southern neighbors would change. Indeed, a negative reaction has been perceptible throughout the globe, with the exception of the most devoted U.S. allies.

The U.S. Administration has stated with satisfaction that the objectives it set have been achieved. First, "the lives of U.S. citizens were protected," second, General Noriega will appear before an American court, third, "democracy has been restored in Panama," and, finally, there is "no threat" to the treaties between Panama and the United States.

Let us try to analyze what lies behind these objectives. One is reluctant to waste many words on the first: The notorious theme of the "protection of U.S. citizens" has been used so many times to justify unseemly manipulations and military invasions.

I do not know how the U.S. court will deal with General Noriega, but I would like to remind you that in the not so distant past the highest U.S. political circles did not regard him as "persona non grata." Far from it. Incidentally, G. Bush, now the U.S. President, met him, though, true, he was head of the CIA at the time. In my opinion the very fact of that meeting, together with the well-known caution that is Bush's characteristic trait, is evidence that not only did they receive Noriega, but they were favorably disposed toward him. Surely the CIA chief must have had information at that time about the unseemly deeds of the now disgraced general? It is incredible that he did not. I would venture to suggest that the displeasure with the general began to emerge at the time when nationalist (or, in U.S. eyes, anti-American) sentiments began to become fairly well defined in the general. After all, General Noriega was perhaps the most resolute successor to General Torrijos, who was the Panamanian people's national hero and brought about a revision of the old Panama Canal treaty. Let us observe that Torrijos died in an air crash in highly mysterious

circumstances, and there is a widespread conviction in Latin America that the CIA had a hand in it.

For years the United States has tolerated dictators whose devotion it did not doubt. Was any attempt ever made, for instance, to overthrow Stroessner, Pinochet, or Somoza? Yet public opinion, even in the United States, was unequivocal with regard to these and other similarly odious figures. One cannot help remembering a rejoinder uttered by one U.S. politican with regard to the former dictator of the Dominican Republic: "Trujillo? A son of a bitch. But... he's our son of a bitch!" Has Washington still not given up this approach, even today? There can hardly be any question of the "restoration of democracy" when Panama's new president, G. Endara, was sworn in at an American military base. It is no accident that as of today only 17 countries have recognized the new Panamanian government. I think this fact also reflects the feelings about the U.S. action. Apparently Washington is well aware of this. Hence Vice President D. Quayle's hurried preparations for travel. He will visit a number of Latin American countries, where he will try to justify the unlawful act of invasion.

In any case, you cannot restore democracy with bayonets.

And it was not in order to reinforce "democracy" that a concentration camp was set up, covering an area of 60,000 square meters, where persons "remaining loyal to the Noriega regime" are being kept. Anyone who has been to southern latitudes knows what the sun is like there. A tent is very poor protection from its merciless rays. Incidentally, the guards are changed every hour. But that did not prevent their chief, Captain Skelton, from boasting that the camp in his charge is the biggest since the time of the Vietnam war. He also mentioned another country that was once subjected to U.S. aggression. "After the invasion of Grenada camps were set up there too, but they were nothing like ours," the captain claims. Let us only add that all those behind barbed wire are being subjected to indoctrination by the intelligence service of the U.S. Southern Command.

Maintaining military bases on Panamanian soil and control of the Panama Canal, wanting to teach a lesson to other Latin American countries—those are the main aims for the sake of which the norms of international law and generally accepted morality were unceremoniously flouted. The United States has decided not to wait for the year 2000, when, under American-Panamanian treaties, the canal should be transferred to Panama's full jurisdiction. I would say that for some months the United States was carefully "creating" the situation that ended with the unconcealed act of aggression.

It is also reasonable to assume that there was another objective that was not mentioned in front of the microphones or in the press. It is common knowledge that, for all his enormous powers and authority, the U.S. President is not free enough to avoid having to maneuver between the poles of different political forces. I think that the covert aspect of the blatant military demonstration was conceived also as "reassurance" for those right-wing U.S. forces that do not like either the U.S.-USSR dialogue, or the global trend toward the lessening of confrontation.

It seems that the influence of right-wing forces on the course of the American foreign policy ship is considerably stronger than may appear at first glance. Evidence of this is provided by a recent statement by U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney on a CNN television program. First the polite bow: The invasion of Panama, he said, does not mark the start of the implementation of a "Bush doctrine," that is, the policy of the use of military force "to safeguard the outcome of the free electoral process." But, answering a question on Nicaragua, the defense secretary would not bind himself with promises not to try to use strong-arm tactics there too. "In general terms we always reserve the freedom to choose, depending on the situation," he stated. One recalls something very similar being heard from Washington just before the invervention in Panama. It cannot be ruled out that they want to extend the "Panama experiment" to other Latin American countries too. In that case, which of them will be the next victim of the United States? The consequences of this line would be simply disastrous for the future of peace. It is the duty of all countries to exclude the very possibility of such actions.

The condemnation, by the vast majority of the world community, of the open international tyranny, which reminds us today of the notorious days of the "cold war," sounds a dissonant note in contrast to the victory fanfares in Washington.

U.S. Political, Economic Scene Viewed

PM0801130590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch under the rubric "On the Threshold of the Nineties: View from Washington": "'While There's Life...'"]

[Excerpts] Washington, January—[Passage omitted]. The world is changing at a giddy pace but the United States 1989 is not very different from the United States 1990. [passage omitted].

Thus, last year American women continued to storm political barricades over the problem of abortion, and the people as a whole began to look after their health with even greater fanaticism—trying to eat properly, not drinking or smoking, doing physical exercise, and playing sports. Polls indicate that a whole mass of problems which have given the country no rest recently—drugs, education, environmental pollution, surrender of trading positions under the onslaught of its foreign allies and competitors—have also been carried over into the nineties. To be fair it must be said that all this has in no way affected President Bush's popularity, which is still at a record high. Nonetheless...

Nonetheless, to put it mildly, the incumbent Administration still has more than enough unfinished business. The relative calm of its first year in power can be attributed to a lack of presidential initiative rather than to the coming of "peace and harmony" in the White House's relations with the Democrat-controlled Congress. Whereas in the foreign policy sphere toward the second half of last year, the president and his entourage had overcome the passivity that shocked many people, there have been no palpable changes on domestic issues. The few proposals that Bush has submitted to the Congress for consideration mainly concerned minor topics and could not affect the overall status quo. That is why it is no coincidence that observers began to say with one voice that Bush's popularity is broad but not deep and that it will rapidly fall at the first serious "test" against the socioeconomic touchstone.

Data from a Gallup public opinion poll just out confirm this opinion quite convincingly. Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Americans hope and expect an overall increase in their quality of life in the coming decade, pessimism over chronic problems has risen palpably. Thus almost 75% of those polled expect an increase in inflation, 71% expect an increase in the crime rate, while 67% and 62% respectively expect the problems of poverty and homelessness to worsen. The number of people who consider an increase in unemployment feasible along with more widespread alchoholism and drug addiction is not far behind these indicators.

The contrast between personal optimism and social pessimism is obvious and it may quite well betoken quite hard times for the Bush administration since the seeds of potential conflicts put out roots long ago. At the same time it would be at the least unfounded to predict the worsening of White House headaches. Although several clouds can be counted on the U.S. economic horizon, in general there are no signs that the long period of economic stabilization is ready to end in a catastrophic recession.

Admittedly, over the past few days some federal departments, including the U.S. Department of Commerce, have published reports forecasting that the economic development rate will slow from 2.2% to 2%, while a number of forecasting companies assume on the whole that the country is threatened this year either with stagnation or with a recession. However, you must know the Americans, who endeavor to find a hint of a hurricane even on a calm day. Probably so as not to relax their guard...

As of last year the expression "peace dividend" became firmly entrenched in American vocabulary, showing—despite America's isolation by oceans—how interdependent and mutually sensitive the world has become in the face of rapid international transformations. Changes—catalyzed by the reforms in the USSR—that seemed unthinkable several weeks ago have given rise to talk within the administration and the country of the possibility of cutting back the stupendous military spending in the coming decade by tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars. R. McNamara, former defense secretary, said at the recent Congressional hearings: "the time has come to reconsider our military requirements in view of the lessening of the Soviet threat." By reducing the Pentagon budget, he said, "we will be able to strengthen global stability and our own security, and at the same time acquire the resources to implement the much-needed reorganization of the economy." The reference is above all to the elimination or at any rate radical draining of the multibillion federal budget deficit which has fettered the U.S. economy.

At present this question is purely theoretical and it is expected that the U.S. Congress will tackle it specifically when it resumes sitting at the end of January. However, you can already hear demands from all sides for Pentagon appropriations to be substantially reduced, military production to be resolutely converted, and the freed funds to be transferred to socioeconomic needs. The "peace dividend" may play a very important role. The Japanese economy, for instance, is much better than ours because we spend billions of dollars on military purposes, while they spend it on research, consumer goods, and so on. It is obvious that when we obtain the "peace dividend" we will be able to spend it on various domestic programs, which will help us to compete on world markets, Ray Brady, a CBS TV economic correspondent, reckons.

...In olden days people rightly said that while there is life, there is hope. Americans are like everyone else. Like everyone, they are hoping for a better life for themselves and their children. The world is changing but human nature remains unchanged.

Riga Official Interviewed on U.S. Trip

PM0501094590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with Alfreds Rubiks, USSR people's deputy and chairman of the Riga City Soviet of People's Deputies Executive Committee, by "our correspondent" V. Litvin under the rubric "Deputy's Stand": "Parallels; Thoughts After a Visit to the United States"—date and place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Respect for the spiritual and moral values common to all mankind and observance of civilized norms of communication and conduct: That is one of the most important aspects and reference points of perestroyka. But, while declaring our commitment to these lofty values and norms, do we always abide by them in practice? Do we really consider other countries' very valuable experience which is in many ways instructive for us? These subjects were discussed during the conversation between our correspondent and Alfreds Rubiks, USSR people's deputy and chairman of the Riga City

Soviet of People's Deputies Executive Committee. He was recently in the United States as member of a Soviet parliamentary delegation.

[Litvin] Judging by the enthusiastic reports of those who have recently returned from abroad, your visit was, as they say, doomed to succeed. The attitude to the Soviet Union is changing for the better literally before our eyes and perestroyka is welcomed even among the most conservative circles in Western countries.

[Rubiks] Our visit was indeed very successful. Interest in perestroyka is both sincere and enormous and, moreover, is apparent in all strata of American society. If you add to this the ability of senators and congressmen to be hospitable, attentive, and relaxed, you can get the impression that influential political circles in the United States have really changed their attitude to us by 180 degrees. But impressions, as is well known, can be deceptive. Some of our journalists who give effusive descriptions of the rapturous reception given to perestroyka abroad for some reason overlook a perfectly obvious fact. The forms and approaches are changing but not the essence. American politicians—and other Western politicians, incidentally—are still bourgeois politicians reflecting the interests of their class and pursuing the same imperialist objectives.

[Litvin] Knowing the prevailing attitude in a number of our popular publications, I can see you being criticized for "conservatism" and a lack of "new thinking."

[Rubiks] I do not class myself as either a "conservative" or a "radical." Not least because I am prepared to listen to any valuable piece of advice or suggestion, wherever it comes from. I consider the practice of labeling to be a sign of a low level of political and intellectual sophistication and an inability, sometimes even reluctance, to listen carefully and without bias to others' opinions when they differ from your own. Incidentally, conservative politicians and parliamentarians are listened to with great respect in the West, particularly in the United States. Reagan and Thatcher, both conservatives, have broken all the records for political longevity and the conservative prime ministers of the FRG, Japan, France, Italy, and many other countries have also enjoyed and enjoy authority. To no small extent this is because they have been able to very effectively promote economic and social progress in their countries and have displayed sufficient realism in their foreign policy. In developed capitalist countries no one has any doubt that conservatives and radicals, "right-wingers" and "left-wingers," are necessary to the normal course of political and social life. They say that the Republican senators and congressmen who have visited the Soviet Union were baffled as to why the word "conservative" is said with such bitterness and hatred in our country. If we had said "a bad conservative" or "inept conservative," everything would immediately have become clear.

[Litvin] One could object to this and say that, unlike his Western counterpart, our Soviet conservative—particularly in the administrative apparatus—holds back progress and remains committed to the unthinking policy of "holding on and not letting go."

[Rubiks] I do not deny that there are such people. But, you know, they are now clearly in a minority and do not determine the course of events, as they say. What is more, it seems to me that we now sometimes run to a quite different extreme. In other words, we authorize and sanction virtually everything and make no attempt to even slightly influence the spontaneous processes destructive to the economy, the state, and society's spiritual and moral health which, incidentally, are regulated in any capitalist country. In the United States, Britain, and other highly developed states, measures have been taken at state level against gratuitous violence, brutality, and pornography in the mass media, particularly on television, and questions concerning the moral health of society are constantly being brought up for discussion by parliament. These countries' experience convincingly shows that confident progress can only be made by relying on the firm foundations of what has already been achieved and carefully preserving and utilizing national customs, traditions, and idiosyncracies. This, if you like, is an objective law of real progress, a law common to all mankind. Disregarding this law means inevitably provoking crisis phenomena and creating additional obstacles and barriers for yourself.

[Litvin] Your ideas remind me of Leo Tolstoy's famous words: "The right path is this: Assimilate what others have done before you and proceed further...."

[Rubiks] Fine words. And completely consonant with our time. But what are we in fact doing? We sometimes try to rush ahead without assimilating and using—actively using—what has already been achieved and, in the end... we find ourselves rolling backwards. If we had listened carefully in the past to the warnings and misgivings of seasoned "conservative apparatchiks," with their experience and knowledge of real problems, we would probably have made far fewer blunders. Instead of this, we sometimes openly defame members of the apparatus, who now find that it is becoming unsafe to express their "retrograde" views. The whole of society is obviously losing out as a result: It is essentially deprived of the opportunity to objectively weigh up all the "pros" and "cons" and consider other alternatives even if they are "conservative." In the United States, the "progressives" and the conservatives have almost equal opportunities to express their views during the development and implementation of official policy, and I feel that this is only to the benefit of the cause. Indeed, the state apparatus in the United States and any other Western country is noticeably "more conservative" than many politicians, publicists, and scientists, and this too is perhaps a perfectly normal phenomenon. Of course, I am not trying to in any way justify our truly excessive bureaucracy or the sluggish, retrograde views of some members of the state administrative apparatus.

[Litvin] As far as I am aware, the law enforcement system, that is the courts, public prosecutors, and police, works fairly efficiently in the United States. Were you able to appreciate this during your comparatively short stay there?

[Rubiks] Respect for the law in the United States is fostered from childhood. When we were in the state of Arizona, we were told that the police regularly give lectures and talks on legal matters in municipal schools. Moreover, they give these lectures and talks in uniform, which, sociologists believe, increases the effectiveness of the exercise. From my own observations, U.S. law enforcement bodies are without exaggeration like an "iron fist" when dealing with all manner of transgressions of the law and various abuses—and this is considered perfectly natural. Let me give you a specific example. The fine for parking your vehicle illegally is $15. The actions of the police, who impose these fines lavishly, arouse virtually no protest, although some "guardians of order" occasionally clearly go too far in this respect. In this case, of course, in addition to their traditional respect for authority, the pragmatism characteristic of Americans also plays a part: Even if you can prove that the police were wrong, the cost of the legal services and all the corresponding procedures will be far in excess of the fine itself. In any case, however, far fewer complaints are made against the actions of law enforcement bodies than in our country. Personal inconvenience is also suffered without a murmur if this inconvenience is caused by concern for personal safety and the prevention of violence. As a whole, it seemed to me that respect is accorded to the police, the courts, and other law enforcement bodies, which is also appreciably felt in the mass media.

[Litvin] In connection with the subject you have just touched on, I think readers would also be interested to learn how Western politicians—and American politicians in particular—regard informal organizations....

[Rubiks] I would not venture to speak for the whole of the West. But in the United States their attitude is fairly clear and well established. Power is not shared with informal organizations here, nor are they allowed anywhere near the helm of leadership: It is felt that this could only lead to chaos and disorganization and a reduction in the efficiency of state administration. There were no representatives of informal organizations among the parliamentarians with whom we spoke. But, on the other hand, senators and congressmen maintain constant, close contact with these organizations in order to appreciate the real needs of the different strata of the population and to use this knowledge in the struggle for the electorate's votes and in drawing public opinion onto their side. Incidentally, with rare exceptions, informal organizations in the United States recognize the country's constitutional-legal system and do not poke their noses into big politics. I did not see rallies involving thousands of excited people chanting political slogans and waving banners. Informal organizations are mainly concerned with meeting the everyday cultural and social needs of various strata of the population and giving real assistance to invalids, pensioners, the sick, ex-prisoners, and so forth.

[Litvin] Let us return to parliamentary matters, however. As is well known, both the House of Representatives and the Senate have special committees on ethics whose task it is to monitor parliamentarians' observance of specific norms and standards.

[Rubiks] These committees exist not only in the United States but also in the parliaments of virtually every capitalist country. When, at the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies, one deputy proposed setting up a similar commission—a kind of "officers' court of honor" for deputies—he was simply urging that we adopt foreign experience that is obvious to all and has recommended itself well. Nevertheless, as you probably remember, this prompted furious rejection among some so-called "progressive" deputies. Or take the present, Second Congress. Here too we have unfortunately witnessed a blatant excess of violations of parliamentary ethics and, ultimately, simple human decency. Well, in what Western parliament would a deputy essentially be able to get away with bringing unfounded, crude accusations of "lies" against his country's leaders, which was demonstrated by Lithuanian parliamentarian K. Uoka, for example, in relation to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet? And what about composer R. Shchedrin publicly demanding that another people's deputy, First Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee B. Gidaspov, resign because of his involvement in a "conservative," "antiperestroyka" rally? If an American congressman, for example, were to demand the resignation of his colleague on the grounds that he had taken part in a "poverty march" or a sanctioned demonstration with slogans criticizing the government, this would immediately make him the laughing-stock of the whole country and signal the death of his continued political career. In our country, however, those who violate the elementary, fundamental norms of parliamentary conduct are virtually made heroes.

[Litvin] Evidently it is impossible to avoid certain flaws, particularly in the initial stages, especially as abuse does not stick, as they say.

[Rubiks] I agree with you about the flaws, but I am not so sure about the abuse.... Militant loutishness and aggressive intolerance are far from harmless. Diminishing parliamentarians' prestige, they simultaneously undermine respect for state authority among ordinary people and voters. To say nothing of the fact that these "methods" encourage impunity and total license at the "lower levels," locally. The West realized this long ago and drew the relevant organizational conclusions. It is high time that we followed this sensible example. And the sooner the better.

[Litvin] It would be interesting to hear how America treats its political figures of the past....

[Rubiks] In the White House I put the following question to the American colleague accompanying me: "How do you treat your former presidents who were not very popular?" He thought for a while and then replied: "We do not make frequent reference to them but nor do we discard them from history." Indeed, in the White House you can see portraits of American presidents with their wives, together with busts and sculptures of prominent figures from the past of various political trends. Incidentally, the American president's residence is open to visiting at certain hours for anyone who wishes; the long line includes quite a large number of school children and pensioners. Talking to one elderly couple, I learned that one of the reasons they were visiting the White House was their desire to find out how the powers that be regard the past. "It is through history," the head of the family told me, "that respect for your country and belief in its future are clearly seen." For all their skepticism and their belief in pluralism, it seemed to me that the Americans are patriotically-minded and very jealous of their history, their traditions, and their political figures. While a president is in power, he may be criticized—and quite sharply. But after his retirement or death it is considered unseemly and unworthy to make this kind of criticism. Needless to say, monuments and sculptures to historical figures in the United States are not destroyed, whatever the fluctuations in the political climate, and the renaming of the numerous funds and associations named in their honor is not permitted.

[Litvin] And the last question, which I simply cannot help but ask. Did you make any contacts with Latvian emigres, and what is their attitude to our country?

[Rubiks] There are now some 3 million former Soviet citizens in the United States. A considerable proportion of them are of Latvian origin. The most diverse people, but most of them have not forgotten their homeland, miss it still, eagerly follow the development of events in our country, and want to help perestroyka in their own way. With regard to the leaders of Latvian emigre circles, the prevailing mood among them favors Latvian secession from the Soviet Union, which is given fairly broad coverage by the U.S. mass media. These circles have a very zealous attitude to their national symbols, attributes, and language and pay them heightened attention. Actively mixing with the leaders of emigre circles, the leaders of our own informal organizations who go to the United States return to Latvia with similar attitudes and views. It is interesting that official U.S. circles essentially take a quite different stand, not supporting calls for the revision of borders and the redistribution of spheres of influence in Europe. And the last point. Some of the leaders of our informal organizations seriously hope that, if Latvia were to secede from the Soviet Union, well-wishers across the ocean would help it out with capital and free aid. Naive hopes! You will not move an influential businessman to pity with an outstretched hand. The Americans are rich precisely because they know how to count every cent and are not accustomed to paying out cash for dubious ventures that do not promise a guaranteed return.

China

Rogachev Arrives in PRC on 3-Day Visit

LD0901060390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0542 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Beijing, 9 Jan (TASS)—Today Igor Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister, arrived here on a 3-day working visit. He will have routine consultations with Chinese representatives on issues of bilateral relations between the USSR and the PRC, as well as on the problem of a Cambodian settlement.

At Beijing International Airport Igor Rogachev was met by Tian Zengpei, PRC vice minister of foreign affairs, and other Chinese officials, as well as by Oleg Troyanovskiy, USSR ambassador to the PRC.

Beijing Martial Law To Be Lifted

OW0901041090 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 0300 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Excerpt] It seems that the Chinese Government has decided to lift the martial law, which it had imposed in the city of Beijing last May to suppress the prodemocracy movement, by as early as midnight tonight, after 8 months. Along with this development, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev is suddenly expected to visit China this afternoon. The expected exchange of views he will have on issues such as the lifting of the martial law will be extremely noteworthy.

This was disclosed by diplomatic sources in Beijing to NHK's Beijing Bureau. According to the sources, Rogachev will arrive in Beijing at 0400 GMT today at the invitation of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and immediately enter into talks with the Chinese authorities. It is said that the East European situation, the issue of domestic reforms in the USSR, the Cambodian issue, and other topics closely related to the two countries will be discussed during the talks. The exchange of views on the lifting of martial law, the biggest issue in Chinese domestic politics at present, will be of interest. [passage omitted]

Spokesman Cites Topics for Talks

HK0901111090 Hong Kong AFP in English 1100 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Excerpts] Beijing, Jan 9 (AFP)—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev arrived here Tuesday for talks with Chinese officials on ways of settling the Cambodian problem, a Soviet Embassy spokesman said. He will discuss in particular an Australian proposal that Cambodia should be put under a U.N. administration pending elections, the spokesman said. [passage omitted]

The Soviet embassy spokesman said it was unlikely that other questions would be raised during Mr. Rogachev's "four or five day" visit, such as the present upheavals in Eastern Europe.

These developments were already covered during a visit to Beijing at the end of December by a Soviet Communist Party delegation led by the head of the central committee's international department, Valentin Falin.

Mr. Rogachev will go on to Paris for a meeting on Cambodia with his counterparts from the other four permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the United States, Britain, France and China. [passage omitted]

Northeast Asia

Japan's Prime Minister Leaves on Europe Tour

OW0901065090 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Commentary by Tokyo corrspondent Potapov]

[Text] On 8 January Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu embarked on his 10-day European tour. We will now broadcast a commentary by Tokyo correspondent Potapov on this subject.

The present visit will be Prime Minister Kaifu's second overseas trip after his assumption of the office of prime minister last summer. Prime Minister Kaifu already visited the United States and Canada last summer.

His schedule for the present visit is very hectic. After visiting West Germany, he will visit Belgium, France, Italy, and Britain in 5 days. With this, Prime Minister Kaifu will have visited all of the seven advanced nations. [as heard] In addition, Prime Minister Kaifu is also scheduled to hold talks with Pope John Paul II during his visit.

In his talks with the West European countries, the focus will be on issues concerning trade and economic relations between the EC and Japan. With the recent marked increase in Japanese exports to the world market, trade and economic relations between the EC and Japan are at a low ebb. According to Japanese mass media, in his talks with the leadership of the Western countries, Prime Minister Kaifu will not only discuss trade and economic relations, but will also exchange views on the East European situation, perestroyka in the USSR, disarmament, and other current international issues and search for a common stand.

Prime Minister Kaifu will end his European trip with visits to Poland and Hungary. According to Japanese radio reports, during his visits, he intends to expound on the official Japanese Government position on democratization in East Europe. Poland and Hungary are facing a difficult situation as manifested by the problems brought about by the great changes in the domestic economy. According to the KYODO NEWS AGENCY, during Prime Minister Kaifu's visit to Warsaw and Budapest, he will announce a series of financial assistance measures totaling more than $1 billion. Moreover, as a measure being planned by the Japanese Government, a special insurance fund will be formed to protect commercial transactions. A fund of $350 million will be set up for Poland and $400 million for Hungary.

As many observers have pointed out, Prime Minister Kaifu has shown great enthusiasm for his West European trip. In particular, he wants to impress people with his diplomatic activities in view of the imminent general elections in Japan. Eying the elections, Prime Minister Kaifu is interested in strengthening his position in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Furthermore, Prime Minister Kaifu hopes that the outcome of his official visit will enhance his popularity among voters.

IZVESTIYA Tokyo correspondent Agafonov said that Prime Minister Kaifu is scheduled to make a speech before the Berlin Wall during his visit, but Japanese mass media do not welcome the actions he will propose in the speech. IZVESTIYA correspondent Agafonov also pointed out that a great number of mass media comments on the prime minister's foreign visit claim that the government and the foreign minister have overlooked the rapid changes in East Europe, and that in the area of formulating independent East European policies to adapt to the new situation, Japan is clearly behind other Western countries, roundly criticizing the foreign ministry and the Japanese Government.

Japanese Political Figures Support Perestroyka

LD0901052390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0405 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, 9 Jan (TASS)—Japan should actively support the policy of perestroyka being carried out in the Soviet Union. Most influential political figures of the country—Noboru Takesita, former prime minister, and Shintaro Abe, former secretary general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party—unanimously came to this conclusion. On Tuesday they held a meeting in the Japanese capital during the course of which the forthcoming trip in January of S. Abe to the USSR at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee was discussed.

The program of the visit of S. Abe, formerly Japan's foreign minister, as announced both in Moscow and in Tokyo, provides for a meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

JSP Demands Revised Stance on Soviet Threat

OW0601222090 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 3 Jan 89

[Text] According to a Tokyo dispatch of the TASS NEWS AGENCY, the Soviet Union, which Japanese Governments have viewed exclusively as a potential invading nation until very recently, actually poses no threat at all to Japan's security. This is stated in a statement which the Japan Socialist Party [JSP] issued

on 2 January. The JSP statement calls for a major revision of Japan's foreign policy while taking the positive changes in the international arena into consideration. Furthermore, the statement adds that while the United States, the Soviet Union, and various European nations are reducing their military spending, the Japanese Government is attempting to strengthen its military capacity through such measures as increasing its defense budget by 6.1 percent in the next fiscal year. It also points out that such a policy will turn Japan itself into a new threat endangering the security of other nations.

Under such circumstances, the JSP proposes that the government should, above all, freeze defense spending at the current level for the next 3 years. According to the JSP proposal, it will be necessary to set up a special committee on the disarmament issue in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors following the freezing of military expenditures.

In addition to tackling the revision of Japan's military policy by considering the overall easing of East-West tension, the committee will probably be able to submit constructive bills on promoting the disarmament process in the Asian region. It also is stated in the JSP statement that Japan should play a positive role in establishing the so-called Asian Security Council. The council, which will be comprised of the Soviet Union, the United States, PRC, the DPRK, and the ROK, in addition to Japan, will directly deal with various problems concerning regional politics and the easing of military tension.

Journalist Delegation's Visit to DPRK Described

PM0801154590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "Guests of MINJU CHOSON, or a Brief Account of a Business Trip to the DPRK"]

[Text] Pyongyang-Moscow—IZVESTIYA has traditional ties with the editorial board of one of the DPRK's leading newspapers, MINJU CHOSON. At its invitation an IZVESTIYA delegation comprising Deputy Chief Editor A. Druzenko, special correspondent L. Malinin, and V. Lukashin, the newspaper's own correspondent in the DPRK, visited the republic at the end of December.

The tour program was very full. We will dwell on its main points, drawing the descriptions from the book "Korea," published at the Pyongyang Publishing House for Literature in Foreign Languages in 1988 and presented to us as a gift.

The IZVESTIYA staffers' stay in the DPRK began with a trip to Mangyongdae. This is "the spiritual home of the Korean people and the cradle of the Korean revolution, where the great leader [velikiy vozhd], President Kim Il-song, was born and spent his childhood.... The family home of the great leader President Kim Il-song and priceless relics associated with his unfading revolutionary services and with the brilliant combat deeds of members of his revolutionary family are carefully preserved in Mangyongdae, a historic site of revolutionary glory."

Then we viewed modern architectural ensembles in Pyongyang, museums, and monuments.

Our first stop was at the Monument to the Ideas of Chuche. As the colorful prospectus states, "On 15 April 1982, the 70th birthday of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song, the Monument to the Ideas of Chuche was erected in downtown Pyongyang. The monument is situated on the bank of the beautiful Taedong River and covers a total area of 130 hectares, and the obelisk with a torch is 170 meters high."

And here is another grand structure. "On 14 April 1982 the Triumphal Gate was constructed in the historic triumphal square at the foot of Mount Moran in the capital, Pyongyang, to reflect the unshakable will and unanimous desire of our people to glorify forever the unfading services of the great leader President Kim Il-song."

In Pyongyang we visited the Museum of Victory in the Fatherland Liberation War. "This is a monumental temple generalizing the immortal services of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song, who wisely directed our people to struggle to defeat the U.S. aggressors, who thought themselves the 'strongest' in the world."

A tour of the People's Palace of Learning took several hours. "The palace was built on Namsan Hill at the very center of the capital, Pyongyang, and was opened 1 April 1982. Under the wise leadership of the great leader President Kim Il-song and dear Comrade Kim Chong-il the palace was constructed in the short time of 1 year and 9 months.... The People's Palace of Learning is a center of the intellectualization of all society and a temple of learning for all the people. It has a total construction area of 100,000 square meters and can hold 30 million copies of books and accommodate more than 12,000 readers a day."

Then we visited the Academy of Traditional Eastern Medicine. Its five basic institutes are seeking ways to develop folk medicine, creating effective herbal remedies, and discovering new possibilities of the famous ginseng. We were told that the academy is just one part of the public health care system, which is underpinned by free medical services. These, incidentally, were introduced here 1 January 1953, when the liberation war was still going on. "Under the beneficial socialist health care system created by the great leader President Kim Il-song," we read in the book "Korea," "our people lead a happy life, singing the praises of 'youth at 60 years old and the onset of old age at 90.'"

Our delegation traveled outside the capital three times. There was a memorable trip to Panmunjom, where the armistice was concluded and where negotiations are still taking place between representatives of the North and South of the Korean Peninsula. We also viewed the

famous ferroconcrete wall built by the South Korean side near the 38th parallel in 1953....

The Western Sea Floodgate is an impressive structure. DPRK military construction workers built it in just 5 years and commissioned it in June 1986. The floodgate was constructed in the mouth of the Taedong River, which flows into the Yellow Sea or, as it is called here, the Western Sea of Korea.

We were also given an opportunity to familiarize ourselves with the output of a sewn goods factory (men's shirts, 80 percent of which are exported—all to our country) and of an enterprise where embroidery experts work.

Another journey was to Myohyangsan. An unusual museum is situated there, called the Exhibition of Friendship Among the Peoples (it is worth describing in greater detail, which we will do in the final part of the report).

During the tour the IZVESTIYA staffers had meetings and talks with leaders and working people of the MINJU CHOSON Editorial Board, including Kim Chong-suk, its chief editor.

On the eve of its departure from Pyongyang the delegation was received by Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the Standing Council of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly.

"I hope you have been able to familiarize yourselves with our specific conditions, which give grounds for speaking of a Korean model of socialism," Yang Hyong-sop said during our talks. "The DPRK is guided in its activity by the ideas of chuche advanced by the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song. The ideas of chuche are the creative development and continuation of Marxism-Leninism under modern conditions. The working masses underpinned by their own forces constitute the driving force of socialism.

"As Comrade Kim Il-song teaches, socialism is people's power plus the implementation of three revolutions: ideological, scientific-technical, and cultural. We put the ideological revolution in first place. Its task is to influence the consciousness of the masses, to prepare them to fulfill the tasks advanced by the party and by Comrade Kim Il-song. The task of the cultural revolution is to make society fully intellectualized. We have tremendous successes here: All the people are studying. The scientific and technical revolution must take place in all spheres....

"The role and purpose of the leader is to make the masses conscious that they are the masters of their lives and to rouse them to revolutionary activity. This is what Comrade Kim Il-song is doing. A simple example. After the war all our cities and villages had been destroyed. Some 420,000 bombs had been dropped on Pyongyang, a city of 400,000 inhabitants. The Americans said that the Koreans would not rebuild it even in 100 years. Many people were at a loss and did not know where to begin. At that moment Comrade Kim Il-song said: If we pool the efforts of the entire people, we will be able to rebuild both our cities and our villages. Can you not see from present-day Pyongyang how successfully we resolved that task?

"We were guided in economic building right from the start by Comrade Kim Il-song's principle of reliance on our own efforts and the creation of an independent economy.

"The leader must be constantly in the midst of the masses; Comrade Kim Il-song has adhered to this principle from the time of the anti-Japanese liberation struggle to this day. The people are the driving force of the revolution, but the decisive role in it belongs to the leader. He always stands in the midst of the people and is the flesh of the people's flesh. We believe that world history has never known a leader such as Comrade Kim Il-song.

"We take account of the experience of the world communist and socialist movement, but we do everything in our own way, with due regard for our own specific conditions. Since the revolution continues from generation to generation, the leader too must give way in accordance with this same principle. If the leader's successor is ill-prepared, this is a disaster. For us this problem does not exist, because alongside the great leader there is someone who possesses in full measure the qualities of a leader. I am speaking of dear Comrade Kim Chong-il. He tackles many serious problems. Among them I will name the preparation of Pyongyang for the 13th Youth and Students Festival, after which so many fine projects appeared in our capital."

And now the promised reportage by our own correspondent in the DPRK on the Exhibition of Friendship Among the Peoples.

The name of the Myohyangsan Range, which extends from the coast of the Yellow Sea to Lake Changjin high in the mountains, translates as follows: wonderful fragrance of the mountains. "Myo" means wonderful, "hyang" means fragrance, and "san" means mountain. At the foot of the mountain stands the Buddhist temple of Pokhen [name as transliterated].

It is here, at Myohyangsan, that a monument of the present day has been erected. It is officially called the Exhibition of Friendship Among the Peoples, but everyone in the DPRK knows that gifts sent to Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK] and president of the DPRK, from various countries are assembled there.

We crossed a little bridge across a mountain stream and saw a palace beneath a curved tiled roof. Huge copper doors with patterns in relief, each weighing 4 tonnes, lead into it. The silhouette of this modern temple can be seen in the DPRK on banknotes, stamps, and silk tapestries.

"How did the idea of creating the exhibition come about?" I asked Sin Sang-kyun, member of the WPK Central Committee and author of many books devoted to the DPRK president.

"Right after the liberation of Korea we began receiving gifts from heads of governments of friendly powers," he recalled. "The first were from the Soviet Union. Then every delegation brought its own gifts. There were more and more of them. We suggested to the great leader that he place some of them in his work study. He objected: 'The gifts were sent not only to me but to our party and people.' It was then that a special gifts department was established under the WPK Central Committee. A building was set aside for the gifts. But people brought and brought them. And then we decided to build a special exhibition complex."

...Our guide was already waiting for us. Chang Yong-suk, a young woman, easily opened the massive door, and we walked into a vast hall carpeted by a fluffy scarlet carpet. At the far end stood a large, white-stone sculptural portrait of Kim Il-song. All tours begin at a map of the world on which the states which sent gifts are marked.

"The exhibition was opened in 1978," our guide said, "on the eve of the DPRK's 30th anniversary. Some 60,000 gifts from 150 countries are displayed in 50 halls on its 6 floors. Most are from the Soviet Union, China and Japan."

Our own Soviet exhibit is impressive. A special hall contains the armored ZIS-110 presented by I.V. Stalin. There are two ZIM's sent by G.M. Malenkov and N.A. Bulganin. You are struck by a gift from L.I. Brezhnev—golden damask in a chest bound with blue silk and small drinking vessels decorated with white and dark-blue enamel. Here, too, are a marshal's parade saber and a wine glass sent by K.U. Chernenko. The collection includes Palekh boxes, snuffboxes, articles by the masters of Gzhel, crystal, and china.

Many of the gifts portray Kim Il-song. Here is a bust of him carved from wood that grows in the distant Andes. This was a gift from the director of an Ecuadoran publishing house.

In the DPRK portraits of the president can be seen not only in establishments but also in every home and every hotel room. In songs and verses Kim Il-song is called an "imcomparable patriot," "military leader," and "sun of the nation." Places where sculptures of him have been erected are marked on maps by a sun's disk radiating rays.

...A tour of the unusual museum takes a long time. Its exhibits are striking by virtue not only of the skill of execution but also of their great diversity. It is hard to walk past a golden figurine of a buddha sent from Japan: It is several centuries old. A ceramic amphora presented by the socialists of Cyprus is 3,000 years old. Todor Zhivkov sent Kim Il-song a silver vase and a snuffbox decorated with precious stones. The late General Ziaul Haq bestowed a jade casket of jewels.

In conversation with me Sin Sang-kyun recalled that Comrade Kim Il-song visited the exhibition on the eve of its official opening.

"The leader told us about each exhibit. He remembers everything: Who presented him with a particular gift, where, and when...."

I noticed an unusual delicate violet flower decorating one of the halls. Our guide smiled:

"This too was a gift. In honor of our leader. It was called 'Kimilsongilia' [name as transliterated] on the personal orders of President Sukarno of Indonesia. This flower was developed by a plant breeder at Indonesia's main botanical garden. It is now the most beloved flower of the Koreans...."

Weapons are liberally represented. Sabers, swords, broadswords, daggers, submachineguns, pistols.... The work of Mongolian masters: a dagger and a hunting rifle with inlaid work presented by Yu. Tsedenbal. A gift from E. Honecker—a carbine with a telescopic sight. A sword in a golden scabbard presented by President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria. And here is a weapon that has actually been used: a machinegun handed to Kim Il-song by Humberto Ortega, commander in chief of the Sandinist People's Army. G. Husak sent a modest gift in his time—a spinner, a set of fishing lines, hooks....

Here too, at Myohyangsan, I learned that the DPRK president has been awarded 170 orders and medals of more than 70 countries. The awards include Orders of Lenin, Karl Marx, Klement Gottwald, Jose Marti, and "Playa Giron." The president's international activity has been marked by 80 gold medals. Some 400 streets, enterprises, and organizations in 90 states have been named for him.

"Why was the exhibition mounted precisely at Myohyangsan?" I asked Comrade Sin Sang-kyun.

"Of course, it was no accident," he smiled. "The great leader loves the mountains and visits Myohyangsan. He has even dedicated his verses to Myohyangsan. One day Comrade Kim Il-song came out onto the review ground after viewing the exhibition. It was a wonderful fall day. And suddenly we heard moving lines from the leader's lips:

"'The view from the balcony is unforgettable, renowned for its beauty since ancient times. This loveliness delights the eye—the exhibition with its green roof has opened amid the wonderful mountains. The majestic Peak Piro looks proudly down from on high, glorifying the nation's honor....'"

...Mountains have always inspired artists, poets, and leaders.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Plan for Cambodia

PM0801115790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

["E.A. Shevardnadze Interview by VNA and SPK Correspondents"—IZVESTIYA headline; date, place not given]

[Text] Question: Comrade Minister, how would you evaluate the situation now taking shape with regard to a Cambodian settlement?

Answer: We believe that favorable opportunities are now being opened up for progress toward a really lasting and balanced solution of this protracted regional conflict.

Vietnam has withdrawn its military subunits from Cambodia—which has created a qualitatively new situation in terms of a settlement.

Many countries are making efforts to ensure that solutions are sought not on the battlefield but at the negotiating table.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas has advanced the idea of holding an informal meeting in Jakarta of representatives of the Cambodian sides, the states of Southeast Asia, and France as cochairman of the Paris conference on Cambodia.

Thai Prime Minister C. Chunhawan has proposed examining at this meeting questions concerning the creation of an international control mechanism for Cambodia, a cease-fire, and the ending of foreign military aid for all Cambodian sides. Australian Foreign Minister G. Evans' idea on UN involvement in organizing elections in Cambodia in accordance with the "Namibian formula" appears to be timely and to have real potential.

For its part the Soviet Union has advanced a proposal to establish a moratorium on military aid to all Cambodian sides—a proposal supported by the United States as part of a comprehensive settlement.

Displaying goodwill, the government of the State of Cambodia has advanced an important new initiative which goes some way toward the proposals of Australia and Thailand. Hun Sen, chairman of the State of Cambodia Council of Ministers, has declared his readiness to examine the question of creating a UN organ in Cambodia which would assume control over the implementation of the accords reached by the Khmer sides and over the organization of general elections while preserving the two existing governments—of the State of Cambodia and Democratic Kampuchea—during the transitional period and leaving Cambodia's UN seat vacant. The Cambodian leader has called for the negotiating process to be resumed without delay and for a new informal meeting to be convened in Jakarta within the framework of the Paris forum, as the Thai side proposes.

Thus, a whole package of productive, consonant proposals has now been advanced with a view to further advancing and completing the settlement process. There is also a negotiating mechanism which can implement these proposals. It is important now for all the sides concerned to display readiness for reasonable compromises, taking account of the realities inside and around Cambodia.

The Soviet Union has already come out in support of the constructive line of the government of the State of Cambodia. We believe that it opens up real prospects for reaching mutually acceptable accords on Cambodia. The USSR also takes a positive view of the enterprising steps of Australia and Thailand. Our country urges all the sides concerned to contribute to ending the bloodshed in Cambodia, to preventing it in the future, and to achieving a comprehensive long-term solution to the Cambodian problem.

Question: What, in your opinion, is hindering the speediest achievement of a settlement of the Cambodian problem?

Answer: Above all, the fact that the Cambodian opposition is still gambling on military strong-arm methods. The military trial of strength imposed on the Cambodian people following the Vietnamese troop withdrawal is as senseless as it is immoral. Bloodshed is essentially continuing only in order to make Phnom Penh agree to the Pol Potites' separate involvement in the transitional power structures. What is hindering, therefore, is the lack of accords on a cease-fire and on ending military aid to all the Cambodian sides.

I would like to emphasize once again that the proposals of the Government of the State of Cambodia open up a direct path to the speediest achievement of a settlement. They are optimal and take account of all the sides' interests. Let the Cambodian people determine their own destiny and the internal system in their own home through the free expression of will under international control, just as Phnom Penh proposes. No one has the right to decide this for them.

It is important for all the sides concerned to take advantage of the favorable opportunities which have now been opened up for resolving the conflict situation and to prevent attempts to impose on the Cambodian people what is unacceptable to them.

Question: Comrade Minister, what impact, in your opinion, could the settlement of the Cambodian conflict have on the development of the situation in Southeast Asia?

Answer: I am convinced that the resolution of the Cambodian conflict, on which the contradictions in the region have been focused for long years, would substantially improve the situation not only in Southeast Asia but also in the Asia and Pacific region as a whole. A boost would thereby be given to the positive processes and trends which are gathering momentum in the region.

What we see as positive changes are are now occurring in Southeast Asia, not uninfluenced by the general warming of the international climate. In the context of a Cambodian settlement a shift away from confrontation toward a search for a formula of good-neighborliness between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN has become apparent, and a Vietnamese-Chinese dialogue has begun. The USSR's relations with the ASEAN member states are improving.

Further detente in the region would make it possible to release the positive political potential contained in the ideas of creating in Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a nuclear-free zone and to begin resolving a broad package of questions of developing mutually advantageous cooperation in the economy and in other spheres, in elaborating generally acceptable confidence-building measures, and so forth.

In combination with the processes in other parts of the Asia and Pacific region the elimination of the conflict situation in Southeast Asia would make a substantial contribution to strengthening peace and security in this vast, dynamically developing part of the world.

The Soviet Union favors such a prospect for the development of Southeast Asia. We favor a joint search for solutions in the spirit of the new political thinking.

In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to convey to the Cambodian people cordial congratulations and best wishes in connection with the national holiday—the 11th anniversary of the formation of the State of Cambodia.

Progress of Initiatives on Cambodia Reviewed

LD0901093490 Moscow TASS in English 0903 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 9 TASS—By TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev:

The Indonesian foreign minister goes to Bangkok today. A special envoy of Japan leaves for Phnom Penh soon, and an Australian envoy has set out on a tour of five countries.

The purpose of these visits is to discuss with all the sides concerned the package of problems concerning a settlement of the Cambodian situation.

What explains such diplomatic activity over Cambodia? Is it that there has appeared light at the end of the tunnel as far as Cambodia is concerned? It seems that matters stand precisely in this way.

It is clear that the withdrawal of Vietnamese military units from Cambodia in September last year created a qualitatively new situation concerning a settlement of the Cambodian issue.

A number of countries came forward with new constructive proposals aimed at finding a solution to the Cambodian problem at the negotiating table, and not on the battle field. It must be noted that the opposition's counting on military-force methods to "settle the problem" is absolutely untenable. It has not and cannot bring success.

In a gesture of goodwill the Indonesian Government has suggested holding a new informal meeting of all the sides concerned in Jakarta soon.

Matters concerning the establishment of an international control mechanism for Cambodia, a ceasefire and military aid to the opposing sides could be considered at such meeting (on Thailand's proposal).

The idea put forward by the Australian foreign minister is also noteworthy: to apply the "Namibian formula" to a settlement of the Cambodian issue.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it, within the framework of an overall solution to the problem, suggested introducing a moratorium on military aid to all Cambodian sides.

Naturally, it was up to the leadership of the State of Cambodia to decide, and it was not slow in coming towards the proposals and, for its part, came forward with a new initiative.

The essence of the initiative is in the Cambodian leadership's readiness to consider the question of establishing in Cambodia a U.N. body to monitor the realisation of accords reached by the Khmer sides and the organisation of general elections with the maintenance of two existing governments during the transitional period. Cambodia's seat at the United Nations shall remain vacant for that period.

The new initiatives, provided there is goodwill and readiness of all the sides concerned to agree to a reasonable compromise, are expected to finally take the Cambodian issue out of the deadlock.

It is now up to their ability to proceed from the realities of the present day, both those inside and outside Cambodia, and to act in the spirit of new political thinking.

Benefits to Cambodia Through Cooperation Noted

BK0801092690 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 7 Jan 90

[Station observer's commentary]

[Text] Today the Soviet people join the people of the State of Cambodia in celebrating the most wonderful date in the existence of this country, the 11th anniversary of its victory day.

The Radio Moscow observer writes: In 1979, immediately after being liberated from the claws of the genocidal regime, the new leadership of the country and the Cambodian people were left with only the most difficult

prospects. In that trying moment, Vietnam and Laos rushed to the rescue of their Cambodian friends. Considerable aid has been provided and is being provided by the Soviet Union.

It was on 25 June 1979 that the first Soviet-Cambodian agreement was signed in Phnom Penh dealing with economic and scientific and technical cooperation. The main objective of this agreement was to bring an urgent revival to the Cambodian economy. In 1979 and 1980, the worst years for Cambodia, the Soviet Union gratuitously sent 120,000 metric tons of rice, 80,000 metric tons of corn, 30,000 metric tons of wheat, and petroleum products, clothing, pots, pans, trucks, and tractors worth a total of more than $220 million. Moreover, for the restoration of economic structures, the Soviet Union poured in an additional $68 million.

Within a short period of time, Cambodia's two deep-sea ports—the Kompong Som and Ream Ports—had been repaired and reactivated. A state-owned power station was built. This plant driven, by diesel shipped from the Soviet Union, supplies electricity to the homes of many Cambodian families. The restored Institute of High Technology reopened its gate to students. Here, highly skilled instructors, including Soviet lecturers, are preparing the cadres for Cambodia's industrial and agricultural sectors. Operating alongside this institution of higher education is a vocational center. At the Cambodian-Soviet Friendship Hospital, equipped with ultramodern medical equipment, Soviet doctors usually advise their Cambodian colleagues about new methods of treatment.

In summary, during the past 11 years, thanks to the assistance and technical support of the Soviet Union, more than 30 large buildings in the fields of energy, agriculture, transport, telecommunications, industry, and construction have been repaired and reopened to service. A healthy balance of trade has developed. In 1988 the volume of trade was worth R125 million. Thanks to imports from the Soviet Union, the national economy of the State of Cambodia can fulfill its needs in petroleum products, metal sheets, fertilizer, machinery, and appliances. The Soviet Union buys from Cambodia natural rubber, precious woods, tobacco, and handicraft products.

The most important field of our cooperation is the training of Cambodian cadres at various educational establishments in the Soviet Union. During the past 11 years more than 3,000 Cambodians have studied in universities, technical schools, and vocational schools in our country.

Our station observer continues in his article: The Soviet Union and Cambodia are now paying special attention to enhancing the effectiveness of the bilateral economic relations, to mobilizing forces and means in sectors and fields vital to the Cambodian economy, and to maximizing the use of material and technical fundamentals.

At the latest meeting of the Soviet and Cambodian intergovernmental committees for economic, trade, and scientific and technical cooperation, our two countries have marked off specific measures in implementing the new forms of cooperation, such as the creation of joint ventures and the setup of direct production units between Soviet and Cambodian enterprises. We have already encountered some complexities, but we firmly believe that they will be overcome, for they are simply technical difficulties. We hope that in the future the assistance given by the Soviet Union to the Cambodian people will serve the strengthening of our friendly relations in the interests of every Cambodian.

In conclusion, our observer quotes the remarks taken from the interview granted to Radio Moscow by Comrade Heng Samrin, chairman of the Council of State of the State of Cambodia and secretary general of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee. Comrade Heng Samrin said:

[Begin Heng Samrin recording] So far, the Soviet party and government have provided immense and effective material, moral, and political assistance for the revolutionary cause of the Cambodian people, contributing importantly to the rebirth of our nation and creating favorable conditions for future development. To this, the entire Cambodian party, state, and people would like to express most profound and unforgettable gratitude. [end recording]

Leadership Bodies Send Greetings to Cambodia

PM0801160790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[USSR leadership bodies' greetings message to Cambodian leaders]

[Text] To Comrade Heng Samrin, general secretary of the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia Central Committee and chairman of the Cambodian State Council;
Comrade Chea Sim, member of the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Cambodian National Assembly;
Comrade Hun Sen, member of the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Cambodian Council of Ministers.

Dear Comrades!

We cordially congratulate you and the entire Cambodian people on the 11th anniversary of the Cambodian national holiday.

The Soviet Union notes with satisfaction that under the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia considerable successes have been achieved in reviving and building the motherland. The profound socioeconomic and political transformations and the democratization of society being implemented in the country are bringing about further progress on this path.

The Cambodian leadership's constructive course of national reconciliation and achieving an all-embracing political settlement and permanent neutrality for Cambodia is meeting with approval in the international arena.

We make a high assessment of the multifaceted cooperation between our two countries and advocate its further development. We wish you, dear comrades, and the entire Cambodian people peace and successes in national building.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee
The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
The USSR Council of Ministers

SRV Writer Deplores 'Gloomy' Depictions of Socialism

PM0801160190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[Article by Vu Tu Nam, general secretary of the Vietnam Writers Union, under the rubric "Entering the New Year": "Let There Be Happiness in the Home"]

[Excerpt] Hanoi—[Passage omitted] Last year brought us great changes, particularly in the economy. It cannot be said that our workers, peasants, and economic leaders did not wage a courageous struggle for innovation in previous years. But for that struggle, our people's gains would not exist. Their struggle brought closer and made inevitable the advent of renewal.

But it was difficult for the people. It may sound strange now, but, after all, until quite recently a good man, a first-rate worker, a resourceful economic manager could become a hero of labor but also end up in the dock. That is why the course of renewal has been so closely taken to heart by the working class and why our peasants, who accomplished a real feat in growing an unprecedented harvest in 1989, have so risen to the new tasks.

Our intelligentsia and scientists, who criticized the mistakes and shortcomings, now feel that their proposals and reform projects are being studied and put into practice rather than being rejected. Such people should become the heroes of new works of literature, movies, and other forms of art.

But there is another side to perestroyka and renewal. This is shown by the experience and events in certain socialist countries where attempts are being made to present in a gloomy light the whole stage along the path of socialism thus far traveled. Often this is done by those people who only yesterday were painting every picture exclusively in rosy colors.

We too have people who assess all the diversity of life from the standpoint of the commodity market. They question the spiritual value and real achievements of socialism. Yes, we have made quite a few mistakes and spoke about them boldly in the decisions of our sixth party congress. But, nevertheless, socialism has become the cause of millions, has put down roots in people's hearts, and has given them the great strength to accomplish revolutionary transformations. An American journalist once asked me: "Are Vietnamese writers not faced with the problem of the choice of social system?" And I replied with complete sincerity and conviction:

"No such dilemma exists either for writers or for the people. For 30 years the Western world—from France to the United States—attempted to knock us off this path with arms rather than words, but it was defeated. The 30 years of war and sacrifices we endured to achieve victory are the most convincing demonstration that it was not by chance that we chose our path and defended it. That path was opened up for us too in October 1917...." [passage omitted]

Near East & South Asia

Military Successes Boost Kabul's Prestige

PM0801162390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 7

[APN correspondent A. Pravov dispatch especially for PRAVDA: "January in Kabul"]

[Text] Kabul—Red party flags and green Islamic flags appeared in the streets of Kabul during the last few days of the old year and the first few days of the new year, as is now usual on holidays. The country has celebrated the 25th anniversary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA]. The red and green colors complemented each other peacefully, recalling the need for various ideologies to coexist and the possibilities expounded in the policy of national conciliation being pursued by the Kabul government and the PDPA.

Afghan President Najibullah, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, addressed the ceremonial meeting devoted to the anniversary. Giving a high evaluation of the role of the party in contemporary Afghan society, he nevertheless critically analyzed the whole difficult path which the PDPA had taken, and dwelt in detail on the mistakes that had occurred, particularly in the first few years after the April Revolution. Najibullah paid particular attention to the question of how to lead the country out of the state of war. The president once again appealed to all the forces participating in the protracted conflict to lay down their arms and join in the policy of national conciliation.

"The irreconcilable opposition" answered the appeals for peace with renewed shelling of the capital. As before, rocket projectiles exploded chiefly in the densely populated areas of the city. One of the most insidious types of rocket projectile, the cluster type, which had previously been used by the U.S. Army in Vietnam, has been used recently in the shelling of the capital.

The most hardheaded of the "irreconcilables" are stating that they will continue to carry out military actions, demanding the Kabul authorities' removal from the formulation of the country's policy in the future.

During the past year the Afghan Armed Forces have repulsed 8 large-scale enemy attacks at Jalalabad and 12 at Khowst, during which the attackers suffered severe losses. These military victories have perceptibly raised the authority of the Kabul government and the PDPA's prestige. And the policy of national conciliation today enjoys the support of various strata of the population.

"While giving assistance to former opposition members who have come over to the government's side," Afghan Minister of State Security G.F. Ya'Qubi told me, "the government is faced with the task of restoring the razed hospitals, schools, mosques, and irrigation ditches."

As far as the "irreconcilables" are concerned, the number of clashes between them is growing.. This primarily refers to two large groupings—Hekmatyar's "Islamic Party of Afghanistan" and V. Rabbani's "Islamic Society of Afghanistan." A real bloody vendetta has been going on between them for some months now, and it has taken many warriors' lives on both sides.

Passions are inflamed day after day. At the beginning of the year the "jihad" between the armed detachments of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan has already enveloped several of the country's provinces—Takhar, Badakhshan, Vardak, Qandahar, Balkh, Parvan, and some others.

In this situation the population is becoming increasingly aware that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of national conciliation.

Activities of Iranian Foreign Ministry Delegation

Bessmertnykh Meets Va'ezi

LD0901133790 Moscow TASS in English 1304 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 9 TASS—Talks were held here on January 8-9 between Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, and his visiting Iranian counterpart Mahmud Va'ezi.

The sides considered the main aspects of Soviet-Iranian relations, prospects for their further development and several international and regional issues, primarily those related to the Near and Middle East.

Tehran Radio Report

LD0801175990 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Today in Moscow, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Va'ezi met and conferred with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnyhkh.

The Central News Unit reports that in the meeting pivotal issues about bilateral relations, as well as regional issues, were discussed. The Soviet first deputy foreign minister evaluated the process of expanding bilateral relations as positive. He further described the continuation of bilateral talks as the necessary background for expanding comprehensive relations between the two countries and stressed that such relations can expand with greater momentum in all aspects.

Va'ezi, in turn, pointed to the process of continuous deepening of economic, political, and cultural relations between the two countries. He further pointed to the convention of the two countries' joint economic commission, which will meet in Tehran in the near future. He said: Today we enjoy new fundamental grounds for lasting mutual cooperation.

In conclusion to that meeting, the two sides stressed further expansion of relations and the exchange of political and economic delegations.

Iranian Tourism Delegation Visits Baku

LD0901132790 Tehran IRNA in English 1222 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Tehran, Jan. 9, IRNA—An Iranian delegation currently in the Soviet Union to hold talks with Soviet officials on providing facilities in the field of tourism, arrived in Baku, capital of the Soviet Azerbaijan republic, Tuesday. The delegation, headed by the director of the consular Affairs Department of the Iranian Foreign ministry, Tolu Massuleh, was welcomed by the deputy foreign minister of Azerbaijan Republic and other local tourism officials.

The two sides are expected to hold talks on the exchange of tourists between Iran and the Soviet Union.

The Iranian delegation has already held talks with the Soviet consular officials in Moscow. It also signed an agreement in Moscow according to which the two countries will open tourism offices in each country.

A Soviet delegation is due to visit Tehran in a near future to exchange views on tourism.

Iranian Deputies Attend Friday Prayers in Moscow

LD0601225490 Tehran in English to Europe 1930 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] During Friday prayer ceremonies which were held in Moscow's mosque, attended by a large number of Muslims, a group of deputies of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Majlis, were present. In the ceremonies, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Fakhreddin Musavi, the deputy of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, in a sermon reiterated the world Muslims' unity and cohesion. He said: Muslims must assist one another and make their efforts for the promotion of the banner of monotheism and Islam. The Friday prayer leader of Moscow's mosque, in his sermon, described the sending of the historic message by the late Imam Khomeyni, may his soul rest in peace, to the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, as a great and historic event.

Official Views Arab-USSR, Arab-U.S. Relations

JN0801172890 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic
7 Jan 90 p 18

[Interview with Vladimir Polyakov, chief of the Near Eastern and North African Countries Administration at the USSR Foreign Ministry, by Niqula Nasir in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] [Nasir] How would you assess Soviet-Arab relations, especially in the era of perestroyka?

[Polyakov] Soviet-Arab relations are wide-ranging and have developed in all areas. Soviet-Arab relations on a people-to-people basis have also advanced appreciably. We have no problems whatsoever with the Arab states, as the Soviets and Arabs agree by and large on all regional and global issues. We highly value our dialogue with nearly all the Arab states. We believe in the value of dialogue with the leaders of those countries on key regional issues and other world affairs. Furthermore, our relations with Arab states are branching out and we believe that the potential exists for good relations with all Arab states regardless of their political or economic systems. We base our relations with the Arab states on principles of noninterference and on respect for sovereignty and tradition. Our new political thinking envisages relations with the Arab states founded on a nonideological basis, on human rights, and on international law. The USSR is now taking an even greater interest in building up its relations with the Arab states. We appreciate that the Middle East is a turbulent region vexed by serious issues. There are unionist moves in the Arab world and the Arabs are increasing their international economic contacts, thus laying firm foundations for excellent USSR-Arab ties. There is room for further development of these relations on an intergovernmental and people-to-people footing. We have a high regard for Soviet-Arab relations, which go back decades.

[Nasir] With the Palestinian peace offensive and the Palestinian issue at a dead end thanks to Israel's intransigence and the U.S. commitment to Shamir's plan in the dialogue with the PLO, how do you see the way out?

[Polyakov] I do not subscribe to this assessment. The viability of this or that plan is up to neither Israel nor the United States. The settlement envisaged by the 19th session of the Palestine National Council, along with the intifadah, has created the right climate for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem. The Palestinian peace initiative, which enjoys widespread Arab and global support, is still going strong. We believe that the way out may lie in a solution based on reconciling all the current ideas and suggestions so as to achieve a balance of interests within the framework of the proposed international conference. Security and stability in the region will remain elusive in the absence of a fundamental solution to the Palestinian issue.

Palestinian peace initiative, which enjoys worldwide support, including general Arab support, continues to draw reactions. In our view, a solution can be reached through the participation of all parties representing the current opinions and proposals aimed at achieving an acceptable solution based on a balance of interests, a peaceful and comprehensive settlement, and an international conference. The issue of security and stability in the region can be resolved only through a radical solution to the Palestine question. We believe that the Casablanca summit resolutions can be used effectively in this regard through the Arab committee, which was set up in Casablanca for this purpose. The current rapprochement between Syria and Egypt may open the door for closer coordination among the five Arab parties to the conflict and may lead to the convening of a conference of their representatives.

[Nasir] Since Soviet leader Gorbachev and former U.S. President Reagan held their first conference, five summit meetings, about 40 meetings between USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and two U.S. secretaries of state, and many Soviet-U.S. meetings at the expert level have been held. As a result, solutions to numerous regional disputes have begun to occur. However, U.S. diplomacy has always failed to balance its position and achieve a breakthrough in the Palestine question. Can you give the Palestinian people and the region any hope for a solution and for peace in the foreseeable future as a result of these meetings?

[Polyakov] It is known that regional issues are discussed in the course of Soviet-U.S. political dialogues. The Middle East is a major issue in this context. It is also known that just solutions to regional disputes can be reached through Soviet-U.S. cooperation. We are trying to employ constructive and honest cooperation with the United States in searching for a solution to the Middle East dispute.

In this context, the Middle East was discussed during the Malta summit and in Shevardnadze's talks in Wyoming. A settlement can be achieved in the Middle East only through recognizing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and their national interests.

I must say that during all these meetings—which number about 30—between Soviet and U.S. leaders and foreign ministers, the Soviet side stuck to the following position: Without a just solution to the Palestine question, there will be no just settlement in the Middle East; that the Palestinian people's national rights, including the right to self-determination, should be safeguarded; and that the PLO should be viewed as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

At this point, we must commend the PLO's constructive position of seeking to achieve a just solution in the Middle East. Regrettably, there is still no proper Israeli response to the Palestinian and Arab proposals. The intifadah in the occupied Arab territories means that the Arab people there reject the "Israeli response."

We assert that the Soviet Union supports the PLO and the intifadah [uprising]. This is the position supported

by all Arab states, which was demonstrated in the Casablanca summit. We believe that the current appropriate circumstances must be exploited to start the process toward the international conference on the Middle East. If these circumstances are not taken advantage of, it will be hard to predict how the situation in the Middle East will develop. These are the main ideas that we raise during our dialogue with the Americans at every level.

[Nasir] Have the Egyptian 10 points affected—positively or negatively—Soviet efforts to convene the international conference on the Middle East?

[Polyakov] We pay attention to every proposal or initiative that seeks to start the peace process. We believe that one of the forms of this process is a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. As I said earlier—and according to the Soviet-French statement on the Middle East—it is important to provide conditions for safeguarding the rights and interests of all parties, including, naturally, the PLO. It must also be pointed out that the PLO must play an active role in resolving all issues and problems related to the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue.

[Nasir] Do the current circumstances call for resuming Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations as a necessary condition for activating the peace process in the region?

[Polyakov] You know very well the Soviet position on the issue of diplomatic ties with Israel. We can resume diplomatic ties with Israel only within the general framework of a settlement in the Middle East. This does not rule out the possibility of establishing relations between the Soviet Union and Israel on the political level for example, or through diplomatic channels. The Soviet foreign minister met three times with his Israeli counterpart in the past 3 years. We told the Israelis that they must adopt constructive positions, build relations or hold dialogue with the Palestinians, and achieve a settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the balance of interests.

During his visit to Egypt, our foreign minister said the Soviet Union was ready to host a Palestinian-Israeli meeting on Soviet soil in order to push the Middle East peace process forward. The Palestinians accepted the proposal while the Israelis have not as yet supported it.

The Americans suggested that we organize the meeting jointly, but that was only an attempt to draw us into their own position on the Middle East settlement. Very regrettably, the Americans did not consider the PLO as party to the settlement.

[Nasir] Soviet-Egyptian relations have recently witnessed marked progress. How are these relations currently developing?

[Polyakov] Egyptian-Soviet relations have a long history and are based on good traditions. Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Egypt has actually developed in all fields in the interests of the two countries and peoples and in terms of world peace and security. It is no secret that our relations deteriorated remarkably during the rule of President Anwar al-Sadat, but that was not the fault of the Soviet Union. Our two countries have managed to remove almost all the old obstacles thanks to the visit to Moscow by 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, Egyptian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, in May 1988 and the visit to Cairo by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in February 1989. There now exists an active political dialogue between us at the highest level.

There are now preparations for President Husni Mubarak's visit to the Soviet Union. In brief, the prospects are good for improved relations between our two countries; we are taking advantage of these prospects with a view to promoting and maintaining these relations.

[Nasir] Do you expect an imminent leap in Saudi-Soviet relations? It has been noticed that as a result of divorcing ideology from foreign relations, Soviet ties with the Arab countries termed as conservative have improved. Has this been accompanied by tepidness in relations with countries traditionally friendly with the Soviet Union?

[Polyakov] There are diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia. We have repeatedly announced our readiness to establish diplomatic relations and to promote ties. If the Saudi side makes an initiative to this effect, then we will respond favorably.

Political dialogue also exists between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia. I visited Saudi Arabia in 1988 as an official representative of my country—the first in 50 years; and I delivered an official message to the crown prince.

They did not view me as a communist in Saudi Arabia, nor did they reject the fact that I was. The reception was warm and the hospitality was Arab. I met once with Crown Prince 'Abdallah and twice with Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, and they arranged a special office for me at the Foreign Ministry where I was visited by representatives of all ministries.

Furthermore, the USSR and Saudi Arabian foreign ministers maintain contacts. We keep the Saudis informed of our political positions via our ambassadors in London, Washington, and other captials. A few years ago, a Saudi football team led by the minister of youth visited the Soviet Union, toured historical sites, and attended a local wedding ceremony.

[Nasir] Reports have appeared in Western media about a cooling in Syrian-Soviet relations. What is the truth behind these reports, and how will President Hafiz al-Asad's coming visit to Moscow be affected?

[Polyakov] There is no grain of truth in these reports. We have far-reaching and solid relations with Syria. We are bound by a treaty of friendship and cooperation, and

have identical views on the key regional and international issues. Syria is our closest ally in the region. It is no secret that some quarters are upset by this relationship. Government delegations still exchange visits, which are not mere formalities but of a functional nature. Furthermore, presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Hafiz al-Asad keep in touch and are well acquainted with each other. Their contacts have enriched Soviet-Syrian cooperation.

[Nasir] Turning to the nationalities question, last September the CPSU recommended increased powers for the Soviet republics. Would this result in direct contacts between Israel and the republics?

[Polyakov] The republics reserve the right to hold contacts not only with Israel but with other countries as well. To our knowledge, Azerbaijan and Georgia have direct contacts with Israel and Arab states, but these ties are not political. They are of a touristic nature and are conducted among a few corporations.

For example, groups of Estonians visited Israel in July at the invitation of Israeli economic institutions. While there, they invited the Israeli agriculture minister to visit Estonia to attend a flower exhibition (he laughs). The contacts were made through Jewish Soviet citizens.

[Nasir] Has the recent conference of Jewish organizations in the Soviet Union been attended by any delegations from Israel?

[Polyakov] We know that the organizers of the conference invited some Israelis as individuals only.

[Nasir] There are some fears in sections of Arab public opinion that the separation between ideology and foreign relations in Soviet policy and the principle of balanced interests will, in its application, affect Soviet-Arab relations negatively. For example, in 1988, Soviet defense sales to the Third World declined by about 47 percent while U.S. arms sales to the Third World increased by 66 percent—something between 8 and 9 billion dollars. The U.S. foreign aid program, which was announced more than 2 months ago, allocated 3 billion dollars to Israel, with more than half of the sum in the form of free military assistance. This means that legitimate Arab self defense against Israeli aggression and expansion will be affected negatively by the new Soviet approach unless there is a reciprocal U.S. approach. If the Soviet approach continues and U.S. military assistance to Israel continues to flow, then legitimate Arab self-defense will greatly be harmed.

[Polyakov] This is a very big question. The new political thinking in the Soviet Union is aimed at creating the appropriate atmosphere for world peace and security and preventing the eruption of a nuclear war.

The new pattern of our political thinking aims at establishing personal relations and contacts among all world leaders in order to serve the local and national interests of nations and the interests of humanity at large.

The main issue is nuclear disarmament, because there are weapons in the world that can destroy our small planet many times over. Soviet scientists believe that the use of nuclear weapons will bring disaster to the whole world, as proven by the Chernobyl accident. We are trying to settle regional conflicts and ease tensions in the world. We are doing this in the Middle East and other parts in the world through peaceful means and without resorting to force.

Therefore, the Arabs must search for the quickest and best ways to settle the Middle East conflict, because if this conflict continues, tension in the region will increase and military arsenals will continue to be built up.

Currently, the Middle East comes third after the Warsaw and NATO pacts in terms of armament. There are now weapons in the Middle East capable of destroying the North, including nuclear missiles and bacteriological weapons. There are also states in the Middle East "ascending" into space, which currently contains rockets. [sentence as published]

Hence, we tell the Americans and the Arabs that we must achieve a quick solution and reduce the level of armament in the Middle East. For example, we have signed an agreement with the Americans to liquidate medium- and short-range missiles. We do not have the right to export such weapons to the Middle Eastern states, and we will do our best to prevent the United States from doing so.

So far, the conflict in the region has not been resolved and certain Arab states are, regrettably, in a state of belligerence, and we take this matter into consideration. Therefore, we use the theory of reasonable defense sufficiency. This theory must be used by all states and in all regions in the world.

We tell the Americans that their policy of raising the level of Israeli's military capability will only benefit certain forces and will accelerate the arms race in the region, which will prompt the Arabs to obtain the same weapons. We also tell them that we Soviets are not taking part in the arms race and we support the search for a quick solution to the problem in the Middle East.

We continue military cooperation with Syria, Iraq, and some other Arab states. But, at the same time, we tell our Arab friends that we are against the arms race and support a quick solution to the problem, and we accept the Arab's viewpoint on their right to defend themselves. Therefore, we try to remove all the causes for arms races. There is nothing new in this, and we say it publicly.

Increased Jewish Immigration to Israel Examined

LD0501181990 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Unattributed commentary: "Once Again on Jewish Emigration From the Soviet Union"]

[Text] There has been a noticeable increase recently in the number of Soviet Jewish emigrants from the Soviet

Union, and views are being put forward that this tendency will continue and may even broaden. Various forecasts are also being made in this respect.

One should say that this matter has a history, but efforts are now being made to focus on its political side and also to misrepresent it. Soviet officials have more than once given an explanation for this issue, and despite everything we return to this matter.

The Arabs' sensitivity on the issue of the emigration of Jews to Israel does not need to be demonstrated—but the Soviet Union has always proceeded from the point that one cannot realize rights for some citizens while violating the rights of others, and this applies in the first place to the Arab Palestinian people who had been driven away from their homeland. It also applies to the rights of Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union without any restriction and to live where they want. This is called for by the nature of the time, international conventions, and the quest to practice relations with other countries and peoples on a civilized basis.

As for those who are propagating the question of the emigration of Soviet Jews, they are not seeking to expose its essence but to misrepresent Soviet policy, and to undermine the relations of the Soviet Union with the Arabs. One should mention here that distorted facts and figures are being presented deliberately and ignorantly in many cases concerning Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.

According to data furnished by the Soviet visa office, some 90,000 persons have indeed left the Soviet Union with visas for Israel, and only 7,000 of them have in fact arrived in Israel. True, there may be some increase in this respect, but naturally the point at issue is that there has been absolutely no arrival on masse of Soviet Jews to Israel—a matter which, as is alleged, may lead to a fundamental alteration of the demographic situation in the Arab-occupied lands.

There is something else which draws attention in the light of the propaganda campain under way: It is the fact that some information media are propagating the idea that many Soviet Jews arriving in Israel become extremist supporters of the conservative wing of the Israeli political forces. No one wants to justify the illegal acts against the Palestinians by former Soviet citizens who have settled in Israel. The position of the Soviet Union on this matter is clear and it has been affirmed more than once from the international podium of the United Nations during the debates of the situation in the Arab-occupied territories—but what demands vigilance is the fact that judgments made regarding this subject discreetly lead to conclusions concerning general Soviet Middle East Policy. In other words, we are clearly witnessing an attempt to pillory the essence of the Middle East policy in the Middle East. For the sake of being truthful, one should say that most of the Arabs themselves reject such lies, and the enemies of Soviet-Arab friendship are the only ones to raise this question in this manner.

They exploit the feelings of ordinary people for their precise political objectives of doing away with the great potential for achievements which have characterized Soviet-Arab relations for decades.

Sudanese Efforts To Solve Economic Crisis Noted

EA0501202890 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Text] The political difficulty Sudan is facing has been exacerbated by the economic crisis in which this nation finds itself. Aleksandr Mikhaylov, Radio Moscow correspondent, comments on the military government's attempt to solve the economic difficulty Sudan is facing:

General 'Umar al-Bashir, who took over the running of the country in a coup d'etat on 30 June last year on behalf of 15 generals and colonels, has said that Sudan's economy can only be revived by an iron hand. The regime believes that suppression of the corruption and mismanagement brought about by the multiparty system is one of the ways of correcting the economic ills of Sudan. It also believes that the apprehension of businessmen linked to religious and political groups is another method that can help solve Sudan's economic plight [words indistinct].

The regime's objective is excellent. Such a program would enable the regime to win the support of the majority of Sudanese, said our commentator. The current war being waged against corruption and mismanagement is a credit added to the achievement of the military regime. In order to wage a fierce war against the illegal hard currency market and the hoarding of food, special courts with full powers have been established. These courts have already sentenced some people, one of them to a death sentence. Mahdi Mahjub, a famous young Sudanese businessman, was sentenced to death last month after he was accused of dealing in hard currency. The sentencing of death to Mahdi Mahjub slams the door on the face of all those corrupt and illegal traders who thought that this case might be concluded with talk and general compromise.

Would the military regime therefore receive any praise for its victory if the problem did not exist? All these stringent measures have had an adverse effect on the economy of the country. It has suddenly been realized that it is impossible to compete with the illicit trade in Sudan. The military regime thought that after bringing pressure to bear on the illicit trade, the government economic sectors and private businessmen would enter the market to fill the vacuum created by the banishment of black marketeers. But this has not happened.

The food shortage is getting worse because traders have started to hoard commodities to avoid selling them at government-controlled prices and the government is

unable to supply these commodities. The foreign exchange situation is difficult. It has always been difficult to obtain foreign currency with Sudanese pounds. Before now the situation was better because of remittances by Sudanese working in Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, estimated at up to $1.5 billion last year. This source has also dried up because of the instability in the country. The illicit trade has been reduced by the stringent government measures but the rate of exchange has risen steeply. The stringent measures by the military regime on the foreign exchange market have been profitable. The revenue from the foreign exchange market has been estimated at several million dollars. The question is: How has this revenue been spent?

Any economist would advise the government to invest it in the economic sectors that can produce urgently needed commodities or to import the country's requirements. The import of commodities would be more useful than any stringent measures to bring down prices. The Khartoum government, however, has bought weapons to modernize the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces are arming themselves in accordance with the directive of Gen 'Umar al-Bashir to the effect that the Sudanese Armed Forces should prepare themselves to inflict a final defeat on the southern rebels. The stringent measures adopted by the regime in the economic sector may be open to debate, but there is no doubt that whatever revenue is received from such measures is not serving to improve the economy of the country.

Bahrain, USSR Exchange Telegrams

90UI0237A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 11

[Text] (TASS)—The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has sent a telegram of congratulations to Sheykh Isa bin Sulman al Khalifa, amir of the state of Bahrain, on national day—the 28th anniversary of the amir's ascension to the throne. The telegram conveyed sincere congratulations and wishes for good health and happiness to the amir personally and prosperity and success to the friendly Bahraini people.

In a telegram in reply to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium the amir of the State of Bahrain expressed gratitude for the congratulations and wished the friendly Soviet people further progress and prosperity.

East Europe

Bulgarian Newsman's Impressions of Albania Cited

PM0801160590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[RABOTNICHESKO DELO international observer V. Stratiev report specially for PRAVDA: "How Albanians Live..."—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] "Albania remains a 'blank spot' for us." "Why do we write nothing about this country?" "How do Albanians live?"—this type of question often crops up in letters and phone calls. No Soviet journalists have set foot on Albanian soil for more than 25 years. However, diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Albania, for instance, have not been broken off. Although interparty ties are "frozen," trade exchanges continue. Last year our Bulgarian colleague attended a regional conference of Balkan countries held in Tirana.

...The fact that Albania is a beautiful country is something you can learn for yourself at home by reading a guidebook. But what really struck me was how well-tended the land was, or, rather, how the people are able to make use of any piece of land suitable for cultivation—be it a swampy hollow or a hillside with olive plantations.

Albania proclaimed the course of "standing on its own feet," but lately its leaders have been increasingly realizing that the efficient development of the national economy is inconceivable without links to the outside world. How to achieve this and to what extent is another matter. I cannot reassure PRAVDA readers interested in the problem of the restoration of Soviet-Albanian relations: The Albanian leadership recently condemned the perestroyka policy, interpreting it as a "return to capitalism." So, regrettably, there is no "light at the end of the tunnel" as yet.

There are no private cars in Albania, but there are no taxes either. There are restrictions on the sale of meat, sugar, and certain industrial goods, but fruit and vegetables are available in abundance. One other interesting fact is that since 1967 Albania has been the world's sole officially atheist country...

So what are Albanians like? I discussed this with the well-known poet and translator Fatos Arapi [name as transliterated], who once studied in Bulgaria.

"Albanians are sensitive but tough characters at the same time," he said. "Albanians may be impoverished and poorly read but they are kind and friendly to others."

I would add to this that Albanians are hospitable, although, regrettably, the state of relations between our countries is not overly conducive to the manifestation of these qualities.

On the whole, summing up my impressions, I would claim that Albanians are ordinary people. The kids love playing soccer, the adults prefer watching TV.

Bulgarian Consulate General Opens in Minsk

LD0501152590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1430 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] A consulate general of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has commenced its activity in Minsk. Stoil Ferdov, who has been appointed the People's Republic

of Bulgaria consul general, has been received by leaders of the Communist Party and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic government.

Minister Bessmertnykh Receives Bulgarian Envoy

PM0801112790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy foreign minister, received G. Pankov, Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR, 2 January.

The ambassador briefed him on the latest Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee plenum and gave him the text of the Bulgarian Councils of State and Ministers decision revoking earlier individual decisions infringing the rights of Bulgarian citizens with Muslim names.

In the course of the conversation questions of the further improvement of Soviet-Bulgarian foreign policy collaboration and a number of topical problems pertaining to the international situation were also discussed.

Bulgarian Public Council Discusses Minorities

LD0801152490 Moscow TASS in English 1508 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Sofia January 8 TASS—Bulgaria's Public Council today began to discuss various aspects of the minority issue at the National Assembly building.

The meeting is attended by representatives of the National Committee for the Protection of National Interests, members of the ethnic Turkish and Muslim minority, leaders of the National Assembly, parliamentary groups of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union and Parliamentary Standing commissions, representatives of the public, non-party public figures, the Bulgarian patriarch and the chief mufti.

The meeting was opened by National Assembly President Stanko Todorov.

On Sunday, the National Assembly leadership issued an appeal to Bulgarian citizens, saying the Public Council was convened because the minority issue "had turned into a dangerous watershed."

It said the polarisation and confrontation in Bulgarian society "have reached a point, beyond which developments become unpredictable."

The appeal urged the population to display a "high sense of responsibility, reason, restraint and readiness for constructive dialogue to achieve democracy, calm and security—the values that are so much desired by all of us."

The parliamentary leadership warned against any action violating public order and tranquility in order to ensure a calm week from January 8-15 for the Public Council's normal work.

Radio Assesses Bulgaria's Ethnic Unrest

LD0701102190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 7 Jan 90

[Text] Our correspondent in Bulgaria has reported that the situation in the southern districts of the country, especially in the cities of Kurdzhali and Khaskovo where a significant number of the Turkish-language population live, is becoming difficult and that tension is growing. So listen to the correspondent's report of Viktor Samarin.

[Samarin] The wave of passions which has swelled up concerning national and ethnic problems is surging already into other districts. In Sofia, Varna, and Ruse there have been large street meetings of both advocates and adversaries of the decision adopted just before the New Year by the State Council and by the government about restoration of the legitimate rights of citizens who consider themselves ethnic Turks.

One would hae thought: What objections can there be against the restoration of justice and of elementary human rights? It would seem that every one has seen how assimilation according to the Zhivkov method brought incalculable suffering and denigration to hundreds of thousands of people. Those who did not agree to voluntarily change their names were arrested. Gravestones with the Turkish names of ancestors were destroyed. A fine was imposed for observing customs and rites and even for addressing someone in a shop in Turkish. Now, when the undertaking of Zhivkov at last has been condemned and cancelled as being definitely criminal and absolutely anti-democratic, such a reaction on the part of a fairly significant part of society is, you will agree, absurd. At some meetings, chauvinistic calls resound to exile all Bulgarian Muslims to Turkey, and at other meetings bellicose natioalists demand even the territorial division of Bulgaria, and wave Turkish flags.

Of course, the overwhelming majority of Bulgarians are indignant at both groups. All the major sociopolitical forces and organizations of Bulgaria, including the Communist Party, the Bulgarian Crop Farmers' Popular Union, the trade unions and the unions of democratic forces, the PODKREPA [expansion unknown] independent federation, the Union of Veterans of Struggle Against Capitalism and Fascism, and youth associations and creative unions have made a joint declaration. The declaration contains a call to all citizens of Bulgaria to rebuff the chauvinists and nationalists, and in harmony to work for democratic transformations in a Bulgarian society, in which all people, regardless of what nationality and what religion they considered themselves to belong to, would be equal under the law and would feel that they are free masters of a united Bulgaria.

Bulgarian Demonstrations, Developments Reported

PM0801112390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Kapralov report: "Difficult Path to Unity"]

[Text] Sofia—The most serious consequence of Zhivkov's distortions in solving the nationalities question was the cultivated artificial opposition of the main section of Bulgaria's population to its Muslim section. These sentiments particularly increased in the summer of 1989 during the mass exodus of the Turkish-speaking population to Turkey, when those who remained bore a double burden both in industry and in agriculture.

At the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Central Committee plenum at the end of December when the question of overcoming the distortions permitted regarding the country's Turkish-speaking and Muslim population was being decided, there were no illusions that this process would be painless. Some people, particularly from among those who returned to Bulgaria after their enforced "excursion" to the neighboring country, were unable to resettle in their homes. Difficulties also arose with work. Nationalist and chauvinist sentiments have still not been overcome.

On 2 January the BCP Central Committee Politburo examined the question of what initial steps had been taken to explain and implement the decisions of the December plenum. It was noted that most Bulgarians approve of this decision. Although it was overdue, nonetheless it prevented a dangerous turn of events in the country. A positive reaction is also typical for those places where both sections of the Bulgarian people live, so to speak, side by side,—in Plovdiv and Varna oblasts. There citizens and state and party organs interpreted the plenum's decision responsibly and are demonstrating political maturity.

At the same time, the Politburo noted, some party organizations were concerned about and disagreed with the plenum's decisions. This particularly concerns Razgrad oblast and Kurdzhali municipality. The Politburo expressed confidence that emotions would give way to common sense and a peaceful solution to the conflicts. It appealed to the Kurdzhali inhabitants to demonstrate good will and mutual assistance.

The Politburo appealed to the population not to tolerate opposition, not to yield to provocations and threats, and to abandon old grievances. Supreme national duty and the country's interests dictate the need for national unity, reconciliation, and accord. The Politburo stresses that local party and state organs, as also noted in the plenum, are not responsible for the fact that people's names were forcibly changed. So all those who instigate violence, who resort to speculation or intrigue, will meet the party's firm resistance. The main concern now is painstaking work to interpret, explain, and implement the decisions adopted by the party. A firm "no" should be said to nationalism, chauvinism, and Islamic fundamentalism and a firm "yes" to unity, reconciliation, and accord.

...About 15,000 people gathered in Kurdzhali in front of the party municipal committee building. A. Lukanov, member of the Politburo and secretary of Central Committee, addressed them. Banners were raised over the heads of those assembled: "We welcome the decision of the BCP Central Committee plenum!", "Give back the Muslims their names and rights!", but next to them were "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians!", "Stop Turkizing the Bulgarians!" Addressing the rally's participants, A. Lukanov said that in the immediate future a parliamentary group will arrive in Kurdzhali for meetings and consultations with representatives of the population. All the opinions and assessments heard will be presented to the National Assembly.

On the same day, 2 January, about a thousand Kurdzhali citizens held a rally near the National Assembly in Sofia. They were protesting against the way the decision was taken at the December BCP Central Committee plenum. In the opinion of the rally's participants, it was made without taking account of the situation at local level. A. Dimitrov, deputy chairman of the National Assembly, was handed a declaration containing a demand to postpone the decision on the nationalities question in parliament and not to adopt it at either of the two sessions which will take place in January, but to do this only after a nationwide referendum.

CSSR's Havel To Visit USSR Early February

LD0801143190 Moscow TASS in English 1427 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS—Czechoslovakia's President Vaclav Havel will arrive in the Soviet Union on a working visit in early February at the invitation of the Soviet leadership.

Katushev, CSSR's Calfa Discuss Cooperation

LD0501073690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] At a meeting in Prague between Marian Calfa, head of the Czechoslovak Government, and Konstantin Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations, the further development of economic cooperation between the USSR and Czechoslovakia was discussed.

They gave particular attention to deliveries of oil and oil products to the CSSR. Also examined were problems of economic integration, the activities of CEMA, and questions of price formation within the framework of bilateral trade.

CSSR Political Developments Detailed

PM0501154790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Toward a Renewed Czechoslovakia"]

[Text] Prague, 4 Jan—Behind the glossy cover of the "quiet" revolution in Czechoslovakia, the prose of everyday life has begun. The country's new leadership is having to come to grips with the intricate plots of this prose. CSSR President V. Havel has visited Ostrava, where social tension has increased in connection with the forthcoming reorganization of the coal mining industry and massive redundancies for miners. It has been decided to pay fairly impressive sums of money to the miners being laid off, as compensation for the loss of their jobs. There will be some 15,000 redundancies over two 5-year-plan periods.

Six weeks have passed since the events of 17 November in Prague. According to information provided by the parliamentary commission, more than 160 people were hurt when the student demonstration was broken up. The first fatal outcome of this conflict has been recorded. Unable to stand the psychological pressure and sensing that retribution was inevitable, yesterday morning J. Becvar, a colonel in the National Security Corps and one of the leaders of Operation "Student" on National Avenue that November evening, shot himself. On Wednesday, the parliamentary commission heard evidence from a number of people, including Major General B. Carda, former chief of the capital's National Security Corps Directorate. He said that since October 1988 the breaking up of demonstrations has been personally overseen from the National Security Corps headquarters by M. Stepan, former first secretary of the Prague Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] City Party Committee. It was on his orders that tear gas, water cannons, and armored personnel carriers were used against demonstrators. Essentially, M. Stepan's guilt was totally proven at yesterday's session. Arrested 23 December, he awaits the start of his trial. The question of who will be tried with him will be decided by the parliamentary commission, which also has at its disposal material from the investigation conducted by the CSSR General Prosecutor's Office.

The student community does not want to remain in the shadows of the sociopolitical processes now taking place in Czechoslovakia. They have even remained unimpressed by an appeal from L. Vaculik, a prominent figure in the 1968 "Prague Spring," who said at a meeting with students at Charles University: "You have begun something which you yourselves will not be able to resolve. A lot of work awaits you. Go home. Your main aim is to study." It has been announced that yesterday a meeting of representatives of the country's higher education establishments in Prague set up an all-state strike union, which is expected to protect the interests of its members. The union's highest body is the student parliament, which consists of two chambers: Czech and Slovak.

One of the main topics in the first days of this year is the release from jails and corrective labor establishments of all those prisoners affected by the amnesty decree. The gates to a new life for the good of a renewed Czechoslovakia are opening up before the exprisoners. That is how the extensive amnesty announced by President Havel is being interpreted here. A different fate awaits those people who provided the ideological base for the policies of the former CPCZ leadership. Many journalists of party publications are being forced to change their profession. M. Kusy, chairman of the CSSR Federal Press and Information Administration, recently warned of the impermissibility of launching a "persecution campaign" against Communists. But this campaign has begun anyway, despite his appeal. CTK has distributed a report directly accusing a number of RUDE PRAVO journalists of "distorting facts and events in the interests of a one-party monopoly." The report contains an appeal to strip them of the title of laureate of the highest journalistic accolade—the Julius Fucik Prize—awarded to them last year.

Economic Reforms Planned

PM0701210190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "CSSR: Upcoming Economic Reforms"]

[Text] Prague, 6 Jan— Every passing day since the "velvet revolution" in Czechoslovakia brings new evidence of continuing struggle between political forces.

Outwardly all is quiet. Students are washing store windows, plastered with leaflets and posters during the recent weeks. The portraits of V. Havel which inundated Prague are disappearing. Havel is at the Castle, the struggle for the presidency won. Ahead lie elections to the Federal Assembly, which will take place in the new conditions of a multiparty system.

The "Roundtable" meeting participants noted the need to change representative organs at all levels. They came to the conclusion that the elections to the supreme organs of power should be held during the first half of the current year, and the elections to local representative bodies later, when the necessary political climate has been established in society. The meeting participants regard the efficient and responsible operation of these organs as a necessary precondition for the functioning of the state mechanism and the further development of democracy.

It is also time for action in the economy. Vaclav Klaus, CSSR minister of finance, gave a news conference on a "package of measures to implement important reforms." He stressed that the transformations will apply also to the retail trade price system, and in the very near future at that. The government is taking this step consciously, although it is aware that it may be risky. Judging by these words from the minister, it will be a question of price rises, some of them substantial.

The minister still likes to joke. Speaking about his visit to Poland, V. Klaus noted that he agreed with the author of the Polish economic reforms, L. Balcerowicz, that should their plans fail—an option which they themselves, obviously, do not rule out—they would jointly write a book with the title "How Not to Implement Economic Reforms in Conditions of Centralized Planning." However, if these plans fail, the peoples of Czechoslovakia and Poland will be in no mood for jokes.

In Bratislava a meeting was held between the CSSR and Austrian ministers of internal affairs. They discussed joint measures to protect the state border between the two countries following the removal of barriers, and also a package of questions relating to day-to-day life in the border area.

The press and television report multiplying suicides among former staffers of the party apparatus and the security service. There are reports about a rising crime rate since the president's proclamation of a large-scale amnesty and the release of criminal elements. These are the realities of present-day Czechoslovakia, which is entering a period of reconstruction of political, economic, and social life.

PRAVDA Cites Adamec CPCZ Plenum Remarks

PM0801125090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
8 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "New Correlation of Forces"]

[Text] Prague, 7 Jan—A plenum of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee was held here on Saturday [6 January], the first since the extraordinary CPCZ congress. The participants expressed views on questions of party building and defined priority tasks for primary party organizations.

A report was delivered by L. Adamec, chairman of the CPCZ. In the CSSR, he noted, a new correlation of political forces has arisen, a new power structure of a pluralist type, in which the party is one of the component parts. Party organizations are now under strong pressure and in some places they are having to leave the labor collectives or cease their activity. The party has to proceed on the basis of this realistic assessment of the situation.

L. Adamec cited as the central question in the CPCZ's activity the consistent eradication of past deformations, which the majority of honest Communists, primarily the rank and file, not only did not agree with, but even came out against. They also take the credit for the fact that the revolutionary changes were able to take place calmly, by nonviolent means.

The CPCZ, he went on, does not see it as its mission to stimulate opposition sentiments; it is in favor of honest dialogue and the quest for compromises and agreements. The idea of national mutual understanding is one that is close to Communists' hearts. The program principles of the president and the political forces that put him forward include many ideas that are common to the entire rebirth and democratization movement today.

We make no secret of our differences of views on some issues, such as the postwar deportation of Germans. However, we hold the view that today our country must focus its attention on what unites the majority of citizens, the party chairman stated.

L. Adamec expressed confidence that socialism is not dead, but is a real force, an attractive alternative solution to the present-day problems of the development of human civilization.

CSSR Row Over 'Apology' to Germans Reported

PM0801161390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Jan 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent S. Vtorushin dispatch: "There Will Be No Apologies... About an Incident in Prague"]

[Text] Prague—Until quite recently Wenceslas Square was the hottest spot in the Czechoslovak capital. People dissatisfied with the policy of the country's former leadership gathered here in their thousands for rallies and demonstrations. They demanded changes, and these changes took place.

In the last few days, however, the name of another of Prague's squares—Old Town Square—has been on the lips of many people. Crowds gather around the Jan Hus Monument, right in the middle of the square, from morning till night. 68-year-old Miroslav Klen [name as transliterated] has declared a hunger strike as a sign of protest there. The protest is against a statement by recently elected CSSR President Vaclav Havel that he deems it necessary to apologize to Sudeten Germans who were deported from Czechoslovakia after the war on the basis of the Potsdam Conference decisions. It became known that Havel declared this 1 week prior to his election in a letter sent to FRG President Weizsaecker. RUDE PRAVO cited an excerpt from this letter 4 January. It says:

"I personally, like many of my friends, condemn the expulsion of Germans after the war. I have always believed this to have been a profoundly immoral action which inflicted both moral and material damage not only on the Germans but also, in all probability on an even greater scale, on the Czechs themselves. When an evil is countered by another evil, this means that evil is not suppressed but is, on the contrary, compounded."

The day after he sent the letter, V. Havel said in reply to a question by Czechoslovak Television:

"I think that Czechoslovakia's borders must remain unchanged and none of the deported Germans should return. At the same time, I think that we must apologize to the Germans who were deported after World War II."

These words provoked a far from unambiguous reaction in Czechoslovak society. Miroslav Klen proclaimed a hunger strike by the Jan Hus monument as of 1 January. Posters are also to be seen there, reading: "My father was twice arrested during the occupation, subjected to inhuman tortures, and died soon after the war. My uncle Vojtech, his wife Olga, and their children Maria, Vera, Jozef, and Jindrich; another uncle, Alois, his wife Olga, and their son Milan were murdered by the Nazis. I myself was in the underground, then in a concentration camp, then I fought abroad, and was hospitalized until 1946 when I was discharged as an invalid. And I should apologize?"

Many letters arrive nowadays in Czechoslovak Television, newspaper editorial offices, and the Civic Forum Coordination Committee. People write to recall that more than 360,000 Czechoslovak citizens died during World War II. Henlein's party, which gained over 90 percent of the votes of all Germans living in Czechoslovakia at the 1938 elections, became Hitler's "fifth column." It played an evil role in the liquidation of the Czechoslovak Republic and its occupation by the Nazis in 1939. After that the Czechoslovak people had to live through 6 terrible years of humiliation, violence, and physical destruction. The Soviet Army helped to restore the people's freedom and revive the republic.

Signatures against apologies to the Sudeten Germans are being collected near the Jan Hus monument in Old Town Square. That same square is also the stage for incessant debates.

Ladislav Adamec, chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, issued a special statement in connection with the prevailing situation. It says, in part: "Apologies for the deportation are impermissible also in view of the fact that they would, without any doubt, encourage the promotion of more and more fresh demands by many organizations of German migrants, which would raise doubts about postwar developments in Europe and would complicate—if not render impossible—the building of the common European home." The statement emphasizes that the Communist Party is striving to create an atmosphere of international mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation, and supports the government's foreign policy aimed at boosting Czechoslovakia's role in this process. It advocates the deepening of good relations with all German neighbors. But Communists do and always will remember the people's vital interests and will never give up their defense.

A news conference was held at the Civic Forum premises 4 January. It was noted there that the question of the Sudeten Germans' deportation was finally resolved a long time ago and the Czechoslovak Government will not offer any apologies in this regard. At the same time CSSR President V. Havel issued an invitation to Miroslav Klen. According to a report on the meeting, a detailed explanation of the president's positions indicated that their views on this question are virtually identical. M. Klen ended the hunger strike.

The incident is over, and this could be the end of it. But it does offer some food for thought. In today's world even top leaders are unable to determine policies without participation by the whole people, let alone to speak on their behalf. The people are no longer willing to play the role of silent bystanders.

GDR, FRG Leaders Berlin Meeting Described

90UI0244A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 52, 27 Dec 89 p 9

[Article by TASS correspondent Igor Osinskiy, under the rubric "7 Days": "Hello, Berlin! The Brandenburg Gate Opened Wide"]

[Text] **This day has been long awaited on both sides of the Berlin Wall, perhaps since 13 August 1961, when by government decision the Brandenburg Gate, and with it the country's entire border, was "locked and barred."**

On Friday, 22 December, a light rain began in the morning. It got heavier and heavier, as if to test the patience of the crowd around the wall. At around 1500, 1 and ½ hours before the festive ceremony, it became a downpour. The umbrellas became soaked in the hands of those who had been there since morning, but no one paid any attention to it.

I shall, perhaps, not be wrong if I say that in spite of many attempts to present the opening of the gate almost as a symbol of a reunified Germany, common sense ruled in this matter. "If walls fall in the East, then they must also fall in the West for world-wide reconstruction, for the good of mankind"—I read on one of the posters on the other side of the wall. Incidentally, this was the only day so far that a TASS correspondent not specifically accredited in West Berlin could go there without encountering obstacles. That, which already long ago became reality for the inhabitants of the GDR, for citizens of any other nation, is still in the realm of hope for the Soviet people. I have seen how border guards barred the way to my newly arrived colleagues from the USSR bringing extreme astonishment to the American, British, and French journalists and I find it difficult to explain to them the reasons for such discrimination. What part of the ceremony of the opening of two pedestrian passages remains strongest in my memory? Perhaps the handshake between GDR Council of Ministers Chairman Hans Modrow and FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl. They literally squeezed toward each other through crowds of Berliners feeling themselves, at that moment, as being inhabitants of a united world city

This was not the first meeting between the heads of government of the two German states. A short time before they held talks in the GDR capital on the creation of a contractual community. The understanding of this in international parlance is not yet a matter of habit, therefore a few words about how it is being treated by the negotiating parties.

The central factor in a contractual community must be economic. Close coordination of economic activity, including the creation of joint enterprises, is foreseen. Incidentally, the first of them has been formed already, its "godparents" being the combine "Robotron" and the West German company "Pilz." The first production—compact disks—they will be issued in 1991. Step by step, the levels of development of the FRG and GDR economies should move closer. Naturally, this can happen only with significant material help from the FRG to the GDR, which has been promised already.

According to one view, when the living standards and positions on the more important international problems become comparable, when one can get rid of the decades-old "image of the enemy" for good, remove ideological barriers, when the "all-European house" takes a real form, the two German governments will discuss the unification question.

The outline of the development of relations between the GDR and the FRG, in the agreements signed by H. Kohl and H. Modrow, looks like this on paper. It is not to be forgotten that, in reality, all will be somewhat different. Quite a few hotheads on both sides of the border are not satisfied with the rate of progress. They insistently demand—and not only at public meetings—a quicker pace. I will not predict which of the tendencies will take the upper hand. But, I believe, that to those who determine policies in both German governments it is no secret that history knows no drafts, it can be done only in final form. Therefore it is better to measure very carefully.

Conflicting Reports on Soviet Role in GDR Noted

PM0701210990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed feature: "Who Was It That Did Not Shoot?"]

[Text] "E. Honecker... issued a written order to open fire on demonstrators in Leipzig... According to some information, our top officers in the GDR were also directly or indirectly involved in preventing a tragedy." (NOVOYE VREMYA No. 1, 1990)

M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff: "Our military were in no way involved. They were instructed by the General Staff not to intervene in any matters pertaining to domestic interrelations in the fraternal countries. Everything that is happening there is the sole concern of each individual country."

W. Brandt, honorary president of the Social Democratic Party [SPD] of Germany and former FRG chancellor: "If anyone ever writes about this period of time, then 9 October will be noted as a special day of German-Soviet friendship, because on that very day top Soviet officers prevented a 'blood bath' in Leipzig," Willy Brandt has said, without giving the sources of his information." (BERLINER ZEITUNG, quoting the ADN NEWS AGENCY).

[Editorial Comment] Without question, the credit for avoiding a "bloodbath" in Leipzig and other parts of the GDR during the mass demonstrations in early October 1989 belongs above all to the democratically-minded members of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the GDR citizens themselves. It is not a question of distributing laurels. However, if the prestigious West German politician is right, then this probably says more about perestroyka and democratization inside the Soviet Army than the Soviet generals have said during the past 5 years. Unfortunately, we cannot comment on the two utterances because we still lack the most important version of the story—that of Soviet eye-witnesses of the events.

This was the situation as of 2120 hours [presumably 6 January].

Abuses by Former SED Leaders Brought to Light

PM0801135590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Investigation Into Abuses Continues"]

[Text] Berlin, 5 Jan—An independent medical commission will soon answer the question of whether E. Honecker's state of health allows him to be detained in custody. This was announced here at a session of the parliamentary committee investigating cases of abuse of power, corruption, and personal gain. According to ADN, members of the committee have visited the jail where W. Stoph, G. Mittag, G. Kleiber, W. Krolikowski, E. Mielke, and H. Tisch, former members of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] leadership, are being detained and said that the conditions in which they are being kept correspond to the generally accepted norms.

A number of former party and state leaders gave evidence at the committee session. K. Hager said that he confesses his guilt and repents of his actions. He was responsible for culture, public education, science, and public health care. Virtually every decision to ban works of literature and art was personally sanctioned by him. He was involved in the exile of the well-known poet and singer W. Biermann, and his "dispute" with the scientist R. Havemann, head of department at Berlin University, led to the latter being expelled from the party, losing his job, and suffering persecution by state security organs.

Hager said the former party leadership's biggest mistake was its "arrogant attitude to the Soviet Union," which was openly shown after restructuring began in the USSR.

Members of the committee reacted indignantly to the statement by H. Sindermann, former president of the People's Chamber. They were particularly outraged by the fact that, after a turning point had been reached in the GDR's internal life, Sindermann prevented the People's Chamber from going immediately into session. "I did not appreciate the full import of this decision," he admitted.

Facts attesting to personal gain by the family of the former president of the People's Chamber were published. In the last 2 years, members of his family have bought various goods worth 200,000 marks in stores in the government settlement of Wandlitz, although, according to Sindermann, his monthly salary was no more than 4,500 marks. Shortly before the closure of these special trade centers, members of his family acquired four Western television sets there, for example. Free servicing of their cars, the use of special aircraft for holidays in Greece and Bulgaria, hunting in lush lands: all this was considered normal.

Former State Secretary K. Kleinert disclosed details of houses built for the families of nomenklatura personnel. It is estimated that the cost of the materials and works amounted to 240,000 marks. This sum alone is triple that spent on building "ordinary" individual homes. As a rule, however, the figure was considerably higher than this. The houses which Stoph, Krolikowski, and Kleiber had built for their children cost 1.5 million marks. Moreover, this money had been allocated for the supposed purpose of building "defense installations."

The parliamentary committee is continuing its work.

SED-PSD Leadership Makes Changes, Cutbacks

PM0801160390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism Apparatus Cutbacks"]

[Text] Berlin, 3 Jan—Complying with the demands of its extraordinary congress, the board of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS] has begun the determined process of breaking up the old structures. This process is being carried out from the very "top." The task is to reorganize the apparatus so that it becomes an organ for the administration of party life and does not interfere in the activity of the national economy and other spheres.

The departments of the former Central Committee have been abolished and nine commissions formed in their place; these commissions will determine the main directions of party policy. They are responsible for the organization of internal party work and party education, as well as the activity of party press organs and the international policy of the SED-PDS, and will work out the main positions on the most important sociopolitical problems. Working groups have also been set up to assist the commissions; these groups will prepare the necessary information material.

According to L. Bisky, member of the SED-PDS Board Presidium, when developing new forms and methods of party work, the main emphasis is to be placed on democratization, the ensuring of broad glasnost, and indissoluble ties between the leading bodies and the base. The information and consultation center which recently began operation in the board building has become the scene of constant meetings and discussions.

No less substantial changes aim to cut expenditure on maintaining the apparatus. The salaries of leading personnel have been considerably reduced. For example, the party chairman's salary is M1,000 marks less than that of the former general secretary. Only the chairman, his deputies, and the commission leaders have the right to use official personal transport. Ladas have been allocated to provide this service. Citroen cars will be used to receive high-ranking foreign statesmen. Remaining personnel will be given vehicles only on specific request in the event of serious necessity. Thanks to these measures, a large number of passenger vehicles have become available, which, in line with the decision taken, will be sold to citizens.

A number of privileges enjoyed by members of the former Central Committee are being abolished. The dining hall serving members of the Politburo has been closed, and the radio communications link between the Board and district and regional committees has been abolished.

Aboimov, Hungary's Gyorke Discuss Relations

LD0501173290 Budapest MTI in English 1612 GMT 5 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, January 5 (MTI)—The possibilities of fostering Hungarian-Soviet relations were surveyed at the Moscow discussions of Sandor Gyorke, newly accredited ambassador of the Republic of Hungary to the USSR, and Ivan Aboimov, Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs.

At the meeting, the opinion was expressed by both diplomats that unfolding the Hungarian reform endeavours and the transformation taking place in the Soviet Union serve the development of bilateral ties and the elimination of difficulties arising from personal reasons and the system.

'Considerable Increase' in Hungarian Food Prices

PM0501143590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent V. Gerasimov dispatch: "'Brakes Taken Off' Prices"]

[Text] Budapest, 4 Jan—A considerable increase in the prices of foodstuffs in connection with the abolition of the subsidy on them was announced back in December. Today it has been officially reported that meat products and meat will be 30-43 percent more expensive as of 8 January. The food price index as a whole will increase 32-37 percent.

The prices of foodstuffs will be determined by agricultural enterprises themselves depending on market conditions. A new purchasing mechanism is being introduced. The purchase prices of milk and dairy products, for example, will be different in the summer and the winter.

The trade unions opposed the abolition of subsidies and the price hike. S. Nagy, general secretary of the Hungarian Trade Unions Central Council, declared that an extraordinary situation has taken shape.

Polish Economic Program Gets Stormy Sejm Reception

PM0501120590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by own correspondent L. Toporkov: "Poland: Program Adopted"]

[Text] Warsaw—On the threshold of the new year the Polish Sejm adopted a number of draft laws submitted by the government, which, when put together, constitute a package of radical economic reforms. In principle, the government has renounced interference in the pricing process (with the exception of 13 groups of goods), which will be regulated by market mechanisms. State subsidies for coal extraction are abolished as of 1 January. This has already meant a 400% increase in the prices of electricity, hot water, heating, and gas.

There was a very acrimonious discussion of the government program of economic recovery in the Sejm. L. Balcerowicz, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of finance, admitted that the adopted measures will lead to a reduction in the volume of production, the bankruptcy of a whole series of enterprises, and unemployment.

Naturally, the government program prompted a mass of questions from many deputies. Who will bear the brunt of its implementation? Undoubtedly it will be working people in the socialized sector of the national economy, that is, the majority. They are the ones who will be most affected by the fall in real wages, the rising cost of living, and the unemployment also. A figure of 400,000 unemployed is being talked about for 1990. Only the rich minority among the members of the private sector will have a painless passage out of the crisis. It is expected that this sector will gain as a result of thr sale of state enterprise shares, that is, the process that is known as privatization.

"We must be honest with society and with our electorate," deputy J. Dalgiewicz (Polish United Workers Party) said, "and tell them that switching the Polish national economy to a capitalist system, or, as some prefer, market economy, based chiefly on private ownership, does not promise success and does not guarantee prosperity for all."

Deputies representing the intreresrs of the peasantry also shared their worries and fears. Contrary to past assurances, agriculture has not become a priority economic sector. According to deputy J. Bonka, approximately 1 million small, individual peasant farms face ruin. The Sejm listened to an avalanche of criticism and adopted a resolution the draft of which was prepared by the agrarian deputies themselves. It contains proposals, albeit of a general nature, geared to easing the consequences of the crisis in agriculture and the food industry.

"One's head spins when one thinks what might happen after 1 January," wrote the issue of the weekly POLITYKA published on the threshold of the new year. "The government has decided to dive into a pool filled with a mass of unknown quantities. Let us hope the pool will be deep enough and the water in it will not be icy, for after all, the whole of society will be making the jump with the government."

PZPR Head Says Socialism Fails Test of History

PM0801101790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "M. Rakowski Speech"]

[Text] Warsaw, 5 Jan—A businesslike and principled discussion of pressing problems and the prospects for the broad movement of left-wing forces in Poland took place on the eve of the 11th Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Congress in Katowice, the main city in the country's largest industrial region. M. Rakowski, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, met here with party aktiv members and delegates to the forthcoming party forum.

A series of key questions of current concern for broad circles of left-wing forces were raised during the conversation with the PZPR leader. They primarily concerned the restoration of the party's role in society, the possible revival of the capitalist structures with which the working people parted without any regrets, as well as the threatened split, the situation within the party leadership, and appraisals of its past during the period of Stalinism.

Replying to numerous questions, Rakowski said that real socialism had failed the test of history, but this does not mean a collapse of the socialist idea. Today it is necessary to adopt a different approach to questions of freedom and democracy, to elections. The party now has to pay a high price for having formerly ignored these problems.

Romanian Moves on Parties, Organizations Reported

PM0501144990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report under the general headline: "First Steps"]

[Text] Bucharest, 4 Jan—The first days of 1990 have been marked by new steps by the Romanian Government aimed at creating a democratic society in Romania.

The National Salvation Front Council has legitimated by a decree the creation and activity of any political parties and public organizations, except fascist ones or ones which propagandize ideas contrary to the laws of the Romanian state. Political parties will be formed along territorial lines. To be registered, they must submit their political program to Bucharest Court and indicate the location of their headquarters and their financial position. A party must have at least 251 members at the time it submits its application. Servicemen, civilian personnel of the Ministries of National Defense and Internal Affairs, judges, prosecutors, diplomats, and also radio and television employees cannot be members of political parties.

The National Salvation Front Council has also adopted a law-decree on the organization of people's meetings. It provides for the registration of rallies and other similar measures with police organs at least 48 hours before they begin and for the organizers' responsibility for compliance with legality during the holding of rallies and demonstrations.

The National Salvation Front Council has adopted a law permitting every Romanian who in one way or another came into conflict with the Ceausescu regime to return to the motherland; such persons will have their Romanian citizenship reinstated, and the returnees will enjoy all the political, economic, and social rights of Romania's citizens.

Romanian Army's Current Role Examined

PM0501145590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jan 90 First Edition p3

[Telephone report by Lieutenant Colonel A. Oliynik, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "Defending the People's Freedom"]

[Text] Bucharest, 2 Jan—Romania marked the New Year with funeral candles and a minute's silence in honor of those who died for freedom and new life in their native land. Among those who fell were many Romanian Army servicemen.

"The Army fulfilled its duty in the revolution. The Army is with the people!" These lines, taken from the first address to the Romanian people by the National Salvation Front Council, broadcast on radio and television on 24 December, have now gone down in history. So too has the action of Colonel General V. Milea, former national defense minister: an action illumined by a high degree of honor and courage as an officer. He refused to obey the last order of the "father of the people"—to put down the uprising with weapons and tanks—and threw these words in the tyrant's face: "My men will never fire on their own people!" The revolution has highly appraised this act of heroism, according Milea the title of army general, posthumously.

Romanian Army soldiers and officers now enjoy great respect throughout the country. On several occasions in recent days, I have seen young people gathering around the men in bright green army uniform and the population offering military patrols whatever they can: the majority of subunits have been on alert duty and regular duty since 22 December.

The Army is still responsible for guarding the most important places in Bucharest: the radio and television center, Republic Square, the North Railroad Station, the international Otopeni Airport.... Tanks and armored personnel carriers with national flags waving in the wind patrol the streets of the Romanian capital day and night. In the opinion of the officers in the Romanian Army General Staff whom I chanced to meet, terrorists from special departments of the secret service are certainly not reconciled to defeat.

There is a lot of talk in Bucharest about how Colonel General I. Vlad, former chief of the security service department, and a number of other top-ranking officials from this department and the internal troops were arrested on 31 December. Some have gone underground, however. The "Romanian Otto Skorzeny", as Colonel Berts, commander of the special "Securitate" forces, is referred to in journalistic circles, has also gone into hiding.

The "People's Army" subway station in Bucharest: At the entrance, a reinforced army detail was searching passengers. People understand that this is a forced measure. Learning from the interpreter, Igor Masyuk, that a Soviet military journalist from Moscow was standing before them, the soldiers allowed us through. The head of the patrol smiled broadly and saluted: introducing himself as Sergiu Iordache, senior lieutenant. The officer willingly entered into conversation.

"How does the Army regard the forthcoming disbanding of party organizations and the abolition of political departments? What does it say about the law passed by the National Salvation Front, which stipulates that cadre military servicemen cannot be members of political parties?"

"I think that at the present time this is the only right decision," the officer said confidently. "We must fulfill our main task, which is to defend the motherland, its sovereignty and freedom."

"Are the soldiers and officers among the recipients of the aid which is now arriving from almost 30 countries, including the Soviet Union?"

"For the most part, the parcels of food and essential goods are going to the injured, to the central military

hospital, and to the families of those soldiers and officers who died. But we are also being helped by the people of Bucharest."

The burned, charred walls of the university library in the center of Bucharest. There are always a lot of people gathered near the black bench where the blood of the insurgents was spilled. People, young and old, are frozen in melancholy thought. Photographs of young men in military uniform are caught in the gleam of the funeral candles. An inscription blazes on the stones above: "Free Romania will not forget the army servicemen who fell in the battle for the revolution!" Blood-red carnations lie on the snow. They are flowers of remembrance and gratitude.

Ceausescu Ouster Marks End of Stalinist Methods

PM0801162990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Doctor of Philosophical Sciences T. Muranivskiy letter under the rubric "From the International Departments' Mail": "Lessons of Ceausescu"]

[Text] Moscow—Economics of the absurd and totalitarianism existed in socialist countries long before Ceausescu. But national and social problems recently became bound up in a tight knot in Romania. It is sufficient to recall how Ceausescu used the notorious experience of "developed socialism" to destroy "unpromising" villages.

Any discontent was nipped in the bud. Ceausescu's party apparatus held complete sway over the mass media. It not only preserved but also continuously strengthened its leading positions. The offensive against opposition forces was conducted with great "determination and principledness." Much was said about observance of "party discipline..."

The Ceausescu apparatus noticed any shoots of opposition when still in embryonic form and reacted immediately to them, characterizing them as antiparty and antigovernment forces. And it appeared easier and simpler to crush odd spontaneous actions. Therefore Ceausescu at once associated the events in Timisoara with "reactionary chauvinist circles and the espionage services of various countries" with all the resultant consequences. We now know how that ended. As regards an organized opposition, it took shape in Romania in a matter of days on the wave of a spontaneous popular uprising.

Ceausescu's "experience" of involving the family clan in managing the country, of placing hard-currency private deposits in famous Swiss banks, and so forth also merits study. But the chief lesson of the executed dictator probably lies in the hope that the times for Stalinist and Pol Potite methods of dealing with the people are over. The peoples seek the renewal of socialist societies on the paths of the consolidation of healthy forces, by overcoming the impatience of some and the intolerance of others.

PRAVDA Views SFRY Reform Process Problems

PM0801165590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent Ye. Fadeyev dispatch: "Into the Nineties: The View from Belgrade. The Magic of Words and the Reality of Deeds. How Are Reforms Progressing in Yugoslavia"]

[Excerpt] Belgrade—[Passage omitted] The SFRY is living through an unprecedented economic and sociopolitical crisis. Yugoslav comrades ask that reports about them contain the truth and nothing but the truth. Any experience here—even when negative—is experience nonetheless.

Our friends tell us: Don't repeat our mistakes. Decentralization is fine. But elements of anarchy emerge when it goes beyond sensible bounds. Workers' self-management is wonderful, but every enterprise must bear responsibility for all the decisions that are made.

The republic has achieved a great deal in all spheres: Its industrial products are known in dozens of states in the world, its construction industry's trade mark is widely known, its foreign policy enjoys respect. But there are also problems. They are the subject of frank discussion. Virtually everything in the country is subjected to critical analysis: The economic mechanism, the political system founded on a single party's leading role, the personal stance of functionaries.

The situation in the Kosovo Autonomous Province remains tense. There is no easy way out in sight. Quite recently this was compounded by the unconcealed conflict between the leaders of Serbia and Slovenia. According to the press, if the Slovene and Serbian platforms are stripped of their propaganda trimmings, it emerges that Slovenia advocates broader autonomy and political pluralism while Serbia, being much more restrained about a multiparty system, advocates a strong federation and a firm party.

Specialists' forecasts of the growth of nationalism and social tension have proved right.

Here is a forecast taken from the collective anthology "Yugoslavia in the World Economy on the Threshold of the 21st Century": "Taking into account the fact that many of the conditions for a more active policy and changes in the national economy's structure have not yet been created, it would be realistic to assume that the factors which produced economic stagnation in the country in the past will remain in effect."

Of course, there can be no changes in Yugoslav society without changes in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY], which is also living through a complex period. The fact that an extraordinary party congress—the first in its entire history—is scheduled to convene in January 1990 speaks for itself. There are differences in the higher LCY echelons regarding the further development of democracy and the transition to a market

economy. The main task of the LCY congress will be to answer the question: What specific form of socialism would the party like to see in Yugoslavia? Its foundation ought to be an efficient economy with every citizen living in conditions of sufficiency and dignity. There should be broad application of the market principles of economic management and all forms of ownership should have equal rights. A reform of the LCY ought to be implemented.

Arguments and debates are taking place about a multiparty system in Yugoslav society. A series of informal associations and groups emerged in Slovenia and Croatia for the first time in 1989. The Vojvodina Peasants Union was founded in Novi Sad in November. Many alternative movements adopt the following stance: The LCY ought to function in competition or alliance [sodruzhestvo] with other social forces. An altogether extraordinary event occurred at the League of Communists of Croatia congress which recently concluded its work. A group of Croatian Communists, uniting with representatives of "informals," advocated a multiparty system and free elections. It is evidently far from accidental that the SFRY Federal Assembly (Parliament) made an unprecedented decision for the first time: Not to allocate the requested 4.5 billion dinars from the state budget for the LCY congress in January.

Here is what Stipe Suvar, until recently president of the LCY Central Committee Presidium and now a member of the SFRY Presidency, had to say in conversation with PRAVDA's correspondent:

"Certain circles in our country do not pose the question 'Should there be a multiparty system or not?' as a question concerning the future of socialism in general. I would not say that this is correct. The present crisis of socialism is a consequence of a political monopoly which stifled initiative, issued directives, created apathy, abolished competition, and—with help from bureaucratic centralism—suffocated criticism. Differences of opinion and dissidence were deemed a priori against the system, destructive, and unacceptable.

"The most important point now," S. Suvar went on, "is to democratize social life and ensure openness so as to enable our people to really make decisions, monitor power, and so on. We have no desire to take advantage of the criticism of the multiparty system's weaknesses to in fact block political pluralism within the framework of socialism, competition between socialist projects, trade union autonomy, and autonomy for the new social movements. An attempt to replace all forms of representative democracy by 'indirect' democracy and to reject the real experience of parliamentary democracy will only boost the bureaucracy's role. It is impossible to leap over stages in society's political development, in the same way that it cannot be done in the economy."

I would like to mention once more that the reforms being implemented in the SFRY and our own perestroyka—despite all the specific national features—have quite a lot in common. This includes the processes of the economy's decentralization, the emancipation of producers' initiative, the expansion of citizens' participation in management, and the strengthening of democratic and legal principles. All these changes cannot avoid being accompanied by difficulties and trials. The crisis in the SFRY, just like in the other socialist countries, does not erase the socialist values that have been gained. What is happening today is a response to life's contemporary demands. Many Yugoslav comrades noted this in conversations with me.

Last year was not easy. It was, however, the year when fresh shoots started breaking through in all spheres of the country's economic and political life. "From Words to Deeds!"—this slogan is frequently encountered in Yugoslav newspapers. These are the words on which I would like to end this dispatch from wintertime Belgrade, awakening to a covering of frost in the mornings and preparing to meet every new day with its routine concerns. Let us, according to custom, wish our friends a successful new year. May their future worries prove not so heavy!

E. European Communist Congresses Evaluate Crisis

PM0401144390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[V. Sharov report under the "Party" rubric: "Emergency Congresses. Extraordinary Congresses"; last paragraph is PRAVDA conclusion]

[Text] Communist parties in most socialist countries have been faced with Hamlet's question: "To be or not to be?" Should the party be the political vanguard or will alternative forces relegate it to the back burner?

An emergency Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Congress and an extraordinary Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Congress were held in December. Nor can you describe as routine the recent 14th Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Congress. An MSZMP Congress (admittedly, unnumbered) was at work quite recently in October. The Hungarian Socialist Party, which proclaimed itself the successor of the MSZMP, was formed at one of the sittings. Some communists did not agree with this. An MSZMP Congress was convened on their initiative.

The upcoming convocation of an extraordinary congress of Bulgarian Communists and of an emergency congress—of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY]—in Yugoslavia have been reported.

What is the topic of discussion at the top party forums?

The December congresses indicate that there is above all a need to comprehensively analyze the situation and determine the roots and depth of the crisis and the ways out.

Having assumed responsibility for the deformations and miscalculations in socialist building, communist parties

have drawn upon themselves the fire of criticism. On the initiative of the parties themselves articles regarding their leading role have been removed from the constitution of a number of fraternal countries. A multiparty system is becoming as reality there. In a number of countries communists have been left in the minority in the government. Many people are leaving the communists' ranks. Primary party organizations are disbanding themselves and ceasing their activity in the army, law enforcement bodies, state establishments, and in a number of cases, at enterprises too. The explosive way in which events are developing has thrown some communists into confusion and disarray. Moreover it was pointed out at the SED and CPCZ congresses that these parties would now have considerably fewer problems and difficulties if an antiperestroyka spirit had not prevailed among the former leadership.

When assessing the roots and underlying causes of the crisis within the parties, communists in various countries have cited Stalinist deformations, the gulf between words and deeds and policy and morality, and double standards. Events have shown once again that socialism and the administrative-edict system are incompatible.

The congresses' decisions contain specific features reflecting local conditions. But they all share one thing—a desire to defend and assert the values of democratic, humane socialism and to unite and consolidate all forces of a socialist orientation.

The political responsibility shouldered by the fraternal parties in the current critical situation is tremendous. The parties are hoping to revive their prestige among the people and become political vanguard forces by dissociating themselves from everything that has become exhausted and that has been discarded by life and social development itself, renewing themselves organizationally, and offering the working masses comprehensible program aims dear to their hearts.

One typical feature of the fraternal parties' congresses in October-December 1989 in Hungary, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia was the sharpness of the polemics and delegates' unprecedentedly active participation in elaborating decisions. The sittings often dragged on way past midnight.

East European Political Changes Examined

PRAVDA Observer's Viewpoint

LD0501033390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 4 Jan 90

["Point of View—International Broadcast" program, presented by Nikolay Agayants, with PRAVDA observer Andrey Krushinskiy]

[Text] [Agayants] Hello, esteemed comrades listeners. The new year, 1990, has come into its own and is confidently gathering pace and striding across the planet. How it turns out will depend in many respects on all of us, but there is hope that it will bring nearer a truly peaceful period in the history of mankind. Life does not stand still; it is going forward. People want happiness, freedom and prosperity and it would be absurd, naive, and very dangerous to attempt to halt this purposeful struggle toward a better future.

Last year, 1989, became a year of major changes for the better in the international arena. Even though it did not happened as quickly as we would have liked, the new political thinking has already started to yield its positive fruits. Let's say that, while quite recently the idea of creating a common European home was perceived skeptically, with distrust, as a kind of utopia, today this is spoken of as a real prospect.

If one is to sum up what we have lived through in the year 1989, one must mention without any exaggeration as the main achievement of the efforts of goodwill, that the split of the continent is receding into the past. One is fully justified in saying that the past year has marked the end of the cold war. This was assisted in many respects by the stormy events that have gripped the countries of Eastern Europe. The waves of revolutionary renewal have fortunately washed away the totalitarian regimes, which were created over [illegible] and decades, the ferro-concrete administrative-bureaucratic systems that had nothing in common with the noble socialist ideals being solemnly proclaimed.

The need to combine socialism with democracy has again with immense force found confirmation in the dramatic turnarounds of public life that have taken place in Berlin, Sofia, Prague, and Bucharest. It is on these complicated deep-seated processes, which are taking place in the Eastern European countries today and which are by no means unequivocal and at times unexpectedly contradictory, that we would like to dwell in greater detail in our broadcast. Next to me in the studio is a well known Soviet publicist, international observer from PRAVDA Andrey Krushinskiy. Over to him.

[Krushinskiy] The change in the countries of Eastern Europe is of course one of the main omens of the past year. I would even say not of the year but of its final 3 months, when one after the other four leaders were overthrown: Honecker, Zhivkov, Jakes, and Ceausescu.

On the very eve of the New Year two abbreviations, PPR and RSR, disappeared from the political dictionary. I mean that the Polish People's Republic is now simply called the Polish Republic and the Romanian Socialist Republic is simply called Romania.

[Agayants] Yes, quite a few analogies can be retraced in the events that have taken place in these four socialist countries and the fate of their leaders is a specific example of that. Let's compare: In Poland and Hungary where restructuring of the political system and of the methods of running the economic started long ago the change itself of leaders passed off, it can be said, painlessly. I mean of Jaruzelski and Rakowski in Poland, and of Grosz and the now late Kadar in Hungary. From their

previous posts they stepped down, I would say, with honor. In contrast to this, what drama accompanied the change of leadership in the GDR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.

[Krushinskiy] All imaginable and unimaginable troubles suddenly rained down on the leaders who for years had been deified; expulsion from the party and threat of court action, and Ceausescu has even been shot. But it was, alas, logically enough. Remember, right up to last autumn the seven member countries of the Warsaw Pact were theoretically divided into three groups: the USSR, Poland, and Hungary, where the communist parties were boldly embracing perestroyka and renewal; the neutral, so to speak, Bulgaria, where a great deal was being spoken of perestroyka but where they were not doing anything in earnest; and the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, whose leaders then conceived the idea of erecting an antiperestroyka "Iron Curtain." Ceausescu, as I remember, was nursing the idea of convening something like a conference of fraternal parties for the condemnation of the ideas of perestroyka. Honecker sank so low as to ban the distribution in the GDR of a number of Soviet publications. With regard to Jakes, do you remember, we were strolling together across Wenceslas Square in Prague for a couple of weeks?

[Agayants] How could I fail to remember that, Andrey Sergeyevich?

[Krushinskiy] Do you remember, among the posters put up on the walls of the houses and the shop windows there was one that said: in the southern part of city there still is a Stalin Street. How could it be that this person, who is regarded as a criminal throughout the world, still has his street precisely here in Prague?

[Agayants] Somewhere during the last third of December it was of course renamed, as I remember?

[Krushinskiy] Yes, but wasn't that a bit late? The name of a street is, on the whole, a trifling matter. The fact that, as has turned out, his statues were still standing in a number of towns of Czechoslovakia recently is also a trifling matter. But in itself, this is symbolic. The leaders of a number of European socialist countries, guided by motives that were by no means unselfish, sought to preserve in their countries the Stalinist model of barracks socialism. The more strongly they were persisting in this, the more fatal this turned out to be for them themselves. After all, perestroyka is an objective necessity. It is the only possible way out of a deep political and economic crisis in which the socialist countries have found themselves. In those instances in which communist parties attempted to halt this objective process, or if only to hamper it somewhat, they have found themselves in a most grave position.

[Agayants] Well, we could see this for ourselves at the extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] to which we were both accredited.

[Krushinskiy] Yes, you must agree, this congress was unusual. More than once I have had occasion to participate in coverage of congresses of ruling Marxist-Leninist parties: in Bulgaria, China, and also here in Czechoslovakia previously. Each time in the countries themselves this was regarded as an event of extra significance. The congresses were accompanied by a festive decking out of the capital. The attention of the press and television was focused on them. This time, however, the newspapers, going by what one could read in RUDE PRAVO, devoted only a few lines to the congress, as to a completely ordinary event.

[Agayants] On the other hand, forgive me, Andrey Sergeyevich, for interrupting you, more foreign journalists than ever in the past were accredited to the congress, if I am not mistaken some 200 people, including 19 television groups.

[Krushinskiy] Yes, that is quite correct. Abroad the interest in the extraordinary CPCZ congress was greater than in any of the preceding, routine congresses. Well, I think that this is logical [words indistinct] how yawningly boring were our congresses in the past—featureless debates without debate, the standard greetings of foreign delegations, glorification addressed to the most prominent person, formal unanimity. Remember how we observed on our television screens a hall—this happened quite recently—which was chanting Ceausescu - communism, Ceausescu - communism?

[Agayants] I agree that at the extraordinary CPCZ congress all these attributes, which set one's teeth on edge, did not feature now. But should one admire it? That is the question. After all, it can be said that it registered a most grave crisis situation in the party.

[Krushinskiy] Yes, I agree, it registered this, but the party began to experience this crisis situation as such much earlier. Moreover, it was its own fault. The crisis in the party and the drop in its prestige in society were connected above all with the fact that its leading role began to be associated in people's minds with bureaucratism and the vices of the command- administrative system. Many of its leading figures in the center and locally had gotten themselves tangled up in corruption. Despite all this, the CPCZ did all it could to protect itself against criticism and polemics, obdurately hindering the trends toward restructuring and glasnost. I must say I did like the extraordinary congress, all the same. I liked it for the desire it demonstrated to make a decisive break with the past and for its robustly polemical debate. It seems to me that all this gives one ground for hoping that the Czechoslovak communists now have the most difficult days behind them.

[Agayants] That goes, by the way, for a number of other communist parties in the countries of socialism that also held their congresses at the close of 1989.

[Krushinskiy] Yes. Incidentally, that is another common feature of the processes that have encompassed the countries of Eastern Europe—the emergency and

extraordinary congresses. The forum of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was held in October. Then there was the forum of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Ahead lies an extraordinary congress of Bulgarian communists. As in Czechoslovakia, the date originally set for it has been changed, in response to demands from communists, it has been decided to speed up the run-up for it. It has also been announced that an extraordinary congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has been called. Finally there has just been a report that an action committee of members of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] has made a statement in Bucharest proposing that an extraordinary RCP congress be called as soon as possible to adopt a decision on the self-dissolution of the RCP since, according to the text of the statement, and I quote, in the dark period of the Ceausescu dictatorship the RCP compromised itself before the people and before history.

[Agayants] What conclusion should be drawn from all these facts? Bitter words are frequently heard from listeners who call our editorial office and send letters and postcards to the effect that the world socialist system has collapsed and that we have allegedly lost our allies.

[Krushinskiy] You know, in my view what is collapsing at the present time is the Stalinist model of barracks socialism. Regrettably, whether we like it or not, we frequently fall prey to a reversal of meanings. For instance, Ceausescu called the regime based on his personal power a socialist republic and described the apparatus for the exercise of his personal power as the implementation of the leading role of the party, and we treat the collapse of his dictatorship as well nigh the collapse of socialism. The processes that are now unfolding mark in fact the start of Romania's ascent to genuine socialism.

[Agayants] In Romanian society previously, were there really no elements of a socialist socioeconomic set-up?

[Krushinskiy] That is of course a fair objection. I think that both in Romania and in other countries of Eastern Europe the past did not consist of deformations alone. There was inspiration and enthusiasm, and there were genuinely socialist transformations based on the principles of humanism and social justice. None of this, I think, has gone to waste.

Let me, in conclusion, give you a quote from Vaclav Havel, a man who on the eve of the New Year was elected president of Czechoslovakia. A little over a month ago he was giving an interview to the West German magazine, DER SPIEGEL. As they talked, the journalist asked: So it means a return to the first Czechoslovak republic of 1918?. As you may know, Havel comes from a wealthy bourgeois family and our West German colleague of course expected he would get an affirmative answer from him, but it was not so. Here are Havel's words, and I quote: No, in history there can be no return to the past. The structures of society and of whole of civilization are quite different today from what they were between the two world wars. A new type of democracy may emerge in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Whatever happens, there will be no mechanical copying of the classic parliamentary democracy of Western Europe.

[Agayants] Add to that the fact that when a sociological opinion poll was held in Czechoslovakia recently, only three percent of those polled spoke in favor of a return to capitalism, and there is a clear conclusion to be drawn: It would be quite wrong to regard the changes taking place in the socialist countries as the collapse of the world system of socialism. Thank you, Andrey Sergeyevich, for taking part in our program. I hope we will meet again many more times in this studio.

Grammatikov Commentary

SK0801135690 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 4 Jan 90

[Commentary by Georgiy Grammatikov]

[Text] After the start of the new year, it has already become clear what kind of political events will take place in the East European countries this year. If the year of 1989 was the year of democratic revolution in the history of these countries, this year will become the year of elections. The people of Hungary, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania will decide on the path to be covered by their countries and on the nature of their societies.

Comrade Gorbachev, in his New Year address, noted that the dramatic events in Berlin, Sofia, Prague, and Bucharest once again stressed the need to combine socialism with democracy.

Frankly speaking, this is not an easy task. The reason is not that the concept of socialism cannot be compatible with democratic life. Socialism as a concept of social fairness can serve as a condition for genuine socialist democratization.

However, let us look at how this concept has been distorted by power. The concept has been eventually turned into a tool to make a mockery of people, deprive all freedoms, and seize power.

What kind of abnormal phenomena do you think this has created in the economic field?

So, it is not unusual at all that some people turned to a conspicuous degree their animosity against such a dictator as Ceausescu and others of his ilk into antipathy against the concept of socialism itself. This is because the people had thought for several decades that Ceausescu is precisely socialism. This is the same as what our Soviet people were repeatedly saying, that socialism was Stalin.

Now is the time to awaken. Various views can be expressed. However, a way is being painfully sought to build a society in which objective economic principles

are respected. The progress is underway to gradually link our countries with the rest of the civilized world.

Vaclav Havel, the new president of Czechoslovakia, says that the republic he is dreaming of is one that is self-reliant, free, and democratic and which is economically prosperous and socially fair.

Petar Mladenov, president of the State Council of Bulgaria, says that there is no other way than to pursue a democratic society, a modern constitutional country, and truly humanitarian socialism.

I would like to note that Vaclav Havel is not a party member but Petar Mladenov is a leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party. However, I do not think that they are pursuing a way incompatible with the social structure of their countries.

All countries have their own national writers who write history. However, the alphabet called democracy to be achieved by them is, generally speaking, the composition of the same letters. Therefore, it is very important to minimize the damage and loss in achieving democracy, to prevent the people with many different views from taking revenge on one another, and to seek economic reform without disorder and dispute. At the same time, it is extremely important to prevent the desire of minority races trying to recognize their own identity from precipitating mutual antagonism and violence.

Through our sad experiences, we know what destructive consequences can be brought about by the eruption of the concept of radicalism.

Today, the new leadership of the East European countries have set many examples of prudent and constructive treatment in settling the matters being faced by their people. Many legislations full of democratic spirit, election programs, dialogue with all social circles; all these things make us optimistic about the new year.

PRAVDA's Korionov Reflects

PM0801152390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Korionov article: "What Will Follow the Storm? PRAVDA Political Observer's Reflections on Events in East European Countries"]

[Text] The end of last year proved stormy for the socialist countries of East Europe. Explosive events followed one on another.

The intense attention with which the world is following these events is understandable. What is happening? Is the loud chorus in the West really right when it shouts from the housetops : "Socialism is collapsing"? Are the masses, perhaps, really making their choice in favor of political parties and movements opposed to socialism?

Let us try to reason—precisely to reason—since the processes of change in East European countries are in a state of development. Ossified forms of political life are being replaced by new ones, but the latter have not yet taken final shape. And, of course, events are developing in their own original way in each country. So it is evidently a little early to draw full conclusions. Still, it is clearly possible to try to assess the main trends in the current processes.

The development of a new world social system is a very complex process. It took capitalism more than one century to establish itself—let us recall the wars, conflicts, and other upheavals which accompanied this process. The communist and workers parties of East Europe did not entirely emerge into a political virgin land—they had the CPSU's experience before them. Both positive and negative experience. For various reasons, however, much was taken over mechanically and was frequently simply copied, and proper lessons were not drawn from the dramatic events in the history of the first socialist country. Of course, this in no way means that it is permissible to belittle, still less to cancel out, the huge role of the Communists of Poland and Bulgaria, of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, of Hungary and Romania in building the foundations of socialism and defending European and world peace.

There is no lack of attempts now to assert that Communists used either violent or Machiavellian methods to usurp power against the will of the peoples, and now the peoples are overthrowing them. In reality things are by no means so simple.

To begin with, let us pose the question: Which Communists or, rather, what kind of leaders should we be talking about? Speaking recently with a nonparty person about the events in Romania, I remarked that in the case of N. Ceausescu people had come up against the degeneration of a communist into a dictator of the very worst kind. But my interlocutor kept stubbornly repeating: "All the same, he was a communist..."

However, the millions of Communists who raised the masses to realize socialist ideals are one thing. And those leaders of theirs who began gradually to consign Marxist-Leninist principles to oblivion, to lose a sense of reality, to establish a regime of personal power, and to perpetrate arbitrary rule and lawlessness are another matter. Account must also be taken of the fact that T. Zhivkov in Bulgaria spent 35 years in the post of leader, and N. Ceausescu almost 25 years. To lay down firm maximum times for holding the posts of party and state leader—this, I believe, is one of the conclusions that suggest themselves.

Another aspect of the problem is still more important. "It would be a fundamental mistake to think," V.I. Lenin warned, "that the struggle for democracy could divert the proletariat from the socialist revolution or push it into the background or the shadows, and so forth. On the contrary, just as victorious socialism is impossible unless it implements full democracy, so a proletariat which does not wage an all-around, consistent, and revolutionary struggle for democracy cannot prepare for

victory over the bourgeoisie." This is how the great dialectician put the question. And the correctness of that formulation is confirmed by the course of events.

In East European countries the distorted bureaucratic-edict "model" of socialism is collapsing. This distortion had its origins in Stalinism, but the "model" proved so tenacious and so hardy that it considerably outlived its creator. The root of the present difficulties of the new social system lies not in the peoples' socialist choice nor in the principles of Marxism-Leninism but in the departure from these principles, in their flouting by the parties' leading groupings. One of the gravest consequences of the Stalinist distortions was the loss of the most important thing in the Marxian and Leninist concept of socialism: the understanding of man not as the means but as the end.

Does this mean that the communist parties do not bear political responsibility for what happened? No, it does not. The ruling parties cannot be absolved of responsibility both for the way socialist transformations were implemented and for what could not be accomplished. And in those East European countries where Communists have openly admitted their responsibility for the situation that had taken shape and declared their determination to repay their debts to the peoples they retain the possibility of holding on to their role as the political vanguard.

The international significance of Soviet perestroyka consists precisely in the fact that the present leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state has realized that an end must be put to distortions and deformations of socialism. It is necessary not only to return to the sources of Leninism but also to remember that Lenin, as he himself wrote about this in his last works, did not have time to draw all conclusions from the situation which had taken shape after the end of the civil war and did not have time to create a finished program of socialist building in our country. The present generations have to resolve this task under historic new conditions.

A discrepancy between words and actions is contraindicated for socialism. An attempt to rise above the people, to order them about, to disregard their desire for freedom and democracy, and, still more, to perpetrate violence ends in the communist party losing its role as the political vanguard. Of course, some people managed to hold on to power for some time by means of falsehoods and double standards, but the explosion resulting from this proved all the greater, and if, moreover, the attempt to put living life in the grip of dogmas was also accompanied by a flouting of legality, by corruption, and by embezzlement of state property, then fury took the form of a devastating hurricane. The paralysis which deadened the Romanian Communist Party is graphic evidence of the grave consequences for a communist party of ossification, loss of revolutionary principles, and, all the more so, its transformation into a weak-willed tool in the hands of a dictator.

Life attests that those who fail to hear the challenge of the times, fail to get in step with restructuring processes in good time, and find themselves tagging along behind events undergo upheavals. This is a lesson of history.

Many Communists both in the USSR and in other socialist countries are now feeling perplexed, for it seems to them that socialism is really collapsing. What is changing, in fact, is what had inevitably to be destroyed in the course of life. The old, obsolete, disfigured aspect of socialism is being broken up. Broad sections of working people are coming out against the deformations of socialism and demanding that the socialist idea be purged of distortions and returned to its democratic, humanist values.

Of course, I would be acting against my conscience if I were to say that everyone in East European countries today advocates socialism. Of course not. However, data from public opinion polls conducted recently in a number of these countries are characteristic. Thus, in the GDR 7 out of every 10 citizens advocate the preservation of their socialist republic, and in the CSSR just 3 percent of those polled advocated a return to the capitalist way of life. Characterizing the sentiments in East Europe, THE NEW YORK TIMES points out: While striving for democracy, at the same time millions of East Europeans "want to preserve untouched, or at least partially, the socialist security of their position."

Nevertheless, there are no grounds for complacency. The reality is such that the Communists' prestige has been badly undermined. Probably more than ever. However, if we again take a realistic stance, there are grounds for saying: Prestige can be regained. But only on condition that there is a real renewal of the parties and a total break with everything that in the past was associated with a departure from the principles of humane, democratic socialism.

To keep ahead of events is a command of the times. Weakness, indecisiveness, and halfhearted actions now play into the hands only of socialism's enemies. Life is already beginning to confirm that an active, honest dialogue with the masses and respect for their opinion, including that of ordinary Communists; support for initiatives aimed at purging society of all braking accretions; tolerance of dissidence and readiness not in words but in deeds to make alliances and coalitions with those who put the motherland's interests first and who advocate preserving the peoples' traditions are an indispensable condition for restoring the prestige and influence of those who head the building of a new life.

The renewal processes in the socialist countries are not confined to the sphere of internal life. Everyone can see that our perestroyka is the source of the Soviet Union's tremendous prestige in the international arena. It is precisely under the sign of the new political thinking proclaimed by perestroyka that interstate relations are now developing. The qualitatively new international

situation, above all on the European continent, is creating favorable external conditions for the Soviet country to resolve internal tasks.

Relations among the socialist countries are also being purged of the accretions of the past. In Prague, for example, the new leadership has already declared that, following the Warsaw Pact countries' official condemnation of the fact that five Warsaw Pact countries sent troops onto CSSR territory in 1968, all the conditions have been created for the USSR and the CSSR to return to the traditionally good relations between our two countries.

People in the West also cannot fail to draw certain conclusions for themselves from the changes in the eastern part of Europe. Of course, there is no shortage of hotheads in the West who would like to "warm their hands" on this fire. The U.S. CIA, for example, is already adopting a decision to increase the number of its agents in East European countries. At the same time voices are being heard increasingly clearly calling for people to proceed from the realities of the postwar time on the European continent, and the existing state borders above all. There is growing understanding of the fact that, having successfully implemented perestroyka, the Soviet Union will become a more open and stable power and, consequently, a still more reliable partner.

Socialist countries with stable political regimes, which respect their international obligations—primarily the obligations stemming from the Warsaw Pact and the Helsinki agreements—are an indispensable condition for stability in Europe, as well as in the world in general.

The processes of renewal are spreading in the socialist world, and their beneficial impact on the course of international events will have a still greater effect as the vanguard force of the social process—the communist parties—and the peoples of the countries of socialism increasingly confidently travel along the path of radical changes.

West Europe

USSR Interior Minister Arrives in Austria

LD0801115190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1127 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Vienna, 8 Jan (TASS)—USSR Internal Affairs Minister Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin arrived on a visit to Austria today. He is to hold talks with Federal Interior Minister Franz Loeschnak, and to acquaint himself with the activities of the internal affairs bodies of the alpine republic.

At the airport to meet the Soviet guest were F. Loeschnak and other officials, along with S.S. Shikin, USSR ambassador to Austria.

Austrians Arrive for Mir Space Training

LD0801182990 Moscow TASS in English 1801 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS—Two Austrian citizens hoping to participate in a mixed space mission aboard the Soviet complex Mir, arrived from Vienna to Moscow today. They are Doctor Clemens Lothaller and Franz Viehboeck.

From the Sheremetyevo Airport, they were driven to the Gagarin cosmonauts' training centre near Moscow, where Soviet cosmonauts and their families live and work. The Austrian hopefuls will train at the centre for the coming flight which is scheduled for 1991.

It is planned during the joint Soviet-Austrian flight to carry out several scientific investigations and experiments in space medicine, physics, materials science and sounding of the earth in the interests of the Austrian economy.

In the near future it is planned to conduct a TV linkup with the participation of the Soviet crew working aboard the Mir complex and the Austrian candidates. It will be broadcast to both countries.

TASS learnt at the cosmonauts' training centre that the Austrians would devote the first months of their stay at the centre to studying the Russian language.

Japanese and British candidates for international space missions are now training at the centre.

EC Parliament Chairman Urges E. Bloc Contacts

PM0901102390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview in Strasbourg with Enrique Baron, chairman of the European Parliament, by Yu. Kovalenko: "Enrique Baron: 'A Genuine Peaceful Revolution'"—date not given]

[Excerpts] Strasbourg—[Passage omitted] "The European Parliament's activity," Enrique Baron said, "is taking place in conditions of radical changes on our continent. On the one hand, the processes of integration are intensifying in Western Europe. On the other, far-reaching transformations are being implemented at an exceptionally fast pace in Eastern Europe. They inspire us with the hope that the division of Europe will finally be overcome. We are witnessing the rapid development of democratization processes and the formation of truly democratic parliaments in the socialist countries. It is also highly symbolic that the arena where all these events are unfolding is in many instances the national parliaments. Whereas previously they were forums for demonstrating an ostentatious unanimity, now they have been transformed into viable assemblies where keen debates take place.

"I have welcomed a number of times the transformations taking place in the Soviet Union," E. Baron continued. "They correspond to the most important principles of democracy. I am convinced that the changes in the East European countries are a genuine peaceful revolution which is having a beneficial effect on the international atmosphere."

[Kovalenko] How does the European Parliament intend to assist these changes?

[Baron] Last September we examined the question of the situation in Poland and adopted a decision to increase aid to it many times over. But providing assistance is not limited to finance, of course. As its chairman, I want the European Parliament to establish relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. I advocate the development of direct ties between the European Parliament and national parliaments. I particularly want to note the significance of the first visits by parliamentary delegations from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. I support direct contacts with the USSR Supreme Soviet and, if invited, I will gladly go to Moscow. There is another point to which I would draw your attention. Two years ago the European Parliament instituted the A.D. Sakharov prize. This year it was awarded to Alexander Dubcek. [passage omitted]

[Kovalenko] What are the European Parliament's priorities in the sphere of West European building now?

[Baron] The main thing is to promote the implementation of the Single European Act, which provides for the formation of a single market of the 12 community countries. To that end we have to ratify around another 150 directives of various kinds (150 have already been approved), to standardize the countries' legislation on the norms and characteristics of various types of goods and output, taxes, and so forth. In addition, we are striving to exercise real control over the activity of our governments and the EC Commission. Here, of course, we do not intend to arrogate to ourselves the powers of the national parliaments, but we are preparing the Europe of the future. My greatest fear is that in the difficult matter of European building some politicians will be guided solely by narrow national interests.

[Kovalenko] Is the European Parliament ready to contribute to realizing the Soviet concept of the "common European home"? What specifically can you do to achieve this?

[Baron] As you know, the EC is now building its own home in which six republics and six monarchies will live under one roof. And that, believe me, is no easy matter. I consider it one of the European Parliament's purposes to promote East-West mutual understanding. We therefore strive to actively support all positive processes conducive to detente and Europe-wide cooperation. It is for that reason that I view M.S. Gorbachev's proposal to hold a Helsinki-2 conference in 1990 as very constructive.

FRG Parties Seen as Interfering in GDR

PM0801113990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jan 90 Second Edition p 7

[Yevgeniy Grigoryev dispatch under the rubric "Correspondents' Comment": "Kreuth in Leipzig? Interference by West German Politicians in the GDR's Affairs"]

[Text] Bonn, 5 Jan—There is talk of two Kreuths in the FRG. One is a cozy Bavarian resort set against the background of Alpine scenery. Bavaria's ruling Christian Social Union [CSU] has chosen it as the venue for its traditional summit meetings in January. The CSU leadership and parliamentarians organize there a gathering for the new year "shakeup" of their party and the definition of tasks and demands on a land and federal scale. Insofar as the CSU, even when compared with the Christian Democratic Union [CDU], holds right-wing positions including stubbornly sticking to "the 1937 borders," the language at these meetings is as a rule sharp and drumbeating, with slogans to match. Thus, in West German political usage, Kreuth has become synonymous with confrontational approaches and propaganda in the "cold war" spirit.

And now the CSU leadership has decided to move this year's Kreuth meeting to—where do you think?—Leipzig which, as everyone knows, is in the GDR. This strange gathering has been scheduled for 12-13 January.

Kreuth in Leipzig is more than just lip service to the pan-German fashion in West German political life. The main point in which the gathering's organizers are interested is to knock together a CSU-like party in the GDR. Purposeful efforts are being made in this direction in Munich. In the first place, as CSU General Secretary E. Huber declared a few days ago, his party wants its ties with certain circles, primarily in the GDR's southern regions, "to strategically support everything that leads to the defeat of socialism." Second, the Munich strategists fear that, in the event of German reunification, their weight in "big-time politics" would substantially diminish and the CSU would lose the opportunity to play—even if rarely—the role of the "tail wagging the dog," as has repeatedly happened in its mutual relations with the CDU in the past. The CSU leaders thus wish to expand their limited Bavarian bridgehead.

The manipulations used for this purpose are curious. During the second half of November, when the latest CSU Congress was taking place in Munich, a large bus was dispatched toward the open border with the GDR, and willing GDR citizens were offered a free ride to the Bavarian capital, where they were briefly dragged to the congress for the purpose of staging a propaganda show. According to assurances by that selfsame Huber, "more and more" people arriving from the GDR are allegedly calling at local party organizations "to obtain information on becoming members of the CSU." And the Bavarian party is already admitting GDR citizens to its ranks as visiting members whose membership dues are waived. All this, as Huber declares without even a trace

of embarrassment, is a spontaneous expression of the natural desires of citizens who wish to see a CSU founded in the GDR. Meanwhile, the CSU leaders themselves are preparing "intensive political education courses for interested GDR citizens" at the border abbey of Banz.

You would think that if some GDR party had taken similar liberties either in the past or now, both the Bavarian and the federal Department for the Protection of the Constitution would have pricked up their ears a long time ago. Nonetheless, it is nowadays claimed in the FRG that, given the "special relations" between the two German states and especially the conditions of openness in the GDR, this is perfectly permissible. Meanwhile, parliamentary parties in the FRG are struggling for influence over the new parties being formed in the GDR.

It is reported that H. Kohl and T. Weigel, CDU and CSU chairmen respectively, will hold a special meeting in Bonn after Leipzig to divide their parties' "spheres of influence" in the GDR. Some representatives of the Social Democratic Party of Germany are offering to participate directly in forthcoming election campaign events organized by the Social Democratic Party in the GDR. Buechler, representative of the Social Democratic faction on the parliamentary commission for questions of German policy, demanded in Bonn "stepped up support for the opposition in the GDR." Furthermore, he advocates that the Bundestag should discuss the question of possibly appropriating sums of money and placing them at the opposition's disposal, which is in line with a recent statement by Bundestag President R. Suessmuth about a supraparty fund in support of GDR parties. In connection with the forthcoming GDR elections in May, CDU General Secretary V. Ruehe has sent a directive letter to his party's components pointing them in the direction of assisting "all political groupings" which share the views of FRG Christian Democrats. In essence, he is calling on them to ensure that these GDR parties gain a "majority of votes" in the forthcoming elections there.

It appears that Bonn is forgetting its own numerous assurances and warnings about the impermissibility of interference in GDR affairs and the conditioning of its citizens. This was said by the FRG president. And here is a statement made by Chancellor H. Kohl during his visit to the GDR: "For us in the FRG, self-determination means also respect for your opinion. We have no desire to tutor anyone and will not do so. We will respect whatever you decide for the country's future." Nice words. The only point is, why is it that some people here behave as if the GDR is already akin to an FRG land?

W. Berlin Donor Sends Medical Aid to USSR

PM0901102790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 1

[Own correspondent S. Zyubanov dispatch: "For the Perestroyka Aid Fund"]

[Text] West Berlin, 4 Jan—Three freezer trailers, 20 taxis, 30 minibuses, and 3 "first aid" vehicles loaded with medical equipment, medicines, food, and other essentials set out today from the city on the Spree in the direction of Moscow, where they will arrive Sunday 6 January [date as published].

"This modest gift from the people of West Berlin to the Soviet people will reach Moscow just in time for the Orthodox Christmas and will be handed over to representatives of the Soviet Red Cross and the Ministry of Health," the organizer of this unusual action—Dietrich Baner, a West Berlin entrepreneur—told me. "We want in this way to demonstrate our solidarity with Soviet perestroyka and to give what symbolic support we can to M.S. Gorbachev's international policy."

D. Baner, who is one of the founders of the "European Initiative for Peace," also initiated the creation of the "Perestroyka Solidarity and Aid Fund" and has already transferred DM500,000 to its account. In D. Baner's opinion, this fund will meet with broad support among friends of the Soviet Union in all European countries.

Mitterrand Answers IZVESTIYA Questions

PM0801144590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko report on F. Mitterrand's New Year news conference: "F. Mitterrand: 'I Wish Your Country Success.' French President Answers IZVESTIYA Correspondent's Questions"]

[Text] Paris—The president's traditional New Year meeting with journalists took place at the Elysee Palace, the residence of the French head of state. During the discussion F. Mitterrand touched upon problems of the future of Europe, East-West relations, the domestic situation in France, and a number of other issues. In the course of the meeting he answered several questions from the IZVESTIYA correspondent.

[Kovalenko] Mr President! Is your recent proposal to create a "European confederation" in the nineties, to include both East and West countries, in some respect a development of the Soviet concept of the "common European home?"

[Mitterrand] The common European home is a very important idea which I approved straight away, but it does not make provision for the creation of important institutions. I, on the other hand, propose a type of international system based on a familiar juridical structure. Confederation is a broader concept than a federation. Western Europe does not yet represent a federation but it is moving in that direction. I have used the term "confederation" because wecannot say to Poland or Hungary at the moment: Join the EEC. They cannot do this, no one is ready for this... The Council of Europe is an important organization and if East European countries join it, I will welcome it.

A European confederation, the French president continued, will be formed as and when East European countries begin to acquire their own democratic institutions. All the socialist states and, of course, the Soviet Union will be able to join it. Why insist on the artificial division of Europe which took shape after World War II?

[Kovalenko] You have backed M.S. Gorbachev's initiative to convene a "Helsinki-2" conference as early as 1990 and have suggested that it be held in Paris. What questions, in your view, should be discussed at this meeting?

[Mitterrand] It is true that I have proposed that the "Helsinki-2" conference be held in Paris, but I will not object if it is held in another city. The main thing is to ensure that it does take place. The key questions that should be discussed at this meeting are confidence-building measures, security, and cooperation. These are precisely the aims of this constantly functioning forum (the Helsinki process—Yu.K.) in which virtually all the European countries and also the United States and Canada are taking part. This is the only venue where European states come together. And in the current situation it must not only be preserved but also put to even better use... Take disarmament, for instance, which represents a key problem. Readiness to disarm means readiness for confidence, cooperation, and security. Proceeding from this, I can see the outline of the political solutions to the problems facing our continent, to be achieved within the framework of the future all-European institutions. That is why I attach so much importance to this conference.

[Kovalenko] Mr President, what New Year wishes would you like to convey to Soviet people via IZVESTIYA?

[Mitterrand] I wish your country and its people success in the development of the economy and the solution of domestic problems in conditions of civil peace. I wish the head of your state to be heard and understood. He is acting boldly, but he has difficult tasks ahead of him. Gorbachev stands at the cradle of one of the biggest shakeups in history and this is in keeping with his aspirations. In doing so, he, of course, remains loyal to the ideas which he accepted back in his youth.

French Intelligence Reorganization Reported

PM0901094590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko dispatch: "New Credit for 'Big Ears'"]

[Excerpts] Paris—According to reports which have appeared in the press, a radical reorganization of French military intelligence, referred to as "big ears" here, is in preparation.

The Ministry of Defense intends to set up a new administration for the gathering of intelligence data of a military nature which will incorporate the special services currently operating under the general staffs of the various armed forces services (the so-called second bureaus).

[passage omitted] The modernization of the military special service will require considerable additional credits since, as one army officer aptly put it, "information gathering is expensive." In the present situation, which is marked by a relaxation of tension and in which the French Government has reduced the growth rate of the military budget, these credits are not easy to obtain. That is why the military have found the following arguments to support their demands: Intelligence will assume the functions of the verification of the practical implementation of the agreements on conventional and strategic arms cuts which to all appearances will be signed in 1990. On this pretext, the Paris press writes, the Ministry of Defense intends to "beef up 'big ears'."

Deputy Minister Vorontsov Receives Italian Envoy

LD0801142590 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS—First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov received Italy's Ambassador to the USSR Ferdinando Salleo at his request. They discussed matters of mutual interest.

CPSU Delegation Leaves for Spain 8 Jan

LD0801144190 Moscow TASS in English 1435 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS—A delegation of the Soviet Communist Party left for Madrid on Monday.

The delegation, led by Grigoriy Revenko, Central Committee member and head of the Kiev Communist Party committee, has been invited by the leadership of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.

Latin America & Caribbean

'Clumsy' U.S. Argument on Panama Acts Refuted

PY0901031790 Moscow in Spanish to Chile 2300 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Leonid Levchenko commentary]

[Text] The U.S. Government's argument to justify the military invasion of Panama is a clumsy attempt to deceive the world, especially when they say that the invasion was necessary to topple General Noriega and turn him over to the courts for drug trafficking.

The general was bothering the United States' for a completely different reason: First, Noriega was demanding that the canal treaties be fully respected; second, as General Noriega himself told Soviet television and radio correspondent (Aleksandr Serikov), Washington was upset by his refusal to participate in the U.S.

plans against Nicaragua. According to this plan, Panama would become the bridgehead for the attack. This interview with Noriega was broadcast by Soviet television yesterday during the special "15 Days" newscast.

Today Panama has become the victim of Washington's ambition to maintain its influence in Latin America by force.

Is there anything more cynical and dangerous than the U.S. intention to maintain its military bases in the Canal Zone and its open threat to once again resort to force in any part of Latin America under the same groundless pretext? These threats by no means respond to the Latin American peoples' hopes.

We believe that the Latin Americans are aware of the obvious advantages of the new mentality and policy proclaimed by the Soviet Union in the international arena.

As has been announced in Washington, in the next few days Vice President Dan Quayle will visit several Latin American capitals to try to justify the U.S. intervention in Panama. I do not think it will be an easy task, although it is feasible.

It is not just coincidence that the deployment of U.S. ships toward the Colombian coast under the pretext of fighting drug trafficking has been received so negatively in Bogota and other capitals of the continent.

Panama Seen as 'Monroe Doctrine' Manifestation

90UI0249A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 26 Dec 89 p 7

[Article by Gennadiy Gerasimov, Soviet government spokesman and columnist: "Displaying the Monroe Doctrine to the World"]

[Text] Last Thursday President Bush said: "Especially at this time of the year, my heart is with those families who lost dear ones in Panama..." The president, referring to the "time of the year," had Christmas in mind.

But it was the president personally, without congress, who issued the order not long before Christmas to bring American military might down on Panama. The ratio in the basic indices (population size, volume of GNP, and armed forces) is 100 to 1.

The President enumerated three reasons for his action.

1. Protection of American lives.

This is the usual argument, which was used in the invasion of Grenada and many times before that. Several days earlier, an American serviceman was shot in Panama. The newspapers in Washington wrote then, citing representatives of the administration, that "Saturday's incident does not give enough reason for retaliatory actions, because the marines entered the zone of a Panamanian armed post." There was another lesser incident: The arrest of a U.S. serviceman by Panamanian authorities, his "rough" interrogation, and a threat to the honor of his wife. Also hardly sufficient grounds...

2. Support of the democratic process.

The process referred to is historically unknown in Panama. We will recall several landmarks in the history of this country. The Panamanian flag was conceived in October 1903 in the town of Highland Falls in the state of New York in the home of John Bigelow from New York's Chamber of Commerce. In November 1903, American gunboats were covering the coast from the Armed Forces of Columbia at a time when separatists declared the creation of an "independent" republic. A country is established for the sake of the canal and is under the control of persons obedient to Washington. In succeeding years, difficulties arose with respect to obedience. Then they remembered about democracy.

3. Preservation of the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties.

But there is no proof of a threat to them on the part of the Panamanians. By the year 2000 the canal must be transferred to the full jurisdiction of Panama. Why should it provoke the United States and place this date at threat? But, perhaps, the United States wants to replay the agreement? It is unpopular in conservative circles. When, in April 1978, the Senate ratified the treaty signed by President Jimmy Carter about the future transfer of the jurisdiction over the canal to Panama, Ronald Reagan declared: "Again Uncle Sam crawled away with his tail between his legs just so he would not get involved in the affair." Was it not the return of a desire to get involved that was the cause of today's invasion?

4. The seizure of General Noriega for the purpose of turning him over to an American court for participating in the drug business.

The general has an interesting biography. He graduated from the military school "School of the Americas," which was established by the American Army in Panama for officers of Latin American countries, and it is unofficially designated "the school of state coups." If you are to believe the American press, when George Bush was the director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), Noriega was a highly paid agent of that establishment. Under President J. Carter, the payment of moneys to Noriega was stopped, but under President Ronald Reagan, he was returned to the payroll of the CIA.

Regardless of the general's biography, to arrange a hunt for him is legally unacceptable.

Columnist Elizabeth Drew wrote in the weekly THE NEW YORKER on 30 October: "Some time ago American policy with respect to Panama jumped the rails. There is something in Noriega that compels presidents and many of us to act silly... Panama brings out something in us that is atavistic..."

Very likely, imperial thinking and the manifestation of the "Monroe Doctrine," according to which the United States considered the country to the south to be its own exclusive private domain.

Thus, the United States decided on intervention, supplementing military brute force with a war of words, calling the operation "Just Cause."

Aside from England, the whole world does not concur

Nuns' Murder in Nicaragua Viewed

LD0801141190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1030 GMT on 8 January carries a report from Managua correspondent Yuriy Baranov.

Baranov observes that so far, during the 8 years of external aggression by the Contras, none of their numerous crimes has given rise to such vigorous condemnation in the camp of the right-wing opposition to the Sandinist government as the tragic murder of the two nuns. Local observers discern a direct link between the murder of the nuns—one of them American—and the death of an American officer in Panama, which—it was claimed—exhausted patience and prompted the U.S. invasion.

Baranov says: "The possibility cannot be ruled out that the leaders of the Contras, having given the order to carry out this monstrous action, expected to take advantage of the United States' strong [boleznennyy] reaction when it is a matter of the life and security of its citizens, in other words, to provide the United States with an occasion, to spur it on. After all, in the past 25 years, even decade, one can recall quite a few examples: The bombing of Libya, the airborne landing in Iran, let alone the invasion of the Dominican Republic and Grenada. However, the Contras overstepped the mark or, perhaps, they were in a bit of a hurry. In the conditions of the election campaign which has got underway, at any rate until 25 January when the elections will take place, a complication of the situation within and around Nicaragua is not advantageous either to right-wing political positions or to the United States, which would like to celebrate a victory over the Sandinists by constitutional democratic means. However, the black deed has been done and one can attempt to rectify it in only one way: By accusing the Sandinists of this monstrous crime, which is what the right-wing reaction within Nicaragua and the ringleaders of the Contras which have entrenched themselves in Honduras and Miami are now attempting to do."

Diplomatic Ties Established With Antigua, Barbuda

LD0601082190 Moscow TASS in English 0810 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Text] New York January 6 TASS—The Soviet Union and Antigua and Barbuda established diplomatic relations here on Friday.

The ceremony was attended by Soviet U.N. Ambassador Aleksandr Belonogov and U.N. Ambassador of Antigua and Barbuda Lionel Alexander Herst.

The agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations provides for the exchange of ambassadors holding posts also in another country.

Antigua and Barbuda is a small insular state in the Caribbean, with a population of 82,000 (1985). More than a third of the population lives in the capital, St. John's.

The state is a member of the Commonwealth. Executive power is vested in the British sovereign, as head of state, and exercised by the governor-general.

Legislative power is vested in parliament, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The government of Antigua and Barbuda, led by the prime minister, is appointed by the governor-general.

Speaking to reporters, Herst expressed hope that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries will help them establish mutual cultural and tourist exchanges and also broaden marine ties between them.

PRAVDA Notes Cuba's Food, Housing Problems

PM0501144590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Moiseyev: "1 January Marks Cuban People's National Holiday: Liberation Day"]

[Excerpts] Havana—Victory in the revolution came to the sunny Caribbean island at the beginning of 1959. The neocolonialist Batista regime collapsed before the insurgent army.

During holidays Cuban television often shows documentary footage of that historic year: Havana greeting the victors. The young Fidel Castro appears on the screen reading his speech in Havana. The capital rejoices and is full of hope for the future.

Thirty-one years have now passed. Time is implacable. And it has not bypassed the Cuban capital, at which, it seems to me, you never grow tired of gazing. [passage omitted]

Any sensible observant foreigner will discover on coming to Havana that reality here is not clear-cut and is quite often contradictory.

Any unbiased person will easily discover in Havana that people on the streets openly and loudly express their ideas and that new polyclinics, kindergartens, schools, and stores are encountered at every step. But the person hoping to find some sort of paradise here will be disappointed. He will perceive that Havanans do not have an easy life and stand in long waiting lines for vegetables,

bread, and meat products. The visitor will see almost empty store counters, telephones out of order, a frequently interrupted water supply service, and bureaucracy. Havanans do indeed experience a whole host of problems.

It would be naive, of course, to seek the causes of the shortcomings and difficulties in bureaucratic obstacles alone. They are also partly the result of the continuing economic blockade by the United States and the covert war which Washington has waged against Cuba for over 3 decades.

The current shortcomings and difficulties have also been caused by former omissions and mistakes by the leadership and poor labor efficiency. All this is recognized by the Cuban comrades themselves, they recognize and are attempting to radically change the situation: A dynamic process of rectification, that is to say, correcting the mistakes and overcoming negative trends, is under way throughout the country under the leadership of the party. Cuba is seeking its own development path, its own method of improving socialism. [passage omitted]

In recent years the leadership of the party and the country has been paying increased attention to developing the Cuban capital. Havana is experiencing an unprecedented construction boom.

The fitting up of one of eight future bus depots is being completed on the southern outskirts of the capital. A team from the Blas Roca Calderio contingent is working there. They are working all out—14 hours a day. The organization and structure of the collective differs from that of ordinary construction teams. "Although I am the leader," Juan Carlos Martinez, deputy director of the contingent, said," it is the collective that always has the final say. It has set an average wage of 340 pesos a month, which is 50 percent more than regular construction workers receive. We rejected overtime and bonuses. Working 14 hours a day for any Cuban undoubtedly represents a self-sacrifice. But we know what we are doing it for: Namely, the accelerated development of our Havana and our republic."

Havana's development is constantly monitored by the party leadership. I managed to converse with Jorge Lescano not in his office but on a busy construction site. This large, tall, slightly stooping man of 54 is a member of the Communist Party of Cuba [PCC] Central Committee and has been secretary of the capital's party committee for 5 years now. And it is virtually impossible to catch him in his office: He is always traveling around the city. Lescano's career can be said to be typical of a Cuban party leader. He comes from a working family and began his working life at the age of 13 in the capital's Artes Graficas printing house. He became a revolutionary, defending the interests of working people in the trade union movement. He was a Havanan workers' leader, fought in the Havana underground against the Batista dictatorship, and suffered arrests and torture. After the victory of the revolution, Jorge Lescano occupied important posts in the trade union movement, was in charge of committees for the defense of the revolution, and was appointed a government minister. And he has always been unpretentious, modest, and accessible to working people.

"Our city party organization," Lescano said, "is the biggest in the republic, with more than 100,000 Communists, which represents one-fifth of all PCC members. There's a host of problems, and that is why we work so very hard. The main problem for the inhabitants of Havana is the acute need for housing and social and consumer services. It is being successfully solved, albeit not so quickly as we would wish. In 1989 9,500 new apartments were commissioned on a turnkey basis in the city. The construction of 20 special schools for children, 11 polyclinics, more than 300 family doctor surgeries, 20 bakeries, and 15 different trading centers. We have, it has to be frankly acknowledged, large reserves in the economy. I think that every party member should set an example in making use of them. We should, while not forgetting the republic's holy of holies—sugar—ensure the population is suppled with food products.

Cubans have a simple proverb: The new year is a new life. It is no wonder that these words are considered to come from the people. They contain the wisdom of optimism, hope, and faith in the future. And thus it is a happy accident of history that the coming of the new year should coincide with the revolution victory fiesta. Havana celebrates a double festival.

Congress of People's Deputies

Treatment of Servicemen in Baltics Deplored

PM0801110190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

["Speech by Admiral V.P. Ivanov, commander of the Baltic Fleet and USSR people's deputy from Kaliningradskiy Rural Territorial Electoral Okrug, at the 21 December session" of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, under the rubric "From the Transcript of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies": "Defending Servicemen's Rights"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Deputies! The experience of perestroyka and of the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet and our Congress show that the building of a just, democratic, rule-of-law state is a responsible and difficult job requiring knowledge, energy, competence, balance in emotion and judgment, and consideration of the interests of all nationalities and social groups. The difficulty of building a rule-of-law state is also manifested in the fact that some of the legal acts which have been or are being adopted by state organs, social organizations, and some union republics contradict the USSR Constitution and USSR laws, the democratic basic principles of Soviet society, and the rights and freedom of the individual.

In the current discussion of the draft Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR, I want to dwell on those aspects of legal activity and the observance of the USSR Constitution in the republics which are having an adverse effect on servicemen's normal performance of their constitutional and professional duty to defend the state. I think that the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, whose creation I consider necessary, should examine these questions in the future.

We military men are in the very front line of the ideological conflict in which some circles are actively trying to denigrate and undermine the prestige of the army and navy and trying to bring the USSR Armed Forces into conflict with the people and the party and to instill a lack of faith in the USSR Armed Forces' ability to defend the country. We also come into direct contact with the most overt nationalist and extremist forces. These forces use all forms in their activity—from provocation and the use of labels such as "occupier" to armed attacks on military installations and servicemen and the desecration of monuments to Vladimir Ilich Lenin and prominent revolutionaries and monuments to victory in the Great Patriotic War and to the servicemen who died in that war. Certain circles have not abandoned their provocative attempts to bring the army into conflict with the people, embroil the army in some adventure, and thereby strike a blow against the prestige of the party, the government, and perestroyka as a whole.

A number of statewide problems relating to the USSR Armed Forces demand closer attention from our congress. First and foremost, there is the problem of the draft and the service of young people in the USSR Armed Forces. With the connivance and definite help of the local soviet leadership in the Baltic and Transcaucasus and by skillfully exploiting the problem of army and navy "bullies" and our difficulties and shortcomings, anti-army forces, people's fronts, and the Latvian women's league have managed to foist on the peoples of their republics a negative attitude toward service in the USSR Armed Forces and thereby jeopardize the routine army draft.

They have also managed to create conditions for increasing the incidence of desertion and avoidance of military service, which are actively being encouraged and supported by the people's fronts.

We have one motherland, Comrades, and it is our constitutional, civic, and I would say manly duty to defend it on the basis of universal military service.

The Armed Forces cannot be formed solely from workers and peasants while rashly exempting other social groups and whole sections of the population from military service.

The laws adopted by some republics on the performance of army service solely on their own territory and the proposals on the creation of national formations which have been strenuously foisted on public opinion have another aspect apart from the negative consequences which People's Deputy General Moiseyev mentioned. These actions will cause nothing but harm to the USSR Armed Forces' combat might and will consequently weaken the state's defense capability.

This is nothing but a deliberate attempt to undermine the basis of our defense capability and a striving by the so-called national leaders of various people's fronts to have at their disposal an armed force sanctioned by law. It is not hard to imagine whose hands it could fall into, for example, in the conditions created in the Baltic region, the Transcaucasus, and in any other critical situation. Can we really take such a step?!

We military men and officers understand that it is impossible to completely reeducate an 18-year-old in 2 years of military service, but we can instill and foster in him an all-embracing sense of human duty, comradeship, patriotism, internationalism, and responsibility. We develop the draftees' political and social outlook, self-discipline, and civic maturity, we provide the soldier and sailor with good military training, we ensure order, organization, and discipline, and we work actively to prevent the anomalies of civilian life from developing into "bullying."

Figuratively speaking, I would say that service in the Army has saved several million young men from destitution and prison, set them on the right road, and given them a real start in life.

Now people are actively trying to impose on us the idea of a professional army and in so doing are trying to make

it seem as though it is only the military who are stopping them. I can tell you honestly that service in a professional army would be easier for us officers. But let us consider what this would cost the state in material, moral, and spiritual terms, let alone the impossibility of creating a resource capable of being mobilized.

In our country there is no sociopolitical legal institution for education and development whose influence on young people could equal that of the army and navy.

And, finally, the theme of constitutional oversight. The army and navy have now encountered difficult problems of life and service. In the Baltic republics local republic organs of power are not allocating housing to servicemen and at the same time are not giving the Defense Ministry permission to build apartment blocks, schools, hospitals, stores, or kindergartens on previously allocated sites, have sharply reduced the planned supplies of brick for the construction of apartment blocks, and are adopting laws which infringe servicemen's rights. And all this in the bad and difficult situation which has come about today in servicemen's sociocultural and consumer supply.

The Armed Forces are being cut by 500,000 men now. By decision of the Defense Ministry 100 apartment blocks have been built for the officers discharged from the Armed Forces, 2 of them for our Baltic Fleet—in a rayon of Riga and in Liyepaya. We view this as a fair decision. Now the officers' families have arrived in those cities but the local organs of power won't issue residence permits. As a result the servicemen in question cannot receive their pension or medical help, find work, or buy food or consumer goods. That point is made in the many letters and telegrams that come in.

On 6 December 1989 the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopted the resolution "On the Estonian SSR draft law 'On Immigration.'" This draft law provides for the allocation to servicemen and their families of fixed-term residence permits—up to 3 years—lasting to the end of their period of service. When establishing the fixed-term residence permit it is proposed that when the permit expires the servicemen and their families will be obliged to leave the Estonian SSR.

On 4 December 1989 the Estonian SSR Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services prepared an Estonian SSR Council of Ministers draft resolution conferring on accommodation allocated to military departments the status of official housing and proposing, as of 1 January 1990, that accommodation allocated by local soviet executive committees or built by the Defense Ministry for Armed Forces servicemen will be considered official accommodation. In addition, when military servicemen are transferred elsewhere, official accommodation in buildings belonging to local soviets is to be transferred to the local authorities. But those people who have severed their links with the Armed Forces, that is, those transferred into the reserve will not be given a permit for the accommodation that they occupy. A draft Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree was prepared at the same time as that draft Estonian SSR Council of Ministers resolution. The former enables local soviets to refrain from issuing accommodation for the Defense Ministry's use. The Defense Ministry is losing all its reserved accommodation on Estonian SSR territory. When discharged into the reserve servicemen are deprived of the accommodation previously occupied by them and are required to leave the Estonian SSR.

Consequently, servicemen discharged into the reserve will not be able to freely choose their place of residence within the state's boundaries, which is a serious breach of Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, furthermore, is a violation of the constitutional right to housing. A similar situation has come about in the other Baltic republics. The overall effect of such acts is to aggravate an already difficult situation. We would ask the Congress of USSR People's Deputies not to allow the adoption of the aforementioned laws.

One last point. On the basis of what has been said already, I propose the following. First: That the Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR be adopted and a USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee be created. Those who oppose this, in my view, are people who want to continue perpetrating lawlessness unsupervised. Several of the deputies who spoke called for that.

Second: Article 12 of the draft law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR, which talks about the kind of questions that the committee is to examine, should be augmented by a paragraph 6 reading as follows: on the appeals of national minorities of individual social groups and social organizations. That should also be included in part two of this article.

Third: We ask you to support the USSR Defense Ministry's proposal to declare the draft and the discharge from active military service not an order of the USSR Defense Ministry but acts of the USSR Supreme Soviet or the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium or resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers, so that they are binding in all republics and regions.

Fourth: I propose that a reliable legal mechanism be created to ensure the fulfillment of the law on universal military service and severe responsibility for desertion and avoidance of military service, to apply also to people who incite others to desert or avoid military service.

Fifth: To create a commission of the Congress or to instruct the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee to examine the lawfulness of resolutions, decisions, laws, and other acts that have been adopted which discriminate against servicemen and infringe their rights.

Finally: To instruct the USSR Supreme Soviet to examine our state's defense policy and prepare drafts of the corresponding legislative acts for submission to the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies. I thank you, Comrades. (Applause.)

Stance of Baltic, Georgian Deputies Criticized

PM0801163990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Jan 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Miroslav Buzhkevich under the "Parliamentary Observer's Comments" rubric: "Positions and Principles"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] In general quite a few speeches were made at the Congress in which facts were, if not juggled, freely interpreted and awkward aspects of the speaker's own stance, the situation in his republic, and so forth were avoided. One such speaker remarked in justification of the introduction of a qualfication that you had to live a specified time in a republic to run as a local soviet candidate deputy that election laws must have restrictions. And he pretentiously explained to the assembly that no one seriously thinks that a 10-year-old could be elected to parliament. The hall was simply unable to grasp whether he was joking or talking completely seriously.

Speeches by certain deputies from the Baltic, Moldavia, and Georgia also came over as insincere. They insistently upheld the sovereignty of their own republics, protested the imposition of the center's will upon them, and so forth. But they did not say a word about the fact that back home in their republics, small peoples, even those possessing autonomy, or people who do not belong to the indigenous nationality quite often suffer discrimination. One deputy quite rightly said of such speakers that they look at only one side and are reluctant to heed the voice of those to whom they cause offense.

People's deputies understand their position in different ways. Some are sincerely concerned at the hitches in perestroyka and at the economic and social situation and seek a solution and ways to overcome the difficulties. They cooperate with everyone who seeks likewise. Others, however, mesmerized by their own personal arrogance, narrow national and regional aims, and ultraradical aspirations, ostentatiously refuse such cooperation and foment a tense atmosphere in the work of the supreme legislative organs of state. I think that this disease of "parliamentary contentiousness" will disappear, and quite quickly. It will be cured by work. [Passage omitted]

23 Dec Debate on Yakovlev Report on 1939 Pact

90US0334 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Dec 89 Morning Edition pp 7-9

[Report on debate on A.N. Yakovlev's report on Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact at Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies in Kremlin Palace of Congresses on 23 December 1989]

[Excerpts] **Twentieth Meeting**

Kremlin Palace of Congresses, 23 December 1989, 1600 hours.

The chairman is A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

Chairman: Are their any questions for Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev? There are. Please.

From the floor: I have a question for the speaker. As we know, the commission was instructed to consider the question of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the documents associated with it. You limited the framework of this consideration to 1939. But as a member of the Politburo you know that in the Baltic republics they have created work commissions that think that the 1940 acts to enter the USSR are directly related to the events of 1939. I would ask you to respond to this statement: Either you do not know about this or for some reason you do not wish to touch upon this problem at this congress but, whether we like it or not, it will be touched in the discussion of your report.

A.N. Yakovlev: Comrades, I have already said that the Congress mandate was to define the following subject for our report: "A political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German nonagression treaty of 23 August 1939." The commission is guided by this mandate.

Chairman: Please, Deputy Goldanskiy.

V.I. Goldanskiy, director of the N.N. Semenov Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, chairman of the Soviet Pugwash committee, Moscow (from the Soviet world fund in conjunction with the eight Soviet committees speaking for peace, solidarity, and international cooperation): Aleksandr Nikolayevich, limiting myself to 1939, I wish to ask several questions.

First question: Was not Litvinov's retirement at the beginning of May 1939 a clear sign that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, with its orientation toward Anglo-French ties, was changing radically and being redirected toward the possibility of concluding a treaty with Germany.

Second question: You spoke about the relatively different assessments of how prepared Germany was for war with the Soviet Union in 1939. We know that there was fairly widespread information to the effect that in 1939 among the German generals there were fairly strong attitudes against Hitler and against war, particularly with the Soviet Union. They gave the names, say, of Blumberg and other leading generals. And there was an attempt on Hitler's life in November 1939. In view of these facts, how significant was the Soviet-German treaty?

And, finally, the third question: Did the Komintern not give any instructions to the communist parties of a number of countries after the treaty between Stalin and Hitler was concluded regarding a change in their policy from antifascist to a policy in which a line that was conciliatory to fascism could be traced?

A.N. Yakovlev: Comrades, I assume that we are not holding a history symposium here.

From the floor: Yes, yes. (Noise in the hall.)

A.N. Yakovlev: I can say only that the commission handled hundreds of documents and documentary data, including some that became known for the first time during the course of the study of this question. It is impossible to present everything; it is all at the commission's disposal.

As for the Komintern and its instructions to communist parties, the study of these shows that they are very, very contradictory. The Komintern was placed in a very complicated position, for it did not know about the secret protocol. But everyone was aware that something was happening. And if you take these instructions, which called for a continuation of the fight against fascism and consolidation of antimilitary, antifascist forces, in the decisions of individual communist parties, for instance in France, and, as far as I can recall Italy too, there was a resolution that called for a certain amount of restraint, although the French Communist Party changed its position after a while.

The study of the documents showed all the complexity of the events, all the fluctuations and the contradictory nature of the decisions and recommendations that were made and so forth. Therefore I also consider it possible to say that the fact that this protocol was unknown and secret placed all antimilitary and antifascist democratic forces in a difficult position.

Chairman: Please, Deputy Sukhov.

L.I. Sukhov, member of the commission of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet for questions of transportation, communications, and information science (Kharkov-Leninskiy territorial electoral district, Kharkov Oblast): Aleksandr Nikolayevich, I have this question. You spoke about the fact that it was France and England who refused to cooperate with the Soviet Union. What do you think, today could you give us a guarantee that if the Soviet Union refused to sign an agreement with Germany, France and England would not sign an agreement between themselves and attack the Soviet Union?

A.N. Nikolayev: My specialty is history and, respecting this science, I cannot guess who would do what under what circumstances, the more so if we must project historical events and our reflections onto the past.

As I have already told you, history has stopped in our analysis, it has already occurred, it has already been. And therefore we can only attach to it one or another of our opinions. What France or England would have done in the same circumstances—this is difficult to say now. We know from the documents only what they did do.

Chairman: Thank you. (Noise in the hall.) The third microphone. Please, Comrade Yorga.

L.I. Sukhov: Excuse me, I have not finished my thought and question.

Chairman: Please, Deputy Sukhov.

L.I. Sukhov: So how is it that today we are saying that the Soviet Union entered the Baltic republics as a conqueror? For example, when Romania was fighting as a part of Germany, a German enlisted man was higher than a Romanian officer.

From the floor: I do not understand a thing. (Noise in the hall.)

L.I. Sukhov: How can we, Soviet people, say that we are conquerors? Answer, please.

Chairman: Why are we conquerors?

A.N. Yakovlev: Excuse me, I did not understand your question. (Noise in the hall.)

Chairman: We shall regard Leonid Ivanovich Sukhov's statement as a rejoinder. Please, Deputy Yorga.

L.I. Yorga, consultant of the journalism division of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] writers' union, Kishinev (Kutuzovskiy national territorial electoral district, Moldavian SSR). Esteemed deputies! In order for people to understand my question, I shall give a couple of facts... (Noise in the hall.)

Chairman: I request, Deputy Yorga, I respect you very much, but I request that you ask the question.

L.I. Yorga: Yes, but the question depends on facts. This will just take a minute.

Chairman: Please, 1 minute.

L.I. Yorga: Esteemed deputies, the problem is that in 1917 when all the colonies of the former tsarist empire were liberated, Bessarabia was liberated as well. This was officially recognized by a telegram from Petrograd. We already know what happened after that, in 1940. The rights of the democratic republic, which was formed on 2 December of that same year of 1917, were trampled on. Moreover, in Kiev in 1917 there was a congress of all the liberated nations and at that congress they adopted a program for these nations which had all the requirements that exist today. History is repeating itself. There was a demand for sovereignty of nations, the state language, and the Russian language as a means of communication between nations. Moreover, a national army was recognized. Now our generals are surprised about this.

Here is the question: If Bessarabia was a colony of the tsarist empire, why did you say just now that it was returned, as though it had been the property of the Soviet Union, of Russia? Further, if the pact indicated only Bessarabia, why did Stalin seize both Moldavia and Bukovina as well? Incidentally, Bessarabia consists only of the oblasts of Akkerman, Kilia, and Izmail, which are now in the Ukraine.

Chairman: Is the question clear?

A.N. Yakovlev: No, absolutely not.

Chairman: Then answer as well as you can.

A.N. Yakovlev: I just wish to say, comrades...

Chairman: Attention, comrades, listen, please.

A.N. Yakovlev: I ask you once again to pay attention to our commission's mandate. You, the congress, defined it very clearly: The nonagression treaty of 1939. We all understand that this subject is such that one could go on endlessly beyond its limits, both to the pact and beyond that. There is justification for that but your instructions were concrete: The 1939 treaty.

Chairman: Please, a question. One minute. First microphone, the last question. That is all, comrades.

A.K. Igrashev, manager of the Uzbekgidroenergostroy trust, Tashkent (Tashkent-Oktyabrskiy national territorial electoral district, Uzbek SSR): Esteemed Aleksandr Nikolayevich! You have already discussed this aspect but I should like to clarify it once again and receive an answer. In your commission's draft decree you write that the real protocols were discovered neither in the Soviet nor in foreign archives. And yet in point seven of the draft decree it is written that "the USSR Congress of People's Deputies condemns the signing of 'secret additional protocol'." Is it correct to say that the congress condemns nonexistent documents? For if they could not be found in the archives of the Soviet Union it probably would have been possible to find them in the archives of the German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany.

Chairman: Thank you. Is the question clear?

A.N. Yakovlev: It is.

A.K. Igrashev: Excuse me, here happens to be a remark from a commission member. When signing the draft of the decree Comrade Kravets wrote: "I think the congress decree should contain only point one." That is, there is no unity between the members of the commission regarding this issue.

A.N. Yakovlev: Twenty-five commission members think it is necessary to adopt the decree as a whole. Comrade Kravets, while not objecting to the essence of the conclusions that we have drawn, made a note that it would be worthwhile to restrict ourselves to the adoption of point one, thus supporting the commission's conclusions presented in the explanatory note. Therefore it is for the congress to decide what should be done here and which decision to make—this is the function of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

And regarding the first question...

Chairman: The question about the fate of the protocol.

A.N. Yakovlev: You understand, comrades, that the draft decree has a clear restriction: The attitude toward the treaty is one thing. The commission came to the conclusion that it was nothing special from the standpoint of accepted international practice at the time, as I tried to explain from the podium.

As for the secret protocol, that is an altogether different matter. Being in violation of procedure and being an obvious pact between two subjects of negotiations, it goes against rights and is fundamentally illegal. Therefore we are giving a political assessment and suggest adopting a formula for discussing it, for this contradicts all principles of Leninist foreign policy.

Chairman: Are there any more questions?

From the floor: No.

Chairman: I ask that you sit down.

A.N. Yakovlev: That is all, right?

Chairman: Yes, that is all. Thank you. Before calling a break I should make two announcements.

There will now be a short meeting of members of the general editorial commission in Room 79. And the second thing: Deputies in the medical field are asked to meet for 5-10 minutes in the center of the hall.

M.S. Gorbachev: Deputy Poltoranin wishes to say something.

Chairman: Poltoranin? Please. Two words.

M.N. Poltoranin, political observer of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY, Moscow (From the USSR union of journalists). One minute, comrades! (Noise in the hall.)

Comrades, comrades, 1 minute! Since my name is being mentioned here all the time—as Chemodanov's was at the First Congress—I should like to say that yesterday you received a paper on which was written that at the request of the people's deputies they were giving the names of the deputies who signed the declaration on behalf of the interregional group. As you know, this declaration was presented by the esteemed Yuriy Nikolayevich Afanasyev. Since I did not sign the declaration read by Yuriy Nikolayevich but my name was included on the list that was distributed, I submitted the note to the Presidium and suggested that this was a technical error. And that is what happened. The names were taken from other texts, we signed many of them, and that text was in Yuriy Nikolayevich Afanasyev's pocket. (Noise in the hall.)

Chairman: Thank you. We shall take a 30-minute break.

(After the break)

Chairman: Comrade deputies! We shall begin to discuss the report from the congress commission for a political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German nonagression treaty of 1939 but before beginning this discussion I would like to read the notes that have been sent to the Presidium.

The first note: "Taking into account the profound, comprehensive, and weighed nature of Comrade Yakovlev's report and also the inappropriateness of attempts to go beyond the framework of the instructions of the First Congress, we consider it possible not to open debates but to restrict ourselves to adopting the decree. Deputies Vladislavlev and Burlatskiy."

The second suggestion: "I suggest that debates not be opened on the report of Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev. The draft decree proposed by the commission should be adopted."

Moreover, several deputies came up to me during the break and said: Look at the draft, it has been signed by all members of the commission and certified with the exception of one small reservation. All the other commission members agree with that. Therefore the deputies suggest not opening up debates. But I must consult with you. Does anybody insist on opening up debates.

From the floor: No!

Chairman: Do you insist, Comrade Kogan?

From the floor: No.

Chairman: But two deputies, Klokov and Yeremey, as far as I can see, insist on the discussion. This means I must put it to a vote: To open the debates or not. That is probably it, is it not, comrades?

From the floor: Yes!

Chairman: I wish to suggest the following. If we do not open the debates we shall have to discuss the decree later. I shall put to a vote the proposals from the deputies whose names I mentioned, not to open the debates on this question but to move directly on to the adoption of the resolution. Those in favor of this suggestion please vote.

Chairman: The suggestion is adopted—the debates on this issue will not be opened and we shall move directly on to the discussion of the decree the deputies have.

Results of the voting:
Voted "for"—1,670.
Voted "against"—109.
Abstained—26.
Total votes—1805.
Did not vote—1.

Deputy Klokov has the floor.

V.I. Klokov, head scientific associate of the Institute of History of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Kiev (from the all-union organization of veterans of war and labor): Dear Comrades, the question is not as easy as it seems; it is a complicated one which will leave its stamp on all future research and on the assessment of what is perhaps the largest and most glorious page—both heroic and tragic—of our history. The 1939 treaty with which the war began later started a chain reaction—the Great Patriotic War, and the Great Victory of our people. I fully agree with the theses of the report or, rather, with the content of the report that was presented. It reflects the political assessment of the time much better than even the text we have. But I categorically disagree with point two of the decree of our Congress if it is let to stand as it is without an evaluation of the extremely complicated political situation which brought about the entire upheaval that ended in the conclusion of the 1939 treaty. Evidence of this is the question asked by Deputy Sukhov and the questions that might be asked by millions of our citizens who experienced all the terror of the war and fascism. I shall allow myself to draw your attention to the text that characterizes the political evaluation of the treaty. The Congress of People's Deputies agrees with the commission's opinion that the treaty had the stated goal of leading the USSR away from the threat of the impending armed conflict. In the final analysis this goal was not achieved, but the illusions generated by the circumstances exacerbated the consequences. What do I see in this? I see in this a direct accusation against our country and our people of starting World War II. Who was the main party guilty of starting the war? Where is the aggressiveness of fascism which beat its way through to world domination? This is the first question.

The second question. Is it possible merely in the actions of governments, merely in terms of "the ambassador said, the ambassador answered" and so forth to substantiate a political evaluation of a treaty. Where are the people here, where is their participation in the historical process without which it is impossible to make a political evaluation? Therefore I suggest to the congress that it take the commission's conclusions under advisement and stop at that. And after that give the text of the oral speech that was heard here, that is, not complete but still close to the truth of the evaluation, for otherwise new chains will be placed on the investigators. Previously there were chains of prohibition on the negative publications about our history and there will not be a ban on positive publications. Thank you.

Chairman: Who else has something to say about this draft? Deputy Petrushenko, please.

N.S. Petrushenko: Esteemed comrades! I think it would be expedient to restrict ourselves to the first point only. But if we raise the question that we also need, say, point five, point six, or point seven, then in a separate point we must write that certain forces are now trying to use the treaty as a way of coordinating quite disparate events.

In my opinion, we should have evaluated the events taking place today in connection with the treaty. I am convinced of this because of what is said in the decree of the First Congress of People's Deputies with the creation of the commission for developing a political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German nonagression pact concluded in 1939 and the documents related to it. But, as you know, related to this treaty are a number of documents adopted in 1989 in the Baltic republics. I suggest

making an assessment of these. I have these documents before me. In one of them in particular, without any justification it is asserted that "the 'Declaration to Include Latvia in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' of the Latvian Sejm of 21 June 1940 and the 'Law on Including the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 5 August 1940 were illegal from the time of their adoption." The commissions of Lithuania and Estonia came to similar conclusions. This is what I think we should focus our attention on. Why do I think this? Since the commission was created it should have given an assessment of these documents as well. We have them since it is not only the Baltic republics who are prepared for their discussion, as was the case at the first congress, but we are as well. In this connection I shall allow myself to read not only point one of the USSR law of 3 August 1940 but also point two which reads: To adopt the proposal of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet concerning including in the union Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Sventsyanskiy Rayon and part of the territory with a primarily Lithuanian population in Vidzovskiy, Godutishkiovskiy, Ostrovetskiy, Voronovskiy, and Radunskiy rayons in the Belorussian SSR. Since in the Baltic republics they insist on revoking the entire law as illegal, let us satisfy that demand and revoke not only point one but point two as well.

Why did I bring this up? Because in my opinion, linking the 1939 treaty to the 1940 treaty, in the Baltic republics they gave no thought at all to the political consequences awaiting them. As an example I shall tell you that in 1972 they did not begin to assess this treaty in the parliament of the FRG despite the insistent suggestion of Strauss. But if the Baltic republics are so interested in this then they might also give an assessment. My opinion amounts to sticking with the first point. If someone should insist on the rest of the points then I shall make another proposal. Believe me I have several of them in reserve. (Laughter in the hall.)

Chairman: Who else wants to speak? Comrade Yeremey? Please.

G.I. Yeremey, chairman of the Moldavian republic trade union council, Kishinev (Brichanskiy national territorial electoral district, Moldavian SSR): Esteemed Comrade Deputies! I can only say that I am sorry that we are spending 1 and ½ days or 2 days each on procedural issues and the congress agenda but when it comes to serious questions we are in a hurry and do not let everyone speak so that we can resolve many problems that are important both for each region and for our union republic.

The commission had a mandate from the first congress to figure out the 1939 treaty. But, taking into account the fact that they signed secret protocols which encompass the period from 1939 to 1941, I ask the deputies to support the proposed draft decree of the commission and the explanatory note or the conclusions that have been submitted for the consideration of the congress.

I do not have in reserve as many drafts and variants as our colleague deputy does but I can sense the pain of the people, the pain of my people. What do I ask? During the course of the commission's work the idea has come up repeatedly that questions pertaining to the inclusion of the Baltic republics in the USSR and the reunification of the peoples of the Ukraine and Belorussia and the return of Bessarabia to the USSR are separate, independent issues. And that is how they should be investigated. Therefore I ask the congress and appeal to the deputies to take an understanding and trusting attitude toward the results of the commission's work and support the proposed draft of the decree on the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German treaty of 1939. But, taking into account the need that has arisen for an analogous evaluation of other treaties, acts, and documents of the 1939-1941 period, I suggest extending the mandate of the commission of the first congress or creating a new one for continuing the work that has been started, and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs concurs. We need this in order to restore the historical truth. Thank you for your attention.

Chairman: Deputy Lippmaa. Please.

E.T. Lippmaa, director of the Institute of Chemical and Biological Physics of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences, Tallinn (Tallinn-Central national territorial electoral district, Estonian SSR): Esteemed Congress! This is an historical document which we are now considering. It is very important to approve this decree. We must show that we adhere to principles. One can understand the pact with Hitler in 1939 but one cannot understand the continuation of this pact 50 years later. This we should not do. Therefore it is absolutely necessary to condemn it. We cannot simply approve the first point and Comrade Kravets' wishes. He has no reason to be concerned about the Ukrainian border. It was stipulated at Yalta and I do not think there are any problems there. Moreover Helmut Kohl also recently expressed the hope that the western borders of Poland are firm, so I do not think there are any special problems here.

We must admit that there was a pact. But now we must work constructively to determine what to do next. This pertains to the economy, military subjects, national issues, and global policy. To say now that we too would like to participate in the pact would be simply an insult. And it is an insult to countries and nations, large and small, and it can never be a wise policy and it is better not to do it. But still let us work constructively. In order to create a good basis for mutual confidence throughout the world, and this is extremely important to us now; we must approve the decree as a whole, as it is, with all the points unchanged. The more so since they were approved by the commission and all the specialists, and this is weighty proof that this was a wise, well-thought-out, and difficult decision. Moreover, this greatly increases the authority of our actions and contributes to increasing confidence in our country.

There is, of course, another aspect—the continuation of the work. Of course this makes sense and the work is continuing. But this is already a different issue. I have already emphasized what is really important now. And there is hardly any point in repeating everything that has already been said. For example, the authenticity of Molotov's signature on the photocopies stored in the FRG has been verified by specialists. There is also the letter from Comrade Sheverdnadze to Comrade Yakovlev. We must know this but I think these are details and I do not wish to delve into these details. Therefore I once again appeal to the congress to approve the decree as a whole. Thank you.

Chairman: You are welcome. One minute and I shall give the floor to the deputy.

From the floor: Esteemed comrade deputies! I have one very small but, in my opinion, very fundamental remark concerning point two of the draft decree. It begins with the words: "The USSR Congress of People's Deputies agrees with the commission's opinion that the nonagression pact with Germany was concluded in a critical international situation...." I wish to add further: "Military actions in Asia and the impending war in Europe." We must not forget about Khalkhin-Gol. This was also in 1939. We must not underestimate the danger that hung over our homeland in 1939. Thank you.

Chairman: So, a correction. Please.

E.E. Inkens, senior editor of the main editorial office for television information programs of the Latvian SSR State Committee for Television and Radio, Riga (Tsesisskiy national territorial district, Latvian SSR): I think the commission has prepared a very good report and has given us an idea of the situation that existed before the war in Europe. And this is a very honest view of the situation. Both Stalin and those around him and Hitler were preparing for war, were prepared to establish bridgeheads and divide up East Europe, having taken Bessarabia, part of Finland, and the Baltic area under their wing. But this was in 1939. The war ended long ago and the territorial situation in the USSR has stayed the same as it was in 1939. Of course it is impossible to think that here at this congress someone would have a different viewpoint. But in 1939 there were different sides.

There was, for example, the Latvian republic. Nobody here can imagine it, since it was destroyed. But that is not so. The fact that it no longer exists de facto does not mean that it does not exist in general since the incorporation of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union is not recognized by the civilized world. The Latvian republic lives in the spirit of those people who are fighting for its independence. They are the People's Front of Latvia and some of the deputies from Latvia. Therefore I assume that for the Baltic countries, since they still retain their territorial status in the Soviet Union, in some sense the war has not ended. The twilight cannot be separated from the night and we cannot separate 1939 from 1940. I suggest continuing the commission's work and, paying attention to the fact that the higher power organs of the three Baltic republics have expressed their opinion regarding this, we should also enlist specialists from the supreme soviets of these republics.

Chairman: Thank you. Who else wishes to speak? (Noise in the hall.)

Chairman: I shall not give you the floor. Please.

From the floor: Dear comrade deputies! I asked a question of the chairman of the commission regarding the secret protocols but, unfortunately, I did not receive an answer, and I could not receive one because, as was stated on the first page of the draft decree, no real protocol was discovered either in Soviet or foreign archives. Therefore I think that if such a document has not been discovered, to make a statement that the Congress of People's Deputies condemns the signing of an additional secret protocol of 23 August, that is, a nonexistent document, is wrong. (Noise in the hall.)

From the floor: Exactly the same thing applies to point eight. Obviously the story does not end just with our congress. In several years, in 50 years other commissions will appear which will say that a decision was made about a nonexistent document. I ask that we prevent this.

Chairman: Please.

V.M. Semenov, first secretary of the Grodno Obkom of the Communist Party of Belorussia (Grodnenskiy territorial electoral district, Grodno Oblast): I want to speak about the reasons for voting. Esteemed comrade people's deputies! One small remark about point four. It says: "Like other Soviet-German agreements of 1939-1941." But this means a contradiction between the subject of discussion and the document that is being adopted. As Comrade Yakovlev reported to us, we are considering only the 1939 treaty and the secret agreement. We have not considered the other documents and we do not have the right to make a decision about them.

My second remark is about point seven's second paragraph: "but the prewar Soviet leadership, in order to bring people to trial, used ultimatums and strong pressure on other states in violation of the legal commitments made to them"—is interpreted too broadly. Since the prewar Soviet leadership was the same as during the war and after the war and we have our doubts about many treaties, including the ones from Yalta, Tehran, and others. With regard to point eight I agree with the speakers before me—it should not be included in the decree; it requires additional substantiation.

Chairman: Please.

B.F. Sandurskiy, general director of the Bashneft production association, Ufa (Burayevskiy territorial electoral district, Bashkir ASSR). I support the proposals of the deputies who suggested leaving only point one in the draft without commenting on the others and I ask that this question be put to a vote.

From the floor: Right!

Chairman: Please. I will give you the floor now.

A.A. Shishov, pensioner, chairman of the Krasnodar Kray soviet of veterans of war and labor (from the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor): Comrade deputies! I think that our congresses are events of history. We too are making state history and therefore we must observe historical precision when dealing with all documents. I would do this: I suggested that we confirm the fact that the nonagression treaty between the USSR and Germany of 23 August 1939 and also the treaty on friendship and borders of 28 September 1939, like other Soviet-German treaties of 1939-1941, in keeping with the norms of international law, became invalid at the moment Germany began the war against the USSR. I do not deny all that was said about the "secret" transactions that took place. Perhaps all this happened but it has not been historically proven. And there is no need to focus on what has passed and receded into eternity. Let the originals be the ones to remain in history not the conjectures of our congress. (Applause).

Chairman: Deputy Vulfson, I shall give you the floor soon. Wait just a minute...

A.A. Sidorov, pensioner, chairman of the Sverdlovsk city soviet of veterans of war and labor): I ask that you pay attention to this fact. We are discussing two points. If there are to be one or two points in the decree, there will apparently be no need to correct the subsequent ones.

If we look at the draft that was issued to us I do not think we can accept the following part of point three: "The originals of the protocol were not discovered either in Soviet or foreign archives. But in light of the documents and materials of 1939-1941 from Soviet and foreign sources there is no doubt about the existence of a secret protocol or the authenticity of the copies of it that have been preserved." How can it be that nothing exists and at the same time "there are no doubts" about it. Here I suggest an entry something like this: "The originals of the protocol were not discovered either in Soviet or in foreign archives. Only in light of the documents and materials of 1939- 1941 from Soviet and foreign sources alone one can assume that a secret protocol exists." We should not state that there was a protocol.

Chairman: Deputy Vulfson. I give you the floor. Our statements are brief. I ask that you confine yourself to the subject of the vote. Please.

M.G. Vulfson, senior instructor of the Latvian Academy of the Arts, Riga (Kirov national territorial electoral district, Latvian SSR): Esteemed Chairman, esteemed Comrade Deputies. I am obviously a naive person because it seemed to me that after the virtuoso performance of Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev the question we are discussing today could help all of us to better understand the position of the victims of the pact of 23 August 1939—the Baltic peoples. And we could finally put an end to the hunt for Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian "witches." And not look in the Baltic states for the image of the enemy, without which, obviously, certain of my colleagues here in the hall could not easily manage. We must put an end to these talks. Because each stone that is thrown at us has repercussions of disturbance in Latvia, in Estonia, and Lithuania. Like the false film we saw about the events in the Baltic area during the night of 14 December. I have in my hotel room a packet of telegrams telling of the disturbance of simple people, with thousands of signatures of those who saw this film. Therefore let us not...

Chairman: I ask you...

M.G. Vulfson: ...let us stop and figure this question out. I think that the conclusion of the commission for a political assessment of the Soviet-German nonagression treaty has immense significance for the Soviet people—I emphasize, for the Soviet people. We are now experiencing an hour of truth. And we shall not allow ourselves to be thrown off the track, for the Congress of People's Deputies is taking another, I would say, extremely important step which will contribute to purging our complicated past of false legends. For decades and even up to the present day certain comrades have covered up anti-Leninist, criminal actions of the Stalin-Molotov clique with World War II, which was fateful for all humanity.

A half century has really passed since that time. And today in the Kremlin Palace, both in the respected presidium and in the hall there are few living witnesses of those days that will never be forgotten by the Baltic peoples. I am one of those, a communist for 50 years. I have been in the party for 50 years and I am a witness to and a participant in the events of this terrible time. I think that we, the living witnesses, can obviously give a more precise evaluation to the deals that were made on 23 August and 28 September 1939 here in the Moscow Kremlin. We shall not forget this.

And here is the shameful consequence of the pact between the two greedy, cruel tyrants of the 20th century. We are speaking about secret agreements between the Stalinist clique and the leaders of fascist Germany for dividing up all of East Europe into so-called spheres of interest. According to these agreements, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and later Lithuania as well were included in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. It was intended to divide up Poland and to annex Bessarabia as well. This was the secret deal out of which World War II arose.

The secret became reality stage by stage. You know this. (Noise in the hall.) If you will allow me to say this... I, of course, respect your opinion but I should like to say one thing. One highly placed leader will speak on central television...

Chairman: Five minutes have passed. (Noise in the hall.)

M.G. Vulfson: Give me another minute. (Noise in the hall.)

Chairman: Continue, please.

M.G. Vulfson: Will this disrespect for numerous peoples really be our main line? Here, Comrades, I am a victim of this deal speaking with my own mouth. Is there really no respect for this? I appeal to you to approve the conclusion of the commission, in which opinions diverged at first, in which there was a heated discussion, in which representatives of both Baltic republics and others participated, representatives of the great Russian people who have defended her honor in the best sense of the word. There were 24 people against 1 who voted for the commission decision. Will you really let doubts creep in today after such prolonged, difficult, painstaking, honest, and faithful work? Do you really have doubts today that there was a protocol, that there was an agreement, that troops were sent into these countries on precise days at precise times? Do you think all this was random?

I was a participant in these events. I was convinced of this after I had verified everything. Everything was as it was written in the protocol, with which, true, I became familiar later. It happened precisely, minute by minute. So any doubts here are unjustified. I have a film here in my hands; we photographed the documents in the archive in Bonn. There can be no doubts about its authenticity because next to it were various documents of agreements concluded between tsarist Russia and Germany. They were in a hurry—Berlin was being bombed. All this was quickly photographed everything on the film that has been preserved. So there is no doubt. Everything happened just as it was written. Why should we doubt it? If I make an agreement with the people in front of me to meet in the Hotel Moskva, we shall not meet by accident. By the same token these meetings were agreed upon as well. I appeal to you to vote for the whole proposal. We shall wash away the spot of shame and tell our people the truth. Thank you. (Applause.)

Chairman: Deputy Kazannik has the floor.

A.I. Kazannik, lecturer on the faculty of labor, ecological, agricultural law of Omsk State University (Omskiy national territorial electoral district, RSFSR): Deeply esteemed Comrade Deputies! I always speak only on problems which I know well. And I want us to respect professionalism.

I have had to work hard on this commission. The work was difficult. At first our positions did not coincide. But then over the signature of Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev there were so many documents from the Soviet archives and the archives of the FRG that I was forced to devote a small room in my small apartment to hold them.

I took these documents and tried to look at them as a lawyer. What conclusion did I come to? To the conclusion that a secret protocol did indeed exist. The legal experts have both direct and indirect proof. And on the basis of indirect evidence one can draw a conclusion about which there is no doubt. First, there is a film which was apparently taken from the original. I say—apparently. Second, in all the documents there are numerous references to this secret protocol. Third, the logic of the actual events has already confirmed the existence of this protocol.

These facts are quite adequate even to convict a person in court. I mean on criminal charges. The commission here no longer has any doubts. And we have tried to work out a compromise decision. I think we succeeded in this to a considerable degree. And now I see that many deputies, perhaps not having studied all of these documents sufficiently (and, I repeat, we received tens of thousands of them), are raising doubts about our commission's conclusion. I am very sorry and I would like to appeal to the deputies to vote for the draft of this decision. I thank you. (Applause).

V.V. Landsbergis, professor at the Lithuanian SSR State Conservatory, Vilnius (Panevezhskiy city national territorial electoral district, Lithuanian SSR): Esteemed Chairman, esteemed Deputies! On 23 August of this year when the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia entered on the Baltic path, hand in hand, having formed a living two-mile chain of memory and international solidarity from Tallinn to Vilnius, the Sejm of the Polish National Republic was meeting in Warsaw. It says in its resolution that the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was not only shameful from the moral point of view but also incompatible with the basic principles of international law and therefore fundamentally invalid and insignificant and that it will remain forever an example of imperial thinking and secret diplomacy and disdain for the rights of weaker peoples.

One can also recall what West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said in his official speech devoted to the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. He pointed out that the Germans understand their responsibility for the actions initiated by this "pact of the devil" (this is what he called it), which manifested a violation of the rights of nations which could in no way be justified.

Up to this point there has been no such statement on the part of the Soviet Union and in the corresponding documents of the supreme soviets of Lithuania and Estonia, they have either not mentioned it or have postponed it. Thus they have postponed the possibility of beginning to live without lies.

Now the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies is faced with an historical possibility: It will have its say on behalf of today's Soviet Union, its say regarding the political evaluation of the concealed or more open confession. This will also be a statement about the Soviet Union, about whether its renewal is real or not, about whether or not today it is capable of separating itself from Stalinism in the form of one of his most terrible

crimes. The reverse is tantamount to admitting that the country essentially remains the same as it was in 1939-1940 and would be too terrible both for the fate of the world and fateful to the hopes that the age of prison camps is ending with the construction of a European home. And there will be no doubts about your political wisdom, esteemed colleague-deputies, and it will be manifested not only in a positive vote for the draft of the decree but also in the support for the proposal that this or another commission continue the work on the events of 1940-1941. Thank you.

Chairman: Deputy Medvedev has the floor. I shall give you the floor in a minute. (Noise in the hall.)

From the floor: Comrades, I have a concrete proposal...

Chairman: Comrades, no more than 2 minutes...

From the floor: In order for us not to get bogged down and be branded occupation forces, I suggest taking from the draft point one, the first line of point three, and point four where it says: The USSR Congress of People's Deputies confirms as real the fact that the nonagression treaty like the other documents were adopted in keeping with the norms of international law and became invalid the moment Germany attacked the USSR, that is, on 22 June 1941. And with this the discussion of this issue should be ended.

Chairman: Deputy Medvedev has the floor and with this we shall end the debates.

R.A. Medvedev, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee on questions of legislation, law and order (Voroshilovskiy territorial electoral district, Moscow): Esteemed Comrade Deputies! I am speaking here as a professional historian and I must say that in my many years of activity I have almost never encountered such a weighed, precise, clear, and absolutely fair document. (Applause.)

I think we must accept it in toto since historians throughout the world have long recognized the existence of secret protocols. We will place ourselves—both the Congress and our historical science—in a ridiculous position before the entire world if we deny a truth that is known to historians of all countries. The criteria for truth are not only copies of protocols but also the practice of subsequent events which proved their existence. There is the science of paleontology which engages especially in the study of extinct plants and animals from their fossils. In school we study a fossilized bird from the imprint it has left on a granite monolith. There is no bird but there is the imprint and we are confident that the bird did exist. We have absolutely precise copies that are authenticated by all the experts. And no historian in the world has any doubt about the authenticity of the copies. I think we should accept this document in toto and not put ourselves in a difficult position. (Applause.)

Chairman: I have received a large number of notes, Comrades, requesting that we close the debates. (Noise in the hall.)

M.S. Gorbachev: Many suggestions have been made.

Chairman: Let us first decide the issue of closing the debates. We have been discussing the draft of the decree for exactly 2 hours. Who is in favor of closing the debates? Who is against? A clear minority.

Further, Comrades. Many suggestions have been made. In particular, we received these notes: "We suggest leaving point one and adding: 'the commission report is appended.'" Professor Vulfson says that he agrees with the masterful report. But still, Comrades, since so many suggestions have been made, the presidium has come to the opinion that perhaps we should instruct the commission to look over all the suggestions once again before tomorrow morning and do some more work on the draft of the decree. (Noise in the hall.)

Chairman: Should we adopt the draft as a whole?

From the floor: Yes.

Chairman: So the first proposal is the proposal of the commission?

From the floor: Yes.

Chairman: I must put this to a vote. I raise the draft submitted by the commission for your consideration. Please. The decree has not received half of the required number of votes. (Noise in the hall.)

Results of the voting
Voted "for"—1,052.
Voted "against"—678.
Abstained—150.
Total voted—1,880.
Did not vote—0.

Comrades, it takes 1,122 votes to adopt the decree since it is not a procedural issue. This is stipulated in the regulations we adopted. (Noise in the hall.) Where is the way out of this situation? It seems to me, Comrades, that we are wiser in the morning than in the evening. Let us tell the commission to look it over once again and we shall hear what it has to say in the morning. (Noise in the hall.) There is another suggestion: Accept only point one and append the whole report. (Noise in hall.) I wish to read you point one of the draft of the decree: "The USSR Congress of People's Deputies takes under advisement the conclusions of the commission for a political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German nonagression treaty of 23 August 1939." And further: "The commission's report is appended." That is the second suggestion. (Noise in the hall.) Should I put it to a vote?

From the floor: Yes.

Chairman: Let us respect ourselves and the regulations we have adopted. In order for the decree to be adopted in

keeping with the regulations it must receive more than half of the votes of all the people's deputies, even taking into account those who have died—1,122. Thus the decree was not adopted. The comrades insist that the second suggestion be put to a vote, the one made by deputies Grigoryev, Goncharov, Grakhovskiy, and Volodko. They suggest leaving point one in the decree and adding that the commission's report, which you received in written form and which was signed by all members of the commission, is appended. May I put this question to a vote? (Noise in the hall.) What?

From the floor: (Inaudible).

Chairman: Good. This is the second proposal. The third proposal comes from Comrade Kravets and it is registered here. He thinks we should just leave point one in the decree and not append the report. But in and of itself point one does not mean anything unless the report is appended. Therefore I shall put to a vote the proposal of deputies Grigoryev, Goncharov, Grakhovskiy, and Volodko, formulated as follows: "The USSR Congress of People's Deputies takes under advisement the conclusions of the commission for a political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German nonagression treaty of 23 August 1939. The commission's report is appended." I ask you to express how you feel about this suggestion from the deputies. (Noise in the hall.)

As you can see, this solution will not pass either.

Results of the voting.
Voted "for"—952.
Voted "against"—862.
Abstained—138.
Total voted—1,852.
Did not vote—0.

I appeal to the congress once again to instruct the commission to present to us its ideas about this question tomorrow. (Noise in the hall.) True, there is another proposal: To adopt the decree without an appendix. (Noise in the hall.) This is Comrade Kravets' suggestion. Tell us, please, Comrade Kravets, do you insist on this suggestion? I ask you to come up to the third microphone.

V.A. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR minister of foreign affairs, Kiev (Kharkovskiy Territorial Electoral District, Kharkov Oblast): Thank you, Anatoliy Ivanovich. The fact is that my proposal coincides fully with the proposal to add the words: "The commission's report is attached." It is just that I did not call it a "report" but the "conclusion" of the commission. My proposal did not pass and therefore I cannot insist on another vote.

Chairman: Comrade Kravets withdraws his proposal. Thank you. Mikhail Ivanovich Muntyan has the floor.

M.I. Muntyan, soloist of the A.S. Pushkin Moldavian State Academic Theater of Opera and Ballet, Kishinev (from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union): Esteemed Comrades! This is a very important question. The commission's chairman, Comrade Yakovlev, has spoken before us. And absolutely everything that was presented in his report is reflected in the draft of the decree. I cannot understand why the comrades who are speaking against the adoption of this decree do not wish to agree that everything said in the report is reflected in it.

I also wish to say that indeed we can put off the consideration of this question until tomorrow. This very important question must be decided intelligently. Regarding the discussion to the effect that these treaties did not exist I can say that the whole world has recognized that they exist and we do not recognize it.

Chairman: Thank you. Turn on the second microphone, please.

From the floor: Anatoliy Ivanovich, I suggested including in the decree point one and point four of the draft that was submitted. And I insist on a vote on this specifically. (Noise in the hall.)

Chairman: All right, Comrade Savisaar.

E.E. Savisaar, deputy director of the Maynor special planning and design bureau of the Estonian SSR Ministry of Light Industry, Tallinn (Vilyandiskiy northern national territorial electoral district, Estonian SSR): I was one of the deputy chairmen of the commission and that is why I requested to speak. The opinion has been expressed here that with respect to this question we could limit ourselves to a brief decision and a statement that the congress is taking under advisement the conclusions of the commission regarding the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German nonagression treaty of 23 August 1939 (point one of the draft of the decree). But this is tantamount to going halfway. The commission's conclusions are only a recommendation for the high authority but in no way express the will of the state. I strictly hold the opinion that the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies should adopt precisely its own developed decision in the form of the decree prepared by the commission.

Chairman: Your position is clear.

E.E. Savisaar: Therefore I suggest a roll call vote. Namely a roll call vote. (Applause.)

Chairman: You see, Comrades, Deputy Semenov has a suggestion regarding point four, deputies Sandurskiy and Shishov suggest leaving point one, Comrade Irgashev suggests leaving out points seven and eight. You see what a wide range of opinions we have. If we all vote without hearing the commission's opinions we shall not show much respect for ourselves. Therefore, in my opinion, it would be more expedient to make a weighed decision tomorrow, taking the commission's decisions into account. (Noise in the hall.)

M.S. Gorbachev: Is it worthwhile to vote on this suggestion.

Chairman: Shall we put it to a vote? (Noise in the hall.) Can we vote with a simple show of hands? All right. Who is in favor? Who is against? The proposal is passed by a majority of votes. At the beginning of our session tomorrow we shall hear a report from Comrade Yakovlev. May I move on to the next question? (Noise in the hall.)

Findings of Congress Panel on Tbilisi Events

PM0801150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 2

["On Events in the City of Tbilisi"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] On 24 December 1989 the Second Congress of People's Deputies heard the report of the commission set up by the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies to investigate the events which took place in Tbilisi 9 April 1989.

In accordance with the resolution that was adopted we publish the text of the statement for the press on the results of the investigation of the Tbilisi events.

Deputy Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, chairman of the commission, was given the floor to report on the results of the investigation.

The commission on the investigation of the events which occurred in the city of Tbilisi, the speaker said, was set up by the First Congress and had 24 members. It included major scientists, famous writers and public figures, military personnel, representatives of the clergy and the new social movements of people's fronts, and Communists and nonparty people. In its work the commission was guided by the Congress' instructions—to fully investigate everything and to get down to the very roots, no matter what or who might be affected. As Comrade M.S. Gorbachev said at the First Congress, this is a major, special, far-reaching, political question concerning what, so to speak, the very foundations of our country's existence.

The events of 9 April 1989 must be examined in the context of the general processes of national and democratic movements now under way in the country. These processes were also under way in Georgia. In these conditions, the republic's party and state leadership was faced with a most important task: to justify its role as political vanguard and to act in the spirit of perestroyka. But the leadership of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee failed to establish contacts and enter into a dialogue with public and, on the contrary, embarked on the path of confrontation with informal movements. This was especially vividly manifested during the November 1988 events during the discussion of constitutional amendments. It must be said that, according to many direct participants in these events, the November 1988 demonstrations in Tbilisi were perhaps on an even larger scale and the situation was even tenser than in April 1989. Even at that time, in November, the republic's leadership was inclined to resort to military force to terminate rallies and demonstrations in the city. Even then the country's leadership was faced with the question of the need to introduce a curfew and a special situation in the republic.

But a tragedy was avoided at the time because the country's leadership insisted on the need to resolve the prevailing situation by political means. Specifically, a beneficial role was played by M.S. Gorbachev's address to the Georgian people and the active and positive role played by the Georgian intelligentsia. We note, however, that the republic's leadership did not draw the proper conclusions from November's lessons, and this ultimately was one of the causes of the 9 April tragedy.

On 4 April 1989 Georgia's informal associations launched several days of unauthorized rallies outside Government House in Tbilisi. It must be emphasized that the holding of unauthorized rallies had become a general rule in the republic largely because the authorities did not authorize the holding of any rallies. Having failed to obtain permission to hold official rallies, representatives of the public and the informal organizations opted for holding unauthorized rallies.

It is sufficient to cite the following fact. Following the adoption of the well known legislative acts on the procedure for holding rallies and demonstrations in August 1988, the republic's local organs of power received 33 applications for permission to hold sundry mass events, but local soviet executive committees gave permission for only 6 such events. Despite this, 28 unauthorized rallies were held, and the holding of such rallies became the general rule from then on.

Numerous most diverse slogans were displayed at the rally organized 4 April, mainly along the following lines: "End Discrimination Against Georgians in Georgia!", "Occupation Troops, Get Out of Georgia!", "We Demand Full Independence for Georgia!", "Long Live Free Georgia!", "Down With the Russian Empire!", "No to the Russian Communist Empire!", "USSR Is the Jail of the Peoples!", "Russian Invaders, Go Home!", "Down With the Turkish Agents!", and so on and so forth.

By 7 April, the republic's party leadership had already concluded that it was necessary to terminate the rally since it disrupted normal life in the city, normal transportation traffic, and the normal work of state institutions and various organizations.

The republic's leadership raised with the union leadership the question of the need to terminate this rally by means of force and of the need to introduce a curfew. That was the topic of telephone conversations with the CPSU Central Committee and other union organs. A coded message containing a detailed list of proposed measures and a request for consent for their implementation was sent to the CPSU Central Committee and was later read out at the First Congress.

A conference of several Central Committee secretaries and Politburo members, attended by the minister of defense, the KGB chairman, a deputy minister of internal affairs, and a number of senior officials from the party Central Committee was held in the CPSU Central Committee 7 April under the leadership of Comrade Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and adopted a decision on the need to give assistance to the republic and to send units of Internal Troops and the Soviet Army there to protect installations and prevent possible disorders. When this decision was made, the utmost emphasis was placed on the need to solve questions by political means, and it was suggested that Internal Troops and Soviet Army subdivisions be sent in (this was said in a General Staff directive issued on that same day in the name of the defense minister) only in the event of the situation being exacerbated, only in the event of mass disturbances developing, for the purpose of controlling movement in and out of the city and protecting the most important state and public buildings in the city of Tbilisi. Consequently, subunits of Internal Troops and the Soviet Army and special militia subunits (OMON) started arriving in the city of Tbilisi already on 7 April. The republic's leadership was informed that it was necessary to act according to prevailing circumstances. Identical instructions were issued by the Ministry of Defense to General Rodionov, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District. Furthermore, General Kochetov, first deputy defense minister, arrived in Tbilisi from Armenia 7 April and attended all republic-level conferences which discussed questions associated with the need to terminate the unauthorized rally and made the appropriate decisions. It follows from this that the decision to terminate the rally by force was adopted at a sitting of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and was afterwards discussed at a meeting of the republic's party aktiv and supported by this aktiv (we would like to note the following detail: Gen Kochetov's arrival at this aktiv meeting was greeted with tumultuous applause by those taking part). This was followed by a sitting of the republic's Defense Council, which also discussed this question. But the decision on the specific operation plan and the specific timing of the operation was made by a narrow circle of persons including Comrades Patiashvili and Nikolskiy, former first and second secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee respectively, and by Generals Rodionov and Kochetov. It was decided that the action in question should take place at 0400 hours 9 April.

Several questions arise in connection with the subsequent development of events, and we must answer these questions. Why was it decided to terminate the rally at that precise time—early in the morning? Why were there so many women and adolescents among the rally participants? And finally, why was there such a large concentration of people in the square outside Government House at 0400 hours? Rough estimates speak of 8,000-10,000 people.

Answering the first question, it has to be said that the decision to terminate the rally actually at 0400 hours was made because that was the time when the number of people in the square had been at its lowest every day—just the hunger strikers (the rally was accompanied by a mass hunger strike with more than 100 young people taking part) and those who assisted and guarded them. Usually the number of people was no more than 200-300. These were the calculations on which the entire operation was planned.

But how come the crowd numbered 8,000-10,000 instead of 200-300? That was actually preceded by events associated with the entry of military subunits in the city and a show of military strength at noon on 8 April: Armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles carrying assault troops drove three abreast along the streets past participants in the rally, while three squadrons of combat helicopters overflew the city at low altitude. The population was thus warned that troops had entered the city and were ready for action. But this actually provoked exactly the opposite reaction.

It was after the show of strength had taken place that the number of people in the square started swelling, kept on swelling, and reached its peak by 0400 hours. Operation leaders Generals Rodionov and Yefimov, having come up against an unfamiliar situation, did not in any way amend the original operation plan. It can be boldly asserted that had the operation been amended in good time, had its procedure and timing been redefined, such serious and tragic consequences would not have ensued. It must be said in all fairness that, immediately before the operation's start, individual members of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau were already making attempts to postpone the operation but these approaches were not heeded by the republic's leadership.

Finally, why were there so many women and adolescents in the square? The point is that the whole city knew of the forthcoming use of force and that the troops were meant to use force against the participants in the rally and disperse them. Therefore, family members and friends of the hunger strikers made their way to the square, reasoning that the larger the number of people, the less likely it would be that force would be used. The following episode occurred. A rather large number of women assembled in a rally outside Patiashvili's home in the afternoon of 8 April, demonstrated for several hours, demanded that someone come out to talk with them, and called for military force not to be used against the city residents. But since nobody came out for a heart-to-heart talk with them, the women moved from Patiashvili's home to the square and joined the rally.

I would like to draw your attention to the following fact. The entire rally, which had lasted several days around the clock, was conducted with the help of ordinary bullhorns. The square was equipped with a powerful public-address system but, for some unknown reason, nobody in the party leadership or the republic's state

leadership thought of the possibility of switching on this public-address system and speaking to the people for however long it took for their words to be heeded.

And finally, there was one more opportunity, right before the operation started, for the republic's leaders and party officials to come out to the square and call on the rally participants to disperse and terminate the rally. I will not speak in detail about the way the operation to clear the square was conducted. It can only be said that the rally participants were cleared from the square in record time. The place where all that happened can only loosely be described as the square outside Government House. To all intents and purposes, it is not really a square but a widening of Rustaveli Prospekt, a pocket-handerkchief area where such a multitude of people had assembled.

It must be borne in mind that, at the time the rally was being terminated, all side streets along Rustaveli Prospekt were blocked off by trucks, buses, and trolleybuses. That had been done by the leaders of informal organizations the previous day in order to prevent a further movement of military equipment, as they explained to us subsequently. This was also one of the causes of the tragedy because the large numbers of people crammed within a small area were simply unable to quickly leave the square when the columns of soldiers moved in on them, and this resulted in a confrontation which subsequently developed into a real battle.

The making of wrong decisions, the inability to properly conduct the operation, the use, in addition to Internal Troops appropriately equipped and trained to some extent, though obviously not enough for this type of action, the bringing into play of companies of assault troops—all this led to the grave and tragic consequences which occurred as a result of this operation. [sentence as published]

I will not cite specific figures for the victims of the action in question. Different documents cite different figures. If we take just the data placed at our disposal by the Main Military Prosecutor's Office at various times—in May, June, or October for example—we will see that these data are completely different. We received different data on the number of victims among the civilian population, servicemen, and militia staffers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] and the Ministry of Health. Ultimately, it is up to the investigative organs and the courts to determine the precise number of victims, the specific nature of the wounds, and the nature of the injuries suffered by these victims.

I would like to raise a different matter today. Namely, the use of entrenching tools and toxic substances, of which so much was said by the periodical press in connection with these events. At this point I would like to draw attention to the following. Immediately after the events in question, representatives of the command and the commanders of subunits which took part in terminating the rally concealed the fact that entrenching tools, special means, and chemical substances had been used. This fact resulted in the loss of public trust in them and in all subsequent statements by representatives of the Armed Forces and the Internal Troops about the 9 April events. It has to be said that the use of chemical substances and special means like "Cheremukha" and "CS" gases was admitted only stage by stage. For example, it was only in early May that the military admitted to the use of "CS" gas, and the use of different types of "Cheremukha" gas was also admitted stage by stage. As for the use of entrenching tools, representatives of the military command continued to deny that entrenching tools had been used even until our commission members arrived back from Tbilisi, which was already at the end of June. However, as a result of the hearings of explanations and meetings with officers and soldiers of the paratroop regiment which took part in these events, we reliably established that entrenching tools had been used. This was said by many officers and soldiers of the paratroop regiment. They objectively could not but have been used in the prevailing situation. That was because, in direct violation of the defense minister's orders, a paratroop company was thrown right in the thick of it all, in the vortex of events unfolding in the square. Moreover, whereas Internal Troops soldiers were equipped in a certain fashion with bulletproof vests, shields, protective helmets, and rubber truncheons, the paratroopers had nothing of the sort. Their normal weapons were taken away from them prior to the start of the operation. Entrenching tools were their only means of attack and of protection against attack. These tools were used by the soldiers in the conditions in which they found themselves. I think that it is up to the courts and the investigative organs to determine the number of people who actually suffered from the use of entrenching tools. Our task is different—to establish the actual fact of the use of these tools and to condemn it. The specific number of people injured by them does not matter. Their use against the civilian population, against one's own people, is impermissible. The use of chemical means like "CS" gas is equally impermissible. The commission established that this means is not part of the Internal Troops weaponry, it is not an authorized means. The use of these means is a gross violation of current rules and regulations. There was an equally gross violation of instructions, standing orders, and rules governing the use of rubber truncheons and prohibiting the use of such truncheons against women and children, their use to beat people about the head, and so on. There were many such violations in the prevailing situation. In exactly the same way, many of the injured rally participants, as well as militia staffers and servicemen, spoke of "Cheremukha" special means being squirted from aerosol containers directly in the face of or close to rally participants, which is also categorically prohibited by instructions. It can thus be asserted that a multitude of violations were committed in the process of terminating the unauthorized rally, ranging from a violation of the defense minister's order prohibiting the use of servicemen to disperse the rally and authorizing their use only for guard duties, in order to guard installations, to a multitude of

violations of standing orders, rules, and instructions in the process of terminating this rally. It is also necessary to mention the gross violations committed in the introduction of the curfew. The announcement that curfew was being introduced was made literally a few minutes before it was due to start. This was fraught with much unpleasantness for citizens who did not even suspect the existence of a curfew.

In the commission's opinion, the serious consequences ensuing after the introduction of the curfew, including the death of one person and the wounding of a number of citizens, were largely preconditioned by violations in the introduction of the curfew. One of the most serious questions arising in connection with the 9 April events in Tbilisi is the question of what caused the people's deaths. There are different conclusions and different opinions, including expert opinions, on the question of the causes of death. For this reason, to clarify this question, the commission invited a group of specialists, scientists in pathological anatomy and forensic medicine, and scientists known throughout the union and the world. They concluded that asphyxia (suffocation) was the immediate cause of the death of all who lost their lives in the square, with the exception of one case of serious craniocerebral injury. But conclusions differ as regards the type of suffocation which caused people's deaths, whether it was due to the use of special means or to crushing by the crowd. Specifically, a conclusion was drawn about the simultaneous effect of various factors, like the body being crushed in a tightly packed crowd and the inhalation of chemical substances. The inhalation of chemical substances coupled with the body being crushed aggravated the negative effect on the organism and this, in the specialists' opinion, caused the death of the victims.

The commission believes that the final conclusion on the causes of the victims' death is up to the investigative organs and the courts, which alone are in a position to evaluate the conclusions of the different specialists and different expert opinions and arrive at a verdict. However, regardless of the immediate causes of the victims' death, it is clear that the common causes of the tragic deaths of innocent people—mainly women, 16 of the 19 persons in question were women—were the violations and errors, the serious mistakes committed both when it was decided to terminate the rally and directly in the process of carrying out the operation to terminate the rally.

In conclusion, I would like to read out the conclusions and proposals contained in our commission's findings, in order to once more draw attention to the results of our commission's work.

On the basis of the available material, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies Commission arrives at the following conclusions.

The causes of the tragic events in the city of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989 are rooted in the fact that, in the conditions of democratization of our society's entire sociopolitical life, the republic's leadership proved unable to head the sharply and dynamically developing perestroyka processes in Georgia, to properly appraise the situation in the republic, and to make the appropriate decisions.

Political responsibility for the tragic consequences of the 9 April 1989 events in the city of Tbilisi rests with the leadership of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, primarily with Comrades Patiashvili and Nikolskiy, former first and second secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee respectively.

Political, moral, and other responsibility, including legal responsibility for their actions, must rest with Tsereteli, Gonsakhurdiya, Chenturiya, and other informal organization leaders who were the organizers of the unauthorized rally outside Government House and committed sundry breaches of public order when organizing and holding the rally: They called for noncompliance with legitimate demands by the authorities and, when a real threat emerged that armed force might be used, they took no measures to terminate the rally and did not attempt thus to prevent the tragic outcome of events.

In the commission's opinion, the decisions to send subunits of Internal Troops and the Soviet Army and special militia subunits to Georgia, formulated on the basis of defense minister's orders and USSR MVD orders following the 7 April 1989 conference in the CPSU Central Committee—to the extent that these orders concerned not simply the movement of troops but in fact the performance of actions introducing individual aspects of a special situation regime in the city of Tbilisi involving controls on movement in and out of the city and the installation of guards at the most important public and state buildings and other facilities—all these decisions were made in gross violation of the law.

The Georgian Council of Ministers order dated 8 April 1989 about clearing the square outside Government House of rally participants and implementing other measures to protect public order—and this, incidentally, is the only document adopted by a state organ in the case—is unlawful as regards the use of Internal Troops and Soviet Army servicemen since the current legislation gives no such powers to the republic's government. It must be noted, however, that this order was actually not performed by the organ to which it was addressed, namely the Georgian MVD.

Serious violations were committed when preparing and conducting the operation to clear the square and, in our opinion, these found expression in the fact that the operation plan was not amended to conform with the real existing situation. It was insufficiently worked out by subunit commanders, no reconnaissance was conducted, and the men, equipment, and facilities of the Tbilisi City Soviet Executive Committee Internal Affairs Administration and the Georgian MVD were not involved in the operation to the due extent. Contrary to the USSR defense minister's order, paratroop subunits were used not to guard installations but to clear the rally

participants. Personal responsibility for the aforementioned violations and errors, which led to tragic consequences, rests with Generals Kochetov, Rodionov, and Yefimov. An appropriate share of responsibility also rests with Gorgodze, Georgian minister of internal affairs, who ducked the performance of his direct duties and whose actions resulted in a certain lack of coordination in the actions of servicemen and militia forces, which also had certain tragic consequences on that day. The commission perceives the need to institute criminal proceedings against the specific persons guilty of people's deaths or of causing grievous bodily harm.

It is also necessary to resolve the question about the liability of persons who violated Article 59 of the Internal Troops Combat Service Regulations, which prohibits the use of "Cheremukha" special means against women, adolescents, children, and in other specifically defined cases. The commission raises the question of the liability of persons who committed violations of the citizens' constitutionally guaranteed rights and legitimate interests in introducing and operating a curfew in the city of Tbilisi. Political, moral, and whenever necessary also legal responsibility must rest with the party and state organ officials who allowed the coverup or distortion of information about the 9 April 1989 events, as well as with commanders of Internal Troops subunits who tried to conceal the fact that special means of the "Cheremukha" variety and K-52 products containing "CS" gas had been used. The commission notes that the periodical press carried a lot of material which was based on rumors, conjectures, and false reports and presented a distorted picture of the events which actually took place. Some of that material was also used in official documents. For example, the commission found no proof of the existence and action of groups of fighters specially formed from among persons with extremist leanings in the square, nor of the claim that the first deaths and injuries occurred before the troops clashed with rally participants. Nor was there any confirmation of widespread reports about a multitude of people who supposedly disappeared without trace after 9 April, about the murder of women with entrenching tools, and so on. The commission notes that there are no facts to confirm Gen Rodionov's claim at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies that a real threat that some of the republic's vitally important installations might be captured had emerged by 9 April. We studied secret KGB reports and official reports by the republican MVD, and not a single one of these or any other documents brought to our knowledge contains specific facts to this effect.

The commission notes that organized actions by former internationalist servicemen in Afghanistan, which helped to normalize the situation in the city, proved a positive factor in the settlement of conflicts between citizens and servicemen while the curfew was in effect in Tbilisi. The commission also notes that many militia staffers, performing their service duties in complex and extraordinary circumstances, not only assisted medical personnel in the evacuation of casualties but also gave any necessary assistance to injured and hunger-striking citizens.

In conclusion, the commission submits the following proposals for consideration by competent state organs and the Congress:

First. The party organs either consenting to, or making at union or republic level, the decision to send in the troops and conduct the operation in question, acted contrary to the 19th party conference decisions "On the Need To Demarcate the Functions of Party and State Organs." In a rule-of-law state, decisions by party organs at any level can become binding on organs of state power and administration, including the army, only after they are incorporated in a legal act by the competent state organ, either a law or a government resolution.

Second. The 9 April events in the city of Tbilisi demonstrated clear gaps in current legislation and the practice of making some most important state decisions on the introduction of special or emergency situations and curfews, and on the use of Soviet Army subunits to protect and restore pubic order inside the country. There is a need for clear and exhaustive legislative regulations governing the maintenance and procedures for the introduction of military (in the event of armed conflicts), special (in the event of internal disturbances), and emergency (in the event of natural disasters) situations which would rule out the possibility of any recurrence of the situation prevailing in Tbilisi, when the introduction of the curfew faced Soviet Army servicemen with the task of maintaining public order, which ought to be performed only by MVD forces.

It appears expedient to examine the question of increasing the strength of the Internal Troops and staffing them primarily on professional principles. It is necessary to legislatively define the procedure and mechanism for using Internal Troops subunits under republic and union subordination.

Third. It is necessary to legislatively prohibit the use of the Soviet Army to put down mass disturbances, making provision for the possible use of army subunits for this purpose only by way of exception, in cases directly envisaged by the law, and in each individual case by decision of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet with subsequent notification to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Fourth. There is a need to legislatively enshrine the rights and duties of militia and Internal Troops personnel in the performance of their duties involving the termination of unlawful actions and mass disturbances.

Fifth. There is also a need to legislatively enshrine the powers of parliamentary commissions set up by the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Specifically, it is necessary to provide for officials' liability in the event of supplying commissions

with deliberately false information. Unfortunately, we came up against this in our work.

And last. The commission draws attention to the need to reinforce the investigative group on the case in question by recruiting officials from the Prosecutor's Office of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and other republics and appointing a special prosecutor for this case, in other words making this a comprehensive investigation and taking other measures for the earliest possible conclusion of preliminary investigations into the case instituted in connection with the 9 April 1989 events in the city of Tbilisi.

Finally, on the commission's behalf, I would like to call on people's deputies not to perceive events in Tbilisi as an event discrediting the Soviet Army and pitting the army against the people. Unfortunately, in the recent past we have only too often come across situations when, as soon as some official or party or state functionary is assailed, this is identified with the party itself. In just the same way, I do not think that it is necessary to identify any wrong decisions made by some military commander, leader, or official with the army. And I do not think that events in Tbilisi ought to serve as an excuse for pitting the people against the army.

Main Military Prosecutor A.F. Katusev, who spoke by decision of the Congress, outlined the Prosecutor's Office view of the events in the city of Tbilisi which preceded 9 April 1989 or happened on that day.

G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, who took the floor after him, disagreed with the conclusions of the Military Prosecutor's Office representatives and gave his own interpretation of these events.

M.S. Gorbachev wound up the debate.

The Tbilisi events, M.S. Gorbachev said, are a painful experience, which we all share. We deeply feel the tragedy of these events and we express sympathy to the Georgian people in connection with what happened, which entailed unjustified loss of human life, death and destruction. I believe that this is something on which we all agree.

However, I would like to say something else. I am one of those who were in favor of not launching into a debate on these events, of asking the commission to draw up a well-weighed report, of thinking more about the lessons to be learned from this, about what should be done in order to prevent events of this kind from ever recurring.

We have embarked on a path of profound changes, of interpreting our entire history and our present, of reflecting on our future. This is a difficult process, the future is connected with the renewal of our society which we must fashion with our hands, our minds, and our hearts. There is no other way, friends. There is no other option! This is the greatest characteristic feature of our country, where so many peoples have lived, united, for centuries—the joint history of our peoples goes back far beyond the confines of the present century. And we are bound to be successful in everything if we stick to our choice and to the friendship and cooperation among all the peoples of our country.

Alarming things can now be found in every republic. We can find phenomena which we cannot condone. However, there is one thing we must always remember: This does not mean that we should, on this basis, judge peoples and their stances and call into question everything that has taken shape over centuries and that united us into a great and harmonious family—a family which has passed through difficult trials and which is capable of great achievements in the interests of both its own country and the whole of human civilization.

Therefore, I believe, the deputies from Georgia (I talked to them during the break, and we conducted that conversation as it should be conducted—openly and directly) should not suspect the other peoples of harboring disrespect, doubt, or even distrust toward the Georgian people, either in this auditorium or across the country. I ask you to support my statement.

Political & Social

Shevardnadze Denies Gorbachev Meetings Cancelled

OW0701044790 Tokyo KYODO in English 0430 GMT 7 Jan 90

[Text] Bucharest, Jan 6 KYODO—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on Saturday denied reports that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had cancelled all his diplomatic schedule for January.

A report from London last week quoted Gorbachev as having told Britain's Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock that he would postpone his meetings with foreign politicians this month. Kinnock was scheduled to meet Gorbachev in Moscow on January 16.

Eastern bloc diplomatic sources in London have reportedly said Gorbachev is busy coping with internal strife in the Soviet Union.

Responding to questions by KYODO, Shevardnadze said the cancellation of Gorbachev's meeting with Kinnock was just a single episode.

Gorbachev to Arrive Lithuania 11 Jan

LD0901100190 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] According to the latest information the Soviet leader M.Gorbachev will arrive in Lithuania on Thursday [11 January] and stay in the republic for 3 days.

Sajudis Organizes Rally for Gorbachev Visit

LD0901111590 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] On the proposal of Kazimieras Motieka a decision was adopted by the Sajudis Seimas council last Saturday to organize a large peaceful rally on the day of the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev. People from all over Lithuania will be invited to take part in the rally.

The main objective of this action will be to demand freedom and independence for Lithuania. A sitting of the organizational committee of this event and a sitting of the Seimas council, especially convened for this purpose, were held today. An appeal of the Seimas council to the people of Lithuania was adopted at the latter sitting. It reads: We should meet M.Gorbachev not as the CPSU general secretary, but as the leader of the USSR. Therefore, he should be reminded of the most pressing issues concerning the restoration of the State of Lithuania.

The appeal invites the people to go out into the streets with the slogan "Freedom to Lithuania," and to present three demands to the president of the neighboring country:

- 1. to condemn the aggression of 1940 against independent Lithuania;
- 2. To withdraw the Soviet Armed forces, which are unacceptable to Lithuania, from the territory of the republic;
- and 3. all claims to territorial and state sovereignty must be once again renounced forever.

Meanwhile, the organizational committee, the chairman of which is Kazimieras Motieka, announced that a meeting of Lithuanian people "Freedom and Independence to Lithuania," will be held on 11 January. The rally will take place in Vilnius, the capital city of Lithuania, on Cathedral Square and streets surrounding it. The rally begins at 1600 local time.

A sacred Mass for free Lithuania will be held in all Lithuanian churches on that night.

Medvedev Leads CPSU Delegation to Lithuania

Meets Vilnius Workers

LD0801215790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Jan 90

[from the "Vremya" newscast; report over video]

[Text] A group of representatives of the party Central Committee, participants in the extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, is in Vilnius. It comprises Comrades Medvedev, Maslyukov, Karimov, Yagodin, Kuptsov, and Ulyanov.

[Correspondent A. Paulyus] Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev's first meeting with the Lithuanian working people today took place at the Vilnius Zhalgiris works. This is one of the first of the republic's machine-tool building industry, created in the postwar years. [video shows exterior of works, Medvedev and entourage, including Brazauskas, enter building]

[Begin Medvedev recording] Good day. [end recording]

[Paulyus] The workers and specialists told Vadim Andreyevich that the enterprise's collective, as in the years when it was being established, is linked in the closest possible way with many of the country's economic centers, and that it is hard to imagine the normal working of the factory without reliable communications. [video shows man operating machine-tool on turntable; entourage touring shop-floor, chatting to workers; Medvedev shakes hands with some of the workers and talks to them]

[Begin recording] [Medvedev] What is worrying you, frankly?

[First worker] It's the more vociferous section of the population which worries us, and our future.

[Second worker] And the nationalities question.

[First worker] The nationalities question.

[Medvedev] What is your attitude? There are certain groupings who are proposing virtually immediate secession from the Soviet Union.

[Second worker] I personally am opposed to it.

[First worker] Against it, against secession.

[voice off screen] In my opinion, it's adventurism.

[Medvedev] Is there a party organization in the workshop?

[First worker] Yes, there is a party organization in the workshop.

[Medvedev] Are you a party member?

[First worker] Yes, I am. But, to be frank, over the past year I have not sensed any work in the party organization.

[Medvedev] The process of perestroyka in which we find ourselves is, of course, a complex one, especially in your conditions. Not everyone takes up the same positions, not everyone understands it in the same way. But we must go forward, and the party must be defended. We believe that everyone must support the party.

[Third worker] I am in favor of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

[Medvedev] Of the Communist Party of Lithuania?

[Third worker] Yes, of Lithuania. I'm a communist and I believe that—I liked, I was reading about this new...I agree with it.

[Medvedev] You are in favor of it being separate, independent?

[Third worker] Yes, independent.

[Medvedev] Well, I must tell you that no one objects—but, together with the whole of the CPSU.

[Third worker] Well, I think that....

[Medvedev—interrupts] It doesn't run counter?

[Third worker] No.

[Medvedev] Well, there's no disagreement here on that score. We must join together.

[Third worker] Of course.

[Medvedev] Then we shall be afraid of no one, then we shall do everything, we shall solve everything. We must restructure the party as well, so that it is more democratic, so that the voice of communists is heard, so that they play a real part in all matters. [end recording]

[Correspondent D. Biryukov] The exchange of opinions was a very frank one, and, naturally, economic problems were discussed in a particularly keen way. The workers wanted to hear a realistic assessment of the situation in the country. Yet, all the time the discussion returned to politics. [video shows Medvedev and others talking to another group of workers]

[Begin recording] [Un9dentified worker] In the political sense, in regional political relations, there cannot be any question of economics.

[Medvedev] True, and that's necessary, too. Political reform, and reform of the party, all this must be done, because we must move forward with political reform. The same thing applies to the state and nationalities issue. We must sharply extend the rights of the republics. [end recording]

[Biryukov] The meeting with the workshops was coming to an end. But there were things that had to be said to the people, and new conversations—interesting and useful, incidentally, to both sides—started up. The tone was a kindly one, and there was also time for a joke. [video shows Medvedev chatting with more workers]

Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev set off for the factory club, addressed the collective and replied to questions. He met the party-economic aktiv of Novovilniuskiy Rayon on the territory of which the Zhalgiris works is situated. Together with Comrade Medvedev was Kuptsov, first secretary of the Vologda Party Oblast Committee. The guests were accompanied by Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, and Burokevicius, secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania within the platform of the CPSU. [video shows Medvedev addressing aktiv]

[Announcer] Comrade Maslyukov today visited Ignalina Nuclear Power Station and met the collective of that enterprise.

Further Details

PM0801234790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Visit to Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR)"]

[Text] Vilnius, 8 Jan—In accordance with the CPSU Central Committee December Plenum decision, a group of participants of that plenum arrived in the Lithuanian SSR today to meet with Communists, party organizations, and labor collectives of the republic.

V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, visited Vilnius' "Zhalgiris" machine-tool building plant, where he met in the shops with workers, engineers, and leaders of the enterprise. During the conversations there was discussion about what worries the collective of this very large enterprise today. People are concerned about why perestroyka is faltering—on plant assembly lines, in transport, and in housing construction. Many people are anxious about the situation the republic's Communists find themselves in during this crucial period for perestroyka. The need to improve the climate of interethnic relations in Lithuania was noted.

A meeting with the production unit's working people then took place in the plant's club, which was filled to capacity. Addressing the assembly, V.A. Medvedev said that the CPSU Central Committee plenum had held a fervent, frank, and committed discussion on the situation created by the decisions of the Lithuanian Communist Party 20th Congress on its withdrawal from the CPSU. The significance of the question under discussion, he noted, is determined not only by the fact that it is a question of the future destiny of a union republic communist party but also by the fact that this is a general political question concerning the party as a whole, a question which also impinges on the problems of interethnic relations, the national-state system, and economic reform. It was also the common conclusion that the decisions of the Lithuanian Communist Party 20th Congress struck a blow against the internationalist unity of the the CPSU and against the construction of a renewed federation and also struck a blow against the whole of perestroyka.

At the same time many people spoke of the need to take the real situation into account and take a well-considered decision which would incorporate a fundamental assessment of what had happened while not blocking off the way to compromise. It was stressed that the depth and scale of perestroyka inevitably lead to the emergence of new situations for us and here it was important "not to commit follies," not to get excited, and to be governed by reason rather than emotion.

What is the main cause of today's problems and difficulties? It was stressed that it does not, of course, lie in perestroyka itself. To see it as the main cause is to turn everything upside down and essentially oppose perestroyka. But it is our only chance. The action program consists in giving greater scope to the processes of perestroyka and acting in such a way that they proceed in a more constructive, more calm, and businesslike atmosphere.

It was noted that for perestroyka and its second phase all doors are wide open today and progress toward enhancing republics' autonomy in the political, economic, and national regard is under way. Against this overall background of extensive development of the processes of perestroyka the decisions of the Lithuanian Communist Party 20th Congress effectively remove the republic from the democratic processes under way in the country. This cannot be assessed as other than an expression of no confidence in the CPSU and its perestroyka line and as a blow to perestroyka itself at the most critical moment in its development. The CPSU Central Committee secretary spoke about the ways of restructuring inside the CPSU which is being conducted and will be implemented on the basis of democratization, pluralism of opinions, and respect for them. He called for people to search together for ways to solve problems, to overcome the difficulties of perestroyka, and raise the country to a new level of development.

The meeting was addressed by A. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; M. Burokyavichyus, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee (CPSU platform); V.A. Kuptsov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau and first secretary of the Vologda Oblast party committee; A. Menshakov, chief plant designer; V. Zhalo chief of the automatic control system department; V. Korachev, a fitter; and other enterprise workers.

In the evening V.A. Medvedev held a meeting in the Novovilnyaskiy Rayon Lithuanian Communist Party Committee.

On the same day Yu.D. Maslyukov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, made a visit to the city of Snechkus. He met with the labor collective and party aktiv of Ignalina nuclear electric power station.

The group of participants in the CPSU Central Committee plenum visiting Lithuania for meetings also included the following: Ye.P. Velikhov, V.V. Grigoryev, V.G. Kolesnikov, and G.A. Yagodin, members of the CPSU Central Committee; V.V. Nikitin, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee; M.A. Ulyanov, member of the Central Auditing Commission; and I.A. Karimov and V.I. Oleynik, USSR people's deputies.

Maslyukov Visits Power Station

LD0801184790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] A report from Vilnius: In accordance with the decision of the December plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, a group of participants in that plenum arrived today in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic to hold meetings with communists, party organizations, and labor collectives of the Republic.

Comrade Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, visited the Vilnius Zalgiris machine-tool building works and held conversations in workshops with workers, engineers, and the leader of the enterprise. Then, in the works' club, Comrade Medvedev delivered a speech before the Zalgiris collective.

Comrade Maslyukov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, visited the Ignalina nuclear electric power station on the same day and met the collective of that major power enterprise.

Pro-CPSU Lithuanian Hits Sajudis' Tactics

PM0801171990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with Yonas Guryatskas, member of the Bureau of the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform), by our special correspondent T. Karyakina: "Effectively Resulting in a Split"]

[Text] [Karyakina] How do you view the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party? What is your reaction to the assessments made by the latest CPSU Central Committee plenum concerning the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress?

[Guryatskas] My view is pure and simple—the Lithuanian Communist Party was split. A split that was long planned, in my view. Incidentally, Comrade Gorbachev's report at the CPSU Central Committee plenum cites the decision by the "Sajudis" Seimas, at which the question of the Lithuanian Communist Party was discussed. The Seimas decided that the Lithuanian Communist Party would be an autonomous party, or, to be more precise, quit the CPSU. This plan was carried out at the 20th Congress. The assessments made in M.S. Gorbachev's report at the plenum are very precise. One could also say that our 20th congress undermined CPSU unity. A secondary goal was attained: Removing Communists from involvement in the big effort to prepare for the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet elections. The Communist Party, having started a debate about its status, culminating in the congress, did not, in effect, participate in this major and important work before the new year. If you look now at the first

candidates who are already being nominated in various collectives you will see that most of them are representatives of "Sajudis."

While aware of the situation in the republic, I am unequivocally positive about the conclusions of the CPSU Central Committee plenum. In my view, the report at it provides an accurate analysis of the situation, and there is simply no other way to approach it. My only fear is that the CPSU Central Committee representatives' coming here now will change little. Why do I think that? The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee has been very busy of late demarcating forces in the party. A new party is being organized. An effort is being made to accomplish this quickly, in order to be able to show the CPSU Central Committee members when they arrive: Here is our party. In order to present them with a fait accompli.

You were at our news conference. Comrade Burokyavichyus showed the form he had devised for a proposed member of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party. It goes as follows: "To the primary party organization of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers. Pleae consider me (surname, forename, patronymic) a member of the autonomous Lithuanian Communist Party. I recognize the Statutes and Program of the Lithuanian Communist Party, adopted at the 20th congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party, and will be guided by them." Date, signature. All the national member need do is sign the paper, without giving much thought to the fact that he is switching to a new, independent Lithuanian Communist Party, and simply enter his surname.

I met with a deputy minister this morning, who said that these forms were distributed at a party meeting yesterday and that people were asked to make a decision. The majority decided to switch to the newly created party. There remained three people who decided not to join the new party formally, by signing a carbon copy. They were told: Think it over, comrades, think it over. Do not merely, so to speak, make up your mind but imagine what will become of you in the future if you do not sign the form.

The forms are being distributed everywhere. Yesterday there was a conference of secretaries of primary organizations at Sovetskiy Party Rayon Committee [raykom]. The raykom first secretary made a speech, explaining that these questions must be tackled quickly so that Communists can decide which way they are going. Or whether they are leaving the Lithuanian Communist Party. Think about it. Either they leave or they stay in the Lithuanian Communist Party.

[Karyakina] How do you view the fact that the new Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau is dominated by representatives of "Sajudis," with virtually no workers or peasants among them?

[Guryatskas] In my opinion, they have not raised the question of workers and peasants before, and there have never been workers and peasants in "Sajudis." "Sajudis" has already carried out its task: It has bent the Lithuanian Communist Party to its will and merged with it. The majority of the "Sajudis" Seimas and the "Sajudis" Council is now in the so-called independent Lithuanian Communist Party. From their actions and from their pushiness one senses that they are also dictating to the new Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party and its Bureau.

[Karyakina] So it is natural to ask the question: Do you consider the congress decision a triumph for "Sajudis" ideology?

[Guryatskas] Yes, I said at the beginning that it was a victory for "Sajudis." The goals its leaders set themselves are being attained. What conclusions can be drawn from recent days? In fact, all forces are now united against the Communists who have stayed on the CPSU platform—the Lithuanian Communist Party (independent) is against them, and it is echoed by "Sajudis," democrats, social democrats, and Christian democrats, who have already formed or are forming independent parties. They are all ganging up against the Communists who are in favor of a united CPSU. You can see how the forces came to be united. There is another point that must be considered. Only a week ago all these forces were actively **opposed** to the Lithuanian Communist Party, when it was still united and unsplit, before the congress. People were voicing all kinds of criticism about the party, they were saying that it had made mistakes, that its history was a stain, and so on and so forth. Suddenly, after the 20th congress a huge rally takes place at which all the speakers come out... in support of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

[Karyakina] Why, in your opinion, did the congress renounce the principle of democratic centralism?

[Guryatskas] This was done deliberately. Democratic centralism is being criticized by "Sajudis" and the other forces which support it. I believe that this is one aspect of their tactics aimed at breaking up the party—that is to say, to turn it into somekind of amorphous political organization without a firm organizational structure. An organization that you can join and leave as you like. Primary organizations are not necessarily subordinated to a superior party organ and so forth. This is advantageous precisely for the people who are opposed to the Communist Party. We know that a party that is based on principles of democratic centralism is a strong party which cannot easily be broken up. A party without democratic centralism falls apart as soon as anyone sneezes. It becomes an innocuous force, a force easily dispersible in the masses. It becomes tame, ready to obey all kinds of political adventurists. Consequently, it is easily dealt with. This is a long-standing task which was implemented at the 20th congress through the adoption of the new Statutes. Did not Chekuolis, a member of the Central Committee of the newly established Lithuanian Communist Party, propose outright either after the congress or even at the congress (I cannot remember): The doors to the party must be thrown wide open. Anyone

who buys a party membership card should be considered a Communist. He proposed that party membership cards be printed and sold. If you buy a card, you're a member—if you don't, you aren't.

[Karyakina] How do you assess the fact that the party anthem, the Internationale, was not played at the congress?

[Guryatskas] Can't you see it? It is an attempt to retain the Communist Party only its title. Take a look at what is happening here in general. The slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" has been removed from all newspapers. All the newspapers whose titles included words like "LENINSKAYA" or "KOMMUNIZM" have changed their titles. All streets which were named for Lenin, the Red Army, or prominent revolutionaries have been renamed. Even the Prospekt Lenina no longer exists in Vilnius....

[Karyakina] "'Communist, whose side are you on?'—Lithuania asks." This slogan was put up for the congress. How would you answer this question?

[Guryatskas] This slogan may mislead some Communists. If this slogan was put forward in an atmosphere other than that of the psychological terror which reigns in Lithuania, it could be regarded as legitimate. Communists should declare where they stand. However, in the current conditions this slogan is obviously to be understood as follows: If you favor secession from the Soviet Union, then you are a good Communist.

[Karayakina] Whose side are you on?

[Guryatskas] I declared my stance long ago and once and for all. I am a Communist, a member of the Lithuanian Communist Party, but I am in favor of our party remaining part of the CPSU. I am convinced that together, by the joint efforts of all the communist parties and all the republics, it is possible to more swiftly overcome the shortcomings which currently exist in our country.

Pro-Independence Lithuanian CP Member Interviewed

PM0801161790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 5 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with Gediminas Kirkilas, member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, by special correspondent T. Karyakina: "We Were Able To Look at Things in a New Way"; date, place not given]

[Text] [Karyakina] You have been elected a member of the new Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party—independent, as they say here, of the CPSU. That was at the recent 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, which was a political sensation. How would you evaluate it?

[Kirkilas] It is no easy matter to evaluate something you are doing yourself, something you are actively involved in and committed to. I will just say that I have been involved in party work since 1982. I have been involved in preparations for many party conferences and other events, but I cannot recall seeing before the kind of enthusiasm shown by the delegates and participants of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. The Communists worked with enormous vigor and in a creative and enterprising way. Many delegates, in my view, were glad to be participating in something, making a contribution. From this viewpoint, the congress was certainly a success. I believe it considerably enhanced the prestige of Lithuanian Communists, who not only admitted their responsibility for Stalinism, stagnation, and errors, but were able to take a new look at history, at socialism, and at the party's role in society. Immediately after the congress applications for admission to the party began arriving at party committees. Voluntarily, without coercion. This is a pleasing and hopeful sign.

Unfortunately, we did not manage to avoid a split at the congress, although we tried to prevent it. I believe, however, that we will continue to have a dialogue and I do not doubt that we will find mutually acceptable solutions.

[Karyakina] What is your personal view of the assessments made in connection with your congress' decisions at the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum?

[Kirkilas] I am positive about M.S. Gorbachev's report. It not only contains a great deal of criticism of us, but is also a serious attempt to understand the underlying causes of what happened. This is very important. On the abstract level it is easy to talk about "Stalinist distortions of internationalism," but in practice this affected the lives of thousands of people. And not only them. Entire nations were abused by the tyranny. Perhaps that is why the self-defense mechanism was strongest in the case of "small peoples." This, in turn, evidently, offends others. The solution of the problem is that all sides must make concessions. To use the words of the report, the center should go too far in the direction of concessions to national elements, rather than not far enough.

But some of the assessments I regard as too harsh and hasty. Perhaps in time many things will be reconsidered. The main thing that was lacking at the plenum, it seems to me, was the desire to get to grips with our program documents, resolutions, and declarations. It seems to us that we have succeeded in emerging from the crisis and finding our feet. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian Communist Party can expect a difficult struggle for Soviet power in the republic at the February elections.

[Karyakina] How many "Sajudis" members are there in the new Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau?

[Kirkilas] I would point out that the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has been substantially renewed and expanded. It has been decided to have periodic rotation, that is, the Bureau members will

change, depending on what the most urgent tasks are. For instance, the present Bureau membership is geared primarily to political tasks.

The old Central Committee Bureau was "elected" mainly on the basis of position: It concluded all the top people in the republic, the first secretaries of the biggest city committees, and one worker. Now this principle has been dropped completely and the most prominent scientific and cultural figures and progressive leaders are elected by secret ballot. Some of them are USSR people's deputies and also supporters of "Sajudis." ("Sajudis" does not have a membership.) They are K. Prunskene, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers; R. Gudaytis, writer; B. Genzyalis, professor and secretary of the Vilnius University party committee; R. Ozolas, philosopher; E. Vilkas, academician; and M. Stakvilyavichyus, first secretary of Shyaulyay Party City Committee.

[Karyakina] Weren't the ideology of "Sajudis" and the ideology of the Lithuanian Communist Party combined at the congress? Or did this happen before? I ask this because in an interview for VOA on 26 December 1989, the philosopher R. Ozolas said: "The party knows that it has been restructured, in the first place, for the purpose of separation from Moscow, that is, to break the link that is a threat to Lithuania's rebirth. In the second place, to bring into the party's political organs people who today represent the 'Sajudis' orientation and will be able to exercise a stronger influence on the new party policy...."

[Kirkilas] I know nothing of the latter, so I cannot comment. Your question is a complex, but interesting one. Since "Sajudis" started up, many Communists have participated in its leading organs and in its activities. They also criticized the party to which they belonged. But they did not lose faith in it and sought to restructure the party along the lines of democratization and revival of national and general human values, like society in general in our republic. When the Lithuanian Communist Party began to change and go over to political methods of work, meaning above all a desire to express the interests of the people, it turned out that many Communist supporters of "Sajudis" were not political opponents. On the contrary, they were the pioneers of perestroyka in the party.

The ideology of "Sajudis" (and that is why it won over the masses) is democracy, glasnost, and the national and spiritual rebirth of society. Of course, there are among the "Sajudis" activists people who are trying to use its platform for selfish purposes. But is that not the case in the party?

At the 20th congress Lithuanian Communists attempted to analyze the crisis in communist ideology and the ideologized economy, cultural, and social relations. All this is reflected in the program documents.

[Karyakina] The dominant tasks in the new Lithuanian Communist Party program are those of the new STATE of Lithuania. Does this not push into the background the interests of SOCIETY?

[Kirkilas] In the Lithuanian Communist Party program the state is seen as a condition of the creation of a democratic society. The state is not an end in itself. "Not the people for the state," Lenin said, "but the state for the people." It is essential as a guarantee of democracy and equality for all members of society, irrespective of nationality or membership of a particular social stratum.

According to the USSR Constitution, we are a union of sovereign states. But Stalinist and then Brezhnevist policy finally destroyed the slightest sign of statehood in the republic (even anthems, coats of arms, and flags). That is why the question is so acute today.

[Karyakina] The Lithuanian Communist Party statutes have dropped the principle of democratic centralism. Isn't the Lithuanian Communist Party going to be a reorganized, fragmented force, when it should be more organized than ever before?

[Kirkilas] There was great deal of argument about the principle of democratic centralism throughout the pre-congress debate. Nevertheless, it was decided to abandon it. Perhaps the desire to democratize intraparty relations as much as possible and give free rein to initiative in primary organizations prevailed. We rely on ideological unity and conscious discipline. Practice shows that rigid centralization leads to window dressing at all levels.

[Karyakina] Why was the "Internationale"—the party anthem—not sung at the 20th Congress?

[Kirkilas] We are in the process of abandoning many things that have lost their original meaning, in our opinion. I notice that PRAVDA dropped the orders from its masthead at the start of the New Year. As for the "Internationale," for a long time it has been a pure formality at party forums. A tape recording would be put on, but, as a rule, the congress participants did not sing. The singing was a sham and the unity was a sham. I believe that it is always better to get rid of lies and self-deception, particularly when they are traditional.

[Karyakina] Some banners were prepared for the congress. I saw one: "Lithuania Asks: Who Are Communists With And Who Are They For? " What would your answer be to that question?

[Kirkilas] I favor democratic socialism, the renewal of society, radical perestroyka of the economy, and a new policy vis-a-vis the intelligentsia and intellectuals. As for the state of relations between the Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU, we must not be in a hurry to arrive at conclusions and decisions before the 28th CPSU Congress, which will undoubtedly serve perestroyka in the party. But we must hurry with the congress itself, in my view, because the situation in the party at the moment demands radical solutions, without delay.

'Split' in Lithuanian Communist Party Viewed

LD0801142790 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Excerpts] The situation in which the Communist Party of the Soviet Baltic Republic of Lithuania found itself remains complicated. [passage omitted] In other words, writes our commentator Vitaliy Gurov, there is a split—the first one in our history. [passage omitted]

A leader of the Communist Party of Lithuania upholding the platform of the national Communist Party, Vladislav Shved, believes Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to his Republic is somewhat delayed. There are party branches being set up of the independent Communist Party of Lithuania.

More rallies have been held in the republic of supporters of both parties. Our reporters say that, unlike the leaders of the two Communist Parties who would like to find point of contact, these rallies seldom call for compromise variants for solving these problems. It looks like people don't hear one another.

Here are two interviews granted to our correspondent at a rally of supporters of the Communist Party of Lithuania that stand on the platform of the national Communist Party. What is the purpose of the rally? The main purpose is apparently unity of the ranks of the Soviet Communist Party, said (Stanislava Yuonine). People have certainly come at the rally because they believe that unity of the Soviet Communist Party is the unity of the country and it means normal life for the republic.

(Irina Slubskiy) has joined the party precisely at this complex time for the Lithuanian Communists: Now is the time, the time for decision in the party, when each one and everyone must make his or her choice. My choice has been made—to be in the ranks of the party, which is being discredited and being split by some people. I do my best for the party to survive and live.

So what will the Communist Party of Lithuania be like? This is a question which concerns all Soviet communists.

Lithuanian Party Elections Discussed

90UN0444A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 29 Nov 89 p 2

[Interview with Stanislav Yasis, first deputy chief of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Organizational Party and Cadre Work Department, by Yu. Mazheykis: "The Delegates Have Started the Preparations for the Congress"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Mazheykis] The election of candidates for the upcoming 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress has just ended. Please tell us how many communists were elected for the congress and how these elections differ from previous ones.

[Yasis] The election of delegates for the party forum of the republic's communists is a very important stage in the preparations for the congress. A total of 1,040 delegates representing all city and rayon party organizations, and also military units, were chosen. As usual, the largest delegation to the congress will be the Vilnius city delegation, which is made up of 211 delegates. In fact, there will be several dozen more communists from the republic's capital at the congress: Many rayon and city party organizations have given the deputies mandates. Of course, they are primarily the most well-known people in Lithuania—party, soviet, and economic leaders, public figures, representatives of science and the arts and culture, and journalists.

Second in terms of numbers is the Kaunas city delegation with 113 delegates, followed by Klaypeda with 73, Shyaulyay with 33, and Panevezhis with 29. However, there will also be small delegations. Delegations of five to seven delegates will go to the congress from Druskininskay and from Skuodasskiy, Shilalskiy, and Shirvintskiy Rayons.

Procedure for choosing delegates to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress has been at the center of attention during the course of party discussions. References were frequently made to the election of delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which evoked sharp criticism from both communists and nonparty people. Indeed, the very process of democratization in party life and glasnost in the party have required significant changes in the procedure for selecting congress delegates, despite existing instructions. An absolute majority of communists expressed themselves in favor of delegates being chosen directly in the primary party organizations or at the recommendation of rayon and city conferences. These proposals from communists were supported at the 21st Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum.

Most delegates were chosen directly in the various primary party organizations or groups at general party meetings. There were only 18 city and rayon party conferences for the election of delegates, and even there they did not choose all the delegates from the city or rayon. Some of the primary party organizations wanted to choose the representatives at the congress at their own meetings and conferences. So we may conclude that the distinguishing feature of the election of delegates to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress is recognition of the authority of the primary party organizations.

[Mazheykis] What kind of activeness has been displayed by the communists and primary party organizations during these elections?

[Yasis] There is no cause for complaint about the activeness of communists, including the primary party organizations. The sharp increase in the activeness and interest of communists at the election of delegates can, in my opinion, be explained by two reasons. First, the primary party organizations and the communists themselves had

the decisive word in the nomination and election of candidates. Second, the communists have a great sense of responsibility for and interest in having the mandate for congress delegate being given to communists who are best trained on the political plane and who have their position and are able to defend it. The activeness of the communists was accompanied by the manifestation of a growing exactness with respect to the nomination of delegates. There can, therefore, be no question of regulating the composition of delegates from above, as used to be done previously. Each nomination for delegate understood clearly that only by passing through the sieve of exactness is it possible to gain the trust of the communists.

There were usually three or four, and sometimes even five or six candidates for a single delegate's mandate. These candidates were first discussed in the lower party wings and their names published for the general information of the labor collective, rayon or city. Taking into account the number of contenders for the delegate mandate and the secret voting, it was a rare thing for all delegates to be selected at the first round of voting.

Yet another test awaited many of the candidates: They were given just a few minutes to present their own platforms and answer questions. Not everyone passed this test successfully. A lack of experience was also observed in setting forth one's position briefly and succinctly, and sometimes even a lack of any such position. But in any event this essential part of the elections became a good and useful lesson in democracy.

[Mazheykis] It would be of interest to trace whether it was the most active proponents of perestroyka who, because of their new thinking and public activity are known widely in Lithuania, have become the delegates to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress.

[Yasis] I have already remarked that the primary party organizations proposed as delegates the most active communists who are experienced in party and political activity and who are involved in preparing the program documents for the congress.

Taking into account the fact that almost half of the delegates were chosen only during the last week, and that the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee has still not received all the paperwork on them, it is, of course, impossible to analyze them qualitatively. All the information on the delegates (and there is much less than previously) is being generalized and will be prepared by the congressional credentials commission.

Some very general and preliminary results of the election of delegates can nevertheless be reported to the newspaper readers.

Almost one delegate in four is the leader or deputy leader of a labor collective. Workers from science and the articles and culture, teachers and instructors, and physicians make up 17 percent of delegates to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. One delegate in ten is a primary party organization secretary. Attention is drawn to the fact that, in addition to first secretaries of party rayon committees [raykoms] and city committees [gorkoms], a large group of other party committee secretaries and other workers in those committees—department chiefs and even instructors—has been elected. The picture is the same with Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee workers—from instructors to Central Committee secretaries. Thus, subordination according to post, which has been usual for years at these elections, has been disrupted. This is also one of the signs of democratization in the party.

Only 35 workers and kolkhoz farmers were chosen for the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. Comment on this fact may vary. Of course, the large detachment of worker-communists could have been represented at the congress by a more solid delegation. But at the meetings the workers and rank-and-file kolkhoz farmers preferred to cast their votes for other candidates even though they often constituted a majority in the party organizations of the labor collectives.

Almost all those in the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and some members of the republic have become congress delegates.

Among the congress delegates we see people who are well known both within the republic and beyond: Scholars Yu. Pozhelu, V. Statulyavichyus, E. Vilkas, A. Zhukauskas, R. Rayatskas, and I. Minkyavichyus; the popular writers and poets V. Bubins, Yu. Martsinkyavichyus, V. Martinkus, V. Petkyavichyus, and A. Maldonis; and many other representatives of our intelligentsia who are particularly active participants in Lithuania's sociopolitical life.

The delegate's mandate for the congress will also be given to active figures in the "Sajudis" movement and members of the seyma council B. Genzyalis, R. Gudaytis, R. Ozolsau, A. Chekuolis, and others.

The congress delegates represent all social spheres in the republic's life. The delegates include people of the most diverse nationalities living in the republic.

One other distinguishing feature of the delegates to this congress is that the absolute majority of them have a higher education.

[Mazheykis] So the delegates to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress are now known. What activity will they engage in before the congress and what role should they play in the preparations for this forum of Lithuania's communists?

[Yasis] The 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress is called upon to resolve very important problems for the communist party. In other words, to decide the fate of the Lithuanian Communist Party. All the communists in the republic are well aware of this, and the delegates themselves recognize even more deeply that this is an historic congress for the party.

The crucial nature of the tasks to be resolved at the congress demands the same kind of responsible and comprehensive preparation of the delegates for it. It seems to me that first and foremost all delegates must study well the program documents of the congress, discuss them jointly before the party forum, and submit proposals and amendments. Delegates will also be given an opportunity to express their opinions beforehand on the organization of the congress and certain procedural matters.

Some of the delegates to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress will be taking part in the republic debate on problems of socialism and other program documents.

We hope for the most active involvement of delegates in the debate on all urgent problems in party life, with the help of the mass media and through face-to-face meetings with with the communists who have entrusted them with this honorable and crucial mandate of delegate to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress.

Rayon Chief Dropped Due to Pro-CPSU Faction Links

LD0801234290 Klaipeda Maritime Press Service in Russian 1000 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] A meeting of the party activists of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon of Vilnius has been held. The participants decided to convene a rayon party conference, and in connection with the fact that Vladislav Shved, first secretary of the rayon committee, has been elected secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, it was decided not to recognize his authority as first secretary of the rayon committee.

Greater Economic Autonomy for Latvian Press

PM0801164590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent I. Litvinova report: "Latvia: Press Acquires Economic Autonomy"]

[Text] Riga—The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Publishing House, where many of the republic's newspapers and journals are published, will grant many local editorial offices much more autonomy from this year. This has been discussed at a session of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau.

No one will dispute that during the era of glasnost journalists have come appreciably closer to the cherished creative freedom. In the material context, however, there may not have been any increase in rights. Old instructions still restrict editorial office collectives even on trivialities. Now editorial offices at all the republic's newspapers and journals have been given the right to independently determine their structure and staffs—within the limits of the single remuneration fund being created. It includes money from the wages fund, editorial office funds, and, where necessary—which was not previously the case—some of the royalty fund, which is intended to pay staff workers. Lastly, an editorial office will be able, on legitimate grounds, to pay for consultants' services—on economic, legal, scientific, and cultural issues. A top-up payment has been authorized for newspaper and journal staffers with a knowledge of and using foreign languages in their daily work. As for advertising, authorization has been given for contract prices to be used for its publication in the press.

Latvian editorial offices will possibly become richer in rubles. But what about hard currency? This question has been answered. The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Publishing House and the "Avize" ("Newspaper") Publishing House have been allowed to establish direct ties with foreign firms and obtain hard currency for exporting newspapers and journals. Some of the hard currency will be allocated to editorial offices.

K. Dundurs, director of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Publishing House, said that only the first, most urgent steps have been taken. In accordance with the USSR Law on Economic Autonomy for the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics, it has been decided to elaborate by 1 March a concept for the publishing house's activity and an economic model for relations with editorial offices.

"A page of the People's Front newspaper ATMODA costs R100 while mine only costs R28," V. Krustynsh, editor of the republic's popular weekly LAUKU AVIZE (RURAL NEWSPAPER), said at the meeting. "You cannot compare salaries either. If we want to compete with the new mass media we must put publications on a more or less equal footing."

Estonian Komsomol Resolution on Transition

90UN0505A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian 28 Nov 89 p 1

[Text] Proceeding from the fact that the internal organizational work of the majority of primary organizations of the Estonian Leninist Communist Youth League has ended, that there is no perceived need at this time on the part of the republic's youth for a mass political organization and that the LKSME [Estonian Leninist Communist Youth League], as an organization, essentially lacks influence on the internal political life of the republic, the 21st LKSME Congress resolves:

1. To announce in the LKSME a transitional period up to 1 March 1990, upon the expiration of which to consider the activity of the LKSME based on the statutes currently in effect terminated.

2. Within the transitional period:

2.1. Taking as the basis the 21st LKSME Congress resolution "Independence of the LKSME," to ensure for all members of the LKSME the right to freely determine their attitude toward the program documents of the youth organizations submitted for discussion by the 21st LKSME Congress and in the transitional period. To consider claimants to the status of successor to the LKSME the youth organizations formed from LKSME members which hold constituent assemblies and prior to 28 February 1990 submit to the LKSME Central Committee their constituent papers and petitions on succession.

2.2. The leading authority of the LKSME is its Central Committee. To accord each city and rayon organization of the LKSME and the Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] organizations of the Estonian Maritime Shipping Company and the "Estrybprom" Production Association the right to delegate to the LKSME Central Committee three representatives each. The Central Committee to be confirmed by the 21st LKSME Congress.

2.3. The executive authority of the LKSME Central Committee is the LKSME Central Committee Secretariat. The numerical composition of the secretariat is determined and elected by the 21st LKSME Congress. The powers of the secretariat are to be determined by the LKSME Central Committee at its first plenum.

2.4. The LKSME Central Committee or its secretariat may create commissions for the solution of questions that arise.

3. On 1 March 1990 the LKSME Central Committee will record at its plenum the progress of fulfillment of clause 2.1 of this resolution. Questions connected with succession of the LKSME are to be decided at an LKSME Central Committee plenum not later than 25 May 1990.

The authority of the LKSME Central Committee confirmed at the 21st LKSME Congress terminates at this plenum.

Only organizations formed on the basis of the terms of this resolution and registered in the established procedure may be successors of the LKSME.

4. Temporarily, until the end of the transition period, to take as the basis of the financial and economic activity of the LKSME the financial-accounting system of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] which has been in existence until the present time.

(The 21st LKSME Congress resolution "Independence of the LKSME," the resolution on decisions on the Estonian Communist Youth Union and the youth organizations which operated in Estonia until 1940 and the resolution on Articles 6 and 7 of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution and the ruling "Evaluation of the Association of the Estonian Communist Youth Union With the VLKSM" will be published in the next issue.)

Estonian Poll on Supreme Soviet Sessions

90UN0592A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 14 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by A. Saar: "Pessimism Prior to the Congress of People's Deputies"]

[Text] The First Congress of USSR People's Deputies which took place six months ago became a major event in our lives. It engendered hope and shed light on the insurmountable contradictions and occasional helplessness of our developing democratic thought. We have seen all of this with our own eyes. As telephone polls conducted during the Congress have shown, there was enormous interest in it and the assessment of its work corresponded to the forum's effectiveness. The All-Union Institute of Sociology and the Journalists' Information Center conducted the series of June polls. Recently, yet another joint poll was conducted and, in contrast to the first, rural residents were also queried in addition to Tallinn residents.

The results of the poll are listed in the tables below. Approximately 311 people were polled in Tallinn and 100 people (of various regions) were polled in the rural area.

Is perestroyka living up to your expectations?

	Estonian Tallinn Residents	Non-Estonian Tallinn Residents	Rural Residents
Totally living up to	18	6	9
Partially living up to	53	30	68
Not living up to	24	44	13
It is hard to say	5	19	10

How do you assess the changes in the condition of the state during the period between the 1st and 2d Congresses?

	Estonian Tallinn Residents	Non-Estonian Tallinn Residents	Rural Residents
It has improved	27	7	27
It has not improved	35	28	33
It has worsened	28	46	27
It is hard to say	10	19	14

How do you assess the activities of the Supreme Soviet that was elected at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies?

	Estonian Tallinn Residents	Non-Estonian Tallinn Residents	Rural Residents
The Supreme Soviet has done everything within its power	17	11	7
The Supreme Soviet is carrying out its tasks for the most part	32	28	38
The Supreme Soviet cannot handle its main tasks	41	44	42
It is hard to say	10	17	14

Do you believe that a turning point will occur at the 2d Congress and that it will solve the state's economic problems?

	Estonian Tallinn Residents	Non-Estonian Tallinn Residents	Rural Residents
I believe it will occur	21	51	19
I doubt that it will occur	31	25	47
I do not believe it will occur	41	8	25
It is hard to say	7	16	10

Will the Congress be able to resolve national [ethnic] problems?

	Estonian Tallinn Residents	Non-Estonian Tallinn Residents	Rural Residents
It will	20	34	26
I doubt it	33	32	41
It will not	44	16	28
It is hard to say	3	17	6

Do you believe (hope, suppose) that the Congress's activities as a whole will be successful?

	Estonian Tallinn Residents	Non-Estonian Tallinn Residents	Rural Residents
I hope so	38	49	44
I doubt it	36	27	39
I do not believe it will	11	7	10
It is hard to say	15	17	8

How do you intend to follow the work of the Congress?

	Estonian Tallinn Residents	Non-Estonian Tallinn Residents	Rural Residents
Regularly	25	61	16
More or less regularly	47	23	48
Selectively	25	14	36
It is hard to say	2	2	1

In your opinion, how significant will the forthcoming session of the Congress be in contrast to the previous session?

	Estonian Tallinn Residents	Non-Estonian Tallinn Residents	Rural Residents
More significant	63	52	60
Same as the previous session	16	21	18
Less significant	2	6	5
It is hard to say	19	21	17

The information is such that it does not require commentary. This is public opinion at the present time. Commentaries will be required later when we are able to compare assessments of events as they develop.

Estonian Price Hikes to Support Social Fund

LD0801154290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] We have just received a report from Estonia that prices of alcoholic drinks there have been raised by an average of 20%. Beer is up 100%, and cigarettes 50%. The sums obtained from the increases will be paid into a fund recently set up in the republic to finance wage increase for workers in the nonindustrial sphere and increases in pensions and scholarships. This can be called a first step toward eliminating social inequality in financially autonomous Estonia.

Estonian Government Adopts Decisions on Banking

LD0901104190 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Summary] Today's session of the Republican Government adopted resolutions on several matters.

Tax rates were established for natural resources, with the application left to the local governments. Wages were raised for workers in social and cultural spheres.

At the press conference, Indrek Toome said that the government is still four ministers short. He named the four men whom he is going to put forward at the next Supreme Soviet session.

Toome also spoke about banking. He said: A very serious issue is that of the republican banks to come under republican jurisdiction. This is a very important issue. It is associated with the USSR law on the implementation of the economies of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Latvian SSR, and Estonian SSR becoming independent.

Article 1, subdivision 4, lays down that republican banks are within republic's jurisdiction, administered by top state powers in the republic; and indeed, in that connection we adopted a resolution to the effect that the republican branch of the [USSR] Savings Bank, the Estonian Republican Bank branch of the USSR Agroindustrial Bank, the Estonian Republican Bank branch of the USSR Housing-and-Social Bank and the Estonian Republican Bank branch of the USSR Industrial and

Construction Bank should in the future adhere to the Estonian SSR law on banking and the rights of commerical banks adopted on the basis of other Estonian SSR laws. Regulating their work, according to the law on banking, should take place via Estonia itself.

Baltic Self-Determination Poll in Moscow

90UN0532A Riga ATMODA in Russian
4 Dec 89 pp 4-5

[Findings of a Moscow poll on Baltic Self-Determination: "Results of a Poll in Moscow"]

[Text] The Independent Sociological Service conducted from 9 to 11 October 1989 in Moscow a poll of the population on the subject of the political self-determination of the Baltic republics. The poll was conducted per a scientifically compiled sample reflecting the social stratification of the population of the capital city. Exactly 2,000 persons were polled altogether (the Independent Sociological Service sought a round figure for convenience of processing). It is noted here that approximately 30% of those questioned declined to participate in the poll (despite its anonymity) at various stages. This may be seen as evidence of the lack of faith which is deeply rooted in the consciousness of considerable numbers of the population in the officially proclaimed policy of democratization and glasnost.

Socially, those polled were distributed as follows: 21.6%, workers at large industrial enterprises; 0.6%, likewise, per the special-entry limit (so-called "limitchiki"); 4%, workers of small-scale enterprises and establishments; 17.2%, engineering-technical personnel; 15.2%, employees, 1%, party, Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] and soviet officials; 0.8%, representatives of the managerial machinery of the middle (top) tier; 6.1%, research personnel; 4.2%, liberal arts intelligentsia; 2.2%, medical personnel; 0.8%, cooperative workers and individuals; 1.2%, servicemen; 1.2%, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and KGB employees; 9.1% trainees and students; 12%, pensioners; 6.2%, trade and service workers; 2.2%, housewives; 5.4%, persons temporarily out of work; and 0.2%, persons of no fixed address.

These indicators are quite close to the actual state of affairs. Some categories, however, were appreciably underrepresented in the poll: These were, first, party, Komsomol, and soviet officials (1% instead of the effective 3.5%); representatives of managerial machinery of the middle (top) tier (0.8% instead of the effective 3.5%); servicemen (1.2% instead of the effective 2.5%); and, finally, persons of no fixed address (0.2% instead of the effective 2%). This may be explained with a high degreee of certainty by the fact that it was the representatives of these social categories which either declined to take part in the poll (servicemen; party, Komsomol and soviet officials; and MVD, KGB employees) or attributed themselves to other social categories (representatives of the managerial machinery to that of employees; KGB employees, to that of servicemen; the persons of no fixed address, to that of those temporarily out of work; and so forth).

In respect to age, those polled were divided as follows: 11%, persons aged 16-20; 13%, 21-29; 28%, 30-39; 20%, 40-49; 15%, 50-59; and 13%, 60 and over. This result also corresponds well to the effective breakdown.

According to sex, those polled were divided chrestomathically: 49% men, 51% women.

In terms of party membership: 14.5%, members of the CPSU; 85.5%, nonparty persons; 16.5%, VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members; and 2.6%, members of "informal" social and political organizations. The ratio of members of the CPSU and nonparty persons is close to what was anticipated, the number of VKLSM members, however, is less than what was anticipated, this testifying, evidently, to the rapid drift of young people away from the ranks of the VLKSM. The number of "informals" is negligible by Baltic standards, of course, but this figure is quite high for Moscow and is greater by an order of magnitude than that anticipated.

In terms of national characteristics: 48.2% called themselves Russians; 14.2%, Ukrainians; 12.6%, Jews; 9.5%, Armenians; 6.5%, Tatars; 4.6%, Belorussians; 4.4%, Georgians; and 10%, representatives of other nationalities. These figures differ somewhat from the officially quoted information concerning the national composition of Moscow's population, but correlate well with the known data on the relative significance of various national groups in the structure of Moscow's population. It is interesting that 1.1% of those polled (22 persons) were representatives of Baltic peoples: 12 persons called themselves Letts; 5, Lithuanians; 4, Estonians; and 1 Kurshi.

To the question "What is your attitude toward the idea of political self-determination for the Baltic republics?", 38.2% of those polled answered "positive," 42.4%, "negative," and 19.4% were unable to voice any definite opinion on this question. It should be said right away that the final figure hardly corresponds to reality since it is indirectly checked by other questions: Only 7.2% of respondents, for example, had difficulty answering the question of whether the situation in the Baltic could reach the point of open interethnic clashes, 7% had difficulty answering the question of whether a military invasion of the Baltic were possible, 7.2% admitted that they were not in fact following events in the Baltic, and 7.6% had difficulty answering whether they considered themselves fully informed as to what was going on in the Baltic. It is logical to assume that the number of those having difficulty expressing their attitude toward the idea of political self-determination for the Baltic should somehow correlate with this figure fluctuating in the 7-percent to 8-percent range. The more so in that the approximately 20% not interested in events in the Baltic nonetheless defined their attitude toward the idea of

political self-determination for the Baltic republics. The bluntness of the question (first on the form, what is more) most likely embarrassed some respondents. This may again be seen as evidence of lack of faith in the seriousness and durability of the democratic changes in the country. It is interesting that up to 50% of those polled who opted for this version of the answer were people over the age of 30. One notices also that over one-half of the representatives of the managerial machinery of the middle (top) tier, MVD (KGB) officials, and "limitchiki" answered the same way. Obviously, higher-than-usual guardedness is typical of these categories of the population.

Of those who responded positively to the idea of political self-determination for the Baltic, over 70% were people aged 39 and under. Among students, what is more, such people constituted more than 85%, and among the artistic intelligentsia, over 70%; whereas among workers of large industrial enterprises, little more than 25%. It is interesting that almost all the "limitchiki" polled who ventured to define their position on this question (fewer than half) unequivocally opposed political self-determination for the Baltic republics in any form. This is all the more surprising because over 80% of the "limitchiki" polled were representatives of non-Slav peoples and, consequently, might have been sympathetic to the idea of political self-determination for the national outlying areas. Of the social categories taking issue most sharply with political self-determination for the Baltic, one is struck by pensioners (almost 80%), servicemen (over 92%), and housewives (over 75%). Party, Komsomol, and soviet officials set the record—100% of them opposed self-determination! However strange, the liberal arts intellectuals proved very conservative—over 58% of them opposed self-determination. It is interesting that almost 42% of CPSU members supported the idea of political self-determination for the Baltic—this was far more than expected. Another interesting result is the fact that among the "informals" almost 13% also opposed national self-determination for the Baltic! Study of the forms of these 13% testifies that they evidently belong to organizations of the "Pamyat" type.

Of the persons who supported political self-determination for the Baltic, 21.2% defined the concept of "political self-determination for the Baltic republics" as a "broadening of a number of the republics' political rights on the economic basis of republic financial autonomy combined with negligible modifications of the present form of the USSR," 40.2%, as "the political and economic independence of independent states voluntarily united with other independent states within the framework of a confederative formation—the USSR," and 38.6%, as "political separation from the USSR and restoration of the status of independent states". The surprisingly high last figure—38.6%—testifies that, judging by everything, the people agreeing with the idea of political self-determination for the Baltic hold quite radical political views and have firmly determined their position on a number of acute political issues. Among the students and trainees who agree with the idea of political self-determination, approximately 80% cleave to the last interpretation of the "self-determination" concept, and among the "informals," over 95%. At the same time, however, 50% of workers (all categories), engineering-technical personnel, and office workers who supported national self-determination for the Baltic opted for the second version of the "self-determination" concept, advocating a confederation. The exceptionally low number of those in agreement with the first definition ("broadening... of rights... on the basis of financial autonomy") indicates, to judge by everything, that a majority of those polled does not take seriously the idea of limited financial autonomy put forward from above as a panacea for all economic political ailments.

To the question "Has your view of this problem (political self-determination) changed in the past 6 months?", 18.6% of those polled answered in the affirmative, 81.4%, in the negative. This is very high dynamics for such a short (6 months) period of time. Only approximately 8% (60 persons) of the respondents here with a positive attitude toward the idea of political self-determination for the Baltic have arrived at this viewpoint from the opposite viewpoint in the past 6 months. Almost twice as large a number of those polled—112 persons (13.2% of those with a negative attitude toward the idea of self-determination effected, on the other hand, the reverse evolution). This testifies to dynamics of Muscovites' mood which are inauspicious for the supporters of independence in the Baltic. As factors that entailed a change in attitude toward this problem, what is more, over 50% in the first category cited the general course of events in the country, 25%, the fuller and more truthful illustration of the "Baltic question," and approximately 7%, a change in their political views or philosophy in general. In the second category, over 60% cited as the reason for the change in their views the political strikes in Estonia and the enactment by the Estonian Supreme Soviet of an electoral law providing for residency qualifications, and 80% cited this factor together with the political strikes in Moldavia and the events in Fergana, Novyy Uzen, and Abkhazia. Only 7% gave as the reason prompting them to alter their viewpoint the CPSU Central Committee statement on the situation in the Baltic. The latter evidently points to the **almost total loss of the CPSU Central Committee's authority.** One notices that 92 of the 112 persons who have changed their viewpoint on questions of self-determination from positive to negative are workers. This testifies to the **actual existence of a "proletarian solidarity" mentality,** contrary to the widespread opposite opinion.

To the question as to the direction in which the situation in the Baltic is developing, 40.2% answered toward a broadening of democracy; 36%, toward dangerous interethnic tension; and 19.8%, toward a restoration of capitalism. One notices that 3.8% of those polled wrote on the form the answer: Toward a "revival of fascism." This testifies to the extreme tenacity of the Stalin propaganda myths. The latter would seem all the more

dangerous in that among these there are not only 3.8% pensioners but also, for example, 4% office workers, 8% engineering-technical persons, 3% students, 6% servicemen and so forth—all ages. It may be noted as a paradoxical feature that the Jews, who are usually sensitive to all hints even at fascism and anti-Semitism, do not observe and do not fear a "revival of fascism" in the Baltic: Of the 76 respondents who wrote down the "revival of fascism" in the Baltic, none was a Jew (although these represent in the sample the third nationality group in terms of numbers—12.6%). A further paradox is the fact that one of the two Germans who took part in the poll wrote about a "revival of fascism."

To the question "Could the situation in the Baltic reach the point of open interethnic clashes of the Nagorno-Karabakh type?", 52.2% of those polled answered "yes," 40.6%, "no," and 7.2%, "don't know." The figure of 52.2% is very high, testifying to Muscovites' actual concern at interethnic relations in the Baltic. Considering that the development of the situation in the Baltic was described by 40.2% of those polled as a "broadening of democracy," such concern can hardly be attributed to government propaganda. It is rather a result of recognition of the fact of the confrontation between the popular fronts and the interfronts in the Baltic. The figure of 52.5% does not reflect reality here and is actually artificially low. This is verified by the following question, in the course of which it was suggested that the respondents who did not believe in the possibility of open interethnic clashes arising give reasons for their position. Two options were offered: "The authorities would not allow" and "the Baltic has different political traditions from those of the Transcaucasus." It was suggested that other versions of the answer be formulated independently. An unexpectedly large number of those polled (over 12%) gave an answer of the following type: "The Baltic would sooner set up on its own than allow things to come to the point of clashes." This means that the above mentioned 12%-plus believe that **there could be no such clashes in an independent Baltic but by no means deny their possibility in the Soviet Baltic.** Adding these people (97 persons) to the 52.2%, we obtain 56.8%. This also, evidently, is an inaccurate figure since the answer "the authorities would not allow" (chosen by 32.5%) has quite an ambivalent ring. The number of persons who referred to the "political traditions of the Baltic" amounted to 38.5%, which points to the quite high authority of the political culture of the Baltic peoples among Muscovites. It was not possible to detect statistically reliable differences between "optimists" and "pessimists" on a social basis, but on an age basis an undoubted increase in "pessimism" is observed given a reduction in age.

It was suggested that those who said yes to the likelihood of interethnic clashes arising in the Baltic answer the question of who would be to blame for this. The answers were distributed as follows (in percentages, the sum total thereof exceeding 100 since giving several answers was allowed): The policy of perestroyka, 17.2%; the legacy of Stalinism, 70.8%; extremists on both sides, 72.6%; the local republic leadership, 25.5%; the Moscow leadership, 62.1%; the Latvian and Estonian people's fronts and "Sajudis," 36%; more extreme national forces—the Latvian National Independence Movement, the Lithuanian Freedom League and the Estonian National Independence Party, 68.8%; the Intermovement, Interfront, and "Unity," 50.2%; and KGB provocateurs, 56.2%. The respondents were allowed to suggest their own answers also. Of these versions, two were statistically significant: 7.2% pointed to "fascists," and 31.2%, "foreign (imperialist) subversion centers and their agents." The last figure interested us and prompted an additional study of the forms of these respondents. It was ascertained that over 60% of them came from office workers and pensioners (the remaining categories were represented more or less evenly), and, what is more, the age of 70% of the respondents was 40 and over. The relatively small number of students, inteilectuals, and workers (this is the most socially active part of the population for Moscow) and young people may in this case be considered a good prognostic sign for the supporters of self-determination in the Baltic. We would comment from the rest of the figures as follows. The fact that only 36% attributed to the "guilty parties" the people's fronts and "Sajudis" (and only 25.5%, the local republic leadership) testifies to their quite high prestige among those polled. These are in fact the best figures for all the subjects of influence indicated on the form (the "policy of perestroyka" and "legacy of Stalinism" are not, of course, subjects of influence but objective reality). The 7.2% for "fascists" and 31.2% for "foreign agents" are not counted in this case since these figures indicate merely the number of respondents who altogether believe in the existence of such political forces in the Baltic. At the same time, however, the fact that the DNNL [Latvian National Independence Movement], the LSL [Lithuanian Freedom League], and PNNE [Estonian National Independence Party] are seen as the "culprits" of nationality clashes by 66.8% of respondents (whereas the Interfronts, by only 50.2%) testifies that in Muscovites' social consciousness the Interfronts are not so much extremist formations as associations in defense of the rights of the nonindigenous population, and it is the DNNL, LSL, and PNNE which are seen as "extremists" (the figure of 68.8% is close to the 72.6% indicator—"extremists on both sides").

The fact that 62.1% named as the "culprit" of possible clashes the "Moscow leadership" by no means indicates a profound distrust thereof and suspicion that it intends to exacerbate the situation in the Baltic. Certain respondents meant here that the central leadership does not have the right to bring the situation in the Baltic to the point of open clashes, and were such clashes to occur, it would be to blame for not having been able to prevent them.

The indicator of 56.2% attributed to "KGB provocateurs" deserves separate comment. This column was deliberately worded in this way ("KGB provocateurs," and not simply "KGB") in order not to duplicate the

"Moscow leadership" column and to uncover the degree of the respondents' trust in the KGB and ascertain their opinion on **whether the KGB has its own plans and aims concerning the Baltic distinct from the central leadership.** The poll results show that there is in society a deep-rooted distrust of the KGB and the idea of the KGB as a "state within a state"—with its specific interests and unattractive practice. The mere fact that over one-fourth of all those polled agreed that the KGB employs provocation as a modus operandi characterizes to a sufficient extent the set of ideas about this state service.

To the question is military intervention in the Baltic of the 1968 type in the CSSR permissible in principle, 20% of those polled answered "yes," 68.2%, "no," and 11.8% refrained from answering. It was suggested that those who answered "yes" specify under what circumstances, in their opinion, such intervention is permissible (the sum total of answers is over 100% since indicating several variants was allowed). One hundred percent of those who answered "yes" indicated that military intervention is permissible in two instances: "Given the Baltic republics' separation and proclamation of independent states" and "given the outbreak of interethnic armed clashes;" 98.6% allowed of military intervention given "the Baltic republics' refusal to abide by USSR laws;" and 70.2%, given "the enactment of laws discriminating against the nonindigenous population." Some 42.2% added that military intervention is permissible in situations which, summarizing the definitions expressed, may be formulated as follows: "Given the mass flight or deportation from the Baltic republics of the nonindigenous population."

This radicalness of opinions should not lead to confusion: It should be remembered that it is a question of people who consider military intervention an entirely permissible political action. Comfort may be taken merely from the fact that their number was not more than 20% of those polled.

Far more indicative was respondents' answer to the following question: "Regardless of your thinking as regards the permissibility of such an action, in your opinion, might the Moscow central authorities accede to it if they deemed it necessary?" Some 82.4% of respondents answered "yes," 10.6%, "no," and 7%, "don't know." These figures testify that the vast majority of Muscovites emphatically do not believe first, that the Soviet leadership has abandoned (following the defeat in Afghanistan) the habit of deciding contentious issues by means of force and, second, that the Moscow leadership is seriously in accord with the fact that the Baltic republics have the right to realize their constitutional right to self-determination. This answer also indicates that **the majority of respondents, while personally rejecting military invasion of the Baltic, see no way to pressure the government for the purpose of forcing it to take stock of their viewpoint.** It is very likely that this reflects the actual state of affairs.

The final group of questions offered the respondents concerned the extent of their knowledgeability about the situation in the Baltic.

All these questions were in respect of one another mutually verifying.

To the question "Are you following the development of events in the Baltic?", 22.8% answered "yes, particularly intently and constantly;" 26.5%, "yes, but no more than events in other regions;" 43.5%, "irregularly;" and 7.2%, "practically, no." This testifies to Muscovites' quite extensive interest in political life in the Baltic. One notices that events in the Baltic are being followed most intently by the students and representatives of various categories of the intelligentsia (which would seem natural) and also—and this is astounding!—by party, Komsomol, and soviet officials, representatives of the managerial machinery of the middle (top) tier, servicemen, and MVD (KGB) employees. Careful processing of the forms induces the thought that whereas the first category is intently following the events in the Baltic with hope, the second, with apprehension and alarm. Paradoxically, among those "intently following" were all no-fixed-address respondents. The small overall number thereof (4 persons) prevents a reliable judgment on whether this is a chance coincidence or whether the prevailing opinion among the persons of no fixed address is that changes in the Baltic should be somehow radically (positively, evidently) reflected in their fate. In the latter case we should evidently expect an influx of this category of citizens into the Baltic republics.

To the question "Are you obtaining sufficient information about the situation in the Baltic?", 14.8% of those polled answered "entirely sufficient," 32.6%, "sufficient in principle," 38.2%, "insufficient," and 14.4%, "extremely insufficient". However, to the check question of whether the respondents considered themselves fully informed about the situation in the Baltic, "yes" was the response of only 11.6%, 80.8% answered "no," and 7.6% had difficulty answering. These figures point to a decided shortage of truthful and full information about the events in the Baltic. The illusion of high (approximately 50%) satisfaction noted above testifies merely that the information which is being supplied is entirely sufficient for half the respondents since they have no need on the basis of this information to resort in day-to-day life to any practical steps. The word "full" employed in the next question introduces a subconscious adjustment toward certain responsibility (albeit potential) of the respondent for his actions based on the information received. The response clearly characterizes the actual state of affairs. The 11.6% of those polled, moreover, who considered themselves "fully informed" evidently are such to a considerable extent. Study of their forms shows that the majority firmly and consistently express their viewpoint on all the questions asked and also that they derive information on the events in the Baltic from several sources, which are usually not dependent on one another (almost all the respondents of

this category, it transpired, are following events in the Baltic "particularly intently and constantly").

The next question, "From where do you get your information on the situation in the Baltic?", clarifies the picture (the sum total of responses is over 100% since indicating several sources was allowed). It turns out that information about the Baltic is obtained from the central press, television, and radio by 100% of those polled; from the Baltic press and radio by 7.7%; from Moscow newspapers, television, and radio by 8%; from publications of the independent Baltic public organizations 5.2%; from the Russian independent press ("samizdat") by 5.6%; from foreign newspapers by 12.5%; **from foreign radio broadcasts by 42%**; and from the accounts of relatives, friends, and acquaintances by 16%, and 8.2% of those polled cited personal impressions.

This provides food for thought, primarily about the inadequacy of the efforts of the Baltic governments and Baltic independent organizations in getting their viewpoint across to the consumer of information outside of the Baltic. Moscow, as the capital city, should be showing better indicators in this respect. In the provinces, to judge by everything, things are even worse. In addition, the category of those citing Baltic publications and radio practically coincides with the categories of persons reading the independent Baltic press and the Russian "samizdat." It was these people who showed, in the main, that they are following the events in the Baltic "particularly intently and constantly." The majority of these are representatives of the intelligentsia and students, and the "informals" were incorporated in this group of respondents almost to a man.

As a whole, these are quite worrying data. They testify to the **virtual monopoly of the central news media on coverage of events in the Baltic.** The sole source in any way capable of opposing them is foreign radio. One has the impression that it is to foreign radio that the Balts have entrusted their news presentation in Russia. This is a profoundly mistaken position, first, because the Baltic theme is not the lead topic in foreign radio broadcasts and, second, because the source itself is not stable (possibility of jamming). In practice the Baltic remains, in the event of exacerbation of the situation, unprotected against "black propaganda" on the part of the central mass media. There is just one way of rectifying the situation—**developing a news offensive today.** The necessity for this is also indicated by the fact that the number of respondents who have in the last 6 months changed their sympathy in respect of political self- determination for the Baltic to antipathy is twice as high as the number of respondents who effected the reverse evolution.

We leave it up to the consumer to evaluate the results of this study independently. We would like, however, to point in conclusion to the following, in our opinion, cardinal finding: **Quite a large percentage of those polled has a positive (or, at least, neutral) attitude toward the very idea of political self-determination for the Baltic, but at the same time, however, the vast majority views extremely skeptically the possibility of the embodiment of this idea in reality.**

[Signed]Independent Sociological Service, Moscow.

Belorussian Party's Sokolov on Perestroyka

PM0801121390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jan 90 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Feature under the rubric "The Party and Perestroyka: Toward the 28th CPSU Congress" comprising unattributed roundup of readers' letters; undated interview in Minsk with Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, by correspondent A. Simurov; and undated interview in Kostroma with V.N. Pletneva, a weaver at Kostroma V.I. Lenin Linen Combine, by correspondent Z. Bystrova: "The Central Committee Member. In the Present Revolutionary Times His Active, Principled Stance Is Very Important"]

[Excerpt] Our readers probably remember the selection of PRAVDA correspondents' interviews with members of the CPSU Central Committee published 20 November 1989—with K.N. Panov, production training foreman in Sormovo; L.D. Bryzga, milkmaid on the "Pamyat Ilicha" Collective Farm [kolkhoz] in Brest Oblast; A.M. Korolev, turner at the Urals Machine-Building Plant; and M.A. Golubeva, worker at the "Katun" State Livestock Breeding Center in Altay Kray. Their accounts of themselves and their work on the Central Committee and the bold way problems of the democratization of the party and the activity of the Central Committee apparatus were formulated elicited an appreciable public response.

"At long last we have heard well-founded, businesslike criticism even of the Central Committee, our top elected party organ, and uttered by its own members, not at a session, not in a strictly official situation, but on the pages of a newspaper, in the course of a developed debate," D. Polyanin, labor veteran and CPSU member since 1942 (Moscow City), writes. "It is significant that the first to be allowed to speak were not staff orators skilled at delivering speeches but representatives of workers and peasants in the forward positions of perestroyka. It is impossible to disagree with them: Labor enthusiasm is still not to be felt among us. Many people seem to be waiting for manna from heaven to descend on them or for some uncles to help our country to extricate itself from the situation in which it finds itself. The active stance of Central Committee members is very important in awakening initiative. Today, on the threshold of the party congress, I believe that each of them must seek to find his political face. We want to recognize them just as easily as we now recognize many USSR people's deputies."

"I ardently support the basic idea of Comrades Panov and Bryzga, members of the Central Committee: It is not quite worthy to figure at plenums as 'wedding guests'

who sometimes learn of decisions at the last minute," R. Staritskaya of Leningrad continues, as it were, the reflections begun. "These are truly revolutionary times. And it is shameful to keep quiet during a discussion of very important questions, as sometimes happened during the stagnation years. It is necessary to formulate party policy in a creative and militant way, providing a charge for more fruitful work by the apparatus of the Central Committee and its Politburo. In general I agree with Konstantin Nikolayevich Panov: The time has come to significantly enhance the status of the Central Committee member. Otherwise a worker elected to such an authoritative organ frequently gets lost among the professional politicians and, as I understood from the interviews, does not always dare to raise his voice. The apparatus decides a great deal for him, although you would think that it was called on to carry out the will of the elected organ. This situation can no longer be tolerated. We Communists are obliged to revive the Leninist norms of party life, party principle, and comradeship in full. Both 'down below' and at the very 'top.' Then, I am convinced, things will get moving."

"It seems to me that Central Committee members must set us ordinary Communists an example of courage and confidence in the ideals of socialism," M. Shaposhnikov, CPSU member since 1955 (Sverdlovsk City), believes. "And it would be a good thing for the party organizations which nominated them to take more frequent interest in the words and actions of their wards. Mutual control will help matters."

Debates are taking place everywhere now on the role and place of the CPSU in perestroyka and on the prestige of party members. In order to please the public, some eloquent speakers frequently resort to unworthy methods in polemics and blacken everything in succession without justification, juggling with facts and "snippets."

"But it is not this that alarms me," V. Polesskaya of Poltava shares her observations. "A strong current always forces some spume into a backwater. Something else makes me indignant: Where are the Communists, the party workers? Why, for example, are many of them keeping quiet or even indulging unhealthy sentiments? The silent ones include first secretaries of large party organizations and members of the Central Committee."

There is no denying that this is a serious rebuke. People want things to be definite, they want the truth. In their opinion, indiscriminate criticism of the party must receive a convincing rebuff, above all, from Communists endowed with high trust and power. Many people note approvingly that, as distinct from the First Congress of People's Deputies, at the second the voice of Communists, including Central Committee members, was heard more frequently. Their arguments, criticism, and analysis of very complex sociopolitical problems were more convincing and assertive.

"It is very important for USSR people's deputies to proceed from life itself," N. Demurina of Omsk concludes. "They must know the state of affairs locally. For example, why are railcars being unloaded badly? R. Khabibullin, first secretary of Bashkir Oblast CPSU Committee [obkom], gave a straight answer to this in his speech at the Congress. He pointed to the degradation of the railroad."

But not all criticism, even if it comes from the lips of a Central Committee member, serves perestroyka.

"I could not believe my eyes when I read D. Granin's article in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI recently, reporting an attempt by certain Central Committee members at the last plenum to blame M.S. Gorbachev, the initiator of perestroyka, for its failures," Muscovite V. Kudinov hastens to share his personal impression. "If this is true, the comrades are in error. Considered criticism must not be replaced by its subjective 'sharpness' or by conservatism of thinking. Of course, no one is insured against criticism. But at the same time it is important to remember about objectivity, party ethics, and party comradeship. And also about one's personal contribution to perestroyka."

Similar thoughts are shared by the majority of letter writers, who are sincerely concerned about the party's prestige.

"Glasnost and the democratization of party life at all levels constitute a curative wind of renewal," Sh. Abdullayev of Alma-Ata asserts. "Therefore I support the said proposal that it is necessary to include in the Politburo workers and kolkhoz members—from among those who know the value of bread, smelted metal, and coal extracted from the mine. But the intelligentsia should not be forgotten either. In short, I personally pin great hopes on the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress."

To judge from the mail and from calls to the editorial office, the proposals to amend the CPSU Statutes in the direction of developing democratic principles and enhancing the initiative of Communists also met with support. It is good, readers believe, that this question is of concern to Central Committee members too.

The fact that the responses also include angry views must not be ignored. For example, Yu. Frolov, a teacher from Volgograd City, is almost indignant:

"Just understand: People will start working creatively only when the green light is given to His Majesty Economic Interest. So the naked slogan of the stagnation period—'Do shock work'—is in no way different from today's slogan—'The success of perestroyka depends on each of us.' It is necessary, above all, to remove the braking mechanism, and this is possible, to use A. Korolev's expression, by using the 'clever heads.' It would be useful to ponder this seriously."

Well, this is why an impartial party discussion is held. In order not only to ponder but also, by objectively analyzing different views, to infer lessons from mistakes and draw correct conclusions.

A whole spectrum of opinions... For example, N. Semenov, R. Korbut, and Z. Prokopova drew attention to the account of M. Golubeva, milkmaid and Central Committee member, to the effect that, just like others, she too has to stand in line for imported washing powder and soap.

"We believe her," they conclude. "She is a conscientious worker and has not been spoiled by benefits. But have all Central Committee members, particularly those holding responsible posts, really been completely deprived of privileges? These should probably, nonetheless, be within reasonable limits, but clarity is needed in this matter."

The argument over privileges is an old one, and sometimes too heated. Nevertheless, it is hard not to admit that people are not so much campaigning against benefits for meritorious working people as wanting definiteness and truth in everything. The thoughts of the Central Committee members convince us once again how great the people's trust in them is and how people rely on them in work on cleansing our moral atmosphere of everything that distorts the appearance of the genuine Communist. Readers are sure that the party's renewal will depend on the activity of Central Committee members under the historically new conditions and on their firm stance in achieving the set tasks. This is why they want to know the opinion of the party's plenipotentiaries on literally all vital problems.

Today we have asked members of the Central Committee—Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, and Hero of Socialist Labor V.N. Pletneva, weaver at Kostroma V.I. Lenin Linen Combine—to answer many acute questions.

Minsk—There was hardly time to fit in this meeting. Literally every minute of every hour is mapped out for Yefrem Yevseyevich. Therefore, without beating about the bush, I at once asked my interlocutor what he understands by the concept of being a working member of the CPSU Central Committee and an expresser of the interests of Communists. And further. What are the duties of a Central Committee member under the new conditions, and how do they "tally" with responsibility to the party organization in which he works?

[Sokolov] There simply must not be "nonworking" members of the CPSU Central Committee. It is unworthy of us all to have in the top echelon of the party leadership people who carry out their duties in a formal manner. I believe that the democracy and glasnost which are becoming established in the party totally rule out the question of "extras" in any elected organ. On the contrary, it is a question of a fundamentally different level of Communists' political activeness, of the substance of all party work, and of revealing the new potential of the CPSU as the leader of the transformations in society which will lead us toward a new quality of political, social, and spiritual life.

Incidentally, I do not like at all this way of formulating the question: member of the CPSU Central Committee "expressing the interests of Communists." It goes without saying that a real Communist must express the interests both of the party and of the whole people or, at least, of their progressive majority. A Communist today rejects class narrowness, is able to see society in the dynamics of all its sometimes opposing interests, and is able to influence processes in the direction of expanding the potential of socialism.

But there are, of course, also differences in the actual position of an "ordinary" party member and a member of the CPSU Central Committee endowed with the party collective's special trust. There is enhanced responsibility for any matter, exactingness toward his own personal qualities, and the capacity for self-betterment. And, most importantly, devotion to the people's interests backed up by militancy and intolerance of any manifestations of red tape.

It is the duty of a CPSU Central Committee member to take a very active and very enterprising part in posing and resolving problems of developing and renewing the country and the party. But—and this is no less important—he pursues a corresponding line in the party organization from which he was elected. That is, he not only passes on the will of Communists from below to above but is also called upon, by interpreting decisions synthesized up above, to promote their realization down below.

In my opinion, the new role of CPSU Central Committee members will also take relations between members of the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo to a new level. It is no simple task to interpret the Politburo's line on specific measures but, as I understand it, it is now being facilitated somewhat by the expanding independence of regional formations, which bear the chief responsibility for the state of affairs in their own locality.

[Simurov] Through which forms of party work have you managed best of all to fulfill an active role as a Central Committee member? What has hindered you? What, in your view, must be changed and restructured here?

[Sokolov] I do not think it is possible to say with accuracy: I use these forms and methods as a member of the CPSU Central Committee, these as first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, and these as a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In all roles you deal with people and labor collectives, and the arsenal of means of party work is large. And which means is in greater demand depends on the specific situation.

I always analyze very carefully diverse statistics, sociological research materials, working people's letters, and other signals and reports from the provinces. To make a correct assessment not only of the political and economic

but also the moral and psychological situation in the region and the collective and to formulate a substantiated decision. Acting spontaneously, it would be naive to count on the constructiveness, the participation, and the consolidation of various forces in resolving urgent problems.

I follow the second rule in an equally principled manner: to visit labor collectives regularly. I recently spent several days in Brest and Vitebsk Oblasts and visited my voters. This was essentially a reporting back, a consultation, and a familiarization with experience.

I consider it my duty both as a member of the CPSU Central Committee and as leader of the republic party organization to appear regularly in print. Today, I will state bluntly, excessive silence on the part of party, soviet, and other workers is harmful to both the party and the state.

People sometimes rebuke me, saying: There are elements of conservatism within you, Sokolov. There are. And moreover, there must be. It was long ago remarked that whoever was not a maximalist in his youth did not have a heart, and whoever has not become a conservative by his mature years does not have a mind. I advocate reasonable, progressive conservatism which, as is known, fulfills a kind of protective function in society and does not give innovations for innovations' sake or wholesale nihilism an opportunity to assert themselves.

Now about the second part of the question. I am hindered by the same thing as my comrades in the party—the fact that the processes taking place within it are lagging behind those within society. Many cadres still cling quite tenaciously to the habit of waiting for instructions from above and relying on ready-made prescriptions for all our social ills. This is a losing stance, particularly now that we are getting really close to the elections to the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet and to local soviets of people's deputies. As a member of the CPSU Central Committee I see it as one of my chief tasks to ensure that party organizations go ahead and lead labor collectives behind them.

[Simurov] The elected organ and the apparatus... There is probably no more complex form of relations in the party milieu now. What do you see as the optimum model for these relations at all levels?

[Sokolov] With your question you are treading on the "painful corn" of the apparatus worker of any party committee. How has he appeared in the eyes of readers through the recent endeavors of the press? At first, as a representative of the stratum which, to use your own newspaper's expression, sways between the CPSU Central Committee and the working class—we know not how, we know not why, we know not where. Then he turned into a bureaucrat, a partycrat....

Those who defame apparatchiks and intimidate the people with them have something quite different in mind—the elected organ. For we all know that its militancy and its party influence on labor collectives largely depend on the organizational potential, the intellectual muscle, and the moral "hue" of the apparatus. I disagree with those who, while rightfully allocating to the elected organ a place on the top of the mountain, let the apparatus down into the ravine...

[Simurov] But there are also many opposite examples, where the apparatus seeks to subordinate the elected organ to itself and, as it were, to rise above it...

[Sokolov] Also, a dangerous extreme. Ideally, these relations are seen as follows: The apparatus is a qualified, persistent, committed helper in implementing the elected organ's decisions. I am convinced that the higher party committee must set an example.

Let us take the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. Many good changes have appeared in its work recently. But we in the provinces would like them to proceed more quickly and certain senior officials of the Central Committee apparatus not to try to explain in their own way or even touch up decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat. Those who are fond of such explanations sometimes do not let people take a single step so as not to reveal their demands. Even in matters which are entirely within the competence of local party links. Now that more initiative, creativity, and innovation are required of every party committee, such tutelage or diktat is inadmissible and harmful.

Why, for example, can a republic or oblast party organization not be trusted to decide for itself whom to elect as members of the Central Committee or the obkom? Why must the posts of Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee department heads, deputy chairmen of the republic Council of Ministers, and first secretaries of oblast committees of the Lenin Communist Youth League not be filled without the agreement of the CPSU Central Committee or, more accurately, its apparatus? There are 146 posts of leading Belorussian workers on the CPSU Central Committee schedule today. In my own opinion, there should not be more than 10 of them.

Please understand me correctly: I do not advocate weakening the role of the central apparatus, and I am opposed to an inspectorial approach to the matter. I favor an apparatus whose workers are capable of helping, advising, and supporting a useful initiative. And this means I favor mutual efficiency in work.

As for the prestige of elected party organs, I will say, not afraid of appearing trite, that there is only one way here—action.

[Simurov] The party is being criticized for the administrative-edict style introduced into the economy. What are you doing, as a member of the CPSU Central Committee, to overcome this more quickly in party committees?

[Sokolov] My viewpoint—and I am endeavoring to convey it to my comrades in the party and at work—is

this: The administrative-edict method must be decisively rejected. But what then? The economic solutions have not yet started working. What is more, a culture of relations among economically independent (relatively, of course) enterprises has not taken shape. The very first year of work following the adoption of the law on the enterprise has produced many manifestations of group egoism. Everyone seeks to pull the blanket over himself. And this is the result: If something benefits a specific labor collective, it does not benefit society.

I am convinced that a different method is needed in the present transitional period, when economic levers are still only blazing their trail. For myself, I call it the directive-economic method, that is, combining democratic discussion, economic accountability, and conscious executive discipline. I will use the following example to explain my idea.

Today the republic produces consumer products worth R2.19 per ruble of the wages fund. But this is as a whole. There are enterprises which fail to produce output worth even R1, although there is potential for growth. How can they be made to face up to this problem? Edicts and orders are not appropriate. But something else is appropriate—conviction backed up by economic accountability and showing the benefits which will accrue to the republic's inhabitants and, thus, to the members of these enterprises' labor collectives.

[Simurov] Today much is being said at all levels about Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. What is your personal viewpoint on this problem?

[Sokolov] The party's leading role cannot be restrained by means of a constitutional article. Society is aware of it as a result of specific and, let us say so clearly, henceforth only successful and profitable actions. Actions to organize the people's forces so as to achieve the maximum possible political, social, economic, and cultural effect under the present conditions.

But the question of Article 6 has its own special aspect in the present political situation. Persons and groups who insist on repealing it willy-nilly wish to open the doors to a multiparty system—which again, under the present conditions, would only exacerbate destructive trends on the social, national, and other planes. Therefore I personally would prefer to resolve this question in the context of a revision of the entire USSR Constitution.

What is far more important to us all now is that the party, which intends to conduct a dialogue with all public forces that stand on a platform of democratic, humanist socialism, must be all the more tolerant of dissidence within its ranks. We cannot permit a split, using the slogans of perestroyka as an ax to cut some people off in one direction and others in another direction and ranking some people among the supporters of perestroyka and others among its opponents. We will avoid new destructive distortions if we constantly analyze the arguments both of one wing and of the other, striving for the firm fulfillment of decisions adopted by the majority.

Without such an approach, in my opinion, we cannot preserve the international nature of our party, which was and still is a precondition of its successful political activity. Adhering to the equality of the nations means filling internationalism with the right of every people to the sovereignty of its culture and spiritual makeup within the framework of a socialist choice. The party must stand guard over the freedom of all nations, not permitting the rights of a single one of them to be infringed.

The new discipline which, I hope, is beginning to be asserted in the party will be based both on every Communist's practical influence on the formulation of the policy of the nearest elected organ and on the shaping of policy by the upper echelons of the party leadership. The accountability and subordination of every elected organ must become a natural and unconditional norm of internal party life. It is these questions that are undoubtedly more important to all of us than the essentially procedural question of Article 6, which is raised mainly by the party's ill-wishers, by supporters of our society's capitalization, and by circles that engage in political intrigue. [Passage omitted]

New Belorussian Weekly Published

LD0801222690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Summary] The inhabitants of Belorussia have received the first edition of a new mass circulation publication, the news and discussion weekly SEM DNEY [Seven Days]. It is published by the Belorussian telegraph agency and the Information Department of the republican Council of Ministers. It has a print-run of 100,000 and is printed in Belorussian and in Russian.

Ukraine Patriarch on Catholic 'Extremist Actions'

LD0801153990 Kiev in Ukrainian to North America 2200 GMT 6 Jan 90

[Christmas Message from Metropolitan Filaret, Patriarchial Exarch of all Ukraine—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] It would seem that with the advent of Christ who brought peace and love to this earth, there would be no place for human anger. For 2 weeks now Archbishop Makariy of Ivano-Frankovsk and Kolomiya has been on hunger strike. He is protesting against the seizure of his cathedral by Catholics of the Eastern rite. Unfortunately, this is not the only instance of extremist actions by Catholics.

On 29 October they forcefully seized the Transfiguration Cathedral in Lvov. After a clash with the invaders, the priest Bachalo died outside his temple. After witnessing the seizure of the Transfiguration Church the priest

Stehniy had a heart attack and is now in hospital. Abbot Serafim, superior of the Transfiguration Monastery in Goshev, Ivano-Frankovsk oblast, was knifed twice.

We are indignant over this unlawfulness and untruth. We state that all this is base and dishonest, especially when it concerns a Christian, that is, a man who claims his origins to be in higher spiritual spheres. [passage ommited]

Moldavians Demand Parts of Romania

LD0801225890 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2225 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, Jan 8 (TANJUG)—A rally was held in Kishinev, the capital of the Soviet Republic of Moldavia Kishinev bordering with Romania, demanding the annexation of some parts of the Republic of Romania. [sentence as received]

The demonstrators said that people should not trust the local leadership because it was, allegedly, appointed by Moscow. They also demanded the opening of the Moldavian-Romanian border.

It has been learned that many similar rallies have been held in Moldavia recently and all expressed the same demands.

Moldavia has an area of around 33,000 square kilometers and a population of around four million. It became a part of the Soviet Union in 1940.

Former Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu had held the Moldavian question open. The new Romanian leadership, during the recent talks with Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, agreed that both sides do everything to simplify the procedure of meetings of people in the border regions, in keeping with the Helsinki principles on the inviolability of borders in Europe.

Renewed Tension in Georgia Reported; 1 Killed

AU0801135090 Paris AFP in English 1324 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow, Jan 8 (AFP)—An explosive device thrown into a house in Georgia on Sunday killed a man inside, the Popular Front of southern Ossetia said in a telephone conversation to Moscow on Monday.

The victim, whose name was given as Khinchalashvili, came from the south Ossetian autonomous region and his house stood between Stalin's birthplace, Gori, and the region's capital, Tskhinvali, the Front said.

He was killed "during an attack by unknown people who threw an explosive device inside", the Front said.

Meanwhile, the GRUZINFORM PRESS AGENCY, contacted by telephone at Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, said that "a nine-month-old baby, with a Georgian father and a mother from Ossetia, was executed by two gunshots in front of the parents by masked individuals during the night of January 3", in a village in the autonomous region not far from Tskhinvali.

The journalist said: "Nearly all the Georgian children in the region have been evacuated." He said that people living in Georgian villages in the autonomous region had decided to protect themselves by organising guard duty throughout the day and night.

In addition, 160 people had gone to Tbilisi "to seek help", he added.

Four people from Ossetia who had been arrested, had been released for lack of evidence, the correspondent said, adding that the republic's Interior Minister had said on television that the investigation was being continued.

The Popular Front for southern Ossetia said that a blockade of Tskhinvali had continued since "the events of November 23", when Georgian nationalists went to Tskhinvali to protest against a vote of attachment to Ossetia by the local regional council.

Ossetia is an autonomous republic which falls within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Russia. It is situated in the Caucasus, a pivotal and mountainous region of the Soviet Union, considered the meeting point between Europe and Asia.

The northern part of Ossetia has a population of 600,000, comprising Ossetians, Russians, Armenians, Georgians and Ukranians.

The south Ossetian autonomous region, included in the Republic of Georgia, has 100,000 inhabitants, of whom 66 percent are Ossetians, and 29 percent Georgians. Slightly more than one third of them live in Tskhinvali.

Ossetia was annexed by the Russian Empire after a victorious war against Turkey in the 18th century.

The Bolshevik and White Russian forces fought over it in 1919 and 1920. Subsequently the southern part was attached to the Republic of Georgia, and the northern part to the Republic of Russia, the biggest of the 15 republics in the Soviet Union.

Armenian Supreme Soviet Resumes Session

NC0901112090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1000 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Dear listeners, the 11th session of the 11th convocation of the Supreme Soviet of Soviet Armenia resumed its deliberations today at Stepan Shaumyan Hall with the participation of the representatives of the National Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Samson Tonoyan, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, opened the joint session.

The deputies received with satisfaction the statement by Grant Voskanyan, chairman of the presidium of the

republic's Supreme Soviet, that the production of poisonous materials at the Nairit scientific-production association was terminated as of 1 January.

The following were among the USSR and Armenian people's deputies who participated in the debate on the issues under consideration: Garen Simonyan, Zori Balayan, Genrikh Igityan, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Rafael Kazaryan, Sos Sarkisyan, and Boris Dadamyan.

The session of the republic's Supreme Soviet is continuing its deliberations.

Azerbaijan Party Aktiv Meets 8 Jan

Girenko Address

LD0801200790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] [Announcer] A party aktiv session was held in Baku today at the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party. It discussed topical questions concerning the activity of the republic's party organizations. Special attention was given to problems of socioeconomic development, party ideological work, and interethnic relations. In particular there was discussion of questions connected with events in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and in Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Speaking at the meeting was Andrey Nikolayevich Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He said, among other things:

[Begin Girenko recording] Perestroyka, democratization, and glasnost have given an unprecedented boost to the growth of ethnic awareness. This is accompanied also by conflict when different views confront one another. It creates new situations in all ideological work. It demands of each of us an ability to conduct both a scientific and conventional debate, to argue things out, and convince and prove. This is considerably more difficult than anything that went before, when things were very simple; rulings were given, and any opponent was labelled either nationalist or troublemaker. There can be one conclusion from this statement: The restoration of the historical truth about all peoples, including the Azerbaijan people, and the removal of the so-called blank spots, must become our common party cause.

Obviously, damage in the social sphere in the multiethnic environment affects people's psychology. Not infrequently the blame for one's own pain is shifted onto another people. Impatience to overcome the deformations of socioeconomic development more quickly is understandable. As a result, powerful social pressure on the bodies of power and on our party is created. In the final analysis we must realize more clearly that now a battle for people's minds is in progress, a battle for power.

The events of the recent past convincingly show the need for the party to make itself known, in a new way and out loud, as the party of the working class and the defender of the interests of all peoples. A society which is being renewed needs also a new, renewed party. New is not right; I used the wrong word. Today, every condition has been created, or should be, including conditions under the rules, for fearless confrontation of views, for putting forward alternatives, for the preservation of unity on fundamental questions and the strategic aims of our party.

You know that the 28th CPSU Congress has been brought forward. The platform of the CSPU is now being drafted. Obviously, there is a need to adopt new rules. At the end of January a Central Committee Plenum will be held. It will examine the platform of the party for the congress, and we will all take an active part in discussing and perfecting that platform. But even now, without waiting for the congress, we must make the life of the primary party organizations full-blooded and suited to the acuteness of the problems, to people's desires and expectations; especially at the level of the primary party organizations. I wish to appeal to the party leaders of rayons, towns, republics; the CPSU Central Committee should be told: We must do everything possible in order that the labor collective, the primary link, the primary party organization, should have a really active life. Only then will we be able to restructure the party and achieve a solution of all the tasks of perestroyka. [end recording]

'Contemporary Questions' Examined

NC0901084690 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] The republic's party aktivs met at the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee on 8 January. Contemporary questions about the work of the republic's party organization were examined. Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, opened the meeting.

Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, addressed the convocation. Ismailov, first secretary of the Sumgait city party committee; Anar, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Union of Writers; Rizayeva, member of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Auditing Commission; (?Gasanov), secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee; Salayev, president of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences; (?Vladimov), an operator affiliated with Azerneft; Mirza Ibragimov, a popular writer; Yusif-zade, chief of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers Interethnic Relations Department; [name indistinct], chairman of the Azerbaijan Chambers of Commerce and Industry; and Akhundov, chief of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Party Control Department, also addressed the covocation. Girenko answered questions from the participants of the meeting. Meanwhile, Abdul-Rakhman Vezirov also addressed the meeting.

Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, participated in the work of the convocation.

Aktiv on Border Situation

PM0901095790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

["From a Position of Reason, Restraint, and Respect for Law"]

[Text] Topical questions of the activities of the republic's party organization were examined here today at the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Party Aktiv session.

Taking part in the conference were A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet; and senior workers of the CPSU Central Committee and of the country's law enforcement bodies.

Acute questions came up at the conference concerning how it could happen that right here in Azerbaijan one of the sacred things most respected among all peoples—the USSR state border—was violated. The questions are not simple, but require an answer and a principled assessment. Preliminary appraisals of this kind have already been given by both party and soviet bodies of the republic. Condemning what has happened on the border, they noted that every person must strictly follow the spirit and the letter of the law. but deeper conclusions from everything that has happened in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] remain to be drawn by every Communist of the republic and every party organization, and they must define their positions on the path of perestroyka clearly and in a principled fashion.

At the same time, something else was stressed at the aktiv's conference, namely that probably the main thing in the activity of party committees and soviet organs today is first and foremost to sort out why so many issues which have been worrying people and affecting their feelings and economic requirements have not been tackled for so long.

The widest circle of questions concerning the social and political situation in the republic, economic, legal, and moral aspects, and perestroyka, which is gathering momentum, was touched upon in the speeches at the conference.

A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made a report at the conference on the results of his visit to the Nakhichevan ASSR and numerous meetings with labor collectives and the party and Soviet aktiv in the localities.

In particular, he noted that the period which the country is going through today is truly critical. Either we resolve the problems of the economic and political reform or we will roll backwards in our developments. This was stressed with the utmost certainty at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies and at the latest plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. The republic's party organization is seeking new approaches to leading the development of the social and economic sphere. Bearing in mind the problems that have accumulated, priority areas of activity have been defined and appropriate specific programs have been worked out. There are some positive results, too, for example, amounts of housing construction are growing. Thus more than 10 million square meters of housing have been commissioned in the republic since the start of the 5-year plan period, which is 1.3 times more than during the whole of the last 5-year plan period. Much has been done in implementation of the "health," "ecology," "job placement," and "food" programs. At the same time, the state of affairs in the republic's economy and social sphere remains tense. Deformations in the structure of production and lack of balance in labor resources persist.

A considerable reduction in production volumes has been allowed to occur, and a tangible blow has been struck at the well-being of the people as a result of the aggravation of the sociopolitical situation in the region, strikes, hold-ups in the work of the railways, and slackening of labor discipline.

The implementation of a radical economic reform and new effective programs to develop backward rayons, to carry out the social reconstruction of villages, and to resolve problems of the rational distribution of forces and the empolyment of the population must become one of the key areas in the activity of party and soviet bodies in the republic, Comrade A.N. Girenko stressed.

It was repeatedly noted during a conversation at the conference that at the forefront of social and interethnic tension is not only the lack of balance in the economy, but also questions of the republic's sovereignty. The fact that Narogno-Karabakh problems are unsolved and that there are refugees from Armenia give rise to unhealthy reaction. There was sharp criticism of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers in a number of speeches.

In his speech, the CPSU Central Committee secretary emphasized that the party's position regarding these questions is as clear as can be: The state sovereignty of the republic, the filling of our federation with new content, is something that should ensure economic and political independence of each union and autonomous republic, oblast and kray, and equal rights of citizens and peoples. At the same time the party is resolutely rising up against separatism, no matter what sophisticated slogans and promises of "manna from heaven" are used to cover up for it and irrespective of what garb of defender of interests it sees fit to don.

Speaking about the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region [NKAO], A.N. Girenko noted that lawlessness and violence have become a serious obstacle on the way to getting out of the situation that has arisen. The USSR Supreme Soviet resolution, "On measures to return the situation in the NKAO to normal," speaks in definite terms about the intolerability of encroachment

on the sovereign rights of the Azerbaijan SSR or on its territorial integrity and says that all issues concerning Nagorno-Karabakh must unfailingly be tackled with account for the interests of all people living in the oblast. The resolution of the problems of the NKAO will be implemented in the framework of a constitutional settlement. In accordance with this resolution, a republican organizational committee for the NKAO has been formed, the duties of which involve returning the situation back to normal together with the union monitoring-observation commission, harmonizing economic and cultural life in the oblast, restoring the constitutional organs of authority and government, and ensuring protection for the rights of citizens and a guarantee of security.

There is very difficult work ahead, which demands the maximum flexibility, restraint, and calm, and, at the same time, adherence to principle and consistency. Here one must proceed from the fact that a normalization and a sensible solution of the problems can only be envisaged as the fruit of joint efforts by Azerbaijanis and Armenians of the region.

Many speeches stressed the idea of the need to heighten party discipline everywhere and to guarantee law and order in the republic.

Many of those who spoke at the conference noted that today we need new forms of Communists' ideological work among the masses and that there is a need to really study the art of political struggle. Parties have always acted as instruments in the struggle for power, as the expression of the political will and aspirations of various classes, social groups, and forces. Events of late have shown convincingly the need for the CPSU to make itself known in a new way and in full voice as the party of the working class, the defender of the interests of the people. This is particularly topical before the elections to republican and local soviets of people's deputies, which will undoubtedly bring forth a fresh eruption of politicization of the masses.

A.Kh. Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, spoke at the conference.

Nishanov, Nikiforov on Azeri Border Situation

LD0801225290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2005 GMT 8 Jan 90

["Topical Interview" program, interview with Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet; and Valentin Mikhaylovich Nikiforov, deputy USSR foreign minister; by correspondent Aleksandr Barkhatov; time and place not given; video shows interviewer and interviewees seated around a table—recorded]

[Text] [Barkhatov] Rafik Nishanovich, of course you have just been on the border, it is still hot material for you, but all the same, what is your first analysis, what is the result of your trip, could you speak about this?

[Nishanov] Well, Comrades Revenko, Vezirov, other leading workers, and myself visited the town of Nakhichevan. We went to Ilyichevskiy and Dzhulfinskiy Rayons and a number of others. We participated in meetings of many thousands of people and in group conversations. We visited enterprises, establishments, and kolkhozes, and we talked to people there at the workplace, as well. All of them condemn the enormities and the breaches of law and order that have taken place. Problems have been accumulating. They have been accumulating over many years. There are such sectors where ancient monuments have ended up in the barrier zone, for example, in Dzhulfinskiy rayon, the interesting ancient monument (Ghulistam).

[Barkhatov] And access to it was, of course, restricted.

[Nishanov] Yes, access to it was restricted. People want to visit this monument. Well, to get to it, they absolutely had to go to the border post, ask for permission and get that for a restricted time. At a neighboring border post, a cemetery ended up in the barrier zone. In order to bury their deceased relatives, people there—since the cemetery is closed off—either seek permission—they have to get that from the commander at the border post—or they take the deceased tens of kilometers to another cemetery. In many places, and this means tens of thousands of hectares, there is pasture, there is farmland suitable for tilling, for growing food. In addition to this, people also had the dissatisfaction that many residents of Nakhichevan have their relatives in Iranian Azarbayjan. Naturally, they want to have contact with them. But in order to get there to visit a relative, they spend nearly a month going through the formalities.

[Barkhatov] That is annoying, too, of course.

[Nishanov] That, too, served as a definite aggravation.

[Barkhatov] But have they not thought about these issues before?

[Nishanov] Unfortunately, they have been resolving things temporarily, but not for the long term. And individual extremist elements took advantage of this and egged on young people to these actions. The comrades and I visited the border posts. We conversed with the border guards. We even visited the sections where certain of the installations have been destroyed. People really are sorry now, all of them. They themselves condemn it, but at the same time, there are sectors which could certainly be revised, without any harm.

[Barkhatov] But please tell me, is this the whole root of everything that has happened, that is, the form of spontaneous protest that it all came out in? Just some trivial, annoying foul- ups that could have been settled long ago?

[Nishanov] Well, now, thanks to democratization and glasnost, we have various groups for assistance to the processes of perestroyka in operation, and healthy movements which take place in the restructuring process, and we welcome this. But yesterday's analysis showed there

are some groups which sometimes try to provoke the people to extremist actions, to impatience, and this leads to certain complications. I would say that if we analyze things on the whole, there are both forces which hamper perestroyka as conservatives, and there are also forces which hinder perestroyka by whipping up the events. I would say that certain actions by these extremist forces, in fact, strengthen the position of the conservative forces. It seems to me that both sets of people have to perceive these demands and slogans of perestroyka with the right understanding, and not just be bearers of the slogans, but take a practical, concrete part in these restructuring processes. If these processes were to proceed normally in Nakhichevan as well, then they would gain from perestroyka. There is a lot to be done there, a lot of unsolved economic and social tasks, a lot of problems in the area of doing educative work, and spiritual development.

[Barkhatov] Isn't it possible to regard this problem, so to speak, this spontaneous protest, as being tied in, say, in some way with the situation surrounding Nagorno Karabakh? Is it worth approaching this manifestation in that context or not?

[Nishanov] I do not think that there is a direct link here with Nagorno Karabakh, although that subject was touched upon in the questions and statements people made. But Nagorno Karabakh is also at the center of attention of the CPSU Central Committee and of the USSR Supreme Soviet now. Only yesterday a report was published to the effect that the USSR Supreme Soviet had appointed Comrade Foteyev as chairman of the observation commission. In the next few days Comrade Foteyev will arrive there with his group and we too intend to go to Stepanakert and deal with those issues. We have been noting here at meetings, and when we are in Stepanakert we will stress that we want these two fraternal peoples, the Armenian and the Azerbaijani peoples, who have lived here together and alongside each other for centuries, who for centuries have not simply lived together but who have even had ties of kinship, who have jointly tilled the fields, who have worked together in enterprises and establishments—half a millioni Azerbaijanis have lived in Armenia and even more Armenians have been living in Azerbaijan. We want to restore these goodneighborly relations and to hope the local party and soviet bodies so that these bonds of friendship are restored. Both the Armenian people and the Azerbaijan people, both perestroyka and all the peoples of the Soviet Union as a whole will win from this.

[Barkhatov] Thank you. But now a question for you [turning toward Nikiforov]. In all situations, naturally, where the situation has touched upon the frontier of the Soviet Union, first and foremost the Foreign Ministry, the central Foreign Ministry of the USSR, so to speak, has an interest in a settlement of these problems and issues here. But, nevertheless, in saying that a very great deal depends upon Moscow, no doubt a very great deal also depends upon the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan?

[Nikiforov] For a very long time people living along the frontier had no opportunity to make contact, although it is true that there were few enquiries about doing so. I found out that last year, say, there was only one official application, based on ties of kinship, in that direction with Iran. But as we have said, of course, people have many such questions inside them. They had not been raised officially because solving them was fairly complicated. And now the question is to make simpler the whole issue of the formalities, the crossing of the frontier, and family ties.

[Barkhatov] If it used to be a matter of months, how much time will suffice now?

[Nikiforov] It can be done straight away.

[Nishanov] Yes.

[Nikiforov] This, that is the formalities—if it concerns citizens who live in the frontier zone—this can be done freely, having the appropriate documents for this which will be prepared in advance.

[Barkhatov] Tell us this, at meetings here which took place in some confusion one also heard it said that this frontier, that the problems surrounding this frontier, allegedly came into being over the past few decades. But as far as one knows from history the frontier itself made its appearance precisely in the form in which it now exists at least 160 years ago.

[Nikiforov] Frontiers come into being historically. Here I would support what you say, and this is the most sensitive place in relations between states. One has to be very responsible, therefore, in one's approach to this. And I would like to stress this here, too. I would not, therefore, be sympathetic toward or support this action on our frontier by Soviet people. Changing the frontier is impermissible. That is what it amounts to.

[Barkhatov] Rafik Nishanovich, do excuse me, I have another question for you. I understand that the investigation will dot many of the i's, but nevertheless what is the approximate cost of the damage cause by this action?

[Nishanov] Here, indeed, I would like to call for caution in making assessments.

[Barkhatov] There are very many rumors.

[Nishanov] Yes, I personally covered dozens of kilometers. Frontier posts 165, 166, 167, and further. Of course, there is no destruction running into millions of that kind. But outrages on the frontier are something that cannot be allowed, even it if it is put at R 100,000. So the law enforcement bodies are carrying out an investigation. It's up to us, the judicial bodies, as they say. Let them establish who is guilty and punish them. It's up to us to explain to people the processes of perestroyka correctly and to ask them to participate in them in a practical form rather than by holding mass meetings and using extremist slogans. I believe that this is what the Soviet people expect. Thank you.

[Barkhatov] Thank you very much for the talk, thank you.

KGB Briefing on Azerbaijan Border Situation

90US0376A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 1, 6-12 Jan 90 p 8

[Article: "In the USSR KGB Press Center"]

[Text] A briefing on the situation in Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] (Azerbaijan SSR) was given in the USSR KGB press center. Lieutenant General N. Britvin, member of the Military Council and chief of USSR KGB Border Troops, spoke to the journalists.

The question about opening the border for free contacts with Iran, he reported, was raised back in November of 1989 at meetings in Baku, Nakhichevan, and Lenkoran. Under opening of borders, the People's Front of Azerbaijan (NFA) first and foremost means—the elimination of security systems and the organization of simplified border crossing checkpoints. Border authorities cannot agree with such a position because it would result in a violation of the "border system," which is actually a legal norm coordinated with the other side. Questions concerning such checkpoints (as on the western borders) are decided by the USSR Council of Ministers with the mutual consent of the other side.

During the period from 4 to 19 December, citizens of Nakhichevan and those who arrived from other Azerbaijan cities conducted a mass showing on the border, which was accompanied by the destruction of engineering installations. On 23 December, Colonel Zhukov, commander of the border detachment, received an ultimatum by letter with a demand to submit to the decisions of the NFA. Colonel Zhukov appeared on local television with a warning that any aggressive actions on the part of the civilian population would be suppressed decisively. According to USSR KGB data, more than 300 bottles containing a flammable mixture and hunting weapons turned up in the border zone by 31 December. A total of 9,000 people participated in the disturbances. Tents were set up along the border in which the disturbances' participants were quartered. On the eve of the period set by the ultimatum (31 December), retired General Nasirov appeared on television and called for the people to remain calm.

All night long, until 0600, a joint meeting took place in Nakhichevan, to which local authorities invited NFA leaders and USSR People's Deputies. Despite this, an agreement was not reached, and by 1300 on 31 December the disturbances encompassed 137 km of the Soviet-Iranian border. The Araks River, along which the border runs, is easily crossed, which one person took advantage of.

About 800 persons took part in the disturbances on the Iranian side. The staff of the border commissariat of Iran is troubled by these events. In the words of Lieutenant General Britvin, there were no casualties, other than one unidentified corpse.

Families of the border guards are being evacuated. Taking into account the fact that the NFA leaders do not intend to make concessions, the border authorities, in the general's words, retain the right to adopt preventive measures, and, in the event of necessity, to bring in additional forces. The destruction of the engineering installations is estimated at R3 million. The situation on the border remains tense.

Girenko, Nishanov Visit Baku Refinery

NC0901083790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 7 Jan 90

[Text] Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Girenko, and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities Nishanov are in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. Girenko, Nishanov, and Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, visited the new Lenin refinery in Baku. They held talks with the operators affiliated with section 17 of the first production unit.

Girenko, Nishanov, and Vezirov answered workers' questions. During their talks, which had the characteristics of a businesslike dialogue, the refinery workers requested that tension be removed in our republic and the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh be settled as soon as possible. They also demanded that the central government categorically prevent the neighboring republic [Armenian SSR] from violating Azerbaijan's sovereignty.

Meanwhile, it was noted that the collective is angry about the [word indistinct] central television and PRAVDA's lack of objectivity in covering the incidents on the USSR-Iran border in Nakhichevan and by the [words indistinct] in the eastern part of the country.

Girenko, Nishanov, and Vezirov explained the practical measures that have been put into effect to resolve the problems quickly which have made the oil workers feel uneasy and wished to the collective success in 1990.

Muslim Mamedov, first secretary of the Baku city party committee, and V. Guseynov, chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Committee for State Security, attended the meeting.

Azerbaijanis' Meet With Iranian Relatives

NC0901092090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Report by AZERINFORM correspondent Mirzayev from Nakhichevan]

[Text] Despite the deep cold, hundreds of citizens from (?Culpa) and (?Babest) Rayons and from Nakhichevan city gathered near the Aras River close to (?Mihren)

village in (?Babest) Rayon on Sunday night to meet relatives and friends who live in neighboring Iran. The meeting, which lasted for more than 2 hours, was organized with the consent of the governments of the two countries. The representatives of local government organs, [word indistinct] organs, and unofficial groups participated in the meeting. The border guards in the region provided [word indistinct] and assistance to the people.

In a statement to an AZERINFORM correspondent, Lieutenant Colonel Dugayev, who is affiliated with the Directorate of the Transcaucasus Border Guards, stressed that the meeting was held in a peaceful atmosphere. He added: The border guards have not seen any intoxicated people or [words indistinct] among the residents of the region that would disturb the peace during the incidents that took place between 31 December and 2 January. Nor are any such people to be seen now.

Meanwhile, Miri Mamedov, who is 85 and a resident of Megri town in (?Babest) Rayon, said: I saw my sister at last. Fate separated us in 1916 and we had not seen each other since. I also met my sister's children, who are grown up, and other relatives. This is a very happy day for me.

Similar meetings took place near Il'ichevskiy Rayon's (?Shahbasti) and (?Culpa) villages and near Ordubad. Thanks to [word indistinct] and the reconstruction policy, people were able to meet relatives and friends whom they had not seen for 70 years.

Azerbaijan's Mutalibov Ends Visit to Istanbul

NC0901085490 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Reports from Istanbul note that Ayaz Mutalibov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers, has met with representatives of Turkish business circles. Nihat Celpi, chairman of the Turkey-USSR cooperation committee, warmly welcomed Mutalibov and the members of the delegation accompanying him. He said that the establishment of continuous economic relations between Turkey and the Azerbaijan SSR and other Soviet republics will create wide-ranging opportunities to improve and deepen mutual cooperation between Turkey and the Soviet Union.

Mutalibov said during the meeting that recent developments, including those effected by the CPSU and Soviet leaders in the sphere of international relations, encourage the participation of Soviet Union and autonomous republics in foreign economic activities. He urged Turkish workers to discover and implement new forms of cooperation, such as border trade, the setting up of joint establishments, and the coordination of projects.

The Azerbaijan SSR delegation left Istanbul for Ankara today. The governor of Istanbul, Cahit Bayar, and other officials saw the delegation off at the airport. Prior to departing, Mutalibov told a [word indistinct] correspondent: The talks in Istanbul were very fruitful and useful. For the first time we at the government level are becoming acquainted with the opportunities in this neighboring country for establishing relations. Our visits to industrial establishments and our many meetings with representatives of business circles lead us to believe that there is sufficient potential in both countries to improve relations in the trade, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural fields. We believe that relations and cooperation between the Azerbaijan SSR and other Soviet republics and Turkey will contribute toward strengthening the friendly and neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey.

Violent Incidents, Sabotage Reported in NKAO

LD0801172490 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Stepanakert January 8 TASS—Tension persists in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Overnight skirmishes continue in several villages of the region, including Stepanakert outskirts.

Individual motor vehicles on highways are showered with stones and fired on. Cases of taking hostages have become more frequent.

The number of sabotage acts at communications facilities and economic projects has drastically increased. A reinforced concrete bridge on the highway between the city of Agdam (outside the Nagorno-Karabakh region) and the city of Askeran in the region was blown up on January 4.

The Interior Ministry guards of a railway bridge near the village of Khodzhally in Askeran district of the autonomous region were fired on twice from automatic weapons on January 7. The guards returned fire. There are no casualties.

A powerful blast was set off under another railway bridge, five kilometers from Agdam, later in the day. It damaged the track and bridge supports. The traffic to the region has stopped.

Under the present conditions, the special administration committee of the region and the all-union staff set up on the instruction of the USSR Council of Ministers on December 4, 1989 takes measures to supply the region by air with food, medicines and primary necessities.

Kazakhstan's New Soviets Hold First Sessions

LD0801124690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] The first sessions of the rayon and city local soviets of people's deputies elected during the campaign just before the new year have been held in Kazakhstan. Our Tselinograd correspondent reports that presidiums of people's deputies have been elected for the first time in 15 rayon and 1 city soviet in the oblast. It is precisely

this body that is to represent the totality of the soviets' power at local level. Secret ballots have confirmed the first secretaries of the city and rayon CPSU committees as chairmen of the presidiums. The secret ballots to elect chairmen of the executive committees proceeded differently. The deputies of four rayon soviets rejected the proposed candidates and voted for alternatives.

Uzbek Minister for Tashkent Construction Appointed

LD0801231890 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 10 Dec 89 p 1

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The Presidium of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet decrees the appointment of Comrade Kozim Nasyrovich Tulyaganov as chief of the Main Administration of the Uzbek SSR for Construction in Tashkent City, and Minister of the Uzbek SSR. [passage omitted]

Ligachev Signs Agriculture Leader's Obituary

PM0901095590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Obituary of Viktor Petrovich Borodin]

[Excerpts] Viktor Petrovich Borodin, a personal pensioner of union rank and a CPSU member, died on 31 December 1989.

V.P. Borodin was born 29 April 1924 in the village of Sadki in Volgograd Oblast's Uryupinskiy Rayon. [passage omitted]

In 1972 V.P. Borodin was appointed to the CPSU Central Committee apparatus where he worked until 1976 as deputy chief of the agriculture department. In 1976 he was appointed USSR first deputy agriculture minister and in 1982 began work in the USSR Council of Ministers apparatus, first as deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Commission on questions of the agro-industrial complex and from 1983-1987 as chief of the USSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs department of the agro-industrial complex. [passage omitted]

[Signed] Ye.K. Ligachev, Ye.S. Stroyev, G.I. Usmanov, V.V. Nikitin, I.I. Skiba, M.S. Shkabardnya, V.K. Mesyats, V.A. Karlov, Yu.I. Mordvintsev, Z.N. Nuriyev, V.I. Akulinin, V.I. Kalashnikov, and A.N. Orlov.

Dissident P.M. Yegides Interviewed

90UN0622A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 1, 6-12 Jan 90 pp 4-5

[Interview with philosopher P.M. Yegides by G. Valyuzhenich: "I Am Not Afraid To Be a Black Sheep"; date and place not given; first paragraph is ARGUMENTY I FAKTY introduction]

[Text] For us the word "dissident" has long been associated with those who slandered our social order or propagated antisocialist ideas. The lot of "dissident" has now befallen philosopher P. Yegides. In 1980 he was exiled from the Soviet Union... Now that the "Iron Curtain" has been lifted, we are able to discover just what the ideas are for which we put people in the category of renegade and deprived them of their Motherland.

[Valyuzhenich] Petr Markovich, you have had a dramatic life. Tell us a little about yourself.

[Yegides] I was raised in an orphanage. When the war began, I volunteered for the front. I was wounded and taken prisoner, then managed to escape from the prison camp. I was arrested in my native land and sent to the camp in Vorkuta. A Special Board (three men) sentenced me under Article 58 to 10 years confinement.

In 1948 I was completely rehabilitated. In 1956 I became chairman of the most backward kolkhoz [collective farm] in Penzenskaya Oblast. Even back then I proposed that sections be established to which entire parcels of land would be assigned. These sections would be afforded complete independence—no work orders, no petty tutelage. And payment would be made only for "warehoused" crops. The obkom [oblast party committee] secretary therefore accused me of "petty bourgeois deviation."

One day at a raykom [rayon party committee] plenum meeting I sharply denounced the dictatorship of the party-state apparatus over the kolkhozes. I was accused of subverting the authority of the party...

In 1968 I wrote a book, "The Only Way Out" (this I saw in the democratization of society). "Without achieving democracy," I asserted, "we defame and devalue the very concept of socialism." I was arrested and the manuscript confiscated.

[Valyuzhenich] What ideas in particular did you then advocate? Where did you see the democratization of society?

[Yegides] I proposed that several candidates be nominated for a single deputy post. I advocated the idea that "kolkhozes" be turned into real kolkhozes, being afforded complete independence. I believed that the newspaper PRAVDA must be converted from the organ of the CPSU Central Committee into the organ of the entire party. I also proposed that the KGB be engaged in its own direct function—fighting against espionage—and not the ideological shadowing of people's thoughts.

[Valyuzhenich] And what were you charged with?

[Yegides] Slander of the Soviet system (Article 190 prime, which carries with it confinement of up to 3 years). I wrote in my book that if we do not restructure ourselves or democratize, then a revolution initiated from below cannot be ruled out. They accused me of "calling for" this by virtue of my statement. But I was not calling for it—I was warning of it.

[Valyuzhenich] What did the court decide?

[Yegides] Unfortunately, there was no court. The investigator in charge of my case believed a normal Soviet individual would not advance such demands, and they therefore decided to send me up for psychiatric evaluation. There they "ascertained" that I required mandatory treatment in a psychiatric institution.

[Valyuzhenich] How did they determine that you had a "mental" disorder?

[Yegides] They asked me, for example, why I have a beard. "Loyal Soviet people don't do that." Perplexed, I mentioned Marx, Lenin, Castro... "Well, he has delusions of grandeur, paranoia!"

In the ward they warned me that everyone is asked a provocative question about how they feel. If a person says he is healthy, then they reach their conclusion stating that all sick people consider themselves healthy. And if he says he is sick—then naturally he requires treatment.

When I was asked this traditional question by Professor Lunets, I asked him: "Well, how do you feel?" "What kind of nonsense—I am healthy!" he replied. "Well, it is said all sick people consider themselves to be healthy..." I said. And thus I wound up in the "loony bin"...

[Valyuzhenich] For what reason did they exile you from the country?

[Yegides] For publishing the Samizdat magazine POISKI [Quest], in which I and my friends argued in favor of genuine socialist ideas. They considered this illegal, and the ideas—antisocialist. I was presented with an ultimatum—either I would leave for the West or they would be "forced" to put me back into confinement.

[Valyuzhenich] And from that point in time you have not changed your views or convictions?

[Yegides] No. And here is a curious thing—it turns out now that coming out in the defense of socialism means being a black sheep. Well, I am not afraid of that.

I have noted that the number of intellectuals who have overtly or covertly changed their orientation from socialism to capitalism is increasing quite rapidly. Already people are ashamed to come out in defense of socialism for fear they will be put in the same category as the supporters of Nina Andreyeva. Yet she does not advocate socialism but rather Stalinism, its antithesis.

[Valyuzhenich] In the West—and not only there—they believe the ideas of socialism have become completely discredited...

[Yegides] Here we see some twisted logic. Yes, we have witnessed a complete fiasco with respect to a system which purported to be socialist, but it was not socialist. They identify socialism only with the absence of private capitalist ownership, replaced by state ownership. But in fact, labor in state enterprises has remained not simply hired labor, like in the capitalist countries, but in addition has acquired ugly forms insofar as the laborer does not have any real rights.

Why is it so difficult to part with the idea that our social system is socialism all the same? Because then the question arises: What—for 70 years now the country has made no achievements?

Of course this is not so. There have been many achievements. But they must be ascribed to the heroic overexertion of people who believe in the concepts of socialism. We have never had what constitutes the essence of socialism—the means of production never belonged to the producers. Socialism must be built all over again.

[Valyuzhenich] Building anew is always a long and complicated process. How, in your view, can we solve our most pressing problem today—feeding the population?

[Yegides] I think we could solve this in 2 or 3 years. To do it we must immediately give the kolkhozes the ability to independently decide all matters—what to produce, whom to sell to, what prices to establish, etc.

[Valyuzhenich] And what about state orders?

[Yegides] This can and should take place—but only when the kolkhoz desires it. In addition, sale of production should take place at contract prices. If the order is not advantageous to the kolkhoz, it can sell its products on the market.

[Valyuzhenich] But are you certain the kolkhozes will want this independence? Today they operate with no worries about selling their products since there is a reliable customer in the personage of the state—and they are guaranteed payment no less... But here we would be presented with unforeseen difficulties...

[Yegides] Kolkhoz workers do not want to work for free or very cheaply, and they do not want to work under coercion. As they see it, they just want fair compensation for their labor. They want to awaken their energies, initiative, and enterprising spirit. Recently I visited my own kolkhoz and spoke with the peasants. They are dreaming about this independence!

[Valyuzhenich] You and your wife went abroad when you were of retirement age. How are you making a living?

[Yegides] The French Government has allocated us a minimal pension as political emigres. In principle, our own state should have paid us a pension—after all, we worked here all our lives. Financially we were better provided for there than we would be here, even with a maximum pension. But, as they say, "man does not live by bread alone." Having lost one's Motherland, it is difficult to find one elsewhere.

[Valyuzhenich] Would you like to return to the USSR?

[Yegides] Yes, I would...

Maslyukov Discusses Government Program

LD0901014290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1830 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] [Announcer] Esteemed comrades, Central Television begins a new series today—"At First Hand." We now present Yuriy Dmitriyevich Maslyukov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politiburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the country's state planning committee [Gosplan].

[Voznesenskiy] Hello, comrades. Of late, our life in literally all its aspects has been developing so rapidly, and at the same time in totally different—in some respects even opposite directions—that to guide these processes and channel them into some sort of interconnected system, to create the economic, social, political, and even spiritual conditions required to accelerate the movement is, in my opinion, becoming ever more complicated. There is scarcely a day that is not full of surprises. By no means are these always pleasant; by no means do they always stabilize and unite the life of society, rather they destroy the country's economy and the unity of the state.

In this sort of situation it strikes me as particularly important that the government and society should have various forms of systematic contacts. They already exist, of course. But apparently life demands an expansion of these contacts—a greater variety to these forms. I should like to offer television viewers one such form as of today. Once a month, let's say, on the first Monday of the month, it would, I think, be worth having a half-hour television broadcast in which the leaders of the government could explain what has actually been accomplished in the time that has elapsed to improve the state of affairs in the country, and first and foremost the economic situation; also what has not been accomplished, and why; what steps are being taken to carry through the economic improvement program mapped out by the government and which, as you know, was approved by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

To ensure that this information is as complete and accurate as possible, these programs will give air time to members of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium. Bearing in mind the nature of the programs, we have entitled them "At First Hand." And today this series gets under way with an appearance by Yuriy Dmitriyevich Maslyukov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the country's Gosplan.

Just 2 weeks has passed since the close of the second congress. But even this short time should not of course have been wasted so far as the implementation of the government program is concerned. Tell me, Yuriy Dmitriyevich, how did the government set about this tricky work?

[Maslyukov] As you know, the congress made some fundamental decisions—decisions relating to the government's economic platform for the next few years—and for 1990—and also for the 13th 5-year plan. Immediately the congress ended we set about working energetically at our plans to see how to implement these decisions. The first presidium was held on the 27th, and it examined the outcome of the Second Congress of People's Deputies.

[Voznesenskiy] In other words, just 3 days after it ended?

[Maslyukov] Yes. This presidium meeting examined a rather extensive plan of measures to implement the decisions of the second congress, a plan where specific executors are pointed out. All the questions set by deputies, all the questions the solutions to which were suggested in the government's program—the plan names specific executors and deadlines as well as senior people in charge of the Council of Ministers who are responsible for specific issues. We set our main task for the year 1990 because it is a year of a radical structural perestroyka of industry toward producing consumer goods. It is a year when budget deficit is to be reduced. It is a year when the financial situation of the country and the budget situation of the country are to be substanially improved. The year 1990 we see, above all, as a year when an entire package of documents will be prepared, a package that is essential for a normal functioning of the national economy, taking into account the conditions in which our country now finds itself. Secondly, it is a year when we are due to take ad hoc measures that would help to improve speedily and radically the situation in the production and consumer spheres.

[Voznesenskiy] What does the main task consist of, the task that the government program sets, as it were, for the government, the national economy, society as a whole, the task that must be solved precisely in this year 1990?

[Maslyukov] The main task in 1990 is, in my view—and this is what I reported at the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, and this is the view of the presidium—to fulfil the tasks that have been set to increase consumer goods' production. Even so, a 66 billion [figure only as heard] increase in consumer goods is a colossal figure, even for our huge economy. We have not encountered such increases. Practically, they are four times as much as what we succeeded in attaining in the past years. In this context we are taking the biggest and most resolute measures.

In the first place, I would like to tell you, Lev Aleksandrovich [Voznesenskiy] that the volume of capital investments earmarked for the development of the means of production of consumer goods has been doubled. This is in the first place. In the second place, laws have been adopted which gear the enterprise more toward developing production of consumer goods than

toward developing the production sphere as a whole. Well, the law that sets a 3 percent limit in wage increases does not effect production of consumer goods. It affects production activities of enterprises apart from production of consumer goods, apart from processing of agricultural produce. That is why it is now convenient for enterprises to direct resources to developing production of consumer goods, more so than to direct them to developing production of the means of production.

In the second place, I would like to say that we are also taking other measures. Let us say it is planned now that in the first quarter the national economy will take delivery of 1,600 modules—that is to say production buildings, each one of which has an area of some 1,000 square meters. That is to say it will be in excess of 1.5 million square meters. It is possible to have them assembled in the course of the quarter. These buildings are sets to be assembled, factory-delivered. Already, as of the start of the second half of the year, output can start to be produced at these modules. Moreover, the module is put together as part of the existing network—it has no need for new power resources, new and complex installations, since all this is implanted into existing enterprises. I think that this may yield a very great effect in the production of consumer goods. We have handed over these modules to the republics that are interested, to oblasts that are interested, to major enterprises, and we think that this measure in itself can yield real return in the nearest future.

Now, Lev Aleksandrovich, let us recall one more thing: After all, as far as the results of 1989 are concerned, not everything that we were building and planning to commission and to complete by handing over for use has been handed over for use. I can cite the following figures. If you take production of consumer goods, some 80 percent of capacities have been handed over for use. If you go deeper say if you take processing of meat products, then some 80 percent; some 50 percent in the area of processing compound feed and preparing compound feed; only 60 percent as far as tinned fruit and vegetables are concerned [words indistinct] and as far as sugar is concerned, about 34-35 percent. That is to say, what we failed to do last year must not be dragged out. This work must be completed during the first quarter of this year, so that already during the first half of the year, and at the very least starting from the second half of the year, we can obtain from these facilities a very substantial increment in the production of consumer goods, both foodstuffs and nonfoodstuffs.

[Voznesenskiy] But why even the state order? In such a priority area as the processing of agricultural produce where, as everyone knows, there are astronomical losses which directly affect the level of development of the whole national economy, the population's standard of living, people's mood—why has even the state order in this sphere been fulfilled to such a low level, to be more precise, seriously underfulfilled?

[Maslyukov] I believe there are many reasons for this. We can discuss them. But the main one is the lack of discipline and, perhaps, the absence of a proper degree of toughness on the part of the government. We have issued about 10 decisions on stimulating the fulfillment of the state order, on priorities for the fulfillment of the state order, on additional deductions, on additional privileges, so to speak, for those producing output for the state order. But, unfortunately, we have very few punitive measures for nonfulfillment of the state order. But there ought to be such measures.

[Voznesenskiy] Economically punitive ones, first of all.

[Maslyukov] Economically, first of all. And one of the measures which has been proposed and which has been adopted by the government—and an appropriate document will be issued—is to toughen credit policy, banks' credit policy, with regard to those who do not fulfil the state order, or enterprises which do not accept the state order. That is, to create conditions so that this will be impossible for enterprises. I believe that this is a correct measure because 1988-89 has shown that without such harsh financial measures we will not get to grips with this indicator.

[Voznesenskiy] I should like to stress that, obviously, this increased degree of toughness will gradually give way with the more normal conditions of economic development toward which we are progressing—and at which I hope we will arrive—to the profitability, so to speak, of the state order. That is, the problem of stimulation will be at the forefront, not the problem of punishment.

[Maslyukov] That's right, Lev Aleksandrovich. Of course, while our state order for consumer goods at present is virtually 100 percent, it will in future decrease, and I believe that by 1995 we will keep the perhaps 15 or 20 percent which we need for those who are not in a position to purchase it for themselves at market prices, so to speak. Beyond this the market must come into operation, market relations. Beyond this there must be, so to speak...[pauses] there must be supply, there must be demand, correlations between supply and demand, and the regulation of these correlations by market prices. That's how. Another thing: Why is some output not being manufactured, why are the tasks of the state order not being fulfilled? There are various issues here, but, in the main of course, they come up against that package of basic economic laws about which a great deal was said at the congress and which the Supreme Soviet session is to adopt literally in February, in February or March at the latest, and without which the national economy will be incapable of functioning normally. Until they come into existence we are compelled to adopt the most decisive measures. I also wish to say at this point, taking the opportunity of television perhaps, that there is a very great reserve in the fact that absolutely all people, all workers, managers of any ranks—republican and local—may take part in increasing the production of consumer goods. Party control, people's control, workers' control,

after all, may take part. I am not relieving the government of its responsibility of being obliged to keep an eye on this. It is obliged to control it, it is obliged to punish whomsoever needs to be punished, and to help where necessary. But, at the same time, I believe that the whole thing, that most of this lies in a lack of discipline in the localities, a lack of exactingness and in the fact that resources, in defiance of all decisions, are concentrated not on the installations which are totally essential to the national economy, but on others which resolve some requirements of the moment.

[Voznesenskiy] Yes, and sometimes purely local ones.

[Maslyukov] Yes, sometimes purely local requirements. This we see clearly from the republics and the regions.

[Voznesenskiy] Yuriy Dmitriyevich. You see, 1990 is not only a year when some significant and, if I may say so, even tangible economic results should appear, tangible for people—economic results of the recovery of the national economy. It is also a year of the start of a major advancement in the sphere of, I would say, fundamental improvements in the very methodology of planning and administration of the national economy.

[Maslyukov] Yes, Lev Aleksandrovich. The congress decided—in the context of your question—the congress decided that on 1 September the plan for the next 5-year period should be worked out. If you take the time axis, and mark 1 September, then let us, by, as it were, going back to the present, take a look at what sort of deadlines we have remaining and, in connection with this, what sort of tasks arise in the sphere of planning our activities. If the document should be with the Supreme Soviet by 1 September, the government needs 2 months to work through this question in a most painstaking manner and to balance things out. So, going back from September, we have August and July. Already in June, the document ought to be with the government. If you proceed further, enterprises ought to work out their plans, I mean they ought to balance them out with their related enterprises, to work them through with ministries and so on, and may be this is, likewise, no less than 2 months, or may be even a bit more, so you get May and April. The central economic departments: the USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR State Committee on Prices, the Ministry of Finances, and all others also need about 2 months to produce the essential initial data for planning. Thus what you get is that in February at the very least we ought to have all the necessary initial data. What is this? In order for enteprises to be able to start to work out their plans, the first thing they find essential is a system of new wholesale and purchasing prices. Without this there can be no working out of the plan from below, as we intend to do it, there can be no doubt about that. In the second place, what the enterprise needs is a system of taxis, a system of taxation, in order to grasp correctly what the volume of production of output will be, what funds will be earned, and how to plan all its activities, both in the social sphere and in the sphere of production, and so on.

Furthermore, it is necessary that enterprises at long last have a finished Law on State Enterprise. This law is due to have finishing touches put to it. It is a most important law. Naturally, it should be one of the first to be examined by the Supreme Soviet session. Subsequently our enterprises ought to get the full essential information about the financial and credits system, the system of benefits, the system of sanctions, about the state's interest rate policy—all this is essential precisely for this. Well, this whole sum of essential information and rules should be worked out literally in January and at the very latest by mid-February, in order to obtain...[pauses] we even want to suggest to the Supreme Soviet that the laws which will not, as yet, be adopted, should be published in the press, if only for the purpose of discussion and, apart from that, so that enterprises have something to be guided by, since without these guidelines the deadline of 1 September for presenting the plan is simply unrealistic. Well, this is a most important question. Incidentally, I would like to stress one more very important thing: That when we are working with the Supreme Soviet, with a session of the Supreme Soviet, then very many interlaced tasks arise. We are executing the decisions of the legislators, but, at the same time, we are preparing the decisions for the legislators to examine. Well, this close work we learned last year ought to become even close this year.

[Voznesenskiy] In your view, what effect will the adoption of laws which have such economic nature, above all, or socioeconomic nature, what effect will this have upon economic relations among republics? After all, at present this problem is of concern literally to every republic and to wide circles of the public. This is because people understand that abnormalities in this sphere serve as one of the factors of destabilization also in the area of interethnic relations.

[Maslyukov] It is very painful political, social, economic and human task, I agree. It is a very painful issue. My view is that, naturally, the economy ought to play a very important role in overcoming these negative consequences of these interethnic conflicts that arise upon most various foundations. Republics complain to each other about, say, the fact that one republic, which manufactures the end product, today has more, and lives better than, say, another republic which deals, say, with fuel and raw material resources, or else with the extraction of minerals, or say, processing and producing rolled copper, rolled steel for exaple,and so on and so forth. That is to say, there is inequality in the pricing of the whole national product as it moves along the technological chain, or else according to the purchase and sale stages. Very often, during the congress, one could hear one republic accusing another republic alleging that it lives on accumulated labor. Of course an end must be put to this.

We have proposed, probably correctly, and the congress has supported it, that we go over to value added tax, so that value added tax is charged at each stage of the technological chain which is accompanied, of course, by

the sale of this item, during this processing. This will put an end to all the current arguments that constantly fuel to this fire of relations among nationalities. You understand? This will undoubtedly put an end to it because it will be a just chain of price formation taking place from A to Z, from the beginning to the end. So this will enable us to more correctly calculate relations among republics and to build mutual relations among republics. Of course, not only the system of taxation built upon value added tax, but the entire body of the economic laws to be adopted by the Supreme Soviet will contribute to normalizing and creating normal conditions in relations among regions and republics, among nations, because they will create normal conditions for mutual relations and cooperation among enterprises.

Among all the types of self-management and self-financing, I put the enterprise alone in first position, because it alone is the source of national wealth. Everything else is a process of distribution, redistriction, or consumption. The enterprise is the true producer of national income and it must have all the freedom necessary, irrespective of the republic or region where it is located. It must be guided only by economic incentive, economic expediency. It is for the center to create a legislative system to maintain this incentive at the correct level. It is for the republics, by correctly utilizing enterprise' work and the deductions enterprises pay into the republic's budget, to assist enterprises to develop correctly; that is, to seek in them a partner, not an object for command, because if we are to replace one command system—which permeated down through the whole national economy from the center, shall we say, from this office, even—with another command system which would certainly be worse than the old one because it would not yet have been adjusted...

[Voznesenskiy, interrupting] If only for that reason...

[Maslyukov, interrupting] If only for that reason, it would be more harsh, it would be unjust toward some types of enterprises, toward some types of production. This could, of course, lead to very unpleasant consequences for the enterprise. It must be the real master of the situation. It must have all the freedom necessary for the normal accomplishment of its functions.

[Voznesenskiy] The last question, Yuriy Dmitriyevich. How shall we keep track of the real course of events in the country's economy? Do any monitoring points exist for this, temporary parameters for this tracking? In general, does such a monitoring machinery exist, overall, in our country?

[Maslyukov] To correctly monitor the course of production, the course of development of the national economy, the course of construction, we naturally need very good and reliable statistics. The statistics committee faces this task, and Goskomstat is obliged to present essential monthly accounts. Whereas we used to operate according to quarterly accounts, now we will go over to monthly accounts and we will know each month and have authentic data on the state of affairs in the national economy, especially on the most sore issues. That's the first thing. The second thing is, you know that in the government a special post has been created and introduced of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers for operational issues who is constantly involved precisely with monitoring the fulfillment of plans for the production of consumer goods, for supplying the market. He is also involved with transportations and some other issues, but mainly he has issues of monitoring the course of perestroyka in the sphere of industry, the course of fulfillment of plans for production of consumer goods. Naturally, each member of the Presidium, each deputy chairman of the council of Ministers has been entrusted with the most specific tasks of working out both monitoring and current measures and measures that are in prospect. Of course, very many such tasks are also entrusted to Gosplan, too. Well, I can say that, if we are speaking specifically, about what specific decisions we have adopted, shall we say, over this period...

[Voznesenskiy, interrupting] You mean the Presidium of the Council of Ministers.

[Maslyukov] I mean the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, of course. Then I would note the decision on additional measures for economic regulation and stimulation of the fulfillment of the state order—adoption and fulfillment, more correctly. A decision has been adopted on additional, or rather on the implementation of urgent measures to normalize the money in circulation. This is a whole body of measures enabling conditions to be created for the population to realize the accumulations they now have or in any case, to deposit them in the banking system, bearing in mind that in doing so they will obtain increased interest. It also entails the issuing of bonds, the expansion of all kinds of, the issuing of commodity loans for products in particularly short supply. It also entails a decision on auction trading in some goods that are not in the highest demand, shall we say. These are luxury items, shall we say, items of jewelry, objets d'art, etc. There are measures concerning the handing over to long-term leasing, with the right to bequeath, of plots, dacha plots, for those who wish to, as well as orchard and kitchen garden plots, bearing in mind that payment should be charged fon the basis of the land-survey assessment of the land and on the basis of its suitability for one agricultural purpose or another.

Apart from that a decision of the Council of Ministers has been adopted, literally in the nearest time [as heard] about normalization of the consumer market and price controls. This particularly goes for prices for children and old-age pensioners.

[Voznesenskiy] Apparently we must strive for a correspondence between money and commodity supply—the sum total of material values, material wealth—and, as it were, for the relationship between the two becoming ever closer.

[Maslyukov] This task is one that we are facing: To protect people against inflation. Here we have a whole system of financial measures aimed at improving the situation, but at its foundation is this: With the aid of what mechanism? It is the mechanism of index-linking the standard of life, of index-linking incomes, of index-linking earnings, of index-linking expenditure. That is to say the working out of the index-linking system will give the part of the population on fixed earnings, on fixed pensions—that is to say students, those who have no influence at all on the process of regulating, creating and pricing, I mean so that these people should not feel vulnerable. [sentence as heard]

[Voznesenskiy] In as much as this subject is only just beginning to be a part of life, maybe you could explain just a little bit what index-linking is in this given case, as applied to this task.

[Maslyukov] As applied to this task, let us say this: If inflation over a given period is estimated at 5 percent, or else another figure, then the pensions, or earnings, or grants, or some other source of income should increase by a corresponding percentage or a percentage that is close to it, to be determined by the legislators. This will surely pertain to money in savings accounts, too. The purpose is to ensure a real purchasing ability for the period during which people receive their earned income. We have recently discussed, as you know, the question of creating a taxation mechanism so as to be able correctly to collect taxes from enterprises and cooperatives and, finally, from the population. After all, there is no such mechanism in our country. It must be set up very quickly. A relevant decision has been adopted [words indistinct] precisely in the accuracy and equitability, so that everyone knows that it is an equitable mechanism, approved by the legislators, and that it works. A law on the banking system is in the offing. At long last, the banking system is due to acquire rights it needs in order genuinely to regulate the activities of enterprises, genuinely to stimulate what is at present essential for the people and, at the same time, to create diffuculties where money and investments are squandered on secondary tasks rather than the primary tasks we are facing. This, too, is a very serious question, and we are actively dealing with it. Incidentally, all these issues will pass through the legislature, of course. That is to say they will all be given the form of laws. It will not be, as it were, a wish on the part, say, of members of the government, but a considered act on the part of the legislature, in accordance with which both industry, agriculture, and the processing industry and the population will have to act.

[Voznesenskiy] Yuriy Dmitriyevich, I think that with your help our comrade television viewers have been given a rather extensive description of what the government managed and succeeded in doing during the 2 weeks that have elapsed since the completion of the Second Congress of People's Deputies. Thank you for your contribution. I wish to express fervent hope—shared, in my view, by millions upon millions of people—that the government program will be implemented.

[Maslyukov] Thank you. We find this support essential. In our activities we want very much for the population's hopes to be justified.

[Vzonesenskiy] All the best, comrades.

[Maslyukov] Goodbye.

Rumors of TV Program's Demise 'Exaggerated'

PM0901100190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 7

[M. Zotova report under the general rubric "TV and We" and the subrubric "Page's Mail": "Rumors of the Demise of 'View' Are Exaggerated"]

[Text] Probably no Central Television program of late has been attended by such "renown" as "Vzglyad" [View]. The popular program had only to miss being broadcast twice in succession—24 and 29 December—for rumors to spread that it had been closed down. The rumors peaked during the last days of 1989, when MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS still further escalated the situation regarding the program with its article "'Vzglyad' Has Been Arrested." Even though IZVESTIYA published in issue no. 365 a reply from V. Lazutkin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting [Gosteleradio], who said that the broadcast just before the new year had been taken off because of artistic shortcomings, people concerned about the fate of "Vzglyad" are continuing to call us.

Anatoliy Lysenko, deputy chief editor of Central Television's Youth Programs Main Editorial Board, speaks:

"Many people have already asked us what happened. We are telling television viewers and foreign agencies this: The USSR Gosteleradio leadership decided to reduce the number of politicized programs in the runup to the new year. If I am to say more, it has to be admitted that work on 'Vzglyad' had become more complex in recent months. Nevertheless, the rumors of the demise of 'Vzglyad' and the arrest of the presenters are, of course, exaggerated. The program is to be broadcast 5 January, and on the 12th too. We are endeavoring not to be false to ourselves—to give the program point and topicality."

Soviet Germans Hold Protests in 20 Towns

LD0801130690 Hamburg DPA in German 1207 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow (DPA)—Yesterday members of the Soviet German organization "Rebirth" protested in about 20 large towns in the Soviet Union about the delay in implementing their demands for autonomy and the anti-German mood prevailing in the country. "Rebirth" spokesman Weber stated this today in an interview with DPA. Members of "Rebirth" described as half-hearted the resolutions of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers to gradually implement Soviet German autonomy over a period of 10 years.

Sverdlovsk Food Supply Appeal Reported

PM0801145990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 1

["Our correspondent" V. Sanatin dispatch: "Will There Be Thaw in Urals?"]

[Text] Sverdlovsk—After the 29 December spontaneous rally in Sverdlovsk, members of the CPSU city committee [gorkom] bureau and deputies of the city soviet adopted an "Appeal to the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers."

The document says: "We demand that the government and the CPSU Central Committee adopt urgent measures to guarantee food supplies to the inhabitants of Sverdlovsk commensurate with their labor contribution." The appeal notes that more than 5,000 types of goods are not available in the stores. It is also known that the shortfall in the supply of food products to Sverdlovsk totaled R15 million of allocated funds....

Will there be a thaw in the icy attitude toward the Urals working class?

The CPSU gorkom's idea to set up a public committee for the distribution of food and consumer goods has proved an extremely useful step. Enterprise workers, All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League [Komsomol] members, and trade union activists warmly support this step and are prepared to cooperate with the party gorkom, if necessary tomorrow. An action group has sprung up in Sverdlovsk to organize the "29 December Committee" which will be charged with establishing public supervision of distribution and prices.

An interesting detail: The CPSU gorkom bureau has sharply condemned the stance of the oblast soviet executive committee which clings to its management of the central "Prodtovary" [Food Products] association stores.... Citizens do not mind who is in charge of management as long as they manage reasonably and honestly! In recent days,stores have been trading in goods which are normally in short supply—instant coffee, Indian tea, Romanian knitwear.... The inhabitants of Sverdlovsk are well aware of where the "aid" has come from.

Citizens have only one request of the Sverdlovsk city soviet, which is appealing to them for patience: To stop the selling of goods in the doorways of consumer goods stores in temperatures of minus 30 degrees Centigrade while the stores' spacious premises are generally closed for "stocktaking."

Patience is wearing thin in such low temperatures!

New TV Program To Air 8 Jan, Maslyukov To Speak

LD0801064790

Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0530 GMT on 8 January announces a new program that will be aired on the first Monday of every month. The program is to be called "Iz Pervykh Ust"—First Hand.

The announcer says, "members of the Presidium and of the Council of Ministers will tell of the state of affairs in the economy and of the implementation of the government plan aimed at improving it."

Yu. Maslyukov will speak on this evening's program at 1830 GMT.

IZVESTIYA Readers Assail Perestroyka

PM0901104190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Review of readers' letters by letters department special correspondent Lyudmila Savelyeva: "'It's All Wrong'"]

[Text] L. Belov of Voronezh opens his letter with these angry words, making clear his negative attitude toward the current state of our society. He gives plenty of examples (from "the stores are hopelessly empty" to "the ideals of socialism are smashed to pieces") and his summing up is candidly bleak: "Perestroyka has certainly not gone in the direction people expected."

In no way can it be claimed that these are unusual sentiments. For example, as the editor's mailbag shows, there is plenty of irritation and dissatisfaction. What are people irritated about? Well, about everything, really.

The second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet is not over yet, but letters filled with disenchantment have already appeared. "Call this a parliament?" a distressed K. Vedeneyev writes from Ufa. "People lining up to speak, a general scrimmage, total confusion when tackling the most elementary questions, and frank pursuit of the sonorous phrase." "Talk, debate, endless polemics again," L. Salova of Kostroma echoes K. Vedeneyev. "It is not a parliament but a rally at which people cannot even hear one another out."

It is difficult to argue with the writers of such letters, indeed there are no real grounds for argument—after all, the shortcomings they mention are in evidence, so to speak. But there is something else that is striking—the hasty condemnation and sweeping conclusions: This is certainly no parliament. Obviously we have a very short memory: Is it so long since those fine days when we used to have total unanimity, with people raising their hands as if in a trance—was that a parliament, then?

Here is another frequent feature: The new has barely had time to make its mark, yet many of us have already sharpened our knives. Ideas that used to be seditious but are now spoken out loud make us tremble inside. As soon as the term "private ownership" pops up in the political-economic lexicon, there is an immediate avalanche of

objections and anger: "Recognition of private ownership in conditions of victorious socialism is a total reversion to capitalism" (B. Shults, Kiev). As soon as the proposals on the law on land ownership appeared (proposed rather tentatively, in fact, for discussion), there was another fit of panicky horror: "Land in ownership, with the right of inheritance? Dear Comrades, there is still time—think again: What was the revolution for in the first place?" (I. Krutov, Kherson). "Do not destroy the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]," A. Talalay (Kharkov Oblast) pleads. "Do not make land a commodity, and people farmhands."

P. Perestoronin (Belogorsk), who is also distressed about "everything going wrong," remarks: "Now they have gone even further. Now they want to revoke Article 6 of the Constitution. They want to outlaw the CPSU! This is what it has come to!" Quite a different question is preventing I. Vysochin of Rostov-na-Donu from having a quiet life: "What is happening with religion in our country? Priests are giving interviews on television and in newspapers, they are preaching sermons at bedtime, and they are sitting in the supreme organ of power. Are we all turning into believers, or what?" "Let us be frank about it," V. Samanov writes from Maykop. "It is not democracy, but total license. Not glasnost, but an era of loudmouths, people with grievances, and extremists. Not unity of the peoples, but total anarchy. Do not regard my anxiety as nostalgia for the past—it is fashionable to talk like that when you want merely to brush diffficult issues aside."

"The whole problem is," I. Glazkov of Kerch is sure of this, "that there is no real authority in the country. Anything goes and everything is encouraged—rallies, certain dubious publications, all manner of informal movements. And if anything goes, then everything goes to ruin. Before our very eyes, typically enough."

One could go on forever quoting letters—on all manner of topics. As a rule the forecasts are based on a banal stereotype: The Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies did not live up to expectations, of course. The economic reform will change little, of course, and only mess things up more. The local soviet elections, it is not hard to guess, will go in favor of the overpowering bureaucracy. Cooperatives—and here too no arguments are adduced at all—are all involved in speculation and out to feather their own nests. Not to mention the press, of course, which has "gotten totally out of hand" (for some reason, this is the expression used most often) and is still going on about freedom of the press.

There is a striking pattern here: The writers of these letters (those who, accordingly, are responsible for the sentiments), whether they are angrily condemning or rejecting out of hand a particular innovation (often even an attempted innovation), look at all that is happening with a highly critical eye. No, one would not, of course, call this view of our far from radiant reality indifferent—one senses real pain, genuine alarm and anxiety about the future. One senses something else too—a desire to find simple answers to all the complex questions. But is that really possible? Perhaps it is confusion that makes people try to cling to a past that they automatically idealize. Perhaps this is the source of the stubborn desire, turning into aggressiveness, to blame for everything "perestroyka, which has caused people nothing but trouble" (K. Voropayeva, Moscow)?

But many of our readers might object to what K. Voropayeva and all those who are of the same opinion are saying.

For example, A. Tsvetov of Leningrad: "Those who are currently assailing the unruly press, glasnost, democracy, and perestroyka in general are forgetting a fundamental historical truth: The practice of putting all manner of restraints on the spirit has always caused and continues to cause some to rebel, driven others to apathy and drink, and made cynics of yet others. And we are the last people to need this explained to us—after all, we have been through it all ourselves." Or, for example, V. Selnitsyn (Belorechensk): "As is well known, Lenin devised various concepts of socialism at different times and ultimately came up with the New Economic Policy. Straightaway he found he had opponents who started warning of a return to capitalism, social differentiation, and so on and so forth. The selfsame warnings are being issued now that we are trying to boost an economy wrecked by crude socialism. Everything that is being done is bad. As if what used to be and what still remains were good."

Leningraders G. Aleskeyeva, A. Titova, and N. Grigoryev (judging by the return address on the joint letter, which bears another five signatures, they all live in the same building) observe, not without irony: "How unique we are as a people, how unlike any other. We do—again not without success—everything we possibly can to prevent our neighbor from getting richer than us. Even if he gets rich entirely through honest labor and his enrichment promises to benefit the whole of society." I. Kolyvanov (Bryansk) says with bitterness: "Indeed, for many years they did not sell us like slaves, but simply did what they liked with us. And it actually suited us, you see: Were we as furious then about the difficulties (although we know what happened to any attempted rebellion) as we are now? But now that the sense of slavish fear is disappearing and a feverish search is under way for a way out of the blind alley that existed for years, an unprecedented critical fervor has emerged and vast numbers of people are dying to blame perestroyka, which, they say, has brought only problems, for everything."

Many letters contain calls for a sober, rather than emotional analysis of our life and of ourselves. Isn't it obvious, they say, that sooner or later we will have to banish illusions and wishful thinking? "Banishing illusions is always a painful process, however, they are replaced by realistic hopes" (G. Solovyev, Kaluga). "There is no particular cause for rejoicing, of course," L. Ignatyeva writes from Kursk. "But I do not see any particular reason to be depressed, either: We will go

forward if we stop deceiving ourselves and call a spade a spade." Many, a number of readers stress, curse perestroyka merely because it "is a big and difficult job and not a magic wand" (A. Popovchenko, Kemerovo).

Where are the changes for the better in our life going to come from, A. Litvinenko of Minsk asks very reasonably, if we continue to expect instructions on how to live, if "we ourselves lack a burning desire to think, analyze, and back new approaches."

A. Streltsov of Orlov develops this idea in an interesting way: "We have both changed and remained the same—it is a transitional and not very comfortable stage in our life. We are rejecting the old, aware that there were major errors as well as victories. The old methods—economic or political—have run their course and we must move on. But how? Much as yet is unclear. So we are also rejecting the new—because we do not know how to deal with it. We are still waiting for someone omniscient to explain it all to us and point the way. But this someone, wise and all-knowing, to whom we have grown accustomed, is not there. We must think, decide, and act for ourselves. So here we are, plagued by doubts, impatience, and irritation..."

Certainly—and this worrying thought is contained in the majority of letters—by no means everything is proceeding as we would like. Not as rapidly and easily as it seemed three or four years ago. On the one hand, we are carrying the burden of the past on our shoulders. On the other hand, the new steps are not resolute and confident enough. And our now doleful, now aggressive "it's all wrong," almost exactly accompanying each step, by no means gives the step the requisite firmness. Now that is a cause for concern.

Data Released on Moscow 1989 Industrial Output

LD0801183690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Some data on the work of Moscow's industry in 1989 have been made public. The statistical report does not mention great achievements. As little as 99.7% of the contractual obligations for output deliveries, taking account of the state order, have been fulfilled. The national economy has failed to receive more than R80 million worth of output. A number of light industry enterprises have failed to fulfill their plans.

All-Union Association To Combat Natural Disasters

LD0801153690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] A decision to set up an all-union association to coordinate actions to combat natural disasters has been taken at a conference at the State Commission on Emergency Situations of the USSR Council of Ministers. One of the initiators and originators of this association is the Komsomol Central Committee. It will be founded upon formations which already exist in the country. These are the rescue services of the oblast councils for tourism and excursions, the associations of speliologists and mountain climbers of DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy], and its clubs and schools of militia dog training, radar operators, parachutists, and skin-divers.

The Moscow and Armenia detachments which are to join the association are cooperating with their counterparts from Poland, the FRG, Italy, and Switzerland, communicating foreign experience and collecting it in a data bank. The innaugural conference of the association to coordinate actions to combat natural disasters is to take place in the second half of March.

Election Campaign Problems Discussed

PM0901104990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by PRAVDA social policy editor Oleg Losoto under the "Editor's Opinion" rubric: "Our Choice"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] An analysis of the reports coming in has shown that party organizations in many regions have made use of the experience from previous elections of USSR people's deputies and have become actively involved in the election struggle. [Passage omitted]

But it would be false to say that there are no problems in the current electoral campaign.

For example, reports that apathy can be observed in certain okrugs or that there is an immature attitude among some of the voters, indifference as to whom they elect or as to what the candidate's program represents are worrying. What is this—the reverse side of the "politicization of society"? Weariness? Or is it a lack of faith in the idea that it is possible to change anything in our difficult life? But who will make the changes? The local authorities, whose rights are becoming significantly extended? But the soviets will be the way we elect them...

We do not need a special magnifying glass to perceive in individual candidates' platforms a large degree of demagoguery, slanderousness, complacent inactivity, time-serving, and playing on people's emotions and hopes. Some party, Soviet, and economic leaders, unsure of themselves and fearful for the outcome of the voting, have tried with all their might to remain the only candidates in their okrugs. This has been partially successful.

Unfortunately, this tendency is characteristic of certain other regions too. A candidate deputy to a republic Supreme Soviet called the editorial office literally on the last day of the year that has just ended. I will not reveal his name, as the story has not yet ended. But what he said puts you on your guard. A specific phenomenon is behind it.

The man was working as a legal adviser at a reinforced concrete and silicate articles combine. Then he moved to

the prosecutor's office. And then came the elections. Why not give it a try: He had the ideas, the desire, and the experience. Perestroyka must be supported. He went to his old combine. There he was understood, assessed, and nominated. It was reported in the local newspaper and on the radio. But it turned out that one of the oblast leaders had been nominated for that okrug. And that is how it began. A commission turned up unexpectedly at the combine on New Year's Eve and started checking whether the candidate had been fairly nominated and interrogating the workers...

Whatever you say, this is a strange and altogether paradoxical situation in our times. After all, it has long been well-known, and experience from previous elections has confirmed this many times, that such shameless interference, distrust of people, and political pressure lead to the discrediting in public opinion of the organs that organize it, and they lead their proteges to defeat in the elections. That is how it was in the past and how it will continue to be. Some kind of conclusions must be drawn from previous experience.

Our country is in the midst of a stormy renewal process. Political reform is an important link in this process. The local authorities are to be restructured by instilling specific content into the October slogan "All Power—to the Soviets!" We are returning to revolutionary sources and to Leninist ideas.

"I am delighted that the party and the government are conducting perestroyka and are trying to improve our life," a reader of ours from Odessa, war and labor veteran M. Filippov, writes. "Deputies who will justify our expectations and who will work actively for perestroyka must be elected to local and republic organs."

You cannot but agree with the reader. Our time is a time of choice. We are assessing the past. We are renouncing mistakes and putting them right. We are outlining plans for the future. And if perestroyka is the answer to the challenge of the times, then the need to accelerate it in all spheres of life is the demand of the moment.

It is our choice! Humane, democratic socialism. A society based on social justice. An economy geared to the man.

More on Dismissal of Chernovtsy Obkom Secretary

PM0901092190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[RATAU-TASS report under general heading "Plenums Held"]

[Text] Chernovtsy, 5 Jan—A plenum of Chernovtsy party oblast committee [obkom] was held here today to consider an organizational question.

The plenum relieved N.N. Nivalov of his duties as obkom first secretary for serious shortcomings in his leadership of the Obkom Bureau and for breaches of the norms of party ethics which inflicted great damage on the oblast party organization's prestige.

S.I. Gurenko, second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, spoke at the plenum.

The plenum suspended its work in order to enable oblast party organizations to consider and discuss candidates for the office of obkom first secretary.

Human Rights Body Protests Journalist's Conviction

PM0801112190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jan 90 p 1

["After the Sentence"]

[Text] Our newspaper has already written about the case of Sergey Kuznetsov, Sverdlovsk correspondent of the samizdat journal GLASNOST, who was charged with slander and resistance to militia staffers. He was tried and sentenced, but a study of the case does not give the impression that Kuznetsov's guilt was properly proved. Dissidence in a civilized society, especially one claiming to be a genuine rule-of-law state, should not have an effect on the court's impartiality. In this context, the Public Commission on International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights has sent the Sverdlovsk Oblast Court a telegram whose text is published below.

To Comrade I.K. Ovcharuk, chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Court, and to the members of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Court Judicial Collegium for Criminal Cases

Copy to USSR Minister of Justice V.F. Yakovlev

In connection with the forthcoming appeal hearing of S.V. Kuznetsov's case by the Sverdlovsk Oblast Court, and taking into account the results of a study of the case by our representative who traveled out while the case was being heard, as well as the response by the Soviet and international public and mass media, the Public Commission on International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights expresses doubts regarding the adequacy of the grounds for the sentence passed on Kuznetsov, who was sentenced by the People's Court to 3 years' imprisonment under Articles 130 and 191 (1) of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Criminal Code. Consequently, we express confidence that you will adopt a thorough and objective approach to the question of proving the appellant's guilt and, in the event of doubts on this score, that you will make a fair and humane decision quashing the indictment.

[Signed] USSR People's Deputy F.M. Burlatskiy, chairman of the Public Commission on International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights

Doctor of Juridical Sciences Professor B.L. Nazarov, deputy chairman of the Public Commission on International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights

RSFSR Independent Trade Union Council Formed

LD0801185890 Moscow TASS in English 1827 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Leningrad January 8 TASS—By TASS correspondent Irina Zolotareva:

In the Russian Federation, the largest of the Soviet republics, cooperatives workers have established an Independent Council of Trade Unions dubbed as Yedineniye (Unity), with headquarters in Leningrad.

The new trade union has resolutely divorced itself from the trade union of the workers of RSFSR cooperatives set up late last year within the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] jurisdiction, rejecting both its dependent status and many provisions of its charter.

"There is no such profession as a cooperator, so there cannot be one union for all," Yedineniye's Chairman Valentin Zaslavsky told a press conference here today, stressing that 67 sectoral trade unions of cooperatives workers have joined the new all-Russian Council on Parity Principles.

Participation in the cooperators' trade union does not rule out membership in traditional trade unions. Besides, the charter of Yedineniye provides for membership of not only of cooperatives workers or those hired by cooperatives, but also of people of the most diverse trades, including total strangers to the cooperative movement.

However, Zaslavsky could not provide clear-cut answers to many of the journalists' questions. For instance, how does Yedineniye's proclaimed principal goal of better living standards for the working people squares with cooperatives' exorbitant prices? Or to what extent will social justice be upheld by the "dual membership" principle?

It may be that the laurels earned by the Solidarity trade union stimulate Yedineniye's ambitions and a desire to pay quite a lot in order to get as many votes as it can?

"No, we do not set ourselves any political goals", Zaslavsky said. "But we intend to launch our newspaper and table legislative initiatives at the very first session of the Russian Supreme Soviet of the new convocation. [no closing quotes as received]

Fergana Oblast Ethnic Murder Trial Ends

PM0801122990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Sentence Passed, Investigation Continues"]

[Text] The Fergana Oblast Court panel of judges under the chairmanship of K. Talipov has completed the hearings in the public trial of a murder committed out of motives of hooliganism by the 27-year-old R. Ismailov. He has been sentenced to 13 years of deprivation of liberty of which the first 3 years will be spent in a prison and the rest in a strict-regime correctional labor colony.

This trial has attracted special attention from the inhabitants of Fergana Oblast. Ismailov's criminal actions in Kuvasay and his murder of I. Abdurakhmanov served as one of the causes of the interethnic strife which ended in a bloody drama in June of last year. The witnesses who appeared in court confirmed that R. Ismailov took an active part in the acts of hooliganism and disturbed public order. Their testimony made it possible to fully reconstruct the crime which he had committed.

This trial has ended, but hearings of the cases of the participants in the mass disturbances continue in the oblast and rayon courts.

"At present 121 criminal cases involving 188 active participants in the Fergana events, including those whom we regard as the organizers, are in the hands of the court authorities," A. Frolov, assistant USSR prosecutor general and head of the USSR Prosecutor's Office investigation group, said. "Our main efforts centered on identifying them.

"What we are encountering now is direct pressure on witnesses. People who gave testimony several months ago are denying their words now because of delays in the court proceedings. It is not a question of the court finding it difficult to make sense of the materials of the preliminary investigation. Virtually all the cases presented by our group have been well prepared."

Economic

Maslyukov Comments on Government Program

PM0401165590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Unattributed interview with Yu.D. Maslyukov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the USSR Gosplan (State Planning Committee): "Government in Resolute Mood"; first paragraph is editorial introduction; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The year 1990 has begun—a year allotted a special place in the implementation of measures for economic recovery. We are all pinning great hopes on implementation of the government program which won approval at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Today on page two there is an account of the work of the government and its apparatus. But first a few questions for Yu.D. Maslyukov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the USSR Gosplan.

[IZVESTIYA] Yuriy Dmitriyevich, what do you plan to do first to implement the government program and in what order are the steps to be taken?

[Maslyukov] We associate the beginning of practical implementation of the government's entire socioeconomic program with 1990. The people will lose faith in the program as a whole if there is no sign of real results in 1990. Meanwhile, we must not seek at any price a temporary improvement which will subsequently be impossible to consolidate.

Our main attention will be devoted to concrete measures for economic recovery and a resolute increase in consumer goods production. The plan has provided all the requisite conditions. But the task is a huge one—there must be an increase of R66 billion within the year (as opposed to an average annual increase in the previous 4 years of R17 billion). We must also take normative steps, the main ones being the stabilization of the consumer market and the strengthening of state price control; steps to limit investment demand; economic penalties for nonacceptance and nonfulfillment of the state order; the introduction of a new credit policy; and clarification of the USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association) with regard to the appointment of leaders. Moreover, it will be necessary to revise the procedure for long-term leasing to the urban population of plots of land for dacha, horticultural, and truck garden construction, with payment based on the estimated value of the land, and to clarify and add new elements to the procedure for selling to the population housing from state housing stock and enterprises' housing stock, and a number of other things. There is literally only a matter of days to prepare these and other documents.

That is not all. From the beginning of 1990 strict control will have to be exercised over the completion of the contract campaign for delivery of consumer goods and the fulfillment of concluded contracts. Including for goods shipped out of the republics. Everyday necessities will be efficiently monitored, including levels of production, stocks, availability of raw materials and spare parts, real import opportunities, and so on. The year 1990 will be a year of vigorous work to eliminate the shortage of goods in everyday demand. The allocated resources and production capacities will enable us to resolve this task.

[IZVESTIYA] This was the first time that a government program had been submitted to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies for consideration. To what extent did the discussion at the Congress enrich the program? In the future how do you see cooperation between the executive and the legislature and demarcation of functions between them?

[Maslyukov] The words "the first time" often were heard during the discussion of the government program. There are grounds for this. The method of preparing the program, the structure, the phases, the nature of the discussion, and the actual decisionmaking were fundamentally different from similar documents in the past. I must say that we considered all the fundamental issues in the program several times over—not only owing to the need for a comprehensive approach but also in view of the USSR Supreme Soviet discussion and people's deputies' possible assessment. The realistic view of the current economic situation, comprehensive approach to the resolution of problems, and objective assessment of the proposals presented by well-known economists during the preliminary stage made it possible to prepare, substantiate, and uphold the program for economic recovery and ensure it operates steadily.

As one of the program's formulators I was naturally delighted by the statements which voiced support, approval, and constructive proposals. That is natural: Under contemporary conditions the government can work effectively only if it has a solid vote of confidence from deputies and clearly expressed support. That is the feature of current relations between the executive and the legislature.

Admittedly, in the past, various economic decisions were frequently adopted by directive bodies under the influence of transitory interests and urgent requirements. Their comprehensive nature and conformity with legal provisions were by no means always ensured. That is why they were not generally fulfilled. Such actions are now becoming impossible in conditions where power is increasingly being concentrated in the hands of the soviets.

[IZVESTIYA] We are told that the government has rejected both conservatism and ultra-leftist radicalism and that it advocates realistic, well-considered decisions. However, could you not elucidate the government's attitude to the market and to the dismantling of administrative-edict management methods in general?

[Maslyukov] In our actions we are endeavoring to prevent rash decisions in the future. There is no doubt that, in principle, market relations will increasingly encompass economic relations, displacing the old management methods. Nevertheless, we understand this shift as a continuous process rather than as a one-shot act—a process of construction rather than destruction. Hastily changing the quality of the economy without creating the requisite base would inevitably give rise to painful clashes.

I am sure that the new year of 1990 will be an important phase in our economy's real turnaround toward stable development and the resolution of a wide range of social tasks.

Academician Views Government's Economic Program

LD0801133690 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] A Soviet sociologist, Academician Tatyana Zaslavskaya, finds many attractive points in the government program for improving the state of the country's economy. One of them, she said in a press interview, is

the intention to place emphasis on the social sphere. The program includes measures to provide the population with more consumer goods, improve food supplies, and strengthen money circulation. Spending on industrial construction and defense is cut. Transition to market relations is to play an important role in speeding up positive changes. But that, says Tatyana Zaslavskaya, should be done gradually. Planning and market methods should be combined, otherwise there could be complications.

Concern Over Grain Imports, Currency Drain

904B0079A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 13 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with A.A. Ivashchenko, sector chief in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations All-Union Market Research Institute, by Yu. Baklanov: "Where Are We Losing Currency?"; date and place not given]

[Text] We recently have been hearing more frequent calls to halt the enormous grain imports, which are ruinous for the country. Well, if this were to be done by increasing yields... no, better not not think about it. Who of us does not want to put an end to the unnatural situation in which, while having enormous areas sown for grain, we nevertheless annually import more than 30 million tons of grain from abroad? But surely before widely announcing the estimates of our own strength we should at least grow, reap, and store the planned harvest. If we have something in our own granaries then we can discuss reducing imports. For how many consecutive five-year plans have we considered the grain problem a major problem but have nevertheless been unable to resolve it? The little grain that has been added to the state granaries this year has been sold above state orders for hard currency.

It will be extremely difficult to halt grain imports in the immediate future. So how can we better organize grain purchases so that we do not waste hard currency? This was the starting point of our interview with A.A. Ivashchenko, chief of the foodstuffs markets sector at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations All-Union Market Research Institute.

[Ivashchenko] Previously it happened that there was no currency and the people went hungry. Now we are seeking out currency for any eventuality. And no matter what they may have said, while we have our own grain shortages we must buy it. So where does the money come from?

One of our misfortunes is that we buy grain in such enormous volumes within a short period of time. First, every year we see lowered figures in the plan, and then suddenly a special resolution is issued whereby the grain purchase figures are immediately increased to 30 million tonnes and even 40 million tonnes, which must be acquired and imported within rigid time periods, and, for some reason, it is precisely when we are still harvesting.

It is clear that it is only we who go into the market with such an enormous order, and the price immediately rises for grain and for shipping freight. The ports are unable to cope with the unloading and there are shortages of railroad freight cars, because at that time they are busy carrying our own harvest to the grain elevators. As a result a very complicated situation develops and we have to overpay for everything. Shipping freight costs alone come to about half a billion rubles every year!

[Baklanov] But the government and Supreme Soviet are looking for ways to patch over the gaping holes in the budget. We must certainly halt the losses of hard currency used to purchase and ship grain, and then perhaps we shall be able to scrape a few million together, shall we not?

[Ivashchenko] Of course. It is also clear that every year we buy more than 30 million tonnes of grain. All the capitalists know this. At the beginning of the year the U.S. Department of Agriculture publishes its own assessment of how much grain we shall be importing. Together with the appropriate main administrations of our ministry, the "Eksportkhleb" Association, and other interested organizations, we regularly hold meetings on the market situation and predict prices quite accurately. We are proposing moving away from rigid planning of purchases by period. If "Eksportkhleb" knows before rather than after the corresponding resolution how much grain it has to buy, then it could conclude contracts in various countries and with smaller companies. This also could create competition and manipulate resources over time, reduce prices, and make freight charges less expensive.

[Baklanov] Are these issues raised at the market meetings?

[Ivashchenko] Of course. Grain imports also are scrutinized by the USSR Procurator's Office, but we are the experts. After the meetings and the scrutinies we write papers to be sent upward and we report that it is impossible to make the purchases. The State Planning Committee [Gosplan], the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee have been informed of this. But the impression is being created that there is simply no point of contact in some places. Perhaps it is that the people in those organizations are changed too often. Is it that some have known about the situation but moved on, and then others arrive who have to learn it all over again? I do not know. But each year it is repeated over and over....

[Baklanov] And now, once again, the ships with the grain are waiting to unload in Novorossiysk....

[Ivashchenko] And in Odessa, and in other ports.

[Baklanov] It is the opinion of some scholars that freight costs could be reduced by reorienting imports somewhat toward high-protein fodders and generally reducing bulk on this basis.

[Ivashchenko] Yes, this is so. But in order to increase purchases of soy, for example, we must first bring the level of the proportions for the price of soybean meal [shrot] and vegetable oil into line with world prices. It is not profitable for our enterprises to process soy because of the low oil yield and low prices for soybean meal on the domestic market. Protein is more highly valued in the West.

It is possible to make major savings of resources by changing market conditions, and even make more money. Last year a unique situation developed in the world market, when a ton of meat cost less than the amount of grain needed to produce that meat.

[Baklanov] Meat cheaper than grain? And how much of this did our businessmen manage to obtain at the lower prices?

[Ivashchenko] None! With the planning system here it is virtually impossible to do this. Even though we submitted an appropriate resolution then, because of harvest shortfalls for corn, they started to slaughter hogs wholesale; this coincided with a Common Market campaign to reduce the numbers of cattle, so that the prices for pork and other kinds of meat declined sharply. This situation lasted about two months. The advantage that we could have taken of this! But we still have to have all the proper papers that have to be sent to the proper place, and it takes half a year to gather together the people capable of making the decisions. Time passed and the situation changed, and suddenly word came down: Buy. In the market, if you want to win you must be constantly ready to take hold of an opportunity.

[Baklanov] That is, be more mobile, more immediate?

[Ivashchenko] In order to make the opportunity a reality, we need a different decisionmaking mechanism. But like other foreign trade associations, "Eksportkhleb" does not even have the right to replace one commodity with another for the sake of commercial advantage. It takes a long time to prove this advantage in the Gosplan and Council of Ministers. Also, while you are proving it, the price relationships change and what was advantageous a week ago becomes a loss.

Perhaps it would be expedient to make use of advantages of the international division of labor. Imports and exports are increasing throughout the world, and so those who can do it obtain more. What is lacking is compensated for with imports. Otherwise there is no question of diversity in the range of goods available (something of which we only dream), nor can there be. Expanding mutually profitable trade would be important for our international positions. We would like to be part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); then we would enjoy the conditions of most-favored-nation status and corresponding opportunities to obtain more hard currency. If we do not join GATT, then we shall find ourselves in a disadvantageous position because of the various quantity quotas for health and other restrictions, and it will be difficult for us to move into the foreign market with agricultural produce and, indeed, with many other goods.

[Baklanov] So what can we propose when we have shortages of everything? What about hides, which we sell off left and right by concluding barter deals?

[Ivashchenko] It is not like that at all. I repeat that we are simply failing to take advantage of the opportunities available on the world market. Yes, we do have a grain shortage, and also shortages of vegetable oil and meat. Does this mean that we should not trade those products? I would say that what is needed now is a reorientation of agricultural philosophy, giving due consideration to traditions and the specific natural and climatic conditions of each region. Attempts to devise a unified concept for the country always have been unsuccessful. We must once and for all give the market the opportunity to bring the agricultural structure into line with nature. In the north it would be necessary to revive commercial sowings of rye and oats as competitive products for which there is always a demand. Oats have the highest rates of demand growth in the world market. If our rye were to be delivered abroad by Aeroflot, not as grain or even baked bread, and we had our own mills and bakeries abroad then it would be possible to gain a permanent segment of the market and earn a strong profit in hard currency.

Perhaps the currency incentive could also help in solving to some extent the problem of bread-baking wheat. We have unique conditions for growing it that exist nowhere else except Canada. But as the director of one of our sovkhozes in Tselinograd Oblast told us, unique strong wheat is being put in one form or another into cattle troughs. But on the world market it costs up to $190 U.S., or 230 Canadian dollars, a ton! If we were to sell it, then with the money so obtained it would be possible to purchase large quantities of high-quality protein fodders and increase milk yields and weight gains. It would be even more profitable to make pasta products from that wheat and sell them, for example, in Finland or Sweden. In general the market for bread-baking wheat will always be there, and it will expand because of population growth in the developing countries. If we had more foodstuffs we would be able to obtain from those countries a great deal of cocoa on a barter or commercial basis, and significantly increase chocolate production. We could buy coffee, good tea, and tropical fruits, for which demand by our population is many times less than in the developed countries.

We have excellent conditions for the sunflower. We are already able to export some expensive sunflower oil and bu inexpensive palm oil to produce margarine, making a solid profit from this barter.

By constantly taking the "pulse" of the market, even with limited opportunities it is possible to trade to the country's advantage. We have had many interesting proposals that, unfortunately, were not realized. A situation has developed on more than one occasion when we have been offered boneless meat even more cheaply than

meat on the bone. Buying this and making savings on the transport and refrigeration costs are all pluses. But the client, in the person of the Ministry of Trade stubbornly refused to buy the boneless meat. Why? I may be mistaken, but the reason for this can be seen in the fact that you do not get a great deal of fat from boned meat. There are proposals whereby it is more profitable to buy the front quarters of a carcass but the client insists only having the rear quarters. When this happens, enormous sums of money are lost but to make up for this everything goes according to the plan.

[Baklanov] So how can such losses be eliminated?

[Ivashchenko] In principle it is not complicated to devise a price mechanism that offers material interest right down the entire chain from trade to the processing enterprises. They could be given complete control over agreeing the product range so that they would import what would be favorable in terms of currency spending. And they would make something from the savings. Then, in my opinion, we would not have to pay excess sums for who knows what. That is first. Second, we shall begin to develop a market that does not have institutional market structures that determine the forms by which the market is organized. With the expansion of foreign economic activity by the enterprises what we have is a certain chaotic, unorganized movement with massive miscalculations and mistakes. We are losing on grain and meat purchases. We are losing on sales on timber and hides, fertilizers, and other products. And we shall lose if everyone acts for himself, encountering in the world market strong concerns, companies, and corporations that have rich experience in business.

We must rather study international experience and adopt it. The Japanese, for example, have formed up-to-date trade and industrial groups. The necessarily include a bank, a large foreign trade company, and a network of enterprises, from cooperatives to processing and marketing enterprises. They are all there in the one complex.

Also, as we create the various associations, we are also taking our first steps to master foreign experience. Literally in October an export-import association to develop the export base was set up under "Eksportkhleb" with very broad aims. It includes "Vneshposyltorg," our institute, and a number of kolkhozes, enterprises, elevator facilities, and construction organizations. It will engage in all kinds of products. "Vneshposyltorg" will help with consumer goods, and "Agropromservis" with equipment. In time we would like this association to become a company that integrates participants in the agro-industrial sector, and perhaps the timber sector of the economy, on a voluntary basis.

In response to an order from the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply [Gossnab], jointly with the G.V. Plekhanov Institute of the National Economy we are doing work to establish a commodity exchange that will to some extent help organize the market as an essential element of its infrastructure. Without an exchange or joint-stock companies, a market economy is impossible. People from the cooperatives, and leaseholders and kolkhoz farmers who are not happy with the state price for their products should know their true price. They need a centralized market where prices would be displayed and fixed, naturally, with a regulating role being played by the state. Work to establish market structures is not simple but it is essential with the switch to economic management methods and closer integration in the world market.

Problems in Railcar Unloading Reported

LD0801205790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 8 Jan 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrades, we are continuing to inform you about the state of affairs on the country's railways. The number of containers delivered to their destinations and not unloaded—for the most part carrying consumer goods—has increased by 15,000 since last Friday when we broadcast a report. You probably recall that the report was recorded at the Moscow Department of the October Railway. The overall number of unloaded railcars has also grown by 5,000. There are especially serious complaints against the recipients of loads in Bashkiriya, Krasnodar Kray, Leningrad, Kuybyshev, Volgograd, and Sverdlovsk Oblasts, and Moscow. Among the union republics, the number of unloaded railcars has increased particularly in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Estonia.

We have been told by the USSR Government that, at the suggestion of the Ministry of Railways, the issue of a five-fold increase in the penalties for the above-normal idling of railcars is being tackled.

Scientific

Mir Cosmonauts Conduct Space Walk 8 Jan

Crew Checks Equipment

LD0801180490 Moscow TASS in English 1749 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS—Soviet cosmonauts Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov working on board the orbital complex "Mir" are preparing to walk out into space. The hatch is to be opened at 22 hours 24 [1924 GMT] minutes Moscow time today. The crew plans to be engaged in extravehicular activity for two and a half hours.

Today is four months since Viktorenko and Serebrov arrived on board the complex.

During their stay in open space, the cosmonauts are to install stellar pickups for guidance by stars. As the complex assumed a new form after Kvant-2 module was

linked up, specialists in the mission control centre attach much importance to the problems of its orientation in space.

The crew has been intensively preparing for work in open space. The cosmonauts checked the necessary equipment. The space suits and the functioning of all the systems were checked.

During the present expedition, the cosmonauts plan five outings into space. During the operation of Mir orbital complex, there were seven outings, with the cosmonauts staying altogether 27 hours 35 minutes outside the vehicle.

The first man to make a space walk was Soviet cosmonaut Aleksey Leonov, now deputy chief of the cosmonauts training centre. He made his space walk in March 1965. A woman, Svetlana Savitskaya, also worked in open space.

3-Hour Space Walk

LD0901025290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0045 GMT 9 Jan 90

[Text] Flight Control Center, 9 Jan (TASS)—In accordance with the flight program of the Mir scientific research complex, Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov have carried out extravehicular activity. The main aim of the extravehicular activity was to mount two stellar sensors intended to increase the accurace of the complex's control system.

On 8 January at 2323 Moscow time [2023 GMT], the cosmonauts opened the external hatch of the transfer compartment and went out onto the station's exterior surface.

The crew took the equipment and the instruments necessary for the assembly into the work area in the scientific devices' compartment of the Kvant astrophysical module. Then the cosmonauts installed the stellar sensors on standard points and connected them to the general circuits of the on-board automatic equipment of the orbital complex.

From the exterior surface of the station, the commander and the flight engineer dismantled test-pieces of various materials which had been exposed for a long time in conditions of open space.

After the completion of the planned work, the cosmonauts returned to the station. The crew were in open space for a total period of 3 hours.

Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov are in good health and feel fine.

Austrian Cosmonauts To Train for Mir Flight

LD0801150890 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] Vienna January 8 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov:

The clock is counting down to the blast off of first Soviet-Austrian flight aboard the Mir station, or so it seems to Cleens Lothaller and Franz Vienboeck, citizens of the Republic of Austria.

These candidates for a space expedition left Vienna today for Moscow. Which of the two astronauts will see the globe and his own homeland from near terrestrial orbit will be decided directly before the launch. There is space for only one additional person in the station.

In Star Township the 26-year-old physician from the Austrian capital and the 29-year-old electrical engineer from Perchtoldsdorf are about to start the main preparations for the flight, scheduled for 1991-92.

Apart from rigorous training, they need to pass an intensive 500-hour Russian language course. Both candidates to become astronauts have already begun to study Russian in Austria and are said to have achieved good results.

"These are the best students we have ever had," one of the teachers proudly told journalists. "Already, they have mastered the rudiments of grammar and the size of their vocabulary enables them to communicate," she added.

Lothaller and Vienboeck were selected out of some 200 citizens of the Republic of Austria who wanted to take part in the joint project named Avstromir. "The selection was conducted thoroughly," said Professor Jajochim Huber, who heads the medical commission. "We proceeded from the belief that the future astronaut should be physically fit and highly intelligent," he said.

"In addition, in zero-gravity conditions, the astronaut must work hard," Otto Zelhofer, a project head from the Austrian side, stressed in a TASS interview. "He will perform 15 large-scale experiments, mostly medical, on the assignment of various universities and other scientific institutions in the country. All of the forthcoming research was agreed upon with Soviet partners," he noted.

"We are very glad to go to the Soviet Union," the astronauts said before departure. "We are sure that the time spent in Star Township will be very useful," Lothaller pointed out. "An interesting program lies ahead and we will not have time to be homesick."

"We hope to find new friends in the USSR," Vieboeck added.

Military

Central Asian, Ural Military Districts Abolished

LD0901104790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0330 GMT 9 Jan 90

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] In the coming year the numbers of the country's Armed Forces will be reduced by more than 185,000 men. Two military districts—the Central Asian and the Ural—have been abolished.

Difficulty Freeing Afghan War POW's Discussed

90UI0251A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 52, 30 Dec 89-5 Jan 90 pp 4-5

[Report on interview with I. Andronov, chairman of the All-Union Association of Families of Prisoners of War, by A. Binev: "The War That Does Not End"]

[Text] **ARGUMENTY I FAKTY is receiving many letters in connection with the release from Afghan captivity of A. Lopukh and V. Prokopchuk. The letters contain requests to tell the truth about the problem of getting POW's released. The readers want to know why the release is going so slowly, how many remain in captivity, and what will happen to them? Our correspondent, A. Binev, met with journalist and public figure I. Andronov, who is chairman of the All-Union Association of Families of POW's.**

[Binev] Iona Ionovich, our readers are surprised that only two POW's were released as a result of the negotiations with the leaders of the mujahidin. Why is a final resolution of this question dragging on?

[Andronov] Because it is naive, in my opinion, to set hopes today, as you expressed yourself, on "a final resolution of this question" without delays, when we ourselves for a period of 8 years of our 9-year participation in the Afghan war did not even publicly mention those of our fellow countrymen who were taken prisoner. Now one of the most powerful ringleaders of the mujahidin—Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—told me frankly: "Yes, they will wring my neck if I free even one of your boys out of mercy." This, overall, is the situation now in Peshawar—the border combat capital of the anarchistic Afghan bandits. There, in negotiations with us, mujahidin leaders in the presence of mothers of Soviet soldiers missing in action, tossed packs of colored photos on the table of mutilated fellow countrymen with torn off extremities and burned faces.

Faruk Azam, the minister of the Peshawar government of the mujahidin, who was conducting the negotiations with me, asserted that of 15 million Afghans in this war, 1 million have perished, and every family still mourns those who have died. Azam lost 17 relatives, and his sister's hands were amputated. In his words, she is filled with indignation by the negotiations with the Russians. Nonetheless, even given such heated passions they still conducted negotiations with us, for most of us were mothers of prisoners. We were not state officials, but a social organization. Our contacts with the Afghan opposition are somewhat of a nonofficial nature.

[Binev] When did this movement start?

[Andronov] The tragic fate of our POW's has been troubling me since the spring of 1981, because at that time, finding myself on the Afghan-Pakistan border, I became acquainted with Viktor Losev, a young lieutenant and interpreter, who was taken prisoner and savagely executed several days after our being acquainted. His headless corpse was subsequently identified only from his clothing. At that time, after other battles, the disfigured bodies of our soldiers who fell prisoner were found with their eyes put out, and with their ears, noses, and genitals cut off.

I ran into a bloody nightmare once again in December 1981 in Islamabad, on the other side of the border, where in those days the headquarters of Yunis Khales, the hetman of the mujahidin, had a tape recording of the voice of a Soviet specialist and adviser by the name of Okhrimyuk, who was kidnapped earlier in Kabul. He pleaded to be saved—to be exchanged for a group of supporters of Hetman Khales who were arrested in Afghanistan. Nothing came of this. The adviser was executed.

The cruel treatment of POW's by the mujahidin resulted in a series of suicides. Thirty-four persons perished in an attempt to escape.

It was not until April 1988 that I was permitted to publicize all of this in the press. By that time it was announced that the last Soviet soldier would leave Afghanistan on 15 February 1989. In the meantime, the first steps of our people's diplomacy suggested the idea that, given the absence of any kind of an international agreement on the return of Soviet captives, there is a way to liberate the prisoners: Persuade the public to assume the role of an intermediary between the mujahidin and Moscow. So in July 1988, I established the "International Committee for the Rescue of Soviet Prisoners in Afghanistan" in New York.

The committee was joined by people of diverse views who were united by the conviction that the death of the prisoners will benefit no one. Besides me, the committee included emigre artist Mikhail Shemyakin, well-known radio talk show commentator Barry Farber, Columbia University teacher Professor Jonathan Sanders, public figure Rabbi Bernard Mandelbaum, writer Robert Massey, the famous Russian Parisian Marina Vladi, Greek art critic Georgiy Kostankis, and the American Jesuit priest Michael Harter.

[Binev] What did your organization do?

[Andronov] We made the first attempt to begin negotiations with the mujahidin. However, everything depended, in the final analysis, on the will of the

Pakistanis who gave shelter in their country to the headquarters, camps, and bases of the mujahidin and who distributed supplies of American weapons among the Afghans. At that time, the Pakistani Government was headed by General Ziaul Haq. We asked him for an entry visa, but we received no answer.

[Binev] In this connection, you decided to go to Moscow and hold a rally, together with the relatives of the POW's in front of the Pakistani Embassy, correct?

[Andronov] Originally, this was the idea of Rabbi Mandelbaum. We adopted it, because we had no other choice.

[Binev] But unpleasantness awaited you in Moscow.

[Andronov] Perhaps, to put it mildly. In July 1988, a "coordinating committee" to assist POW's was established under the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], which in the fall approved our arrival; however, on the eve of the rally—23 November—it was announced that it was not possible to hold it because of an apparent danger of some kind of provocative speeches. The fact is that our action was announced in the press in good time. The rally was scheduled for 24 November—the American Thanksgiving holiday. The cancellation of the rally by the Moscow "coordinating committee" in less than 24 hours caused some embarrassment and displeasure among the Americans that I had brought with me. And the relatives of the POW's who gathered from all over in the capital received no warning or explanation and were left completely to the whim of fate. Special militia squads were awaiting the leaderless crowd. It is quite obvious what this was fraught with. But I, submitting to the decision of the "coordinating committee," could have become a latter-day Father Gapon.

[Binev] Then you broke with the international committee?

[Andronov] It turned out that my American friends at first could not understand the behavior of our "coordinators" at all, and then the Americans intended to leave immediately with me for New York, but, for me, here, at home, this meant only one thing—disgrace forever.

Millions of our television viewers remember this, perhaps due to the television reporting of the program "Vzglyad" [Viewpoint]. The mothers of soldiers, about whose bitter fate almost nothing is known to this day, were weeping in front of the Pakistani Embassy. An embassy official invited us to meet with Ambassador Abdul Sattar. They let three mothers, an "Afghan," and me in. The women, who had just been yelling in the street that they and their sons were betrayed and forgotten, and that there is no one to seek help from, suddenly, in tears, surrounded the foreign ambassador, and they wanted to fall down in front of him on their knees. And here someth.. g amazing happened: The hardened career diplomat, seeing that neither troublemakers, politicians, nor demagogues were facing him, but simply unfortunate mothers, softened, and the cold business-like remoteness left him. Much that was done from that time on was done because of him.

[Binev] Our notion of the mujahidin is that they are bearded, cruel soldiers with eyes that express nothing other than hatred and irreconcilability. To what extent does this correspond to reality?

[Andronov] That is the way it is outwardly. But behind this there are really significant losses in morality. Also, their leaders, as a rule, have a good education: West European, American, or Soviet. Some of them can easily recite the names of our generals under whom they studied in military training schools. Negotiations are being conducted in the English language, but some of them have not forgotten Russian either....

[Binev] Can you name the actual number of prisoners?

[Andronov] I cannot. And no one can. Everything that has been reported in the press so far is very approximate. USSR Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov received us twice and reported that, according to his department's list, 312 soldiers and officers are missing in action. We do not know how many are alive and where they are being held.

[Binev] Were you able to ascertain the status of our POW's?

[Andronov] The prisoners are kept isolated from each other. It is very dangerous to make inquiries about them. In order to escape execution, they almost all are forced to accept Islam. Otherwise, they will be killed as "infidels." In this connection, their names are changed for them. For example, A. Lopukh had the Islamic name Dil-Mamat Khan, and V. Prokopchuk—Abdurakhman.

But we became convinced that the mujahidin are not against an exchange of POW's, and, therefore, a mutual comparison of lists is desirable.

Immediately after returning, in July, we were received by M.S. Gorbachev. Despite his busy schedule, he received us within a day after appealing to him. A telegram was sent from the Kremlin to Kabul with a request to give us the necessary assistance. We soon received a positive answer.

Najibullah announced the readiness of the Afghan side to do everything possible to assist our mission, recognizing its social nature. We were provided a list of 40 persons who were designated for the exchange. And in the nature of an act of "goodwill," the names of another 25 Pakistanis who were arrested for subversive activity.

The Kabul list was rejected by the mujahidin and we were presented another one, consisting of 24 names, of which the first 12 were Arabs. We were told that the mujahidin knew who of the listed people perished, who was missing in action, and who is being held in Kabul. The question of an exchange for our two soldiers will be decided depending on how accurately we screen "dead souls" out of the list.

[Binev] This was a check on your authority?

[Andronov] Unquestionably. The list turned out to be "mined." We immediately sent a telegram to Kabul through Moscow and decided to wait. The situation around us was more than alarming. In addition, during the 2 weeks of waiting, our "fund" moneys ran out, and, without the help of the Soviet fund for peace we would have to return with nothing. And we were there 7 weeks...

[Binev] How did the Pakistani Government crisis affect the negotiations?

[Andronov] In the most indirect way. The negotiations with the mujahidin were stopped on 30 October with apologies on the part of Pakistan. A counter-list of the mujahidin with an answer from Kabul was submitted by them and created a positive impression. It coincided completely with the mujahidin information... However, we had to return to Moscow and to await a stabilization of the situation.

[Binev] Why did a short delay occur in the transfer of Lopukh and Prokopchuk?

[Andronov] A terrorist act was committed in Peshawar with respect to one of the major figures of the "family alliance," and a funeral followed.

[Binev] And what about the transfer of the Kabul prisoners?

[Andronov] It is scheduled for the near future. The mujahidin were the first to release the POW's, demonstrating their trust....

[Binev] Does your activity have any promise?

[Andronov] A very conditional one. Everything will depend on the fulfillment of all of the conditions of the first exchange. Afterwards, we intend to renew the negotiations. By far not all of the leaders of the "alliance" support our agreement. We received captives only from the groups of Sayaf and Geylav. Hekmatyar left the "alliance," and the largest group of our prisoners is in his hands. Ahmad Shakh Masud, whose nickname is the "Lion of Pandzhsher," holds the second group of 20 persons. But he, in general, ignores the Peshawar "alliance." Some commanders hide captives among themselves. This is their "gold fund." It should not be forgotten that Peshawar is a camp of desperate heads, a flammable mixture of seven rebellious groups. Separate negotiations will have to be conducted with some of them.

Officer Decries Turkestan 'Nationalist' Attacks

PM0801123790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Lieutenant Colonel A. Bondarenko article: "On Military Service"]

[Text] The Military Council and FRUNZEVETS newspaper day has been held for the first time among the troops of the Turkestan Military District. The main aims of the meeting were to further expand glasnost, to strengthen unity between the Army and people, and the ties between the troops of the Turkestan Military District and the local population, and to increase the patriotic and international education of predraft-age young people in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan.

Here is what Lieutenant General Aleksandr Imametdinovich Zakharov, member of the Turkestan Military District Military Council and chief of its Political Directorate, said about the event:

"In the atmosphere of expanding democracy and glasnost, nationalist forces and enemies of perestroyka are actively making themselves felt too. They are attacking the party and the Army, casting doubt on the principles of the international and extraterritorial manning of the Soviet Armed Forces, and are even trying to provoke citizens into boycotting the draft."

During the district's Military Council Day a range of organizational, ideological, and mass cultural events were held with a view to propagandizing the honest and conscientious fulfillment by the region's citizens of their constitutional duty, and to strengthening ties between servicemen, their family members, and the local population.

Extra Effort Urged During New Training Year

PM0801124590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Colonel G. Miranovich, editor of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Ground Forces Combat Training Department: "Let Us Not Waste Time. New Training Year Begins in Army and Navy"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Probably in no other sphere of military cadres' activity do officers have such opportunities to assert what we have always considered sacred—the concepts of valor and honor—as in the sphere of combat and political training. In this area everyone can demonstrate professionalism, industriousness, honesty, firmness of conviction, and the ability to work with people. So let us not waste time. We will not be able to make people embellish officers' valor and honor if we fail to struggle from the first day of training for high quality in every exercise, every field maneuver, every flight, every voyage, and every combat standby duty.

Nor should we fail to take account of the fact that the tasks facing the Armed Forces in the training year that is beginning will have to be resolved under complex conditions. There is the increase in pacifist sentiments among young people. There are the attempts by certain forces to falsify military history and discredit military service. There is the weakening of the population's military-patriotic education. All these are realities which

cannot be brushed aside. In this situation a great deal will depend particularly on our activeness, persistence, and purposefulness in asserting the new approaches dictated by perestroyka to the questions of military building and troop and naval force training.

There are probably hardly any officers who would not comprehend this. Nonetheless, here are a few lines from a letter received on the eve of the start of the training year. "Everybody talks very often about improving combat readiness," Junior Sergeant O. Medvedev, section commander in the Baltic Military District, writes to the editorial office. "But sometimes people are confused about how to solve issues associated with this." And he goes on to state that in his company there are mortars which nobody has ever used because there are no charges for them. The servicemen appealed to the division commander about it, but received no meaningful reply.

What can we say about this? Obviously, after reading these lines, the commander of the division in which the junior sergeant serves will find an opportunity to explain to people just what is going on. But all of us would do well to remember that while the arguments continue about what kind of Army we should have, people judge what kind of Army we do have not least by our deeds and actions. And the Army's prestige, like the prestige of the officer corps itself, which various forums are currently so concerned about, should not be seen in isolation from those empty mortars, much less from our own incompetence, pedagogical inadequacies, moral insensitivity, and other vices which—let us be honest—abound in our environment.

And concepts such as the prestige of the Army and Navy and the level of their training are even more inseparable. [passage omitted]

A great many things will have to be redone and rebuilt, not just in the Army, in order to ensure that military people—if the state still needs them—feel really military. However, we will not obtain what we want from the Armed Forces by creating new structures, banning the use of combat sub-units for diverse purposes, or through other organizational measures unless everyone in their own area struggles for their prestige. We should remember this truth today if only because up to 40 percent of officers only received a satisfactory rating for last year's results. Isn't this a warning to put more into our work? There is no time to waste. The new training year—the 45th anniversary of our Great Victory—is under way. Let us use the marvelous opportunities that perestroyka offers each officer to realize our abilities, inclinations, and talents as fully as possible.

Poor State of New Floating Dock Criticized

PM0801143390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Reader's letter from Captain Second Class V. Gorlov: "From the Slipway to...the Repair Yard"]

[Text] A few weeks ago I took command of the floating drydock *Anadyr*, which was commissioned by the Navy in the fall of 1988. I ought to have been happy about the appointment: It was a new vessel—ultramodern, as they say—with a high level of automation. But in actual fact, the state of this expensive vessel makes me bitter and confused. How could it have been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent? All the auxiliary boilers and some machinery, devices, and systems are out of action. The *Anadyr* is incapable of putting to sea under its own steam or of providing heating while moored. It is useless putting questions to the floating dock's former commander—Captain Second Class A. Korotkov, from whom I am taking over—nothing will be put right that way any more. In any case, who is responsible for what has happened if the vessel is intended for the Pacific Fleet but based in the Baltic? Too many cooks spoil the broth, and no mistake.... A vessel which left the shipyard 1 year ago already needs at least a medium-level overhaul.

Leaders Sign General Kurochkin's Obituary

PM0801151790

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 January 1990 Second Edition carries on page 8 under the headline "Army General Pavel Alekseyevich Kurochkin" an obituary of Army Gen P.A. Kurochkin simlar to that carried by TASS and signed by the following military and politica! leaders:

M.S. Gorbachev, V.I. Vorotnikov, L.N. Zaykov, V.A. Ivashko, V.A. Kryuchkov, Ye.K. Ligachev, Yu.D. Maslyukov, V.A. Medvedev, N.I. Ryzhkov, N.N. Slyunkov, E.A. Shevardnadze, A.N. Yakovlev, A.P. Biryukova, A.V. Vlasov, A.I. Lukyanov, Ye.M. Primakov, B.K. Pugo, G.P. Razumovskiy, D.T. Yazov, O.D. Baklanov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, A.D. Lizichev, A.S. Pavlov, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, A.N. Yefimov, V.N. Chernavin, M.I. Sorokin, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, D.S. Sukhorukov, Yu.A. Yashin, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, S.K. Kurkotkin, N.V. Ogarkov, V.I. Petrov, S.L. Sokolov, I.G. Pavlovskiy, I.N. Shkadov, V.N. Konchits.